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The Social Science Approach to International Law 
Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton† & Tom Ginsburg‡ 
Abstract 
 
For over a hundred years, scholars have argued that international law should be studied 
using a “scientific” approach. Throughout the twentieth century, however, the most prominent 
methods used to study international law primarily consisted of different theoretical and analytical 
claims about how international law should be developed, interpreted, and critiqued. It is only in 
the first two decades of the twenty-first century that the conventional social science approach to 
research—identifying a specific question, developing hypotheses, using a research design to test 
those hypotheses based on some form of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting 
conclusions, all while acknowledging the assumptions upon which these conclusions are based and 
the level of uncertainty associated with the results—became widely used by scholars of 
international law. International law research using the social science approach has been notably 
more normatively restrained, empirically informed, and skeptical than past international law 
scholarship. This Essay describes the rise of the social science approach and advocates for its 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
At the start of the twentieth century, in 1908, the American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) published an article by Lassa Oppenheim titled “The 
Science of International Law: Its Task and Method.”1 In the article, Oppenheim 
argued that there was a distinctive science of international law, but that too many 
students of the subject went to “work without a proper knowledge of the task of 
our science, without knowing how to make use of the assertions of authorities, 
and without the proper views for the valuation and appreciation of the material at 
hand.”2 Oppenheim further argued that there are seven “tasks to which our 
science must devote itself . . . : Exposition of the existing rules of law, historical 
research, criticism of the existing law, preparation of codification, distinction 
between the old customary and the new conventional law, fostering of arbitration, 
and popularization of international law.”3 After discussing how each of these tasks 
could be addressed scientifically, Oppenheim concluded by arguing that there was 
only one appropriate method to apply to those tasks—what he dubbed the 
“positive method”—which he claimed, “can successfully be applied only by those 
workers who are imbued with the idealistic outlook on life and matters.”4 
At the end of the twentieth century, in 1999, AJIL hosted a symposium on 
the then-prevailing methods to study international law.5 The organizers, 
Professors Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, began by noting that there 
had been major developments in the science of international law in the nine 
decades since the publication of Oppenheim’s article.6 Most notably, they argued 
that the scope of international affairs regulated by international law had expanded 
dramatically, and at the same time, the scope of methods used to study 
international law correspondingly dramatically expanded.7 The Symposium then 
highlighted seven methods that the organizers believed to “represent the major 
methods of international legal scholarship” at the time: legal positivism, the New 
Haven School, international legal process, critical legal studies, international law 
and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and economics.8 
Prominent scholars associated with each of these methods wrote essays explaining 
 
1  L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (1908).  
2  Id. at 314.  
3  Id.  
4  Id. at 355.  
5  Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for 
Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999). 
6  Id. at 291. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. at 293. 
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their approach and its value.9 The organizers specifically asked each scholar to 
apply their method to analyze the same open question in international law: what 
is the responsibility of individuals for human rights violations in non-international 
armed conflicts?10 Although a few of the methods highlighted by the Symposium 
quickly fell out of favor,11 other prominent methods were excluded,12 and at least 
one of the world’s most prominent international law scholars pointedly refused to 
participate.13 The Symposium can still be seen as a snapshot of common 
approaches to international law roughly twenty years ago. 
Although there were certainly major changes in the study of international 
law in the ninety-one years between Oppenheim’s article and Ratner and 
Slaughter’s Symposium, it is remarkable that they share two core assumptions 
about the purpose of international law research. First, neither project considered 
 
9  Id. at 298. 
10  Id. at 295. 
11  For example, as far as we can identify, the only published articles that have mentioned or referenced 
the New Haven School since 2000 described the approach but did not actually use it themselves. 
See Halil Rahman Basaran, Sovereign Immunity, Quo Vadis?, 27 N.Y. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2014); 
Christian Lee González, Note, Law As A Means to Human Flourishing: Law, Morality, and Natural Law 
in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 14 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289 (2019). One article claims 
that there is a New-New Haven School: Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: 
Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007). For classic 
papers using the New Haven approach, see Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 
102 (1952); HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (1992). In contrast, “International Legal Process” was a 
label that evolved out of the eponymous school in American legal thought and is still deployed 
today. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999). 
For example, since 2010, 284 articles on Westlaw have used the term “International Legal Process,” 
as of mid-May 2021. See WESTLAW, 
https://www.westlaw.com/SharedLink/a985462a609647a581444c0a221f03bc?VR=3.0&RS=cblt
1.0. Classic studies include ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1974) and ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). 
12  For example, the Symposium ignored approaches that were vital at the time, chiefly Marxism and 
the just-emerging Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). This was noted at the 
time in a letter from Henry Richardson to the editors. Henry J. Richardson, III, Letter to the Editor, 
94 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 99 (2000) (expressing disappointment that perspectives of “people of color” 
were not represented). See generally B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A 
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1st ed. 1993) (articulating an integrated Marxist 
approach to international law); James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its 
Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011) (tracing TWAIL’s 
contemporary origins in the late 1990s). See also James Thuo Gathii, The Promise of International Law: 
A Third World View, Grotius Lecture Presented at the 2020 Virtual Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/26YB-5KAZ (arguing that 
international law scholars need to go outside the current beltway of the discipline). 
13  The AJIL’s designated representative of critical legal studies, the eminent Finnish scholar Martti 
Koskenniemi, completely refused to answer the question posed, and characterized the whole horse-
race exercise as reflecting “the logic of consumer capitalism.” Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the 
Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (1999). 
The Social Science Approach Abebe, Chilton & Ginsburg 
Summer 2021 5 
the possibility that the “science” of international law should be a conventional 
social science. Instead, both projects mainly conceived of “methods” as a set of 
assumptions and theoretical claims that should be leveraged by scholars trying to 
understand international legal obligations.14 Second, both projects viewed 
international legal scholarship as an enterprise focused on studying the substantive 
obligations of international law. That is, both projects understood the tasks of 
international legal scholarship to be writing about how international law should 
be developed, interpreted, and critiqued. Using the distinction made famous by 
H.L.A. Hart, both projects primarily adopted an “internal” view of international 
law—that is, an approach that, whether descriptive or normative, is at its core a 
doctrinal exercise—as opposed to an “external” view of international law—that 
is, an approach that examines the law from outside, seeking to explain how it came 
to be or what its consequences might be in the real world.15 
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, both of these 
assumptions have been cast aside as a new generation of international legal 
scholars have applied conventional social science methods to study external 
questions about international law. By conventional methods of social science, we 
refer to a research approach that involves clearly stating a research question, 
developing hypotheses, using a research design to test those hypotheses based on 
some form of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting conclusions, all while 
acknowledging the assumptions upon which they are based and the level of 
uncertainty associated with those results. By external approach, we mean that 
instead of arguing about topics like the best way to interpret treaties, these scholars 
have studied topics like why countries sign treaties or the effect that signing 
treaties has on behavior. These scholars have spent less time arguing about topics 
like the merits of realism or constructivism, and more time arguing about topics 
like the best way to empirically assess whether human rights treaties improve 
human rights outcomes. 
In this Essay, we document the rise of the social science approach to 
international law, explain the basics of the method, and advocate for its continued 
adoption. Our goal is to explain and advocate for an existing approach to 
researching international law that focuses on testing hypotheses about how 
international law works in practice. We endorse the study of external questions 
about international law. But by describing the social science approach to 
international law, we do not intend to restart a new debate about terms, labels, or 
 
14  See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012) (“The tendency, until recently, for international legal scholarship to be aloof to 
empirical methods is reflected in the concept of ‘method’ used in the AJIL’s 1999 Symposium on 
Method in International Law. Not one contribution in the symposium addressed method in a social 
science sense, suggesting a significant gap between legal and social science scholarship. Rather, the 
alternative ‘methods’ all involved theoretical and analytical claims.”). 
15  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1st ed. 1961).  
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schools. We are quite happy, in fact, that researchers in this field no longer have 
to expend any time figuring out if they would like to be known as a realist, 
constructivist, or some other “-ist.” Instead, our intent with writing this Essay is 
to hopefully complete the move away from these kind of labels by pointing out 
that it is possible to be an international law scholar without committing oneself to 
any assumptions, theories, or philosophies beyond those required of any other 
social science researcher. 
Before continuing, it is important to clarify the scope of our argument. First, 
we are not the first to document the emergence of this line of international law 
scholarship. Simply put, this line of research is not a well-kept secret; it has been 
published by leading scholars in prominent journals for at least twenty years.16 
Moreover, the basic outlines of the social science approach to international law 
were discussed at least as early as 2005 when Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner 
called for a “New International Law Scholarship,”17 and the research produced by 
this movement has been the subject of several review essays.18 Over the last few 
years, the trend towards social science research of international law has continued, 
but in addition to the quantity of scholarship increasing, so has the quality. There 
have been major projects to collect and code new datasets of the contents of 
international law,19 as well as to incorporate research methods that make the causal 
 
16  To provide a sense of the relative weights of these different fields over time, we looked at 
Certificates of Merit given by the American Society of International Law for books published since 
1990. Each year, the Society gives three awards: (1) for a “preeminent contribution to creative 
scholarship”; (2) in “a specialized area of international law”; and (3) for “high technical 
craftsmanship and utility to practicing lawyers and scholars.” Honors and Awards, AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L., https://perma.cc/73SQ-5EZA. For example, in 2020, in addition to the volume on feminist 
judgements, other Certificates of Merit were given to a technical volume that provides an internal 
view of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a volume on the treatment of international 
organizations using the analogy to states. Our categorization of the books earning the awards since 
1990 suggests that 15 of 96 have been awarded to projects that are social science in nature. Past 
Recipients, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://perma.cc/LL8X-ZZ6C (categorization of recipients’ work 
on file with authors).  
17  Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Response, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 463 (2006). 
18  For reviews of empirical literature on the effectiveness of international law, see Beth Simmons, 
Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010); Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 
14; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human Rights, 51 J. PEACE RES. 273 (2014); Kevin 
L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Response, Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 459 (2016); Adam S. Chilton, Experimentally Testing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, 
18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 164 (2017); Kevin L. Cope, Cosette D. Creamer & Mila Versteeg, Empirical Studies 
of Human Rights Law, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 155 (2019); Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos, 
Preferences and Compliance with International Law, THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. (forthcoming 2021). 
19  See, e.g., BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLAINING 
AGREEMENT DESIGN (2016). 
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estimates produced by this research more credible.20 Our goal is, thus, not to 
identify new trends that have not previously been documented; instead, it is to 
more fully describe and justify this social science approach than prior efforts. 
Second, we do not believe the social science approach is the only useful way 
to study international law. Instead, there are many other valid approaches to 
studying international law, many of which we have previously used ourselves. 
Social science approaches to international law should instead be understood as 
one way to do research that scholars should embrace when appropriate to the 
research question at hand. 
Third, the social science approach to researching international law is not a 
single method. Instead, scholars have used many methods taking a social science 
approach to international legal scholarship, including the use of large-N 
observational data,21 text analysis,22 survey experiments,23 field experiments,24 and 
qualitative field research.25 However, although the research designs and data used 
by these methods differ, the basic approach to research used by all these 
methods—defining research questions, developing hypotheses, using data to test 
those hypotheses, etc.—is the same. 
Fourth, we are not unbiased observers of the trends we are describing. We 
all have a background in international law and political science, and we are thus 
advocating for the continued use of the methods that we have used throughout 
our academic careers. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Section II provides a thumbnail sketch 
of the developments in international legal scholarship during the twentieth century 
that set the stage for the social science approach to become more prominent in 
the twenty-first century. Section III then describes the basics of the social science 
 
20  See, e.g., Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration, J. LEGAL STUD. 
(forthcoming).  
21  See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the United States 
Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201 (2014); Pierre-Hughes Verdier & Erik Voeten, 
Precedent, Compliance and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 389 (2014); Pierre-Hughes Verdier & Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An 
Empirical Investigation, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 514 (2015); Julian Nyarko, Giving the Treaty a Purpose: 
Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 54 (2019). 
22  See, e.g., Julian Nyarko & Jerome Hsiang, Conforming Against Expectations: The Formalism of Non-Lawyers 
at the WTO, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 341 (2019); Cree Jones & Weijia Rao, Sticky BITs, 61 HARV. J. INT’L 
L. 357 (2020). 
23  See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An 
Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014); Anton Strezhnev, Beth A. Simmons & Matthew 
D. Kim, Rulers or Rules? International Law, Elite Cues and Public Opinion, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1281 (2019). 
24  See, e.g., Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielsen & J.C. Sharman, Using Field Experiments in International 
Relations: A Randomized Experiment of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT’L ORG. 657 (2013).  
25  See, e.g., GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE 
WORLD BANK (2012).  
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approach to research and explains several ways this approach differs from prior 
efforts to study international law. Section IV concludes. 
II.  A  THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
Many articles have documented the evolution of international law 
scholarship, and a full accounting is beyond the scope of this Essay. But, broadly 
speaking, since Oppenheim’s call for greater scientific rigor in the study of 
international law in 1908, there have been two main sources of influence on the 
evolution of scholarship in this area: (1) the real-world problems that international 
law was asked to address and (2) broader research trends in the academy. These 
real-world problems generated new questions and debates that social science 
research methods were suitable to answer, and the broader research trends in the 
academy integrated international legal scholarship more directly with the empirical 
revolutions taking place across relevant fields, including international relations and 
public law. We discuss each of these trends in turn. 
A.  Real-World Problems 
In the United States, international legal scholarship has been closely linked 
with legal practice, at least since Secretary of State Elihu Root founded the 
American Society of International Law in 1906.26 Perhaps even more so than other 
disciplines within the legal academy, scholarship and advocacy were mutually 
reinforcing in international law scholarship. Advocates would write academic 
articles supporting litigation positions, and in many cases in the explicit interest of 
their national governments. As a result, international legal scholarship has been 
closely influenced by key events in international affairs. 
Since 1908, the international community has experienced three major 
transformational moments, after which it has turned to law to solve problems. 
Those moments followed major global conflict: World War I, World War II, and 
the Cold War. After each of these conflicts, new international agreements were 
drafted, and new international institutions were established. Each set of new 
agreements and institutions was greeted with hope, but soon politics intervened 
again, and expectations were diminished. 
First, after World War I, the League of Nations was established along with 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. These institutions consolidated an 
earlier round of developments that began with the Hague Peace Conference of 
1899 and reflected a new optimism that international organizations could help 
secure peace. War was outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in 1928, reflecting 
 
26  ASIL History, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://perma.cc/Y5TK-2RJZ. 
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great faith in the power of law to help states beat swords into plowshares.27 We 
know, of course, how this era of liberalism ended. It was pilloried by E.H. Carr in 
his classic The Twenty Years’ Crisis, which was published just as the world descended 
again into war.28 
Second, in the aftermath of World War II, new problems of international 
organization came to the fore. Notably, the United Nations was established, and 
almost immediately, it became the repository of many hopes for a more peaceful 
future. The Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund—were established to stabilize the international monetary system, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was promulgated to regulate 
international trade, human rights discourse flowered, and the Geneva 
Conventions were revived and expanded to codify the laws of war. Many 
international legal scholars actively participated in the drafting of these agreements 
and the establishment of these organizations. In fact, the law of international 
organizations emerged as a distinct field.29 Additionally, the emergence of new 
nations in the process of decolonization led to important debates on sovereignty 
and the role of capital. It is worth noting that, despite the initial hope during this 
period, by the mid-1960s, international lawyers often expressed frustration at the 
inability of law to constrain power.30 
Third, the aftermath of the Cold War marked a new era for international 
relations, and for international legal scholarship as well. American hegemony and 
the end of the Cold War breathed new life into international institutions, just as it 
had at the end of World War II and, to a lesser extent, World War I. The U.N. 
Security Council’s formal authorization of the first Iraq war, the most significant 
military conflict that had occurred since the Korean War, suggested that the U.N. 
Charter’s collective security regime might have some new life.31 Enthusiasts of 
globalization produced a whole series of new agreements to facilitate trade, 
including the institutionalization of the World Trade Organization.32 The 
European Union’s integration project, which had been revitalized by the 1987 
 
27  OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO 
OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017). 
28  See generally EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS: 1919–1939: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1st ed. 1939). 
29  See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994); G. G. Fitzmaurice 
(Special Rapporteur), Law of Treaties, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 104, 108, U.N. Doc 
A/CN.4/101 (describing four constituent elements of international organizations). To be sure, 
international organizations had existed well before World War II, but their number and scope 
expanded dramatically thereafter. Madeline Herren, International Organizations 1865–1945, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK INT’L ORG. (Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd & Ian Johnstone, eds., 2016). 
30  See generally WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1964). 
31  S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
32  Richard Steinberg, The Uruguay Round: A Legal Analysis of the Final Act, 6 INT’L Q. 1 (1994). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 10 Vol. 22 No. 1 
Single European Act, deepened with the 1992 Maastricht Agreement.33 A network 
of bilateral investment treaties began to expand toward the end of the decade. 
Together, this meant the rapid legalization of international economic life.34 
During the 1990s, a desire to respond to mass atrocities also led to the 
development of new international institutions. The ad hoc criminal tribunals for 
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia presaged developments of “hybrid” efforts in 
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon. And the 1998 Rome Statute set up a 
permanent International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over citizens of states 
that had not consented to the agreement.35 Meanwhile, new efforts at nation-
building and trusteeship involved the U.N. deeply in problems of administration, 
in which it managed states coming out of conflict.36 
The new international agreements and institutions created by these three 
transformational moments all produced new directions in international legal 
scholarship.37 For example, the expansion of international economic law through 
new trade and investment rules created thriving and technical fields of legal 
research.38 Similarly, the expansion of international tribunals created academic 
research programs like the Project on International Courts and Tribunals, which 
cataloged some twenty-five international tribunals.39 Many of these involved what 
Karen Alter called the “New Terrain” of International Law, in parts of the world 
far from Europe and North America.40 These tribunals were of course agents of 
further legalization and judicialization.41 In turn, theorists anticipated that 
 
33  Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Maastricht Treaty: Creating the European Union, in OXFORD 
RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA POL. (2019). 
34  Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006). 
35  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
36  See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE BUILDING (2004). 
37  As just one small example, the journal International Organization produced scholarship focused on 
the legalization of world politics to explore how law influenced the activities of international 
institutions and organizations. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 
INT’L ORG. 385 (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG 401 
(2000). 
38  See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 
(2006); Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010); Mark Wu, 
The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261 (2016).  
39  The Project on International Courts and Tribunals, in THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS (Ruth Mackenzie et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
40  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).  
41  See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 
(2002).  
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judicialization might mean the expansion of governance, with a virtuous cycle of 
governance by law.42 
B.  Trends in the Academy 
Beyond the impact of these major world events, international legal 
scholarship was also influenced by developments in adjacent academic subjects 
and disciplines. As international law became more important, political scientists 
and international relations theorists became interested in it.43 During the Cold War 
period, scholars of the realist school were able to describe international law as 
“epiphenomenal,” since it did not seem to have much bearing on the major 
international relations questions of the day.44 The claim became harder to defend 
when states were voluntarily legalizing their international relationships at a rapid 
pace. To understand these developments, scholars turned to newly revived 
institutionalist approaches in the social sciences and integrated these into law.45 
The institutionalist turn in the social sciences happened just as the fall of the Soviet 
Union shifted attention away from ideology as the core target of political and 
sociological analysis, and after the cycle of behaviorism that had dominated some 
fields in the preceding decades had run its course.46 
Institutionalism stood for the idea that individual agents were embedded in 
broader institutional structures and that these structures “mattered,” meaning they 
shaped outcomes. While various disciplines adopted slightly different approaches 
to the study of institutions, a concise and influential formulation among 
economists and political scientists was that institutions demand attention because 
 
42  See generally Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD. 
147 (1999).  
43  Social science approaches to international law initially focused on connecting with international 
relations theory. This literature featured a set of stylized schools—realist, institutionalist, 
constructivist—that put forth grand propositions about the possibilities of cooperation. See, e.g., 
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and 
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (1996). 
44  See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1994–
1995) (describing law as epiphenomenal).  
45  See generally JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). A 
fundamental contribution for international law is ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (2d ed. 2005). 
46  Behaviorism had emphasized the study of observable and quantifiable behavior as opposed to 
formal rules and institutions and tended to focus on the individual decision-maker. One can see 
traces of this in the New Haven School approach with “decision” as the central explanandum. The 
focus was on providing a formula for the authoritative international decision-maker to optimize, 
weighing the various policy-oriented considerations. See generally LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra 
note 11. 
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they are the rules of the game that structure behavior.47 Whether deployed by 
political scientists, sociologists, or economists, institutionalism emphasized 
collective structures, and this represented a paradigm shift away from behaviorism 
as the object of scientific inquiry. Institutionalism fit easily with law, as a social 
device that explicitly provides rule of the game, and so spurred much work on 
international law. 
A major development in this field during the 1990s was the development of 
a liberal school of international relations and international law. Starting with a 
positive observation about state behavior, namely that liberal states tended to 
observe their promises to each other, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter drew on 
the economic insight that law served as a commitment device.48 By providing a 
way of imposing costs over time, law made promises more credible, and thus more 
valuable. States that tied their hands through law could cooperate more easily 
across borders. 
This scholarship combined positive and normative analysis and sought to 
move international law in a direction that was more protective of individual 
interests and human rights.49 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
bombing of the former Yugoslavia to protect Kosovar Albanians in 1999 was a 
major development in that it purported to reach into the borders of a sovereign 
state to protect a persecuted population. Some international lawyers argued that it 
marked an evolution in the regime governing the use of force.50 In the words of 
the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, the invasion by NATO 
had been “illegal but legitimate.”51 The next year the Canadian government 
 
47  See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990) (describing an alternative approach to institutionalism in sociology that 
attacked rational choice theory and sought to focus on social, cultural, and organizational forces 
that shaped behavior). See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
45 (describing another approach, historical institutionalism, that traced path dependencies and 
critical junctures over time). 
48  See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS (2000); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in PASSIONS & 
CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134 (1995).  
49  For example, Slaughter supported projects like the International Criminal Court and the doctrine 
of a Responsibility to Protect, which would justify international intervention as a last resort in 
situations of mass atrocity. She was a central figure in the formation of the Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction, which promised to hold perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable before 
national courts. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES 
ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001), https://perma.cc/S559-TCTM.   
50  See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM 
AFTER KOSOVO (2001); Ralph Zacklin, Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention, 
41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 923 (2001); Emily Schroeder, Note, The Kosovo Crisis: Humanitarian Imperative Versus 
International Law, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 179 (2004); Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743 (2000).  
51  THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000). 
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established the International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty, 
which coined the phrase the “responsibility to protect.”52 
However, the liberal school’s project began to flounder with the 
circumstances of the second Iraq war. The idea that liberal states complied with 
international law was hard to maintain with the American invasion, unsupported 
as it was by a U.N. Security Council Resolution or any viable claim of self-defense 
under international law. Instead, it looked like an example of what Detlev Vagts 
called “hegemonic international law,” in which the sole superpower ignored basic 
rules of the international legal order.53 
During this time, several approaches to international legal scholarship that 
rejected many of the assumptions of past research emerged. Notably, Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner published The Limits of International Law, which argued 
that international law should be better understood as endogenous to state 
preferences instead of as an exogenous constraint on state behavior.54 In a world 
of independent nation-states, cooperation was possible, but only in response to 
particular conditions. Using game theory, Goldsmith and Posner laid out these 
conditions, while arguing against utopian and idealistic views.55 
A separate set of critiques of prior approaches came from a different 
academic direction, namely the emergence and expansion of critical legal studies 
and connected scholarly movements. Critical legal studies was a scholarly 
movement in American legal academia that became prominent in the late 1970s, 
utilizing techniques of deconstruction to show the indeterminacy of law. In the 
case of international law, this was not a particularly hard project. But critical 
scholars took as their aim some of the liberal pieties about rights and remedies. 
David Kennedy’s The Dark Sides of Virtue was one particularly pointed example.56 
The emphasis was on exposing the internal contradictions of others rather than 
building up an affirmative program. 
Additionally, feminist legal theory began to play an important role in the 
early 1990s for international lawyers. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and 
Shelly Wright applied the general approaches of feminist legal theory to 
 
52 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
(2001). 
53  Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001).  
54  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
55  The reaction to Goldsmith and Posner’s book from traditional international lawyers was notably 
critical. See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Book Review, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 106 (2005); Paul Schiff 
Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (reviewing 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 54). See generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND 
PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
56  DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). 
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international law, by looking at the actual impact of doctrines on women.57 They 
tied the feminine voice to the voice of the non-Western world, with both being 
examples of what would be called the “subaltern” in other parts of the academy. 
A number of scholars have followed in articulating a feminist approach to 
international law.58 For example, last year’s ASIL Certificate of Merit for Creative 
Scholarship went to Feminist Judgments in International Law.59 This work is part of a 
broader line of legal scholarship, rewriting judicial opinions in many areas of law 
from a feminist perspective.60 The feminist work originated with a theoretical 
insight and is clearly a normative project that has had some success, informing 
several developments in international criminal law.61 
Another line of critical work emerged with Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL), a field that began to consolidate with the publication 
of Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law in 
2004.62 This was a historical look at the deep links between modern international 
law and European colonialism. TWAIL scholars focused on international law’s 
close entwinement with imperialism, arguing that the connection was not just 
limited to the classical era but is continually being re-enacted today. This is an 
external view that emphasizes power and history and is increasingly popular: a 
TWAIL Law Review has just been launched.63 In this vein, we have also seen a 
recent push for a Critical Race Theory approach to international law.64 
There has also been a “historical turn” among other critical scholars. 
Koskenniemi’s ambitious project is central to this enterprise.65 Taking 
international legal argument as his object, Koskenniemi’s two major volumes have 
laid out a critical history of international law as a “Gentle Civilizer of Nations.”66 
 
57  Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991).  
58  See generally Karen Knop & Annelise Riles, Space, Time, and Historical Injustice: A Feminist Conflict-of-
Laws Approach to the “Comfort Women” Settlement, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 853 (2017); Anne Orford, 
Feminism, Imperialism, and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275 (2002).  
59  FEMINIST JUDGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers eds., 2019); see 
Honors and Awards, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 16. 
60  FEMINIST JUDGEMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn & Erika 
Rackley eds., 2010). 
61  See, e.g., Navanethem Pillay, Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim, 42 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 459 
(2009). 
62  ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
63  TWAILR: THIRD WORLD APPROACHES INT’L L. REV., https://perma.cc/E979-HGG5. 
64  See generally Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2019); Makau Matua, 
Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000). 
65  Anne Orford, International Law and the Limits of History, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS: 
READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 297, 297 (Wouter Werner, Marieke de Hoon & Alexis Galan eds., 
2017). 
66  MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2001). 
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Anne Orford has similarly sought to approach history from the perspective of a 
sociologist of knowledge, drawing on Foucault.67 
Finally, several scholars, including many of those using historical 
approaches, began to look away from the traditional European roots of 
international law. Emblematic here is the Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law, which importantly sought to decenter Europe in the history of 
the discipline.68 Scholars from Asia such as Yasuaki Onuma sought to lay out 
alternative framings,69 while other scholars sought to recover how international 
law was encountered by societies outside the European core. Arnulf Becker 
Lorca’s book Mestizo International Law was an important contribution in this 
regard.70 This non-Western turn was also embodied in the work of Emilia Justyna 
Powell on Islamic Law,71 a major edited volume on the Bandung Conference,72 
and Anthea Roberts’ book, Is International Law International?, which uses an 
empirical approach to answer the question decidedly in the negative.73 And 
China’s rise has given impetus to work articulating a Chinese view of the field, 
including an English-language Chinese Journal of International Law.74 
As this brief discussion illustrates, broad academic trends—for instance, 
toward institutional analysis in the social sciences and critical theory in law, and 
away from Europe in history—have all affected the progression of international 
legal scholarship. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL SCIENCE  
Both the real-world developments in international relations and the 
incorporation of theories from other legal subjects and academic disciplines 
moved international legal scholarship toward social science. As Shaffer and 
Ginsburg documented almost a decade ago, international law subsequently took 
an empirical turn, and broad debates about the efficacy of law have been replaced 
by the study of conditional effects, examining where and when law is effective.75 
 
67  ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (forthcoming June 2021).  
68  OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters 
eds., 2012). 
69  ONUMA YASUAKI, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL WORLD (2017).  
70  ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). 
71  EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL, ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF 
DISPUTES (2020).  
72  BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES 
(Luis Eslava et al. eds., 2017).  
73  ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). 
74  CHINESE J. INT’L L., https://perma.cc/U3BX-J876. See also CONGYAN CAI, THE RISE OF CHINA 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TAKING CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM SERIOUSLY (2019). 
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In this essay, we go one step further and argue that it is not just the case that 
international legal research has become increasingly empirical. Instead, a growing 
body of research treats international law as a subject to be studied using the 
conventional approach to social sciences. 
A. The Basics  
The basic social science approach to research is based on the scientific 
method. Simply put, a researcher hoping to gain new knowledge about the world 
begins by identifying a specific research question. For instance, one research 
question that has consumed a great deal of attention in international legal circles 
is whether signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) leads to increased 
investment flows between the countries that sign them.76 
After identifying the research question, the next step is to develop a specific 
hypothesis that can be empirically assessed. A hypothesis in a social science 
framework stipulates a possible empirical relationship between two or more 
variables. For our BITs example, one hypothesis a researcher may be interested in 
testing is whether signing BITs increases investment flows between the countries 
that sign them. Alternatively, the hypothesis may put forth a conditional theory in 
some way. For example, a hypothesis may be that BITs only increase investments 
when they are signed by large countries with pre-existing investment flows. 
Relatedly, as part of specifying the hypothesis, the research specifies a null 
hypothesis (typically that there is no relationship between the variables of interest) 
and identifies the conditions under which the null hypothesis is rejected. Or, put 
another way, the researcher identifies the conditions under which the research can 
claim support for the hypothesis. 
Next, the researcher identifies a research design and data that will make it 
possible to assess the validity of their hypothesis. This research design should 
ideally make it possible, under a set of clearly articulated assumptions, to provide 
direct evidence to prove or disprove the hypothesis. For instance, a basic research 
design that could be used to test the effect of BITs on investments may involve 
collecting data on bilateral investment flows between all countries over a given 
period, and then comparing the change in investment between pairs of countries 
that signed a BIT in a given year to other pairs of countries that did not. That said, 
a problem with this research design is that evidence that BITs are associated with 
higher investment flows may not be enough to claim that the BITs cause those 
higher flows. This is because other factors may have caused both the signing of 
the BIT and the changes of investment. Ideally then, a research design would make 
 
76  See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do BITs ‘Work’? Empirical Evidence from France, 7 J. INT’L DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 55 (2016); Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct 
Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, in 2009–2010 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. POL’Y 539 
(Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010). 
The Social Science Approach Abebe, Chilton & Ginsburg 
Summer 2021 17 
it possible to rule out the possibility that changes in the outcome of interests were 
attributable to the phenomena being studied. For instance, a researcher could 
leverage a natural experiment that changed the legal protection of some BITs but 
not others in a quasi-random way to see if those changes are associated with 
increased investment.77 
It is important to note that there are a wide range of different social science 
research designs, and correspondingly, a wide range of data that can be used to 
empirically assess the validity of different hypotheses. For instance, our running 
example of testing the effects of BITs by looking at data on investment flows 
could be described as a reduced-form analysis using observational data. But it 
would be possible to test the effects of BITs in other ways using quantitative data, 
and it would also be possible to assess the effects of BITs using qualitative data. 
As one example, a researcher could explore whether corporate executives report 
that signing BITs influences their decisions on where to invest.78 
Finally, in addition to stating the results when using the research design, a 
hallmark of social science research is clearly identifying the assumptions that are 
required for the conclusions of the analysis to be valid and also explaining the 
uncertainty of that estimate. In our example, instead of simply saying “BITs do 
not change investment flows,” a careful social science researcher would want to 
explain the assumptions implicit in their research design and say how confident 
they can be in their conclusion based on their evidence. 
B.  Some Issues Specific to International Law  
There is nothing particularly complicated about importing this basic social 
science approach to research into the study of international law. That said, the 
approach does have some differences with many prior approaches to the study of 
international law that are worth noting. 
First, the social science approach typically adopts an “external” view of 
international law.79 Any legal field, including international law, has an internal 
viewpoint, and scholarship plays a role in producing it. In international law, 
however, the internal viewpoint has continued to play a particularly prominent 
role. For instance, the role of scholarship is explicitly recognized in Article 38(1)(d) 
 
77  See Cree Jones, Do Enforcement Provisions Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment in 
the Investment Treaty Network (Working Paper, 2019), https://perma.cc/TQL8-N7CU.  
78  See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from 
Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011). 
79  As previously explained, following H.L.A. Hart’s distinction, an internal view is one that is 
addressed to legal decision-makers; it can be descriptive or normative, but is at its core a doctrinal 
exercise. An external view of law, in contrast, is one that examines the law from outside, seeking to 
explain how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real world. See generally HART, 
supra note 15. 
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of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, providing that the “teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists” can help inform the Court in determining 
the content of international law.80 This invites doctrinal scholarship, and its impact 
is evident in many sub-fields of international law. Treatises and whole journals are 
devoted to doctrinal developments: the Journal of International Criminal Law, for 
example, focuses on developments in that field, as does the ICSID Review: Foreign 
Investment Law Journal.81 This is what we might call primary scholarship, designated 
“positivism” in the AJIL Symposium. It is embodied in the work of the 
International Law Commission, where scholars from various countries come 
together to “progressively develop” international law.82 In contrast, scholars using 
the social science approach to study international law have focused on external 
questions like why states make international commitments, how international 
institutions make decisions, and whether international commitments or the 
decisions of international institutions produce changes in state behavior. 
Second, unlike some traditional international law scholarship, the reach and 
efficacy of international law under the social science approach are not to be 
assumed but rather are treated as empirical matters to be assessed.83 This requires 
that the target of study is not international law as a whole. A research project using 
the social science approach is unlikely to try and make broad generalizations like 
“treaties do not change behavior.” Instead, a project would study the influence of 
specific regimes involving specific countries at specific times. 
Third, the social science approach does not adopt a teleology. There is no 
assumption that the world is shifting in one direction or another over time, either 
toward compliance or legalism. In this, a social science approach contrasts with 
some of the more optimistic scholarship of the liberal school of the 1990s. It also 
does not assume that legalization or judicialization is a one-way street: indeed, two 
of us recently co-authored a paper on the “Dejudicialization” of international 
politics.84 In general, the world may be getting better or worse, but as E.H. Carr 
 
80 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. 
81 See J. INT’L CRIM. L., https://perma.cc/RQ3R-4EGJ; ICSID REVIEW, https://perma.cc/3B7W-
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84  Daniel Abebe & Tom Ginsburg, The Dejudicialization of International Politics?, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 521 
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long ago noted, there is no natural “harmony of interests” to which states are 
evolving.85 
Fourth, the social science approach does not view itself as a normative 
project. While every scholar certainly has normative priors, social scientists are 
engaged in a positivist enterprise of trying to describe the world as it is, rather than 
how it should be. International law is itself not viewed as either “good” or “bad”; 
rather it is a mechanism through which states “do things” together to achieve 
common goals.86 Put another way, philosophers remind us that one can never 
derive an “ought” from an “is”; in the academic division of labor, social science is 
squarely focused on the “is.”87 To be clear, this is not to say that normative views 
play no role in social science. Indeed, scholars’ normative priors influence the 
projects they pursue, the methods they use, and the way they interpret their 
results.88 Good social scientists should be reflexive about these priors, and aware 
of any biases they might engender. And while the conclusions of social science 
research can also help inform normative conclusions about what international law 
ought to be, social scientists have no special expertise here. Normative matters 
require debate on normative terrain. 
Fifth, social scientists, in general, tend to begin with a healthy skepticism 
about the efficacy of law: the effect of law is not assumed, but must be 
demonstrated. This skepticism is not only because one should be critical of 
claimed empirical relationships as a starting point for empirical research, but also 
because social science research has frequently found that policies do not have their 
intended effect. For instance, scholarship in development economics has found 
that many large, directed interventions have no measurable effect on poverty 
reduction. Scholars familiar with this kind of this research are perhaps more likely 
to be skeptical of the notion that treaties without enforcement mechanisms are 
likely to produce profound change in sticky areas like human rights, environmental 
protection, or poverty reduction.89 
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C. Comparing Social  Science and Other Approaches to 
International Law 
Although the social science approach to studying international law begins 
with a healthy skepticism about the effect of laws, it is of course not the only 
skeptical approach to studying international law. One major difference with many 
of the other skeptical approaches on offer is that the social science approach 
endorses the view that multiple methods can and should be used to tackle the 
question at hand, so long as it helps with inference. The AJIL Symposium of 1999 
was built on an assumption that different methodological approaches, captured 
by labels, would lead to different outcomes. A social scientist’s approach to 
method is different. It would make less sense to run a horse race between 
quantitative and qualitative methods, for example. Instead, one should pick the 
methods most appropriate to the problem at hand and move between them to 
establish propositions. This makes social scientists skeptical about labels. Even 
the term “empirical legal studies” can be interpreted more narrowly (for example, 
to refer to quantitative methods) or broadly (to refer to any systematic approach 
to data). 
A second distinction is that social science is committed to a modernist view 
of knowledge. Facts are to be ascertained and, once established, are considered to 
be valid until falsified. This is a fundamental distinction with critical theory, which 
is committed to a critique of objectivity.90 To be sure, critical scholars have called 
for conversation with empirical social science. But at the end of the day, some of 
the critical calls for engagement have tended to place the normative commitments 
above positive inquiry.91 
At the same time, there are some commonalities between a social science 
approach and a critical approach to international law. Both recognize the role of 
power as an important factor in determining outcomes, for example. But even 
here there are differences. Critical scholars tend toward Foucauldian rather than 
material conceptualizations of power. And social scientists do not explicitly 
incorporate normative orientations into the analysis: whether or not developing 
countries benefit or not from international law is treated as an empirical question 
rather than an assumption or a normative commitment to be demonstrated. 
Critical scholars might accuse social scientists of burying the normative 
commitments in the posing of questions to be answered; but once the method is 
deployed, the answers are to be pursued neutrally. 
 
90  Posner, supra note 88. 
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D.  The Social  Science Approach in Action  
International legal scholarship using the social science approach has re-
orientated many debates toward concrete questions about the causes and 
consequences of international agreements and institutions. Not only have these 
projects explored a wide range of topics, but they have also spurred several high-
profile debates within the international legal academy. 
Perhaps, most prominent, has been a debate over the effectiveness of 
international human rights agreements. In an important book on the topic, Beth 
Simmons produced evidence that human rights commitments tended to be 
observed when they were supported by domestic constituencies.92 It has been 
followed by many other studies that also show the importance of domestic 
constituencies.93 But it was contested with another important contribution by Eric 
Posner, which argued that we are in the “Twilight” of international human rights.94 
Notably, both scholars made empirical arguments using similar data to try and 
assess whether international human rights treaties can be shown to produce 
changes in the human rights records of countries that sign them. Although they 
reached different conclusions, they argued that social science should be the way 
the debate is resolved. This debate has continued to produce active disagreements 
between international law scholars and political scientists. 
As another example, social science approaches have produced a number of 
debates about the efficacy of international dispute resolution. In seeking to 
understand when international courts might be effective, Tom Ginsburg and 
Richard McAdams put forward a coordination theory to explain the caseload of 
the International Court of Justice.95 They argued that the evidence suggested that 
international courts could be effective in resolving certain kinds of problems, even 
without the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance.96 In contrast, Eric 
Posner and John Yoo surveyed a broader set of international courts and argued 
that they were likely to succeed only when they were “dependent” on appointing 
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states.97 This argument generated responses that put forward a more nuanced 
theory about the conditions for successful international courts.98 
There have also been debates on topics such as whether countries comply 
with WTO agreements, why countries sign bilateral investment agreements, and 
the influence of regional organizations on international regulation. We view these 
debates as a sign of a healthy field, in which evidence is subjected to multiple 
analyses and interpretations. The result is a step-by-step process of scientific 
discovery. 
E. The Limits of the Social Science Approach  
Although there are many advantages to the social science approach, there 
are at least two limitations that we would be remiss to not mention. A first 
limitation is that positivist social science has, in general, been subjected to massive 
criticisms within the philosophy of science.99 Data is not self-creating, and 
normative considerations can creep into the identification of measurement of 
data, as can the underlying concepts that motivate research questions. No doubt, 
these general critiques apply to social science work on international law as much 
as other fields. Careful scholarship and scholars must be skeptical about methods 
and their application. 
The question is whether this critique should lead us to reject the approach. 
From our point of view, as social scientists, we think of positivist social science as 
a “research program” deploying a common set of assumptions, with the goal of 
explanation. The key question in replacing a research program is whether a better 
approach is possible.100 The advantage of a social science orientation is that 
decisions on conceptualization and measurement are themselves to be made 
transparent. Social science practices seem to us to be superior to any alternative. 
Further, the idea that knowledge is provisional invites attempts to disprove 
propositions. Falsifying particular studies is a sign of progress, not a reason to 
reject a research program. 
A second limitation is that social science may not provide immediate answers 
as to how to navigate the rapidly changing world. Many areas of international 
cooperation are currently in a moment of transition. Among the issues that are 
transforming the world are the return of the state, the climate crisis, a reduction 
 
97  Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
98  Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to 
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005); Tom Ginsburg, Response, Bounded Discretion in 
International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631 (2005); KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). 
99  See, e.g., MARTIN HOLLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 76 (1994). 
100  Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 116 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).  
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in global integration, and the rise of demands for indigenous recognition. The rise 
of China is no doubt a preeminent development that has profound challenges for 
international law.101 
The general approach of positivist social science may provide help tackling 
these issues, but there is a critical caution that must be observed. Positivist social 
science looks backward to existing data. It will then assess the patterns to see how 
they comport with theory and will put forward conditional propositions about the 
research questions asked. But, if one seeks to apply existing models and findings 
to new phenomena and configurations, one needs to take external validity 
seriously. This means closely considering the conditional effects of current 
findings and speculating on how changing international configurations affect 
these underlying conditions. While we are not confident that the world in ten or 
twenty years will look the same as it does today, we do believe that this kind of 
rigorous, cautious, and skeptical approach is necessary for international law to 
continue to make progress as a field. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Oppenheim thought that the science of international law should be practiced 
by those “who are imbued with the idealistic outlook on life and matters.”102 In 
contrast, we hope that that the social science of international law will continue to 
be normatively restrained, empirically informed, and more skeptical than the 
international law scholarship of the past. 
Additionally, we hope that international legal scholars continue to build 
bridges between the practice of international law, the legal academy, and other 
social science departments. International agreements and institutions pose a range 
of topics worthy of research, institutions require legal expertise to fully 
understand, and the social sciences are continually developing new methods to 
improve the credibility of research. In short, we hope that others will continue to 
join the effort to bring social science approaches to the study of international law. 
In a parallel field, Professor Ran Hirschl made a similar call for 
interdisciplinarity when he proposed moving from “Comparative Constitutional 
Law” to “Comparative Constitutional Studies.”103 Hirschl’s call was for the 
integration of social science and law to understand a dynamically changing field. 
International legal studies should follow this trajectory to better understand the 
promise and limits of international law. 
 
101  CAI, supra note 74. 
102  Oppenheim, supra note 1, at 355. 
103  RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS (2014). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The growing attention to embedding empirical and theoretical analyses into 
legal scholarly work has raised concerns about whether legal scholars could 
borrow methods from social science research, adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach.1 In their Lead Essay for the 2021 Chicago Journal of International Law 
Symposium, Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg2 offer an account 
of “the rise of the social science approach to international law, explain the basics 
of the method, and advocate for its continued adoption.”3 They advocate for an 
approach with the goal of accounting for “how international law works in 
practice.”4 This Essay builds on their analysis and focuses on international 
economic law (IEL)5 as a subfield of international law.6 More specifically, this 
Essay takes up Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s invitation and builds upon their 
perspective to reflect on the value of socio-legal approaches in deepening our 
knowledge of IEL and its variations in Africa. 
This Essay critically assesses how and why one might use socio-legally 
inspired methods (analytical, empirical, and normative) for the study of IEL in 
Africa. It illustrates the empirical method’s importance in understanding one of 
the most challenging aspects of the study of IEL in Africa: capturing the data and 
dynamism of informal cross-border trade (ICBT) phenomenon. It argues that, by 
conceptualizing IEL in Africa as a social phenomenon, socio-legal approaches 
open IEL in Africa to the application of other social science methods, which 
enables us to understand the context in which African regional trade agreements 
 
1  See, e.g., T. Brettel Dawson, Legal Research in a Social Science Setting: The Problem of Method, 14 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 445 (1992). 
2  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). 
3  Id. at 5.  
4  Id. 
5  I define international economic law (IEL) as the international law of trade agreements regulating 
cross- and trans-border transactions in goods, services, investments, and intellectual property, both 
in the formal and informal economic sense. Similar to Detlev F. Vagts, I exclude private 
international law and economic warfare. See Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the 
American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2006) (discussing the history of 
international economic law since the American Journal of International Law was first published in 1907). 
6  For example, Joel Trachtman advocates for a “total de-fragmentation” and “a full integration of the 
field of trade law with every other kind of international law.” Joel P. Trachtman, Functionalism, 
Fragmentation, and the Future of International (Trade) Law, 20 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 15, 16 (2019). On 
the debate regarding whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) is part of public international 
law, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 535 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 855 (reviewing Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of 
Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003)).  
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(RTAs) are implemented.7 The empirical socio-legal approach to IEL in Africa 
pluralizes the false universal narratives of conventional IEL. It deepens our 
understanding of the informal cross-border networks that characterize African 
trade regimes. As James Thuo Gathii has noted, African RTAs are perceived as 
“flexible legal regimes” and platforms of cooperation and should be understood 
as such.8 
This Essay contains three substantive sections. Section II explicates IEL in 
Africa as a social phenomenon. Section III focuses on the promise of a socio-
legally inclined theoretical and empirical analysis for deepening our understanding 
of African trade regimes. Lastly, in Section IV, I synthesize this Essay’s core 
arguments and identify three challenges in the socio-legal analysis of informal 
trade in Africa: data collection, insufficient training in empirical analysis, and 
funding.9 
II.  INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN AFRICA AS A SOCIAL 
PHENOMENON 
Trade regimes in Africa are a socio-political, legal phenomenon and a form 
of social interaction. Suppose we want to fully understand the variations in 
regional economic communities in Africa. To do so, we must reach beyond the 
discipline of law to other social sciences such as political science, economic 
sociology, history, social conflict theory, and anthropology.10 Thus, 
conceptualizing IEL in Africa as a social phenomenon is a multidisciplinary 
exercise. Consequently, IEL regimes in different regions are constituted by varying 
underlying socio-political, cultural, and historical factors. Whether in Europe, 
North America, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, or Africa, IEL involves a 
unique constellation of local conditions, forces, and factors that coalesce in the 
 
7  Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Revisiting the Economic Community of West African States: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis (2017) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Ottawa). 
8  See JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 1 (2011); 
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Theorizing Developmental Regionalism in Narratives of African Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs), 1 AFR. J. INT’L ECON. L. 297 (2020). 
9  Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg speak aptly of the “structural tilt in the ability of larger states 
and interests within them to shape and deploy World Trade Organization (WTO) rules to advance 
their interests, directly and diffusely, through using material, ideological, and institutional 
resources.” Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2012). 
10  Clair Gammage, (Re)conceptualising International Economic Law: A Socio-Legal Approach to Regionalism, in 
SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 
(Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2013); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, What Does It Mean to Take a Socio-Legal 
Approach to International Economic Law?, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT, supra note 10.  
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mantra: context matters.11 Further, the effectiveness of the regulation of economic 
interactions in IEL through trade agreements (in social fields) should not be 
assumed. 
As a multidisciplinary method, socio-legal approaches focus on the mutually 
constitutive interaction between law and society. Generally, socio-legal 
approaches deepen our understanding of the role of law and legal institutions in 
social interactions,12 but their methodologies may vary.13 Some conventional 
socio-legal methods focus on the conceptual analysis of legal phenomena to 
understand the nature of law, its relationship to society, and how legal institutions 
function.14 The utility of this approach lies in the ways it widens our understanding 
of the effectiveness of public institutions—such as courts and the broader social 
reforms that their decisions engender beyond strict implementation.15 Others 
provide a detailed empirical examination of the research problem under study, 
combining qualitative and quantitative research methods. For instance, using 
semi-structured interviews and participant observations to gather data for a more 
sophisticated and interpretive analysis of law and legal institutions’ 
interconnectedness.16 Data and information gathered based on semi-structured 
interviews provide firsthand information that fills existing scholarship gaps and 
generates new theoretical explanations inductively.17 Another strand of research 
 
11  As Celine Tan aptly puts it,  
the self-referential lens of formalist legal theory focusing on purely textual and 
interpretive aspects of international rules and institutions fail to account for their 
contemporary context . . . . It is only with the aid of a socio-legal eye that we 
can capture the constitutive function of law, especially how law influences 
modes of thought, which in turn shapes the conduct of legal actors. 
 Celine Tan, Navigating New Landscapes: Socio-Legal Mapping of Plurality and Power in International Economic 
Law, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, 
SUBTEXT, supra note 10, at 26. 
12  See Lisa Webley, The Why and How to of Conducting a Socio-Legal Empirical Research Project, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS 58 (Naomi Creutzfeldt et al. 
eds., 2019). 
13  See, e.g., Paddy Hillyard, Law’s Empire: Socio-legal Empirical Research in the Twenty-First Century, 34 J.L. 
& SOC’Y 266 (2007).  
14  See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, The Sociological Concept of Law, 10 J. L. & SOC’Y 241 (1983). 
15  See generally Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Towards an Analyses of the Mega-Political Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice, in THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA’S INT’L COURTS 149 (James Thuo Gathii 
ed., 2020) (contending that incorporating the social, political, economic contexts that gave rise to 
disputes and their uses afterwards as levers for socio-political reform—even when the parties do 
not win—widens our understanding of the judicialization of mega-political disputes in ways that 
the traditional analyses do not). 
16  See, e.g., LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE, GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY OPERATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52 (2015). 
17  See Titilayo Adebola, Intellectual Property Rights for Plant Varieties in Nigeria: Critical Reflections on 
TWAIL, Empirical and Comparative Methodologies, AFRONOMICSLAW (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/QDN7-S4YF.  
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combines legal and social science theoretical approaches to analyze asymmetry in 
the interaction of trade actors and the “hidden social, cultural and political 
consequences of economic transactions and relationships . . . that are framed in 
formalistic legal language.”18 
Integrating social science techniques—and notably, socio-legal 
approaches—in the research of IEL is not new.19 In spite of the increasing 
demand for, and the potential of, socio-legal research,20 the formalist approach to 
understanding IEL dominates the study of conventional, or ‘mainstream,’ IEL. 
International legal scholars in this mode are concerned with the set of rules of the 
global trade regime that guide and constrain governments’ behaviors.21 However, 
the study of IEL in Africa through socio-legal methods remains underexplored. 
In the African context, IEL is intricately interwoven into African societies’ 
historical, political, social, and economic peculiarities and diversity. As a result, the 
conventional, formalist, and doctrinal approaches do not effectively capture the 
heterogeneity of African trade regimes. As Büthe and Kigwiru note, research on 
African IEL grounded in theoretical and empirical analysis, particularly by African 
scholars, is scarce.22 This leads to a significant blind spot in our understanding of 
IEL. 
Demystifying the false universal pretenses of conventional IEL is, however, 
not a prerogative of socio-legal scholarship.23 Therefore, this Essay does not 
suggest the primacy of the socio-legal approach over other methods. Instead, 
 
18  Clair Gammage, Critical Perspectives of International Economic Law, AFRONOMICSLAW (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/FU6Z-DTVF. 
19  See generally SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, 
SUBTEXT, supra note 10 (focusing on the distinctive virtues and vices of socio-legal approaches by 
identifying and interrogating three [analytical, empirical, normative] approaches to law and locating 
socio-legal approaches to international economic law along the stretch); INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008); see 
also Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of 
Regional Trade Agreements in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277 (2008). 
20  Stuart A. Nagel, Law and the Social Sciences: What Can Social Science Contribute?, 51 ABA J. 356 (1965). 
21  See Gathii, supra note 8; Gregory Shaffer, A New Legal Realism: Method in International Economic Law 
Scholarship, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 29, 
supra note 19, at 29–42 (classifying the varieties of IEL scholarship into formalist/doctrinal, 
normative/activist, theoretical/analytical, and empirical while arguing for a new legal realist 
empirical approach to the study of IEL). 
22  See Tim Büthe & Vellah Kedogo Kigwiru, The Spread of Competition Law and Policy in Africa: A Research 
Agenda, 1 AFR. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 42 (2020). 
23  Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) is an active arena where scholars have 
exposed the biases of conventional international law. Also, Cecilia Juliana Flores Elizondo’s 
fascinating analysis examines the question: “Can a reflexive law approach facilitate the construction 
of an international economic law that is just, in the sense that it balances economic and wider social 
interests and values?” See Cecilia Juliana Flores Elizondo, Reflexive International Economic Law: 
Balancing Economic and Social Goals in the Construction of Law, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT, supra note 10, at 118–32. 
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socio-legal approaches include diverse perspectives that consider the relationship 
between law, economy, and society.24 
The underlying factor that unifies the different methods is the desire to 
broaden our understanding of the law by integrating socio-political contexts.25 But 
socio-legal methods deepen the contextual understanding of formal and informal 
African trade regimes’ heterogeneity, while revealing the precarity of ICBT in 
Africa, which helps inform policymaking. Perspectives that are rooted in socio-
legal analysis, whether qualitative or quantitative, in combination with disciplines 
in broader social science (for example, politics, sociology, anthropology, 
ethnography, and history), highlight the constitutive power of IEL in Africa, the 
norms underpinning cross-border trade, and their embeddedness in social 
relations. In short, theoretical and empirical socio-legal research with a focus on 
the informal economy in Africa, when linked to policy, will enhance the expanded 
purpose of trade agreements for social inclusion.26 
III.  THE PROMISE OF SOCIO-LEGALLY INCLINED EMPIRICAL 
METHODS FOR DEEPENING UNDERSTANDING OF TRADE 
REGIMES IN AFRICA  
African IEL as a social phenomenon, like law, is not static. Instead, it is 
constitutive, changing, and embodies fundamental principles that reflect and 
shape society’s values. IEL in Africa has evolved and been shaped not only by 
colonialism and post-colonial realities but also by social conflict within the region, 
economic orthodoxies, externalities, and regional struggle for power.  Envisioning 
African IEL as a social phenomenon opens the pathway to reimagining different 
aspects of the field that have constrained ideas from the periphery.27 It opens up 
space for a deeper understanding of the variations, norms, standards, principles, 
processes, and practices of African IEL and their interaction with the Western or 
traditional processes on their own terms. The emergent interaction will likely 
improve the global community’s economic and social governance. 
A socio-legal approach to IEL enables us to discern and appreciate the 
significance of two key related trends. First, the existence of emergent sites of 
normative authority for international economic rules and regulations outside the 
 
24  For recent publications that explore the “socio” and “legal” in “socio-legal” research, see generally 
EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’ OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (Demnot Feenon ed., 2013); EXPLORING THE 
‘LEGAL’ IN SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (David Cowan & Daniel Wincott eds., 2015). 
25  Akinkugbe, supra note 7. 
26  Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 2 (2019). 
27  Gammage, supra note 10, at 67 (“Moving away from the notion of the Westphalian state, these 
socio-cultural theories offer an alternative model of regionalism that conceptualise trade as a social 
phenomenon.”). 
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traditional interstate system.28 And second, the shifting modalities of power in global 
economic governance that enable dominant actors to embed and globalize their 
models of economic organization. In the latter mode, innovative ideas and norms 
about African IEL can influence or inform changes in mainstream IEL. 
In this section, I outline six opportunities and three challenges facing the 
implementation of socio-legal analyses in African IEL, specifically in the context 
of ICBT. 
A.  Opportunities for Socio-Legal Analyses of African IEL 
First, an empirically grounded socio-legal approach illuminates how socio-
political, historical, and cultural factors influence and shape Africa’s international 
economic interactions. African countries trade more with countries outside the 
continent. A significant level of intra-African trade occurs in the informal 
economy.29 Although the IEL regime on intra-African trade is dominated by 
ICBT, the influence of ICBT on legal policy, negotiation, design, and 
interpretation of trade agreements has been minimal. There is a critical lack of 
research to inform policy. Unfilled, this critical void perpetuates a stereotype of 
failure and ineffectiveness of IEL in Africa. The socio-legal approach to IEL in 
Africa offers an important avenue for the systematic documentation of the regime 
of informal economy in Africa. An empirically informed analysis would show the 
multiplicity of legal orderings at the national and regional levels30 and would 
explain the ineffectiveness in the formal aspects of regional integration in Africa.31 
Second, the analytical and empirical assessment of data will enhance our 
understanding of the IEL regimes’ performance. Hence, while practical work on 
formal aspects of intra-African trade abounds, the paucity of data and information 
on the practices of informal trade regimes in Africa is a source of concern for a 
holistic assessment of the regimes. The generation of consistent and reliable data 
on ICBT in Africa is essential for optimizing the gains of the sector and for policy 
 
28  For how different legal orderings matter for our understanding of IEL in the indigenous context, 
see INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BUILDING EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (John Burrows & Risa Schwartz eds., 
2020); Sergio Puig, International Indigenous Economic Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243 (2019) 
(exploring the extent to which the main fields of international law that are tasked with promoting 
economic interdependence—international finance, investment, trade, and intellectual property—
address the rights and interests of indigenous peoples). 
29  See NANCY BENJAMIN ET AL., THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA: FIRM SIZE, 
PRODUCTIVITY, AND INSTITUTIONS (2012). 
30  See, e.g., PEBERDY SALLY, CALIBRATING INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
(2015). 
31  See, e.g., Sami Bensassi, Joachim Jarreau & Cristina Mitaritonna, Regional Integration and Informal Trade 
in Africa: Evidence from Benin’s Borders, 28 J. AFR. ECON. 89 (2019) (empirically analyzing the 
relationship between trade barriers and informality of trade based on recording informal and formal 
CBT flows between Benin and its direct neighbors). 
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making. However, many African states do not collect ICBT data on a regular and 
systematic basis.32 For example, as it relates to the COVID-19 pandemic, a 
contextual analysis is emerging that advances our understanding of the impact on 
informal markets.33 The informal economy is vulnerable to suffering more from 
the negative implications of external shocks. With the shutdown of borders, the 
socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on the informal sector and its actors and 
their performance during the pandemic will be enriched by socio-legal methods. 
Third, socio-legal analysis of IEL improves our understanding of the 
heterodox trade regimes in Africa. ICBT in Africa is often homogenized in the 
literature, but it is heterogeneous. The heterogeneity of ICBT is interconnected 
with local skills, resources, and geographic conditions, among other factors.34 An 
empirically informed socio-legal analysis will help tease out the practices of each 
sector. In the context of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free 
Trade Area,35 empirical methods in socio-legal analysis will exemplify the 
heterogeneity of ICBT in Africa and provide a clearer understanding of the 
dynamics in specific sectors, regional variations in cross-border practices, informal 
trade between neighboring states, movement of persons, goods and services as 
well as which goods and services to mention a few. In effect, the outcome of such 
a method will likely yield more effective policy making. 
Fourth, socio-legal method for the study of IEL in Africa illuminates our 
understanding of the actors’ perceptions of trade regimes—specifically, how they 
may influence institutional changes and inclusive development. One of the recipes 
that has been suggested for African trade policy is the formalization of the 
informal economy in trade agreements. Formalizing ICBT in Africa may attenuate 
the precarity of the sector and its actors. The perennial problems encountered at 
the borders that contribute to the growth of ICBT can be better understood 
through socio-legal methods of research.36 Empirical data on the factors that lead 
to the incessant border challenges and their costs are germane to illuminating 
Africa’s trade policy making. ICBT is rooted in long standing indigenous trade 
 
32  Rwanda and Uganda are the exceptions in this regard. See AFRICAN EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, 
AFRICAN TRADE REPORT 2020: INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE AFCFTA 17 (2020). 
33  Various ongoing country projects have been commissioned that focus on resilience of the informal 
sector in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Nathan Fiala & Jörg Peters, Resilience and Recovery: 
The Economic Impact of COVID-19 on the Informal Sector in Uganda, https://perma.cc/5UAM-7QY5; 
Jessica Gottlieb & Adriienne LeBas, Resilience & Risk in the Informal Sector: Responses to Economic & 
Security Risks of COVID-19 in Lagos, Nigeria, https://perma.cc/P77H-9EBX.  
34  See Eldrede Kahiya & Djavlonbek Kadirov, Informal Cross Border Trade as a Substratum Marketing 
System: A Review and Conceptual Framework, 40 J. MACROMARKETING 88 (2020). 
35  Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, adopted Mar. 21, 2018 (entered 
into force May 30, 2019). 
36  See generally Erick Mwakibete, The EAC and the Never Ending Cross-Border Headaches, THE CITIZEN 
(Mar. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/V9PY-N72N. 
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practices of African communities.37 It also predates the artificial division of 
African communities into states as a result of the colonial encounter. As such, 
ICBT is critical to deepening inclusive trade and sustainable development in 
Africa. Consequently, policy making based on the incorporation of the 
experiences and perspectives of the actors would be important to sustaining trade 
and cultural linkages. 
Fifth, socio-legal approaches in African IEL provide an opportunity to 
generate theoretical frameworks that implicitly examine research from African 
perspectives. The process of developing theories occurs through the case studies, 
hypothesis analysis and observation of the repetitive patterns of phenomenon.38 
In Africa, the discourse of decolonizing IEL’s embedded universalism and 
Eurocentricity is still unraveling. Mainstream narrative of IEL belies the 
heterogeneity of methods, approaches, and conceptualizations of international 
economic law across regions and spaces. To date, Eurocentric theoretical 
frameworks have dominated research on African IEL. While focusing on methods 
are useful, they do not do the work that belongs to theory in research. The quest 
for theory-building offers a contextual understanding of the factors that drive the 
actual performance of informal trade and actor preference. Theorizing on the 
basis of such studies would gradually enhance, rather than position informal trade 
as an exception to mainstream studies of IEL. Studies of African IEL grounded 
in data collected from the continent will give insight to the consistent 
phenomenon in intra-African trade. Overtime, these ideas can be the basis of the 
development of theories that situate and effectively contextualize the 
phenomenon of formal and informal trade in Africa.39 From an economic 
development dimension, the bottom-up theorizing of IEL complements other 
arguments that show the deficit of IEL in engaging processes that are attentive to 
local situations.40 
Sixth, socio-legal approaches provide scholars of African IEL with a broader 
set of research tools. Data visualization, ethical considerations, reliability of data, 
and validity are concepts that many lawyers who base their research on secondary 
 
37  See Stephen S. Golub & Jamie Hansen-Lewis, Informal Trading Networks in West Africa: The Mourides 
of Senegal/the Gambia and the Yoruba of Benin/Nigeria in Benjamin and Mbaye, in THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA: FIRM SIZE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, 173–93. 
38  Roberto Cipriani, Empirical Data and Theory Construction: An Example of Application in Social Science 
Research, 118 BULL. SOCIO. METHODOLOGY 73 (2013). 
39  See generally Richard Swedberg, Theorizing in Sociology and Social Science: Turning to the Context of Discovery, 
41 THEORY & SOC’Y 1 (2012). 
40  Akinkugbe, supra note 7. See generally David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self Estrangement: 
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1062 WIS. L. REV. 1062 
(1974). 
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data miss out on.41 For example, the rise of digital trade has added to the 
complexity of African IEL.42 Also, the normative foundations of IEL are 
expanded today by data governance.43 Robust policy making on African IEL is 
significantly inhibited by the paucity of data on digital economy and data 
governance that are expanding the structure of IEL. Practically, this hinders 
researchers from formulating good research questions, hypotheses, sampling 
techniques, and theoretical frameworks to explain a particular outcome. 
B.  Challenges Facing Socio-Legal Approaches to African IEL  
For all its promises, empirically inclined socio-legal analysis of IEL in Africa 
engenders some challenges. The approach requires a lot of training and familiarity 
with the research tools of social scientists. The challenges are not unique to 
geographical boundaries. Legal scholars, untrained in the methods of social 
science, face this challenge globally. Hence, legal scholars “lack the tools of 
consequentialist social science empiricism, which are most importantly used to 
assess the social effects of rules.”44 As such, there is a professional training 
dimension to this proposal. African law schools, institutes, and organizations must 
be willing to assist with the training required to undertake this form of research.45 
The perennial challenge that scholars face across the world is that of funding 
for empirical research. Many African scholars may not easily afford the financing 
associated with comprehensive empirical research. Empirical research, which 
involves fieldwork and complicated software to analyze data, is costly. The 
assistance offered by a semi-structured interview that leverages technological 
opportunities is limited depending on the audience that is the focus of the 
research. One way to address the financial burden is more collaboration between 
Global North researchers and institutions and their Global South counterparts. 
This recommendation has potential ethical challenges. The power imbalance 
resulting from the provision of funds by the Global North institutions can easily 
become a challenge in relation to intellectual property and ownership of the 
research work. The challenges should not prevent institutions from the Global 
 
41  See generally AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, DOING SOCIOLEGAL RESEARCH IN DESIGN MODE 
(forthcoming). 
42  See Franziska Sucker, COVID-19 Pushes Digital Solutions and Deepens Digital Divides: What Role for 
African Digital Trade Law, AFRONOMICSLAW (May 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/VZ8E-RZKG. 
43  See generally Neha Mishra, International Trade Law Meets Data Ethics: A Brave New World, 53 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L. & POL. 303 (2021); Thomas Streinz, RCEP’s Contribution to Global Data Governance, 
AFRONOMICSLAW (Feb 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/FAT2-ZE4L. 
44  Joel P. Trachtman, International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE, supra note 19, at 43. 
45  The Cardiff Law and Global Justice socio-legal writing workshops for socio-legal scholars is an 
example of this initiative. See generally Socio-Legal Journals Global South Initiative, CARDIFF LAW AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/JF9F-M7HQ. 
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South and Global North from embracing the opportunities to collaborate. The 
key would be to ensure that it is done on equal terms. 
Lastly, the promise of an empirically inclined socio-legal analysis is enriched 
by a theoretical framework. A theoretical framework is an ideological or practical 
lens that informs the researcher’s understanding of the law. The theoretical 
framework permeates all aspects of the decision-making process and the analysis 
of the data. As such, it is essential. Global South scholars have a variety of critical 
theoretical approaches to draw on depending on their research’s focus. Whether 
one chooses to answer a research question through one or a combination of 
feminism, political economy, Third World Approaches to International Law, 
comparative, or other approaches, the overall research must both account for how 
the theoretical approach is effectively accommodated by the data and illustrate the 
method.46 
IV.  CONCLUSION :  EMPIRICALLY INFORMED RESEARCH FOR 
POLICY FORMATION  
Africa’s contemporary complex regime of trade agreements calls for a 
diversity of methods to tell its own unique narratives on its own terms. The ideal 
IEL research centers multidisciplinary approaches that weaves in theory (for 
example Third World Approaches to International Law) with the appropriate 
choice of method to illuminate our understanding of specific trade regimes. Such 
an approach focuses on the diversity of actors (focusing on gender and social 
inclusion), their social interactions in the formal and informal trade they co-
constitute, and the legal institutions affected by these trade regimes. The ideal 
research will also seek to foreground the different legal orderings that are at work 
and the roles of law. For example, it would be interesting to know the legal 
orderings that are ‘internal’ to the social structure that supports ICBT in contrast 
to the ‘external’ legal ordering of the state and institutions that support formal 
trade regimes. 
There is a significant opportunity for empirically inclined socio-legal research 
methods to produce insight and knowledge to inform trade policy in Africa. For 
 
46  See, e.g., AMAKA VANNI, PATENT GAMES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW-
MAKING IN BRAZIL, INDIA AND NIGERIA (2020) (adopting a combination of TWAIL and nodal 
governance theory to explore how the confluence of various actors frame the way(s) pharmaceutical 
patents are adopted and implemented in a given locale within the confines of World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); Adéráyọ̀ 
Sànúsí, Patent Law-Making in Context and the Value of Socio-Legal Approaches to Studying Intellectual Property 
in Global South Countries, AFRONOMCISLAW (Feb. 5, 2021), https://permac.cc/WN4C-EJLK 
(reviewing Vanni’s book and arguing that the future research of intellectual property requires 
creative application of interdisciplinary methods (historical, ethnographic) and theoretical 
frameworks (law, history, anthropology, political theory, STS) that respond to the unique socio-
material circumstances shaping scientific innovations and legal processes in the local context under 
study). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 36 Vol. 22 No. 1 
example, in addition to understanding the dynamics of informal economies and 
cross-border trading at the regional levels, the African Continental Free Trade 
Area Agreement provides another layer of research enterprise. We will need to 
understand the distributive effect of this new trade regime on both formal and 
informal trade in Africa. The future of research on IEL in Africa will need to 
incorporate more social science and socio-legal methods in particular, as well as 
theoretical frameworks that respond to and account for the socio-political and 
economic context of African societies’ interactions. 
As the practice of IEL in Africa deepens, social science approaches and 
socio-legal methods in particular offer an important lens to substantiate the 
innovation of the regime. The decision on which theoretical and methodological 
approach is best for one’s research is not easy for researchers. Finding a creative 
combination of approaches, theories, and methods that address these challenges 
is the key to documenting the narrative of IEL in Africa based on their own logic.47 
 
47  See Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Symposium Introduction: Assessing the Roles of Theory and Methodology in the Study 
of IEL in Africa, AFRONOMICSLAW (Jan. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZR59-NNEQ. 
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This Essay offers a critical yet constructive reading of the social science approach to 
international law. In seeking to frame international legal studies alongside the positivistic social 
sciences, the social science approach has suffered from important methodological deficiencies. 
Though appearing to be an objective science, the social science approach requires a scholar to make 
subjective decisions throughout the research process. A reductionistic social science approach to 
international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and imperialistic institutions in the 
name of objective science. A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences 
requires enriched conceptions of both international law and the social sciences, as well as a proper 
perspective on their working relationship. This dynamic perspective recognizes the constitutive role 
of international law in carrying out the social science approach. It further emphasizes the 
importance of internalizing interdisciplinarity within international legal scholarship itself. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science approach to international law, as advocated by Daniel 
Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg, is a recent academic effort to frame 
international legal studies alongside the positivistic, fact-based, and empirical 
social sciences. The social science approach starts “with a healthy skepticism about 
the efficacy of law” and tests “hypotheses about how international law works in 
practice” through observation and data collection.1 By describing and explaining 
what the world is, the social science approach reclaims the methodological rigor, 
scientism, and legitimacy of international law. 
The social science approach should be understood within the context of the 
law and society movement of American legal academia, which harbors a long-
standing tradition of skepticism toward the normative-formalistic concept of law. 
Its application to international law motivates a wide range of approaches including 
the New Haven School,2 economic analysis of international law,3 international law 
and international relations,4 international law as behavior,5 the empirical turn,6 the 
experimental turn,7 and others. Yet, at a time when international law is increasingly 
perceived as “indeterminate and illegitimate” in the United States,8 the call for a 
social science approach may be understood as an attempt to reclaim its domestic 
relevance by recourse to empirical methods and scientism. 
Contrary to a simplistic polarization between the normative approach and 
empirical research, this Essay suggests that the relationship between international 
law and the social sciences is complex and nuanced. A detailed account of their 
relationship casts light on the possibilities and limitations of the social science 
approach, and also provides useful insights for developing an inclusive and 
engaging international legal scholarship. 
 
1  See Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 
22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 19, 5 (2021). 
2  See generally Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 
66 AM. J. INT’L L. 60 (1972); WESLEY L. GOULD & MICHAEL BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970). 
3  See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
4  See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda, 
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993). 
5  See generally Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer, International Law as Behavior, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS BEHAVIOR 1 (Harlan Grant Cohen & Timothy Meyer eds., 2021). 
6  See generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
7  See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Experimenting with International Law, 28 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1317 (2017). 
8  See Paul B. Stephan, Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Fragmentation, in 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018).  
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II.  SOCIAL SCIENCES W ITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The traditional, normative approach to international law is not at all 
antagonistic to scientism.9 Instead, the normative approach seeks to build its 
legitimacy and relevance by a claim to normative objectivity and certainty. Rules 
are objective, their meanings are ascertainable, and they separate international law 
from both morality and politics. 
Under the normative approach, the main task of international lawyers is to 
ascertain and clarify rules of international law in an objectively verifiable way. As 
international law is represented as a system of objective rules and principles, the 
idea of scientism deeply informs its doctrinal construction. International law is 
discoverable through a process of neutral scientific inquiry, and the 
authoritativeness of the norms depends upon the correct application of the 
scientific method to international law. 
The scientific nature of international law is crystalized in the doctrine of its 
sources. The idea of scientism has been used to enhance the credibility of 
international law as a discipline in the eyes of politicians and theorists.10 It also 
embodies the positivistic tradition of international law.11 It is no surprise that the 
rise of positivism is accompanied by the corresponding infusion of scientism into 
international legal studies. 
The normative approach is not blind to sociology, either. Rather, it has its 
own conceptions of sociology, power, and knowledge. Beneath the construction 
of the doctrine lies a profound sociological understanding of the international 
society.12 For example, positivism reflects the political reality of the monopolistic 
position of the nation-state in international relations, marginalizing the role of 
nonstate actors in the making of international law. In recognizing the 
decentralized structure of international society, positivism also privileges the great 
powers in the lawmaking process. 
A close look at the doctrine of customary international law illustrates the 
underlying sociology. Secondary rules on the ascertainment of customary law 
express the sociological reality of international society. The requirement of 
 
9  See Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369 (2014). 
10  See L. Oppenheim, Science of International Law Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 323–24 
(1908). 
11  See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18 (1999). 
12  For a useful account on positivism from the lens of normative politics, see Benedict Kingsbury, 
Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Oppenheim’s Positive 
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002). 
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concreteness is to render as much as possible the proposed norm in conformity 
with existing state practice.13 
There are many telling examples in this regard. For a new rule to emerge, 
state practice has to be extensive and virtually uniform.14 Further, the practice of 
the “specifically affected states” is given full weight. 15  In conceding to the 
dominant role of great powers, physical acts are weighed more heavily than verbal 
acts. The “persistent objector” doctrine is practically reserved for those states who 
can persistently object to an emerging rule, despite it being affirmed by a great 
majority of states—a possibility only open to a handful of great powers.16 
In setting the law-making procedures, international law internalizes its 
perceptions of prevailing social conditions. The sociological account is implicit in 
the normative approach. Yet, international legal scholars have traditionally stayed 
silent on those normative ideals about the world. Once entering the realms of the 
sociological and the political, it would be a self-defeating exercise to an 
international law project that claims to reject politics and morality. By convention, 
international lawyers are trained as experts in normative jurisprudence, rather than 
as social or political scientists. This mindset of avoidance has had structural 
impacts on the works of international lawyers. It has curtailed the ambition and 
willingness of international lawyers to engage with external disciplines. It also 
causes confusion for many who are trapped in the formalistic approach and yet 
see the political disagreements not surmountable by legal techniques. With the rise 
of critical international law scholarship in the late 1980s, the objectivity claim of 
normative international law has decisively fallen apart. 
III.  SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The social science approach suggested by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
examines the phenomenon of international law by using conventional, empirical, 
and positivistic social sciences. 17 This external approach may be conveniently 
referred to as the social science approach to international law. The basic procedure 
 
13  On the irresolvable tension between concreteness and normativity, see generally MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT (2005). 
14  See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 
20). 
15  Id. 
16  In rediscovering the importance of the persistent objector doctrine due to the changing conditions 
of international lawmaking, Ted Stein claimed her work to be “an exercise in the sociology of 
international law.” See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 481 (1985). A critical reading of the persistent 
objector doctrine is well argued by B. S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 23–25 (2018). 
17  See generally Abebe et al., supra note 1. 
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is to start with a research question, develop a hypothesis, then verify or falsify the 
hypothesis through observation and data collection. In reducing and limiting its 
research task to descriptive engagement without a normative commitment, the 
social science approach advocates a revitalization of the scientific enterprise of 
international law. 
In a sense, the social science approach and the normative approach share a 
common interest in scientism and objectivity despite the profound difference 
between the two approaches. The social science approach replaces the 
normatively-committed objective rules with a new set of empirically-committed 
objective rules. The scientism of the social science approach also needs to be 
demystified.  
The social science approach is premised upon the full separation between 
the subjective and the objective.18 It further assumes the objective being real, 
fixed, unmalleable, and organized – capable of scientific studies without subjective 
intervention. This approach is epistemologically incomplete, if not completely 
impossible. First, no social science is completely neutral, objective, and value-free. 
Social sciences are as politically informed as international legal studies. The 
application of the social science approach to international law requires a scholar 
to make many subjective choices throughout the research process. In defining the 
research question, setting the context, identifying the variables, relating variables 
as cause and consequence, collecting and interpreting the data, establishing the 
causal link, generalizing the research outcomes, and more, one is constantly called 
to make subjective decisions.19 Those delicate decisions are not readily accessible 
in the disciplinary toolboxes of social sciences or international law. Instead, one 
must make decisions creatively. 
How contrary state practice is treated in identification of customary 
international law provides an illustrative example. Torture is prohibited by the 
1984 U.N. Convention against Torture.20 Given that the practice of torture is 
widely found across the world, the question immediately arises whether customary 
international law authorizes or prohibits torture.21 The techniques employed by 
the traditional approach elaborate and define what counts as state practice. One 
answer is to exclude those practices of torture from the purview of “state 
 
18  See BARRY HINDESS, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 138–39 (1977). 
19  The range of subjective selection is manifestly acknowledged in the classics on quantitative social 
research. See, e.g., GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). 
20  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
21  This was a point of debate between Arthur Weisburd and Anthony D’Amato in the 1980s on 
whether the prohibition of torture was purely conventional by nature. See Arthur M. Weisburd, 
Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988); Anthony 
D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 459 (1988). 
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practice.” For the purpose of customary lawmaking, state practice is norm-
generative only if it is accompanied by an opinio juris.22 Because no state has claimed 
that torture is lawful under international law, the practice of torture would not be 
able to create a law permissible of torture. 
The other technique is to define state practice by pairing actions with 
responses from other states.23 Whenever incidents of torture are exposed, they are 
deplored by other states and human rights organizations. It is the acts of torture 
by a state together with the collective responses from other states that constitute 
state practice on the legality of torture under international law. Both techniques 
are presented as factual matters of what to observe and what counts. 
Second, observations and interpretations generate the world we see. 
Personal preferences, beliefs, values, or research methods often determine 
research outcomes. In essence, social science is about constructing narratives and 
order. Data only receive meaning when they are theoretically exposed and 
interpreted. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg provide an illuminating example in 
their article. Using basically the same data, Beth Simmons and Eric Posner drew 
opposite conclusions about the effectiveness of international human rights 
agreements.24 
Another useful example could be found on the scholarly examination of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. According to a survey conducted by the United 
Nations in 1983, 18 states claimed 3 nautical miles of territorial sea, 83 states 
claimed 12 nautical miles, 13 states claimed 200 nautical miles, and another 19 
states claimed different ranges.25 The question is then how far the territorial sea 
reaches under customary international law. 
The above claims are open to different interpretations. One interpretation 
could simply deny the existence of customary international law on the subject 
matter, as state practices diverge. 26  Another interpretation may suggest the 
continued validity of the rule of 3 miles, as this is the least disputable.27 Still 
 
22  See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, at ¶ 77. 
23  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 784 (2001). 
24  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21 (discussing BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) and ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014)). 
25  The Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 2, vi, U.N. Doc. 83-35821 (Dec. 1983). 
26  Michael Byers therefore interprets the 3 nautical miles as a mistaken belief among scholars on the 
customary breadth of the territorial sea. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules - 
Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 173 (1995). 
27  See R.Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of Public International Law, 121 COLLECTED COURSES 
HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 323, 379 (1967). Yet, for a rational choice explanation of the 3 nautical miles 
rule and its subsequent development, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1158 (1999). 
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another interpretation points to the rule of 12 miles, as this rule is endorsed by 
the majority and also incorporates the latest development in state practice.28 
All of the above interpretations stand equally. A choice can be made only by 
reference to policy considerations and normative commitments beyond mere 
factual observation. More importantly, the difference between interpretations is 
irresolvable within the social science approach itself as Abebe, Chilton, and 
Ginsburg seem to suggest.29 The difference does not lie in observations, but rather 
in assumptions and orientations. 
Third, by reducing itself to the study of what “is,” the social science approach 
risks consolidating and legitimizing existing social structure and order. The social 
science approach gives authenticity to empirical facts and data by assuming that 
the truth may be meaningfully extracted from the given. Yet, what is the being, 
what aspects of social life are real, and what is observable are all at the heart of 
the positivism of social sciences. Objectifying certain aspects of social life to 
present them as irresistible and capable of generating meaning and order has 
profound intellectual, social, and political implications. 30  Having renounced a 
political commitment in the first place, the social science approach is left to be fed 
by dominant narratives about world reality. Expressly not committing oneself to 
a normative project amounts to a normative commitment in its own right. 
IV.  RELATING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO SOCIAL SCIENCES 
The social science approach is primarily concerned with international law’s 
efficacy and rationale. It focuses “on external questions like why states make 
international commitments, how international institutions make decisions, and 
whether international commitments or the decisions of international institutions 
produce changes in state behavior.” 31  The social science approach, as such, 
incorporates rather specific parochial concepts of both international law and social 
science. This reductionist approach may hinder a more dynamic and interactive 
discourse between international law and social science. 
The social science approach suffers from three reductionist deficiencies. The 
first is its positivistic conception of the social science method. In limiting itself to 
the empirical method and external explanation, the social science approach, as 
proposed by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg,32 minimizes the contributions of 
 
28  Those arguing for 200 nautical miles are not seen as persistent objectors to the customary rule of 
12 nautical miles. See Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
81, 89 (2010). 
29  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 21–22. 
30  For an insightful account of the ordering power of description, see Anne Orford, In Praise of 
Description, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 609 (2012). 
31  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
32  Id. 
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political science, anthropology, linguistics, or history. It focuses on efficacy and 
causality to the exclusion of other analytic paradigms, such as structural-
functionalism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and systems theory. 
The second reductionist aspect is its conception of international law. The 
social science approach incarnates a robust positivist and statist concept of law. 
International law is seen as consisting of binding rules and principles whose effects 
are to endure test by empiricism. However, in international society, the 
constitutive role of international law is as relevant as its normative function. While 
a rule-based formalistic notion of international law still stands firm, especially in 
international adjudication, other concepts receive increasing acceptance. 
International law is a language of empowerment that legitimizes specific 
claims or actions. By formulating conceptual, paradigmatic, or epistemic 
frameworks, it conditions our understanding of international problems and 
defines the available solutions. The role and relevance of international law are 
much richer than what the positivistic concept may embrace. 
The normativity of international law may be considered in a dual agenda: 
authoritative in adjudication and decision-making, but also normative in terms of 
its political commitments. The traditional approach presents it as a system of rule-
based normativity without normative projects other than international law itself. 
Disconnecting these two levels of normativity is artificial and leads to the practical 
irrelevance of international law to international life. 
The third reductionist aspect is the relationship between international law 
and social science. The social science approach depicts these as two distinct fields 
which only relate to each other externally. In fact, they are mutually constitutive. 
It is important to appreciate the constitutive role of concepts and doctrines of 
international law in the design of the research project, as well as in the 
interpretation of the results. 
Nevertheless, an enriched social science approach would provide useful 
insights for developing international law projects. The mechanisms of causation 
and attribution are powerful institutions for social redistribution.33 For example, 
the underlying causes of poverty in the Global South are subject to different 
interpretations. In turn, these different interpretations point to different 
prescriptions. Poverty may be seen as a consequence of the corruption and failure 
of local governments. It may also be attributed to the lack of legal institutions for 
privatization, property protection, or effective markets. Additionally, it may be 
attributable to the structural status of countries in the Global South in the 
international economic system. Each of these interpretations may be equally valid 
and yet points to different prescriptions. Here, causation plays an important role 
in conditioning our understanding of what the world problem is, who shall bear 
 
33  For an insightful exposition and critique of causational analysis applied to human rights issues, see 
Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
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responsibilities, and where to look for possible solutions. A social science project 
would be useful to substantiate the normative projects of international law 
regarding global poverty. 
A modest and self-reflective social science approach is useful, but not 
because it provides objective, verifiable scientific knowledge. Rather, it offers a 
way to understand how international legal problems may be defined, how the 
order of the world may be depicted, and how politics of international law may be 
conducted at a micro level. 
I would suggest an active incorporation of the social sciences into 
international law. Various arguments against international legal studies as a social 
science can be anticipated. Philosophically, the normative system of international 
law cannot be subjected to Popper’s falsificationist approach, falling under the 
criteria of science.34 Conceptually, the normative approach to law—sometimes 
referred to as the authority paradigm—tells very little about international society.35 
Intellectually, the social science approach often entertains skepticism or even 
hostility toward the legal nature of international law, and a call for interdisciplinary 
engagement often means conquest in reality.36 Politically, much of the existing 
work on the social science approach is viewed as conservative. 37 
Yet, it is both important and possible to relate international law to social 
science in a more dynamic and mutually informative manner. There are several 
useful ways to relate the two subjects. The first possibility is to open the normative 
approach by relocating its background assumptions to the foreground for 
discussion.38 In approaching international law as a project for social reform, it is 
useful to openly acknowledge the sociological assumptions and political ideals that 
underlie the international law project. To make those assumptions explicit would 
do away with the false normative objectivity that has been associated with 
international law. Connecting legal normativity with political normativity would 
enable more direct engagement with foundational ideas about the world in 
international legal discourse. And any reflections of those assumptions would 
practically require sociological investigation and political engagement. 
 
34  See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40–42 (1959). 
35  For discussion of the authority paradigm, see Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View 
from Comparative Law, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288 (2008). 
36  See Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity, 1 
J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35 (2005). 
37  See Martti Koskenniemi, Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity, 26 
INT’L REL. 3, 16 (2012). 
38  See DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 114 (2016). 
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A second way of relating is to openly examine the constitutive role of 
international law in social science. 39  International law today is a powerful 
institution that determines how international issues are framed and resolved. Its 
politics is often expressed in the politics of competing perspectives and outlooks. 
The empirical approach requires theoretical sensitivity in its normative 
assumptions, intellectual reflection about the subjective decisions made in 
selecting and processing data, and prudence when drawing normative conclusions 
from collected facts. 
The third way of relating is to conduct interdisciplinary projects internal to 
international law. International law projects by themselves are capable of speaking 
to historians, political scientists, and scholars of international relations. As Jan 
Klabbers comments, “the best work in international law tends to be individual 
work that is well-informed about neighboring disciplines, and would be readable 
and understandable to those neighboring disciplines, and perhaps even contribute 
something to those disciplines, without however losing its distinctively legal 
character.” 40  Those works are read as legal works par excellence. This raises 
interesting questions about what constitutes an internal approach to international 
law and where to draw its disciplinary boundaries. To conduct interdisciplinary 
projects internal to the discipline of international law would require international 
lawyers to be open-minded to the social sciences, and more importantly, be able 
to internalize those neighboring disciplines in the landscape of legal research. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
What distinguishes international law from domestic law is its constitutive 
role for international society. International law always points to the future and is 
an enterprise that constantly aims to transcend the contemporary conditions of 
human life. International law has constantly been formulated by professionals as 
a project for social reform. International legal scholarship, the social science 
approach included, by itself is part of the international lawmaking process. 
The legitimacy of international law should not take refuge in objectivity or 
scientism. The validity of international law may not come from an external 
verification through economics or sociology. A reductionistic social science 
approach to international law risks consolidating existing inequalities and 
imperialistic institutions in the name of objective science. Such an approach may 
also reduce international law to a set of policy options coded in administrative 
vocabulary. As international law constantly oscillates between faith, normativity, 
and theology on the one end and practice, facts, and science on the other, it is 
 
39  Early calls for such interdisciplinary collaboration go back to the 1980s. See, e.g., Christopher C. 
Joyner, Crossing the Great Divide: Views of a Political Scientist Wandering in the World of International Law, 
81 PROCEEDINGS ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 385 (1987). 
40  Klabbers, supra note 36, at 45.  
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important to steer it as an intellectual space for rational discourse, as well as a 
political space for progressive social projects. 
A healthy interaction between international law and the social sciences 
requires enriched conceptions of both, as well as a proper perspective on their 
working relationship. It is important for international law to absorb a social-
historical perspective and transform legal scholarship from an authority paradigm 
to a more socially informed and politically relevant intellectual project. 
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The struggle to assert the legitimacy and relevance of international law is integral to its 
story. Among academics, that tale has seen other lawyers question whether it is “really” law, 
while scholars of international relations have dismissed it in a bemused footnote. Among 
politicians, the narrative has been one of efforts to establish international law as more than simply 
one foreign policy justification among others. The turn to social science offers a double remedy: 
rigorous methods that will earn the respect of the academy while also demonstrating the discipline’s 
“real world” impact. This is an elegant answer—to the wrong question. For the problems of 
international law cannot be solved by adopting an “external” and therefore objective or privileged 
position. International law’s structure and history make academics necessarily participants as 
well as observers. An uncritical embrace of social science methods risks losing much of what draws 
people to international law and what has, over the centuries, given it value. As a work in progress 
in which academics have a special role to play, a commitment merely to take international law 
“as it is” is not neutral; it is a value statement in itself.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The subject of international law has always struggled to be taken seriously. 
Much of that struggle has been over its status as “law,” with H.L.A. Hart among 
others expressing serious reservations about such a claim.1 More recently, Anthea 
Roberts has questioned the extent to which it can be said to be “international,” 
given divergences in the way it is taught and understood around the world.2 Now 
Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg are raising an eyebrow as to 
whether it even deserves to be considered a “subject” in the academic sense—
proposing that this would be bolstered through recognizing and expanding the 
social science methods described in their Essay. Such an approach will, they argue, 
produce research that is more “normatively restrained, empirically informed, and 
more skeptical”3—by which they mean “better.” 
I will push back against these explicit and implicit claims in two ways. 
First, analytically, their Essay and its plan of action misdiagnose the nature 
of international law scholarship, or a substantial part of it, by embracing the idea 
of an “external” and therefore objective or privileged position. Without 
subscribing to the maximalist claim that objectivity itself is impossible, I will argue 
that international law’s structure and history necessarily make academics 
participants as well as observers. Second, politically, a wholesale embrace of social 
science methods would lose much of what draws people to international law and 
what has, over the centuries, given it value. As a work in progress in which 
academics have a special role to play, a commitment merely to take international 
law “as it is” is not neutral; it is a value statement in itself. I will conclude by 
explaining the somewhat labored metaphor in my title. 
II.  THE PROJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s argument is, at its core, about method. “For 
over a hundred years,” they observe, “scholars have argued that international law 
should be studied using a ‘scientific’ approach.”4 And yet they also observe that 
the methods that those scholars have used have been, to put it politely, lacking in 
 
1  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–37 (2d ed. 2012) (concluding that international law 
constitutes a set of rules but not a system of law, as it lacks a basic norm providing general criteria 
of validity for other norms within that system). 
2  ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). A distinct critique is the 
extent to which non-Western states participated in the development of international law and 
institutions. See Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, 
Present and Futures, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945 (2016). 
3  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 23 (2021). 
4  Id. at 1. 
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scientific rigor. International lawyers invented their own approaches on the fly—
not so much methods as sets of “assumptions and theoretical claims.”5 No 
wonder, one might draw the conclusion, that two international lawyers routinely 
find three different answers to a given question. The solution proffered to solve 
this problem is the tried and tested methods of social science. The authors are 
modest in their argument but cannot hide their apparent mystification as to why 
this was not evident to serious researchers up to now.6 
By social science methods, they mean the formulation of questions, 
development of hypotheses that can be tested with qualitative or quantitative data, 
and offering of conclusions while acknowledging underlying assumptions and 
uncertainty.7 An important part of their critique is that this should be done in an 
“external” manner: “that is, an approach that examines the law from outside, 
seeking to explain how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real 
world.”8 
This is an elegant answer—to the wrong question. 
Because international law is not like other subjects of social scientific 
research, for one-and-a-half reasons. The half reason, which is not a compelling 
one, is that international law—its study and its practice—has always had an 
undercurrent of idealism. I do not mean idealism in the international relations 
sense,9 though the two are connected in that idealism in the theoretical sense 
underpins a strong vein of international law scholarship. Rather, I mean a more 
general sense of having an unrealistic belief in, or the pursuit of, perfection. 
International law and international lawyers have always conflated the “is” and the 
“ought.”10 Anyone who has taught international law knows the experience of 
having to explain to students that “real world” suffering may not be addressed by 
international law remedies. The maxim “no wrong without a remedy” may be true 
in the courts of equity, but it holds no water in the International Court of Justice.11 
 
5  Id. at 5, n.14. 
6  See also Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012). 
7  Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 5. 
8  Id. 
9  See generally MARTIN GRIFFITHS, REALISM, IDEALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A 
REINTERPRETATION (1992). 
10  See, e.g., Andreas Th. Müller, The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State 
Formation, in THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF THE FACTUAL: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN IS AND 
OUGHT 79 (Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Christoph Bezemek & Frederick Schauer eds., 2019). 
11  In the domestic context, see, for example, Leo Feist v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1943) 
(citing it as “an elementary maxim of equity jurisprudence”). In international law, by contrast, 
remedies were long neglected in the literature and the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
provides little guidance on their application. Ian Brownlie, Remedies in the International Court of Justice, 
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT 
JENNINGS 557–58 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996). 
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As I noted, this is not a good reason, and we academics are not immune to 
the desire to make international law better. Indeed, it has often encouraged 
overstretch. To be fair, this has typically been on the progressive side—one need 
only think of the efforts in the early 1990s that led to the new interventionism that 
sought to promote human rights through righteous violence.12 Two problems 
resulted. First, the deaths of U.S. Rangers in Somalia in 1993 showed the limits of 
political commitment to such projects—particularly in Africa.13 Second, 
international lawyers tied themselves in knots to justify the 1999 Kosovo 
intervention when there was political commitment, but the authorization that 
would have added legality was not forthcoming.14 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
quote the infelicitous phrase “illegal but legitimate” to describe this phenomenon, 
a circumlocutory approach that sought to have its cake and bomb it too.15 
Another example of idealism is the efforts through that same decade to hold 
businesses accountable for human rights violations. Coincidentally, my only other 
article in the Chicago Journal of International Law was on this topic, discussing among 
other things the manner in which activists and scholars sought to take human 
rights norms applicable to states and extend them to corporations also—
essentially through sheer force of will.16 When John Ruggie criticized the 
“doctrinal excesses” and “exaggerated legal claims” of such writers,17 he was 
accused of attempting to “derail the standard-setting process and bow to the 
corporate refusal to accept any standards except voluntary codes.”18 
This may sound like special pleading for international law, and, to some 
extent, it is. But the better reason for distinguishing international law from other 
subjects of social scientific research is that academics have always been 
participants rather than mere observers in our field. This is partly because our 
subject matter is incomplete; there are lacunae.19 Indeed, it is sometimes said that 
 
12  See generally THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991–1994: UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN 
CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA (James Mayall ed., 1996). 
13  See, e.g., Thomas G. Weiss, Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome—“Operation Rekindle Hope?”, 1 GLOB. 
GOVERNANCE 171 (1995). 
14  See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–18 (2001) and sources there cited. 
15  INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000), 
https://perma.cc/35FG-5XG4. 
16  Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 327 (2011). 
17  John Gerard Ruggie, Special Representative, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006), ¶ 59. 
18  David Weissbrodt, International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of Business, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 373, 390 (2008). 
19  See, e.g., Prosper Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . .” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (1998). 
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the relationship between international law and law is similar to that between Swiss 
cheese and regular cheese—similar in substance, but a lot more holes. 
More seriously, international law is very unlike domestic law in two ways. 
Structurally, domestic law can be thought of as having a vertical relationship 
between sovereign and subject; international law operates—at least theoretically—
in a realm where states exist in a horizontal plane of sovereign equality.20 As a 
result, a great many substantive international legal questions are left without 
conclusive answers. Is humanitarian intervention permissible? What is the legal 
status of Taiwan, of Kosovo, of Palestine? The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), tasked with giving answers, often dodges them. When asked for an advisory 
opinion on the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, for example, it neatly answered 
a different and far less controversial question.21 Even when the ICJ does give 
answers, they may be contradictory. Within the space of three years, for example, 
it concluded that Serbia both was22 and was not23 the successor state to the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the purposes of ICJ Jurisdiction. 
Nature and the academy abhor a vacuum, so academics fill this uncertainty. 
There is, as we know, a normative basis for this. The ICJ Statute itself lists as a 
subsidiary source of law “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations.”24 From Grotius’s battle of the books to modern lawfare,25 
international law has always provided scope for academics to be advocates as well 
as analysts. 
The position articulated here is an unashamedly internal view of the discipline. 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg allow for this, noting that internal scholarship has 
played a “particularly prominent”—surprisingly prominent, they seem to mean—
role.26 But their call to abandon labels and to avoid “committing oneself to any 
 
20  See generally Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331 (2008). 
21  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22). Instead of addressing the matter of 
Kosovo’s asserted independence, the Court chose to focus on the legal significance of its declaration 
of independence, concluding that international law has no prohibitions on such declarations—and 
leaving unanswered the question of whether the declaration had any legal effect. 
22  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb. 
26). 
23  Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. and Montenegro v. U.K.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 1307 (Dec. 
15). 
24  Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 art. 38(1)(d). And just 
as ninety percent of faculty members generally regard themselves as “above average” teachers, few 
international law professors would put themselves outside the group of “most highly qualified 
publicists.” See K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRECTIONS 
HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1 (1977). 
25  ORDE F. KITTRIE, LAWFARE: LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR (2016). 
26  Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 17. 
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assumptions, theories, or philosophies beyond those required of any other social 
science researcher”27 presumes the ability to be a truly external observer. Some 
postmodernists and poststructuralists have made the strong claim that this is 
impossible in any circumstance.28 Here, I will confine myself to the more modest 
claim that, in the context of international law, the role that academics have played, 
and continue to play, in constructing the discourse makes that dispassionate and 
disinterested claim dubious. 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg are, of course, aware of all this. Indeed, one 
of the two key influences on international law scholarship that they highlight is 
the impact of “real-world problems” on the work done by academics. What I think 
they underestimate is the converse: the impact of academia itself on the real world 
of international law. 
This is not to say that the influence of academics has been uniformly 
positive. It is sometimes naïve, often misguided, and too frequently patronizing 
or colonial in its approach to helping “the other.”29 Sometimes, as at the ICJ,30 the 
contradictions are laid bare: those who supported unilateral humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, for example, struggled to oppose intervention in 
Iraq a few years later—and bristled when Russia invoked the same arguments 
more recently in Crimea.31 Perhaps that is why humanitarian intervention has 
always been more popular among academics than states.32 
Yet, it is hard to deny that academics in international law have had and 
continue to have an impact on their subject that is qualitatively different from 
other fields of social science. Human rights, international humanitarian law, the 
very word “genocide,”33 the one true faith of global administrative law34—all are 
examples of the observer turning participant. All are attributable to the work of 
academics not just documenting but creating the path of international law. 
 
27  Id. at 6. 
28  See, e.g., COLIN DAVIS, AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM: READING, STORIES, THEORY (2003). 
29  See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2001); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
30  See supra notes 22–23. 
31  JUAN FRANCISCO ESCUDERO ESPINOSA, SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMANITARIAN SECESSION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF A GLOBALIZED WORLD: KOSOVO V. CRIMEA 1 (2017). 
32  See Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279–85 (2011). 
33  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF CRIMES 25 (2000). 
34  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). 
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III.  THE VIEW FROM BELOW  
A second reason to push back against this social science manifesto is that, in 
addition to being analytically questionable, it is normatively undesirable. 
Politically, the project of international law remains unfinished. 
If Oppenheim had been successful in his call for international lawyers to 
embrace a scientific method a century ago, few of the advances mentioned in the 
previous section would have happened. Oppenheim acknowledged, of course, 
that international law was a work in progress, that it was necessary for writers, 
“and in especial the authors of treatises, . . . to take the place of the judges and 
have to pronounce whether there is an established custom or not, whether there 
is a usage only in contradistinction to a custom, whether a recognized usage has 
now ripened into a custom, and the like.”35 But there were limits: “the international 
jurist must not walk in the clouds; he [sic] must remain on the ground of what is 
realizable and tangible. It is better for international law to remain stationary than 
to fall in the hands of the impetuous and hot-headed reformer.”36 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg are aware of this as well; they give feminism 
and Third World approaches to international law an entire paragraph each.37 They 
might respond that these are simply different projects: I am writing from an 
unashamedly “internal” angle; their approach is “external.” But the permeability 
of these borders is important. 
The social scientist, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg argue, is “engaged in a 
positivist enterprise of trying to describe the world as it is, rather than how it 
should be.”38 Taking international law “as it is” is a normative position, however—
and in a way different from the maximalist claim that that is true of everything in 
the world. The reason is that the international law academic—more, I would 
argue, than perhaps any other discipline—has the potential to affect the subject 
matter of his or her study. We are not scientists merely observing the phenomena 
around us. When U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts claimed in his confirmation 
hearings that his job was merely “to call balls and strikes,”39 knowing pundits 
rolled their eyes. No ICJ judge would be foolish enough to make such a sporting 
analogy. Or if they did, they would at least concede that their role might well be 
to call balls and strikes—after they have negotiated where the strike zone was 
going to be on that particular day. 
 
35  L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 315 (1908). 
36  Id. at 318. 
37  Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 13–14. 
38  Id. at 19. 
39  I Come Before the Committee with No Agenda. I Have No Platform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/L6EL-C5KX. 
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Assuming or stipulating a measure of objectivity does not dispense with 
partiality and partisanship; it merely masks it. That does not mean that the impact 
of the academic—or the judge—need be nefarious. It does not even mean that 
they will have an impact at all. But they can, and sometimes they will. Being open 
about that impact and responsibility does not guarantee that the project of 
international law will be a liberating one. Hopefully, however, it reduces the 
likelihood that international law will be frozen in time, limiting thereby the voices 
that can be heard and the emancipatory projects that remain unfinished. 
IV.  ABOUT THOSE CATS  
Which brings me, finally, to the labored double metaphor of my title. 
“Herding cats” is, of course, the adage that points to the difficulty—some 
would say the futility—of controlling or organizing entities that are inherently 
uncontrollable.40 States are, manifestly, not cats. But, like cats, their respect for 
authority is episodic at best; when they do not get their way, they may hiss, spit, 
or draw their claws. Various international relations theorists have drawn on this 
analogy to describe what Hedley Bull termed the “anarchical society.”41 
Schrödinger, in turn, is a reference to the famous thought experiment in 
which a cat—somehow having been herded into a box—can be both alive and 
dead, due to its fate being tied to a random subatomic event. Only when the box 
is opened will the cat’s fate be revealed or resolved.42 It should be stressed that 
Erwin Schrödinger intended this as a joke to demonstrate the absurdity of 
quantum dynamics in the 1930s. Nonetheless, it has come to be taken more 
seriously as illustrating that some phenomena only exist in any meaningful sense 
when they are observed. 
In the same way, the status of many international legal questions—more so, 
I would argue, than most phenomena, including human phenomena—remain 
ambiguous until they are studied. Indeed, some would argue that they can remain 
ambiguous. The late, great Tom Franck, writing on the question of humanitarian 
intervention, once observed that sometimes such conduct is lawful, sometimes it 
isn’t, “and sometimes it both is and isn’t.”43 I happen to disagree with Tom about 
 
40  Cf. HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson & Pamela R. Aall eds., 1999). 
41  HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (4th ed. 2012). 
42  John D. Trimmer, The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schrödinger’s “Cat 
Paradox” Paper, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 323 (1980). 
43  Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 204 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Keohane eds., 2003). 
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that one,44 but his point about legal indeterminacy—the lacunae of which I spoke 
earlier45—runs through much of modern international law. 
This, then, is the more serious criticism of the turn to empiricism in 
international legal scholarship, exemplified by this symposium: that it risks 
reducing some of the most interesting questions to yes and no answers, or to 
problems of coding. The Lead Essay essentially concedes this, with the example 
of ongoing debates over the effectiveness of international human rights 
agreements.46 Despite using “similar data,” different conclusions are reached—
though there is said to be agreement that “social science should be the way that 
debate is resolved.”47 As those methods become more sophisticated and opaque—
as we move from regression analyses to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence—we are beginning to see the limits of such approaches, at least in 
relation to inherently contested areas of life, like law in general and international 
law in particular.48 Such approaches are useful and effective when “facts [can be] 
ascertained”49 and when it is possible to maintain an aversion to “normative 
commitments.”50 But if one concedes that, for most of the most interesting 
questions in international law, facts are contested and determining norms is half 
the game—if one concedes that the cat could be either alive or dead or somewhere 
in between—then social science methods alone may not be the answer. 
To their credit, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg do not claim theirs is the best 
or the only valid approach to researching international law. Their aim is to “build 
bridges” between the practice of international law, legal academy, and social 
science departments. Without wanting to wholly align myself with the “critical” 
school as discussed in their article, an uncritical acceptance of these methods risks 
building a bridge to nowhere. 
To end where I began, the subject of international law itself has always been 
ambivalent about its own status. I struggle to think of a discipline that has spent 
so much time and ink agonizing over the very words that should define it. The 
debate we are having is therefore as familiar as it is healthy. Moving forward, I 
fully expect to see more work taking up Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s invitation 
to bring a social science approach to the study of international law. 
And I, for one, look forward to fighting against it. 
 
44  CHESTERMAN, supra note 14. 
45  See Weil, supra note 19. 
46  See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS (2009); ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). 
47  Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 21. 
48  See SIMON CHESTERMAN, WE, THE ROBOTS?: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE 
LIMITS OF THE LAW (2021). 
49  Abebe et al., supra note 3, at 20. 
50  Id.  
 
 59 
China and Comparative International Law: Between 
Social Science and Critique 
Matthew S. Erie 
Abstract 
 
This Essay brings Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s Lead Essay into conversation with 
the literature on comparative international law to ask whether the social scientific approach to 
international law is “international.” In particular, this Essay takes the case of scholarship on 
international law in China to examine why or why not particular methodological and theoretical 
perspectives on international law may gain traction in certain jurisdictions’ legal academies. There 
are a number of linguistic, pedagogic, institutional, and, ultimately, political reasons why the 
Chinese scholarship that uses social science to understand international law is still nascent. At 
the same time, critical approaches to international law in the Chinese literature are ascendant. 
This Essay explains these divergent trends through a sociology of knowledge lens and offers 
provisional thoughts about future trajectories for the study of international law in a period during 
which China’s influence on the international system will most likely grow.  
  
 
  Associate Professor of Modern Chinese Studies, Member of the Law Faculty, and Associate 
Research Fellow of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford. The author 
thanks Liu Yiqiang, Wang Chenguang, and Yang Liu for their help in conducting research for this 
Essay, and Liu Sida for reading an earlier draft. Chinese names are provided with surname first per 
Chinese language convention. All errors and all translations are the author’s. This work is part of 
the “China, Law and Development” project, which has received funding from the European 
Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program 
(Grant No. 803763). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 60 Vol. 22 No. 1 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 61 
II. A Thumbnail History of Chinese International Law Scholarship ................... 63 
A. Real-World Problems ......................................................................................... 63 
B. Trends in the Academy ...................................................................................... 64 
III. Probing the Double Firewall................................................................................ 68 
IV. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 70 
  
China and Comparative International Law Erie  
Summer 2021 61 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Is the social scientific approach to international law “international?” This 
Essay brings some of the findings of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s The Social 
Science Approach to International Law into conversation with the literature on 
“comparative international law.”1 Specifically, I do so through the case of China, 
a country poised to shape international law and global governance,2 to inquire 
whether the social science approach has gained traction in the Chinese legal 
academy. The short answer is “not yet.” The longer answer, and particularly, why 
there may not be a parallel “social scientific” turn in Chinese scholarship on 
international law, however, opens up a number of important questions about the 
relationship between international law, academic knowledge production, and 
ascendant non-democratic states, that may shed light on possible future 
trajectories of international law and its study. 
A few caveats: first, this Essay is not directed toward making normative 
claims about the social scientific turn in international legal scholarship; rather, it 
is an exercise in comparison between perspectives on international law. Second, 
due to space constraints, this Essay is not a literature review; I merely flag major 
trends which will hopefully mark out new terrain that can be further explored 
through subsequent empirical, contextual, and historiographical studies. Third, my 
focus is on the scholarship of mainland China (i.e., the People’s Republic of China 
or PRC) and not that of Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the Chinese diaspora. 
To help frame this Essay and its orientation, I open with an exchange 
between the Party-State and the Chinese legal academy, a relationship that lies at 
the heart of understanding why and how Chinese scholarship on international law 
assumes the forms it does. In 2017, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General 
Secretary and President of the PRC Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to the 
China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) on its sixty-fifth 
anniversary.3 He met with senior legal academics and made a speech during which 
he exhorted the students to contribute to building “global rule of law” (shijie fazhi).4 
Reciprocally, Professor Huang Jin, Vice Dean of CUPL, has proposed that 
 
1  See generally Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative International Law, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
385, 387 (2011); ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017); ANTHEA 
ROBERTS ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018). 
2  See, e.g., He Zhipeng (何志鹏), Guojifa de Zhongguo lilun (国际法的中国理论) [A Chinese 
Theory of International Law] (2017). 
3  Zhongyang xinwen gongzhonghao (中央新闻公众号) [Central Television Public No.], Xi Jinping 
wusi qianxi kaocha Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue hua qingchun tan chuxin jiang fazhi (习近平五四
前夕考察中国政法大学) [Xi Jinping Visited China University of Political Science and Law on the 
Eve of the May Fourth Movement to Discuss Youth, Aspiration, and Rule of Law], XINLANG 
CAIJING (新浪财经) [SINA FINANCE] (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/93VN-QSQK. 
4  Zhongyang xinwen gongzhonghao (中央新闻公众号) [Central Television Public No.], supra note 
3.  
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international law be elevated to a “first-level academic discipline” (yiji xueke) in 
China, effectively calling for a greater standing of international law scholars in the 
Chinese academy.5 Professor Huang is also one of the main advocates of Xi 
Jinping Thought as applied to international law.6 
The picture that emerges from this exchange is that the Party-State and 
international law scholars mutually access each other for their own benefit. The 
former obtains expert commentary which is aligned with its political and 
geostrategic aims. The latter earns access to data and government funding. This 
relationship of mutual access is not unique to China and may be found in more 
muted forms in the United States and elsewhere.7 Further, it is important to note 
that not all Chinese legal academics speak with the same voice, and there is a 
diversity of views and intellectual debates.8 
Nonetheless, Chinese legal scholars operate within a certain set of 
parameters largely shaped by the Party-State. As a result of this restriction and 
other factors, the social scientific approach has not earned a following in Chinese 
international law studies; however, where the Chinese legal scholarship has been 
very active is in producing critical views of international law. Critical orientations 
hold that international law is a product of Western states and mostly hegemonic; 
as part of China’s global expansion, it is the task of international law scholars to 
articulate new rules in line with China’s interests. 
In this Essay, I use, broadly, a sociology of knowledge lens to explain why 
there has (or has not) been cross-fertilization between the Anglophone and 
Sinophone scholarship regarding certain approaches to international law. My 
focus is not just to draw attention to the absence of a given approach, but to also 
underscore which approaches are flourishing in Chinese legal scholarship. The 
structure of this Essay mirrors that of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s Essay and 
proceeds with, first, a thumbnail history of China and international law 
scholarship, including a concern with practical issues and how international law 
scholarship reflects trends in the academy. As part of these trends, I highlight 
critical approaches to international law. I then explain the divergence between the 
 
5  Huang Jin (黄进), Ruhe jiaqiang waifazhi rencai peiyang (如何加强涉外法治人才培养) [How to 
Strengthen the Training of Personal for Foreign-Related Law], ZHONGGUO LÜSHI WANG (中国律
师网) [CHINA LAWYERS NET] (Nov. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/5EFJ-HDCD. 
6  Li Weihong (李伟红) et al., Zhongguo wei guojifa de chuangxin fazhan zuochu zhongyao gongxian 
(中国为国际法的创新发展作出重要贡献) [China Has Made Important Contributions to the 
Innovation and Development of International Law] RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] 
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z8FL-SQ5Q (quoting Professor Huang as saying Xi Jinping’s 
concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind” is a “new contribution to global 
governance and the international rule of law”). 
7  See generally David W. Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1 
(1988). 
8  See generally SAMULI SEPPÄNEN, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA: USEFUL PARADOXES (2016). 
China and Comparative International Law Erie  
Summer 2021 63 
relative nascence of social scientific approaches and critical ones and offer 
concluding thoughts about future directions. 
II.  A  THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF CHINESE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SCHOLARSHIP  
One of the foundational insights of comparative international law 
scholarship is that scholars in any given country may have particular ways of 
conceptualizing international law given that country’s historical position in the 
international system.9 The social scientific approach to international law appears 
to have a particular provenance, specifically, that of European and American legal 
scholars during the long twentieth-century, a period during which those same 
powers effectively built the modern international legal order. Abebe, Chilton, and 
Ginsburg begin their Essay with Lassa Oppenheim’s The Science of International Law: 
Its Tasks and Methods, which the German jurist published in 1908, calling for a 
scientific approach to international law.10 The contemporaneous scholarship in 
China shows a different picture. 
A.  Real-World Problems 
In 1908, the Qing dynasty was in decline and collapsed three years later. 
Despite or because of the political and economic tumult, this period witnessed the 
genesis of international law scholarship in China.11 It was China’s rough entry into 
the international law system through the “unequal treaties” signed with the United 
Kingdom and other states that accelerated its study of international law.12 The 
kinds of real-world problems Chinese jurists faced were existential (e.g., foreign 
extraterritoriality, sovereign integrity, regime survival, economic modernization, 
etc.), and the result was that core ideas of international law entered Chinese 
lexicon.13 Shen Jiaben, the Head of the Bureau of the Revision of Qing Law, was 
one of these early architects for constructing a new legal order in China, one 
commensurate with that of states beyond China.14 Charged with systematizing 
Qing law and translating foreign law, Shen, it should be noted, advocated not 
 
9  See ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?, supra note 1, at 7.  
10  Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L. L. 313, 313–
14 (1908). 
11  Suzanne Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law: The Perspective of the People’s Republic of China, 7 NYU 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3–6 (1974). 
12  Id.  
13  Id.  
14  Matthew S. Erie, Custom in the Archive: The Birth of Modern Chinese Law at the End of Empire, in EMPIRE 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: GLOBAL HISTORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 93, 100 (Jeremy Adelman ed., 
2019). 
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science as the method for studying international law, but rather classical Chinese 
textual analysis (kaoju).15 
Following nearly half a century of relative isolationism, it was not until the 
1970s that modern China, the PRC, began integrating into the international legal 
order. The PRC joined the United Nations in 1971, began signing bilateral 
investment treaties with other states, and acceded to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001.16 In the early 2000s, China, while still the major capital 
importer in the world, made a shift to becoming one of the largest capital 
exporters globally, a transformation that has raised a host of international law 
issues. These include private international law issues in the course of Chinese 
companies conduct of cross-border business, sovereign immunity for Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, the resolution of commercial and state-investor disputes, 
maritime and territorial conflicts, scrutiny of China’s human rights record, and so 
on. These issues can be roughly grouped into three major categories of interests: 
economic (i.e., international business), security (e.g., territorial integrity), and 
world opinion (i.e., naming and shaming). Xi Jinping has called for the growth of 
international legal studies in China to confront these challenges.17 
B.  Trends in the Academy 
The Chinese academy operates in a certain relationship to the Party-State, 
one in which the nexus between power and knowledge is regnant. From the 1980s 
on, there has been increasing intellectual exchange between Chinese scholars and 
their foreign colleagues. Since roughly 2013 when Xi Jinping assumed leadership 
of the CCP, there has been a blowback against so-called “Western values,” 
including such legal principles as judicial independence and liberal rule of law.18 
Whereas there is a plurality of views within the Chinese legal academy, such views 
are ring-fenced by the lack of academic freedom in the country. The study of 
international law is no exception; scholarship must be “useful” to the Party-State 
to garner state patronage, which is a prerequisite for funding, publishing, and 
policy impact. 
At a general level, mainstream Chinese legal scholarship has oscillated 
between two poles: Marxist legal theory and civil law doctrinalism. Marxist legal 
 
15  Id. at 101. 
16  Jacques deLisle, China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 PROC. OF THE ANN. 
MEETING (AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.) 267, 272–75 (2000); Jerome A. Cohen, Law and Power in China’s 
International Relations, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 124, 125–29 (2019). 
17  Jun Mai, Xi Jinping Says China Has a Legal Problem: Finding the Lawyers to Defend Its Interests Abroad, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/AM6S-T5B3.  
18  Zhou Qiang (周强), Yao ganyu xiang xifang cuowu sichao lingjian (要敢于向西方错误思潮亮剑) 
[Dare to Bear a Bright Sword Against the Errant Thoughts of the West], ZHONGGUO XINWEN 
WANG (中国新闻网) [CHINA NEWS NET] (Jan. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/567R-LJE6.  
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theory has undergone its own shifts, from extremist strains in the violent 1960s 
(“all law is bourgeois law”) to more nuanced materialist analyses in the 1980s and 
1990s as China began economic liberalization. For Chinese scholars, Marxist 
theory was a “social scientific” mode of analysis, applying basic principles (i.e., 
productive “base” as determinative of the “superstructure” law) to build legal 
institutions. Textbooks and teaching materials in PRC law schools have 
emphasized such approaches. 19  Starting in the 1990s, Chinese law professors 
began pushing back on Marxist legal theory and started integrating more civil law 
positivism into their research and teaching.20 During this period, more Chinese 
scholars studied abroad in Europe and turned to statutory analysis akin to what 
John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo called “legal science.” 21 
Chinese legal scholarship shared affinities with Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law—
that is, contrary to the Marxist view, law was divorced from such extra-legal forces 
as politics. The depoliticization of legal scholarship was equally a conscious 
decision to, as much as possible, sidestep the fraught knowledge-power 
relationship. Since Xi has been in power, the pendulum has swung back toward 
Marxist theory.22 
The above is a generalization only, but these two oscillating points have left 
little room for other approaches to law, including those of the contemporary social 
sciences (i.e., sociology, anthropology, political science, non-Marxist economics, 
etc.). Yet, there have been strands of social scientific thought that have permeated 
the Chinese legal academy as applied to domestic law, in particular, jurisprudence 
(falixue), criminal procedure, and civil procedure.23 Professor Bai Jianjun of Peking 
University was an early outlier, building datasets and using statistical methods to 
 
19  See, e.g., Falixue Bianxuezu (法理学编学组) [Jurisprudence Editorial Group], Makesizhuyi lilun 
yanjiu he jianshe gongcheng zhongdian jiaocai (马克思主义理论研究何建设工程重点教材) 
[Key Teaching Materials for Marxist Legal Theory Research and the Construction Project [of 
Building a Marxist Society]] (2012).  
20  Lei Lei (雷磊), Fajiaoyixue yu fazhi: fajiaoyixue de fali yiyi (法教义学与法治：法教义学的治理
意义) [Legal Doctrinalism and Rule of Law: The Governance Significance of Legal Doctrinalism], 
40 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究) [JURISPRUDENCE RESEARCH] 58 (2018); Jiao Baoqian (焦宝乾) 
Fajiaoyixue zai Zhongguo: Yige xueshu shi de gailan (法教义学在中国：一个学术史的概览) 
[Legal Doctrinalism in China: An Academic History Overview], 3 FAZHI YANJIU (法治研究) [RULE 
OF LAW RESEARCH] 48 (2016). 
21  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 61–67 (4th ed. 2019). 
22  See, e.g., Jiang Shigong (强世功), Dangzhang yu xianfa: Duoyuan yiti fazhi gongheguo de jiangou (
党章与宪法：多元一体法治共和国的建构 ) [Party Constitution and State Constitution: 
Constructing the Republic through Diversity-in-Unity Rule by Law], 4 WENHUA ZONGHENG (文
化纵横) [CULTURAL TRAVERSE] 18 (2015).  
23  See Sida Liu & Zhihou Wang, The Fall and Rise of Law and Social Science in China, 11 ANN. REV. L. 
SOC. SCI. 373 (2015) (providing a history of social scientific approaches to domestic law in China). 
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test hypotheses since the early 1990s.24 Today, a number of scholars apply “law 
and society” approaches, including Professors Zhu Suli, Zhu Jingwen, Ji Weidong, 
Zhao Xudong, Wang Qiliang, and many others. There has been some institutional 
support in the form of academic journals, for example, Law and Social Sciences (Falü 
he Shehuikexue) and academic research groups like the Law and Social Science 
Research Center (Falü yu shehui kuaxue keyanjiu zhongxin) at Renmin University, the 
Interdisciplinary Legal Studies Academy (Jiaocha faxue xueyuan) at the China–EU 
School of Law at CUPL, and the China Institute for Socio-Legal Studies 
(Zhongguofa yu shehui yanjiuyuan) at Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Koguan Law 
School. 
Strikingly, however, these approaches have largely not influenced the study 
of international law in China. One distinction to note is that, traditionally, scholars 
who focus on public international law and those who specialize in private 
international law operate in their own spheres of activity, with limited interaction. 
So, while it is important to distinguish between the two branches of international 
law, neither has been particularly receptive to the social sciences, although there 
has been more engagement with empirical legal studies on the side of private 
international law scholars as they tend to have more interaction with non-Chinese 
scholars. A number of Chinese legal scholars have lamented the “theoretical 
impoverishment” of Chinese international law scholarship.25 These scholars have 
bemoaned the traditional focus on normative interpretation and logical reasoning 
of international law rules without grasping the fundamental nature of international 
law and its multi-faceted effects in the international system. Of the “methods” 
identified by Professors Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter in their 1999 
piece Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers,26 only some 
have taken root in Chinese soil. The New Haven School,27 critical legal studies,28 
 
24  Bai Jianjun (白建军), Cong Zhongguo fanzui lü shuju kan zui yin, zuixing yu xingfa de guanxi (从
中国犯罪率数据看罪因、罪行与刑罚的关系) [The Relationship among Criminal Charges, 
Crime, and Penalties: A Perspective Based on China’s Crime Rate Statistics] 2 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI 
KEXUE (中国社会科学) [SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA] 144 (2010) (using multiple databases, 
including a longitudinal database of nation-wide crime rates in China from 1988–2007). 
25  Jun Zhao (俊赵), Xueke jiaocha shijiao xia guojifa yanjiu (学科交叉视角下的国际法研究) 
[International Law Research from the Interdisciplinary Perspective], GUANGMING RIBAO (光明日
报 ) [BRIGHT DAILY] (July 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/53VA-SJBL (bemoaning Chinese 
international law scholarship’s lilun pinkunhua (theoretical impoverishment)); see also Li Ming (李鸣), 
Guojifa de xingzhi ji zuoyong: Pipan guojifa de fansi (国际法的形式及作用：批判国际法的反
思) [The Form and Function of International Law: A Reappraisal of Critical International Law], 3 
ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [SINO-FOREIGN LEGAL STUDIES] 801, 817 (2020). 
26  See Abebe et al., The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (citing Steven 
R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999)). 
27  Wang Guiguo, The New Haven School of Legal Theory from the Perspective of Traditional Chinese Culture, 20 
ASIA PAC. L. REV. 211, 212 (2012). 
28  See, e.g., Li, supra note 25.  
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and Third World Approaches to International Law29 have their adherents in China 
but have mainly not entered the academic mainstream. Law and economics, 
however, has gained much more traction.30 The determining factor in the relative 
success of such “methods”31 seems to be the ability of the pioneers of these 
approaches to steer the scholarship toward the developmental aims of the Party-
State. 
Social scientific approaches have gained some measure of currency in the 
policy areas identified above: economic, security, and world opinion interests.32 
There are a number of notable examples. Perhaps the most amount of empirical 
work has been done on issues that touch on China’s economic interests; for 
instance, research has been conducted on investment law, including the legal risks 
in Chinese enterprises’ outbound investment strategies,33 and the enforcement of 
foreign judgments in PRC courts.34 In the category of security interests, there have 
been a number of studies on arbitration under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).35 As to world opinion, Chinese scholars have 
made particular efforts in the area of human rights law.36 So while there have been 
some advancements made in introducing social scientific approaches to 
international law, compared to the English-language literature, the methodological 
 
29  See, e.g., Li Hongfeng (李洪峰), Lun guojifa disanshijie fangfa de pipanxing (论国际法第三世界
方法的批判性) [Discussion of TWAIL], 65 SHEHUI KEXUEJIA (社会科学家) [SOCIAL SCIENTIST] 
88 (2011). 
30  See, e.g., CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW, SCHOOL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(Fa yu jingji yanjiuyuan), https://perma.cc/BD2F-9QA8. 
31  See Abebe et al., supra note 26, at 3 (citing Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in 
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012) (noting that the “methods” are really 
mainly theoretical and analytical projects and not methods in the social scientific sense)). 
32  See supra Section II.A. 
33  See, e.g., Wang Xiaofeng (王晓峰) & Wang Linbin (王林彬), Zhongguo zai zhongya zhijie touzi suo 
mianlin de falü jiqi fengxian tantao – yi Hasakesitan gongheguo wei li (中国在中亚直接投资所面
临的法律及其风险探讨—以哈萨克斯坦共和国为例) [Discussion of the Laws and Risks Faced 
by Chinese Direct Investment in Central Asia: Taking the Republic of Kazakhstan as an Example], 
85 JIANGXI CAIJING DAXUE XUEBAO (江西财经大学学报) [JOURNAL OF JIANGXI UNIVERSITY OF 
FINANCE & ECONOMICS] 113 (2013).  
34  See, e.g., He Qisheng (何其生), Guoji shangshi zhongcai sifa shencha zhong de gonggong zhengce 
(国际商事仲裁司法审查中的公共政策) [Public Policy in Judicial Review of International 
Commercial Arbitration], 7 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCE] 
143 (2014). 
35  See, e.g., GAO JIANJUN (高健军), Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue xiang xia zhongcai chengxu guize 
yanjiu (联合国海洋法公约：向下仲裁程序规则研究 ) [RESEARCH ON ARBITRATION 
PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA] (2020). 
36  See, e.g., Zhao Shukun (赵树坤) & Mao Kui (毛奎), Zhongguo renquan yanjiu de zhutixing juexing 
yu xingsi: 1978–2018 (中国人权研究的主体性觉醒与省思: 1978-2018) [The Realization of the 
Centrality of Chinese Human Rights Research: 1978–2018], 1 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO 
(华东政法大学学报) [EAST NORMAL POLITICS AND LAW UNIVERSITY JOURNAL] 103, 103 (2019) 
(calling for greater use of social scientific approaches to studying human rights). 
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rigor of Chinese empirical studies of international law may be less widespread and 
more diluted. 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg juxtapose social scientific approaches to 
international law with critical ones. While this distinction may be less clear in 
practice, Chinese scholarship on international law has certainly gravitated toward 
the critical. A number of scholars and jurists have produced works that assume a 
strongly normative position regarding the origins, framework, and operation of 
international law.37 While it is difficult to generalize about this diverse body of 
scholarship, the authors share, to varying degrees, the view that aspects of 
international law are created by Western liberal states and are hegemonic. Many 
of these works seek to counter such Western-led (and primarily U.S.–driven) 
hegemony by greater influence from China. These works may dovetail with 
Marxism, critical legal studies, or TWAIL schools, but they more often rely on 
certain culturalist assumptions about “China” (the Chinese state, Chinese culture, 
“the Chinese people,” and/or Chinese civilization). “China” stands for a presence 
in international law that promotes non-intervention, is consensual and 
harmonious, is friendly to the interests of developing countries, and prefers such 
methods of dispute resolution as mediation over litigation. The critical approach 
does not, for the most part, employ empirical methods, and so there is a 
divergence between the critical and social scientific views in the Chinese 
scholarship. 
III.  PROBING THE DOUBLE FIREWALL  
One way to understand this divergence is with reference to the notion of 
what could be called the “double firewall” that exists in Chinese legal scholarship. 
The double firewall refers to, on the one hand, the barrier between the English-
language and Chinese-language literature (the “external firewall”) and, on the 
other hand, that between the domestic law scholars and international law scholars 
within China (the “internal firewall”), which itself could be further complicated by 
the partial siloing between private international law and public international law 
scholars. The double firewall operates to filter out certain approaches to law and 
to allow in others that are legitimate in the eyes of the academic censors. The 
 
37  See, e.g., WANG TIEYE ( 王铁崖 ), Guojifa Yinlun ( 国际法引论 ) [INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 272–73 (1998); XUE HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147–58 (2012); Bing Bing 
Jia, A Preliminary Study of the Title to Huangyan Island (Scarborough Reef/Shoal), 45 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L 
L. 360 (2014); GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
(2015); Liu Jingdong (刘敬东) & Wang Lulu (王路路), “Yidaiyilu” changyi chuangzhi guojifa de lujing 
yanjiu (“一带一路”倡议创制国际法的路径研究) [Research on the Route for the Belt and Road 
Initiative’s Creation of International Law], 6 XUESHU LUNTAN ( 学术论坛 ) [ACADEMIC 
DISCUSSION] 13 (2018).  
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double firewall can best be explained through a kind of sociology of knowledge 
in regard to academic institutions and practices in China. 
Starting with the internal firewall, there are pedagogical, political, and 
institutional factors that have militated against the growth of international law 
studies in the PRC. Pedagogically, compared to domestic legal studies, it is clear 
that the study of international law is relatively embryonic in China. Given that 
academic knowledge production in China is, generally, rather conservative in 
terms of its analytical, methodological, and canonical reference points, it is not 
surprising that there is some path dependency in the thinking of Chinese legal 
scholars, and that this traditionalism may be more pronounced in a field that has 
not had time to experiment, diverge, and debate.  
Politically, Chinese legal scholars have sought to align their research with the 
goals of the Party-State and have done so mainly through doctrinal analyses. 
Despite some vague nods to the value of interdisciplinary research, the social 
sciences have, for the most part, largely not (yet) been validated by the 
authorities.38 It may seem surprising, then, that scholars of domestic law have been 
more successful in integrating economic, sociological, and anthropological 
perspectives into their legal research. However, the U.S. legal academy, too, shows 
greater openness toward social scientific interdisciplinarism on domestic issues 
than on international ones, which could perhaps be explained by the incentives 
for international law scholars to publish research that conforms to the way in 
which international law organizations—organizations the scholars may want to 
join—conceive of legal problems and research.39 Of course, in the PRC, the stakes 
are much higher for Chinese legal scholars to conform. The U.S. government does 
not silence scholars for their political views, an occurrence which is not 
uncommon in the PRC.40  
There are also institutional factors that may hamper the development of 
diverse approaches to international law in China. The promotion and performance 
review system for Chinese legal scholars may encourage certain types of 
scholarship over others. There are opportunity costs associated with spending 
years to pursue a postgraduate degree in a social science discipline and to collect 
and analyze data. The job market, university administrative processes, and the 
broader discipline may not value such labors, especially in the field of international 
law where the field is so much smaller than domestic law. 
Turning to the external firewall, there are, again, linguistic, institutional, and 
political reasons that prevent diverse approaches to international law from 
entering the Chinese legal academy, whereas the Party-State patronage may result 
 
38  See Zhao, supra note 25. 
39  I thank Professor Eric Posner for this suggestion.  
40  SCHOLARS AT RISK, OBSTACLES TO EXCELLENCE: ACADEMIC FREEDOM & CHINA’S QUEST FOR 
WORLD-CLASS UNIVERSITIES 16 (2019).  
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in encouraging critical approaches to represent Chinese views. Under Xi’s 
leadership, the Chinese academy has taken a nativist turn that has strained 
intellectual exchange across the external firewall. So, for example, whereas 
previously Chinese legal scholars could publish in English language journals and 
law reviews, recently the Ministry of Education has disfavored such publication 
outlets. This has emboldened PRC university administrators to double down on 
Chinese language publications, thus strengthening the external firewall. 41 
Conversely, the nativist Trump administration spread anti-Chinese sentiment in 
the U.S. in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic; consequently, there has been a 
decline in interest in as well as funding for  intellectual exchanges with China in 
US universities. 42  For these reasons, the small spaces afforded to certain 
approaches to international law (e.g., social scientific ones) have seemingly shrunk, 
whereas critical approaches are experiencing a kind of surge. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Extending the insights of the comparative international law literature, it 
seems that contemporary trends toward nationalism and protectionism in the 
international system also shape the study of international law by scholars 
differently situated within that system. Despite the grim picture afforded by the 
Chinese double firewall, and the various hurdles it poses, there is cause for hope. 
A new generation of Chinese students are studying abroad and obtaining post-
graduate degrees in social sciences and the law. Against conformist tides and 
various forms of pressure, these scholars are bringing these methods and theories 
back to China and combining them with insights from the Chinese legal 
scholarship to create new epistemic communities, some of which will thrive and 
create transnational links. As China increasingly looks to shape international law, 
the emergent field of social scientific approaches to international law in China will 
be one touchstone for understanding what those forms may look like. 
 
41  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyubu (中华人民共和国教育部) [Ministry of Education of the 
PRC], “Guanyu pochu gaoxiao zhexue shehui kexue yanjiu pingjia zhong ‘wei lunwen’ buliang 
daoxiang de ruogan yijian” de tongzhi (《关于破除高校哲学社会科学研究评价中‘唯论文’不
良导向的若干意见》的通知) [Notice on “Several Opinions on Eliminating the Bad ‘Thesis-
Only’ Trend in the Evaluation of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Universities”] (Dec. 
10, 2020) (stating, “In the pursuit of international publication, we must not deliberately minimize 
and vilify China and undermine national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”). 
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Abstract 
 
This Essay takes up Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s invitation to use a social science 
approach to establish or ascertain some facts about international law scholarship in the United 
States. The specific research question that this Essay seeks to answer is to what extent scholarship 
has addressed international law’s historical and continuing complicity in producing racial 
inequality and hierarchy, including slavery, as well as the subjugation and domination of the 
peoples of the First Nations. To answer this question, this Essay uses the content published in 
the American Journal of International Law (AJIL) from when it was first published in 
1907 to May 2021. It also uses the content published in its sister publication AJIL Unbound 
from when it was first published in 2014 to May 2021. The most significant finding of this 
Essay is that only 64, or 1.25%, of 5,109 AJIL documents substantially engaged with race in 
the body of their texts. In AJIL Unbound, only 11, or 1.94%, of the 568 documents 
substantially engaged with race in the bodies of their text. 
To account for the extremely low number of documents substantially engaging with race in 
the pages of the leading international law journal, I advance four hypotheses. First, that this 
absence is a reflection of the conscious exclusion of African Americans in the American Society 
of International Law in the first six decades of its existence, as the 2020 Richardson Report 
found. Second, it is the result of the stringent scrutiny race scholarship in international law has 
faced in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. Third, that the big or defining debates about international 
law in the United States have focused on issues other than race, and fourth that color-blindness 
has been the default view of American international law scholarship as represented in the journal. 
Ultimately, the point of this Essay is threefold. First, to show that the social science 
approach that Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg advance can be useful to answer questions that 
 
  Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law and Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School 
of Law. I thank my research assistants Michael John Cornell, Romina Nemaei, Caitlin Chenus, and 
Audrey Mallinak for their invaluable assistance with this ongoing project. I also thank Loyola’s 
international reference librarian, Julienne Grant, for her important contributions to the research 
process and methodology. Finally, I would also like to thank Tom Ginsburg, Christiane Wilke, and 
Mohsen al Attar for their extensive comments on the draft of this Essay. All errors are mine. 
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critical scholars like myself are interested in. Second, that when this social science approach is 
applied to answer questions like the one pursued in this Essay the distinction between the 
neutrality of the scientific methodology of this social scientific approach, on the one hand, and the 
normativity of critical approaches that Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg argue characterizes other 
approaches, on the other, falls apart. Third, this Essay shows that there is still ample scope for 
more international law scholarship on race that needs to be taken up not only by scholars of color 
but by all scholars of international law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
This Essay sets out to determine to what extent scholarship has addressed 
international law’s historical and continuing complicity in producing racial 
inequality and hierarchy, including slavery, as well as the subjugation and 
domination of the peoples of the First Nations. To answer this question, this 
Essay uses the content published in the American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 
from its inception in 1907 through 2021, as well as in AJIL Unbound, its online 
companion, from its first publication in 2014 through 2021.1 I want to make it 
clear from the onset that my research question is very narrow. I am interested only 
in establishing whether scholarship that probes the racist underpinnings of 
international law, as well as the racial hierarchies upon which international law was 
constructed, has been published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. In doing so, I am 
excluding from the scope of this paper the ways in which AJIL was itself a site of 
racialized discourses such as “civilization” and “humanity.”2 Other scholars have 
begun to examine AJIL’s complicity in the construction and perpetuation of 
racially exclusionary discourses such as “civilization” and “humanity.” Benjamin 
Allen Coates reminds us, very early in its founding, AJIL justified spreading U.S. 
hegemony not merely through the notion of “civilizing savages,” but rather that 
of civilizing “the world as a whole”3 in the progressive era commitment and faith 
in the progress of civilization “whether conceived of in terms of Christianity, 
natural or social science, governance, or commerce.”4 In fact, international law 
was critical to justifying the U.S.’s annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, 
the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba, and the takeover of Panama to 
build a canal.5 It is against this backdrop of the end of the Spanish-American War 
and the emerging empire acquired by the United States that AJIL came into 
existence.6 Benjamin Allen Coates therefore argues that AJIL Board members of 
the early twentieth century were “not isolated idealists spouting naive bromides 
from the sidelines. Well-connected, well-respected, and well-compensated, they 
 
1  AJIL was first published in 1907, whereas AJIL Unbound was first published in 2014.  
2  See, e.g., Christiane Wilke, Reconsecrating the Temple of Justice: Invocations of Civilization and Humanity in the 
Nuremberg Justice Case, 24 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 181 (2009). 
3  BENJAMIN ALLEN COATES, LEGALIST EMPIRE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 83 (2016). 
4  Id. at 43. 
5  Id. at 1. 
6  Carl Landauer, The Ambivalence of Power: Launching the American Journal of International Law in an 
Era of Empire and Globalization, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 325, 328 (2007). 
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formed an integral part of the foreign policy establishment that built and policed 
an expanding empire.”7 
To emphasize, I am interested in whether AJIL and AJIL Unbound have 
published scholarship that critically engages with the racist and imperial structures 
of international law that justified slavery, colonialism, and empire. I am also 
interested in examining AJIL’s role in constructing and perpetuating racially 
exclusionary discourses.8 To use Mohsen al Attar’s extensive comments on an 
earlier version of this Essay, I am interested in establishing whether the American 
international legal academy has been complicit “in collective acts of epistemic 
injustice.”9 In particular, has AJIL and AJIL Unbound silenced and/or excluded 
critical approaches to international law, especially those influenced by Critical 
Race Theory or Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), in the 
pages of the leading international law journal in the United States?10 
 
7  COATES, supra note 3, at 3. Coates concludes that lawyers were therefore “ideological actors as much 
as technical advisers.” Id. at 180. See D.J. Bederman, Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American 
Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 62 (2006) (“American international lawyers, 
speaking through AJIL, have advanced U.S. policy initiatives, doctrines and positions even while 
vehemently disagreeing with some. Aside from these specific situations, these writers have tended 
(although by no means uniformly…) to believe that the project of international law is a worthwhile 
one that holds promise for world order.”). 
8  See, e.g., Wilke, supra note 2, at 181. In this article, Wilke shows that “the 1918–1947 volumes of the 
American Journal of International Law (AJIL), published by the American Society of International Law, 
reveal that the concept of civilization was frequently used in the period following the end of World 
War I, declined in popularity at the end of the 1920s, and experienced a remarkable renaissance in 
the decade between 1938 and 1947.” Id. at 187. The premise in the article is that the “standard of 
civilization” that was “dominant in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth century international 
law . . . [was] an expression of the idea that international law is a body of norms for civilized states 
only.” Id. at 186. For another analysis of how imperialism was redefined as civilization, see 
Mohammad Shahabuddin, The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Kaw: Intellectual Perspectives from 
Pre-War Japan, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 13 (2019); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 84–86 (2004) (noting that independent non-European 
states like Japan could be brought into the realm of international law if they met the “requirements 
of the standard of civilization of, and being officially recognized by, European states, as proper 
members of the family of nations” and discussing how these non-European societies were required 
to meet the standard of civilization). This standard of civilization shifted in the nineteenth century. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the criteria included Christianity. In the second half, it 
was predicated on “European culture and institutions—in particular, the ability to furnish 
Europeans with legal, economic, and later, political institutions to which they had become 
accustomed.” Rose Parfitt, Empire des Nègres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the 
Abyssinia Crisis of 1935-36, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 849, 858 (2011). 
9  Mohsen al Attar, Subverting Racism in / Through International Law Scholarship, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 3, 
2021), https://perma.cc/M9KT-N3Q9; see also Mohsen al Attar, “I Can’t Breathe”: Confronting the 
Racism of International Law, AFRONOMICSLAW (Oct. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/6HAK-GLQB. 
10  Further, al Attar argues that “[n]on-Eurocentric perspectives enjoy lesser status, unless they are 
measured against a European benchmark and preferably by a white scholar. Despite international 
law’s brutal history and generations of Critical Race Theory, race receives minimal uptake among 
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The results of my empirical analysis showed that only 64, or 1.25%, of 5,109 
AJIL documents substantially engaged with race in the body of their texts. In 
AJIL Unbound, only 11, or 1.94%, of the 568 documents substantially engaged 
with race in the bodies of their text. 
To explain the extremely little content published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound 
over 100 years addressing international law’s historical and continuing complicity 
in producing racial inequality and hierarchy, including slavery, as well as the 
subjugation and domination of the peoples of the First Nations, this Essay 
advances four hypotheses. First, this absence is a reflection of the conscious 
exclusion of African Americans in the American Society of International Law in 
the first six decades of its existence, as the 2020 Richardson Report found.11 
Second, this gap is the result of the stringent scrutiny international law scholarship 
addressing international law’s historical and continuing complicity in producing 
racial inequality and hierarchy has faced in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. Third, the big 
or defining debates about international law in the United States have focused on 
issues other than race. And fourth, color-blindness has been the default view of 
American international law scholarship as represented in the journal. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Section II, I outline the methodology I 
followed in gathering the data. The third section of the Essay is my ongoing effort 
to account for the paucity of scholarship centering race in AJIL and AJIL 
Unbound. 
II.  AJIL  CONTENT-ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS  
In order to determine an answer to my question—whether scholarship that 
probes the racist and imperial underpinnings of international law, as well as the 
racial hierarchies upon which international law was constructed, has been 
published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound—my methodology was as follows. I began 
by establishing whether there was such content in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. To do 
so, I searched the content of AJIL and AJIL Unbound using HeinOnline’s Law 
Journal Library.12 Although AJIL and AJIL Unbound documents can be accessed 
 
international lawyers. Last, many non-racialised scholars fail to appreciate how their approach 
toward racialised academics places us at an unfair disadvantage.” al Attar, Subverting Racism in / 
Through International Law Scholarship, supra note 9. 
11  AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., THE RICHARDSON REPORT, FINAL REPORT FROM THE ASIL AD HOC 
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE EXCLUSION OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF MINORITY 
MEMBERSHIP OR PARTICIPATION BY THE SOCIETY DURING ITS FIRST SIX DECADES (2020) 
[hereinafter THE RICHARDSON REPORT]. This report was drafted by an ad hoc committee appointed 
pursuant to American Society of International Law Executive Council Resolution of 4th April 2018. 
Its mandate was to investigate possible exclusion or discouragement of minority membership or 
participation in the Society during its first six decades. The report was unanimously adopted by the 
ASIL Executive Council in its meeting on April 2, 2020. 
12  HeinOnline’s Law Journal Library is available to subscribers through the HeinOnline platform. A 
description of the content is available at https://perma.cc/Y2GH-LP8S. 
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from the Cambridge Core site,13 HeinOnline served as a much better tool for this 
study for at least two reasons. First, unlike Cambridge Core, HeinOnline makes it 
possible to simultaneously search AJIL and AJIL Unbound. Second, since 
Cambridge Core represents the main portal for subscriptions and sales of these 
two publications, using a third-party content site seemed to me more likely to 
provide an objective count of the content. 
To determine whether the content published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound has 
probed the racist and imperial underpinnings of international law, I undertook the 
following steps. First, I conducted an Advanced Search in the HeinOnline Law 
Journal Library using the search string “rac* OR anti-racis* OR antiracis*” and 
limiting my results to documents in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. This search was 
designed to retrieve all documents in AJIL and AJIL Unbound that contained any 
forms of the word “race,” or any of the words “antiracist,” “antiracism,” “anti-
racist,” or “anti-racism.”14 I then restricted these search results to the following 
AJIL and AJIL Unbound section types: Articles, Comments, Notes, Reviews, and 
Editorials.15 AJIL content that is purely informational, such as Tables of Contents 
and Legislation, was omitted.16 Thus, the relevant content for my inquiry 
numbered 1,535 documents in AJIL and 121 in AJIL Unbound, and the total 
number of documents for the study sample was 1,656.  
Next, I examined each of these 1,656 documents individually to determine 
which ones substantially probed the racist and imperial underpinnings of 
international law, as well as the racial hierarchies upon which international law was 
constructed.17 By substantial engagement with race, I am referring to articles that 
critically examine race (rather than say, states) as a unit of analysis to account for 
the role racial hierarchy and domination have played and plays in shaping and 
 
13  See American Journal of International Law, CAMBRIDGE CORE, https://perma.cc/5ANB-SDPU; AJIL 
Unbound, CAMBRIDGE CORE, https://perma.cc/92S4-Z553. 
14  I restrict my analysis to race, rather than to terms such as imperialism and colonialism because my 
central inquiry relates to establishing if there has been blindness to race and its central role in 
shaping international law and justifying other regimes of subordinating non-white peoples including 
slavery and colonialism in the scholarship published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. 
15  “Articles” includes “Lead Articles,” “Notes” includes “Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law,” “Comments” includes “Editorial Comments,” and “Reviews” 
includes “Book Reviews.” 
16  The AJIL and AJIL Unbound content omitted in my analysis, such as Miscellaneous items, Tables 
of Contents, and Legislation, does not usually include commentary and is included in AJIL primarily 
for informational purposes. The content was excluded here since it did not provide analysis that 
would contribute to establishing the answer to my primary query in this Article—namely, whether 
the content published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound has probed the racist underpinnings of 
international law, as well as the racial hierarchies upon which international law was constructed.  
17  Because there is a two-year embargo on the full text of the AJIL in HeinOnline, the full texts of 
the most recent documents included in the set were examined in Westlaw.   
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organizing ideas and institutions of global order including slavery, colonialism, and 
empire. 
To comprehensively assess which of the documents engaged in a substantial 
analysis of the racist and imperial underpinnings of international law, I also 
identified documents that (a) mentioned “race” as understood to refer to ethnicity, 
identity, color or national or ethnic origin; (b) referred to “race” in a 
boilerplate/statutory/general language form or merely in a list, i.e., these 
documents used “race” without referring to race, color, or national or ethnic 
origin; (c) used “race” in a quotation, citation, or footnote; (d) used “race” 
sporadically or in a one-off manner, i.e., “race” was mentioned only very 
occasionally, and it was not the primary focus of analysis; and (e) included “race” 
in the titles or subtitles of the documents.  
To continue the analysis, I determined the total number of AJIL and AJIL 
Unbound documents in HeinOnline by conducting an Advanced Search in the Law 
Journal Library using “*” as the search term and restricting the search to AJIL 
and AJIL Unbound. I then limited the search results to the same section types 
included in the relevant sample set as described above, which yielded a total of 
5,677 documents. For AJIL, the search produced a total of 5,109 documents. For 
AJIL Unbound, there was a total of 568 documents.18 With this data in hand, as 
well as the results of my earlier AJIL and AJIL Unbound content analysis, I was 
able to address my research question head on.  
The data unequivocally shows that AJIL and AJIL Unbound have not 
frequently engaged with race. This is clearly illustrated by the finding that only 64, 
or 1.25%, of 5,109 AJIL documents substantially engaged with race in the body 
of their texts. Furthermore, of the 5,109 total documents in AJIL, 1,004, or 
19.65%, incorporated the word “race.” Of those 1,004 documents, 489 of them, 
or 9.57% of all 5,109 documents, used “race” in a boilerplate, statutory, general, 
or list-embedded context. Moreover, 515, or 10.08%, of the 5,109 documents did 
not use “race” in a boilerplate, statutory, general, or list-embedded context. 
Finally, only 5, or 0.10%, of the 5,109 documents had “race” in their title. 
Similarly, in AJIL Unbound, only 11, or 1.94%, of the 568 documents 
substantially engaged with race in the bodies of their text. Moreover, of the 568 
documents published in AJIL Unbound, 60, or 10.56%, incorporated the word 
“race.” Of those 60 documents, 30 of them, or 5.28% of all 568 documents, used 
“race” in a boilerplate, statutory, general, or list-embedded context. Finally, only 
2, or 0.35%, of the 568 documents had “race” in their title. 
 
18  When “*” is used as a search term without limiting the results to certain section types, then 7,535 
results appear for AJIL, and 571 for AJIL Unbound. However, to ensure a proper comparison with 
the documents individually reviewed, these baseline totals were limited to Articles, Comments, 
Notes, Reviews, and Editorials. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, there were 5,109 total 
documents in AJIL, and 568 documents in AJIL Unbound.  
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These results are presented in more detail in the following data tables (Tables 
1, 2, and 3) and related charts (Charts 1 and 2). Appendix 1 lists all the AJIL 
documents that mentioned “race” in the bodies of their text, and Appendix 2 
contains a full list of AJIL Unbound documents that mentioned “race” in their 
texts. In Appendix 3, Table 5 and Chart 3 analyze the documents listed in 
Appendices 1 and 2. Appendices are published separately on Chicago Unbound. 
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Table 1: AJIL (1907–May 2021) & AJIL Unbound (2014–May 2021) 
Compared  
  AJIL  % 
AJIL 















identity, color or 
national or 
ethnic origin  1,004 19.65 60 10.56 
Documents 





contexts 489 9.57 30 5.28 
Documents not 





contexts 515 10.08 30 5.28 
Documents with 
(sub)titular 
reference to race 5 0.10 2 0.35 
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Table 2: AJIL & AJIL Unbound Combined 
  
AJIL & AJIL 
Unbound % 
Total Articles, Comments, Notes, 
Reviews, and Editorials 5,677 100.00 
Documents substantially engaging with 
“race”  75 1.32 
Documents that mentioned “race” as 
understood to refer to ethnicity, identity, 
color or national or ethnic origin 1,064 18.74 
Documents using “race” in boilerplate, 
statutory, general, or list-embedded 
contexts 519 9.14 
Documents not using “race” in 
boilerplate, statutory, general, or list-
embedded contexts 545 9.60 
Documents with (sub)titular reference to 





Proportion of AJIL documents substantially engaging with 
“race” (1907–May 2021)
Documents substantially engaging with “race”
Documents not substantially engaging with “race”
1.25%
98.75%
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Chart 2 
 
Table 3: List of AJIL documents substantially engaging with “race” 
(1907–May 2021)  
Title Citation Author(s) 
1 Protection of Minorities by the 
League of Nations  




2 Some Legal Aspects of the 
Japanese Question  





3 The End of Dominion Status  38 AM. J. INT’L L. 34 
(1944) 
Scott, F.R.  
4 Current Views of the Soviet 
Union of the International 
Organization of Security, 
Economic Cooperation and 
International Law: A 
Summary  
39 AM. J. INT’L L. 450 
(1945) 
Prince, Charles  
5 Book Review (reviewing 
CAREY MCWILLIAMS, 
PREJUDICE: JAPANESE-
AMERICANS, SYMBOL OF 
RACIAL INTOLERANCE 
(1994)) 
39 AM. J. INT’L L. 634 
(1945) 
Das, Taraknath 
Proportion of AJIL Unbound documents substantially 
engaging with “race” (2014–May 2021)
Documents substantially engaging with “race”
Documents not substantially engaging with “race”
1.94%
98.06%
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Title Citation Author(s) 
6 Denazification Law and 
Procedure  
41 AM. J. INT’L L. 807 
(1947) 
Plischke, Elmer  
7 The United Nations 
Conference on Freedom of 
Information and the 
Movement against 
International Propaganda  




8 An “Act for the Protection of 
Peace” in Bulgaria (current 
notes) 
a) 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 
353 (1951); b) id. at 357 
Nicoloff, 
Antoni M 
9 National Courts and 
Human Rights—The Fujii 
Case  
45 AM. J. INT’L L. 62 
(1951) 
Wright, Quincy  
10 The Trieste Settlement and 
Human Rights (notes and 
comments) 
49 AM. J. INT’L L. 240 
(1955) 
Schwelb, Egon  
11 International Law and Some 
Recent Developments in the 
Commonwealth (editorial 
comments) 




12 The United Nations’ Double 
Standard on Human Rights 
Complaints (notes and 
comments) 
60 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 
(1966) 
Carey, John  
13 Civil and Political Rights: 
The International Measures 
of Implementation  
62 AM. J. INT’L L. 827 
(1968) 
Schwelb, Egon  
14 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law: South 
West Africa (Namibia) 




15 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law: Summary 
of Developments During 23d 
Session of the U.N. General 
Assembly 
63 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 
(1969) 
Gibson, 
Stephen L. ed. 
16 64th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of 




Studying Race in International Law Scholarship Gathii 
 
Summer 2021 83 
 
Title Citation Author(s) 
International Law (notes 
and comments) 
17 The International Court of 
Justice and the Human 
Rights Clauses of the Charter  
66 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 
(1972) 
Schwelb, Egon  
18 The 1974 Diplomatic 
Conference on Humanitarian 
Law: Some Observations  
69 AM. J. INT’L L. 77 
(1975) 
Forsythe, 
David P.  




AND ETHICAL CHOICES 
BETWEEN LOYALTY TO 
TEAM AND LOYALTY TO 
CONSCIENCE IN 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 
(1975))  
71 AM. J. INT’L L. 160 
(1977) 
Rusk, Dean 
20 Constitutive Questions in the 
Negotiations for Namibian 
Independence  




21 The Meaning and Reach of 
the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination  




22 Federalism and the 
International Legal Order: 
Recent Developments in 
Australia  






23 Current Developments:  First 
Session of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 
(1987) 
Alson, Philip & 
Simma, Bruno  
24 The Meaning of People in the 
African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (notes 
and comments) 
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80 
(1988) 
Kiwanuka, 
Richard N.  
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Title Citation Author(s) 
26 Agora: Is the ASIL Policy 
on Divestment in Violation 
of International Law? 
Further Observations 
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 311 
(1988) 
Barrie, George 
N. & Szasz, 
Paul C. 
27 International Law in the 
Third Reich  




28 Feminist Approaches to 
International Law  






Wright, Shelley  
29 The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance  
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 
(1992) 
Franck, 
Thomas M.  
30 Book Review (reviewing 
PATRICK THORNBERRY, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE RIGHTS OF 
MINORITIES (1993)) 




31 The Gulf Crisis and African-
American Interests under 
International Law  
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 
(1993) 
Richardson III, 
Henry J.  
32 Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, 
Identity and Community in 
Law and Practice  
90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 
(1996) 
Franck, 
Thomas M.  
33 Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law: A 
Constructivist Approach to 
the Asian Controversy  




34 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law (General 
International and U.S. 
Foreign Relations Law): 
Interpretation of U.S. 
Constitution by Reference to 
International Law 
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Title Citation Author(s) 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2002)) 
36 Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 
(2006) 
Shelton, Dinah   




WORLD SOCIETY (2007)) 




38 Book Review (reviewing 




103 AM. J. INT’L L. 180 
(2009) 
Rodríguez, 
Christina M.  
39 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law 
(International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law): 
United States Boycotts 
Durban Review Conference, 
Will Seek Election to 
Human Rights Council 
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 355 
(2009) 
Crook, John R. 
40 The Pillar of Glass: Human 
Rights in the Development 
Operations of the United 
Nations  





41 Current Developments: The 
2008 Judicial Activity of the 
International Court of Justice 




42 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law 
(International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law): 
UN Human Rights Officials 
Berate U.S. Human Rights 
Policies and Practices 
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 594 
(2009) 
Crook, John R. 
43 Book Review (reviewing 
DANIEL MOECKLI, 
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Title Citation Author(s) 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE ‘WAR ON 
TERROR’ (2008)) 
44 Book Review (reviewing 
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, 
A LUCKY CHILD: A 
MEMOIR OF SURVIVING 
AUSCHWITZ AS A YOUNG 
BOY (2010)) 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 307 
(2010) 
Damrosch, 
Lori Fisler  
45 Book Review (reviewing 
HENRY J. RICHARDSON 





104 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 
(2010) 
Gordon, Ruth  
46 Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples on the African 
Continent: Concepts, Position 
Seeking, and the Interaction 
of Legal Systems  




47 Book Review (reviewing 
JEREMY I. LEVITT, 




104 AM. J. INT’L L. 532 
(2010) 
Mutua, Makau  
48 A New International Law of 
Citizenship  
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694 
(2011) 
Spiro, Peter J.  
49 Application of the 
International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian 
Federation) 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 
(2011) 
Szewczyk, Bart 
M. J.  
50 Genocide: A Normative 
Account 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 852 
(2011) 
Greenawalt, 
Alexander K.A.  
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Title Citation Author(s) 
51 Current Developments: The 
2011 Judicial Activity of the 
International Court of Justice 










AND THE POLITICS OF 
UNIVERSALITY (2011)) 




53 Book Review (reviewing 







108 AM. J. INT’L L. 576 
(2014) 
Sloss, David  
54 Exploitation Creep and the 
Unmaking of Human 
Trafficking Law  




55 The Creation of Tribunals 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 173 
(2016) 
Matheson, 
Michael J. & 
Scheffer, David  
56 The 2017 Judicial Activity of 
the International Court of 
Justice (notes and 
comments) 
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 254 
(2018) 
Gray, Christine  
57 Book Review (reviewing 
OONA A. HATHAWAY & 
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE 
INTERNATIONALISTS: 
HOW A RADICAL PLAN 
TO OUTLAW WAR 
REMADE THE WORLD 
(2017)) 




58 Human Rights in War: On 
the Entangled Foundations of 
the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions  
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 553 
(2018) 
van Dijk, Boyd  
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Title Citation Author(s) 
59 Book Review (reviewing 
DAVID L. SLOSS, THE 









60 Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to 
International Law (General 
International and U.S. 
Foreign Relations Law): 
Department of Justice 
Declines to Defend the 
Constitutionality of a Statute 
Criminalizing Female 
Genital Mutilation  
114 AM. J. INT’L L. 289 
(2020) 
Galbraith, Jean 
61 The Proof Is in the Process: 
Self-Reporting under 
International Human Rights 
Treaties  
114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2020) 
Creamer, 
Cosette D. & 
Simmons, Beth 
A.  
62 The Pandemic Paradox in 
International Law 








63 The Limits of Human Rights 
Limits (reviewing HURST 
HANNUM, RESCUING 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
RADICALLY MODERATE 
APPROACH (2019))  




64 Book Review (reviewing 
BERTRAND G. 
RAMCHARAN, 
MODERNIZING THE UN 
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
(2019) 
115 AM. J. INT’L L. 171 
(2021) 
Chimni, B. S.  
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Table 4: List of AJIL Unbound documents substantially engaging with 
“race” (2014–May 2021) 
S. No. Title Citation Author(s) 
1 A Crossroads in the Fight 
Against Human Trafficking? 
Let’s take the Structural 
Route: A Response to Janie 
Chuang Symposium: Janie 
A. Chuang, Exploitation 
Creep and the Unmaking of 
Human Trafficking Law 




2 Why Fighting Structural 
Inequalities Requires 
Institutionalizing Difference: 
A Response to Nienke 
Grossman Symposium on 
Nienke Grossman, Achieving 
Sex-Representative 
International Court Benches 
110 AJIL UNBOUND 92 
(2016-2017) 
Torbisco-
Casals, Neus  
3 Human Mobility and the 
Longue Duree: The 
Prehistory of Global 
Migration Law Symposium 
on Framing Global 
Migration Law - Part II 




4 Human Rights and the 
Future of Being Human 
Symposium on the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights at Seventy 




5 Race and Rights in the 
Digital Age Symposium on 
the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights at Seventy 




6 Theorizing Emancipatory 
Transnational Futures of 
International Labor Law 
Symposium on Transnational 
Futures of International 
Labor Law 
113 AJIL UNBOUND 
390 (2019) 
Blackett, Adelle  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 90 Vol. 22 No. 1 
S. No. Title Citation Author(s) 
7 Towards Global Governance: 
The Inadequacies of the UN 
Drug Control Regime 








Howse, Robert  
8 Introduction to the 
Symposium on COVID-19, 
Global Mobility and 
International Law 









9 Fortress Europe, Global 
Migration & the Global 
Pandemic Symposium on 
COVID-19, Global 
Mobility and International 
Law 
114 AJIL UNBOUND 
342 (2020) 
Reynolds, John  
10 “To Restore the Soul of 
America”: How Domestic 
Anti-Racism Might Fuel 
Global Anti-Racism 
Symposium on the Biden 
Administration and the 
International Legal Order: 
Essay 
115 AJIL UNBOUND 63 
(2021) 
Lovelace, H. 
Timothy Jr.  
11 Introduction to the 
Symposium on the Biden 
Administration and the 
International Legal Order 




Sloss, David L.  
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III.  EXPLAINING THE RESULTS  
What explains the extremely low engagement with race as a theme in AJIL 
and AJIL Unbound? From AJIL’s founding in 1907 to May 2021, only 1.25% of 
its documents (64 out of 5,109) substantially engaged with race in the body of 
their text, and only 0.10% (5 out of 5,109) had race in their titles. Likewise, from 
AJIL Unbound’s establishment in 2014 to the beginning of 2021, only 1.94% of its 
documents (11 out of 568) substantially engaged with race in the body of their 
text, and only 0.35% (2 out of 568) had race in their titles. This is indicative of a 
silence that requires further exploration. 
It is implausible and factually inaccurate to explain this silence as indicative 
of the irrelevance of race in international law. Bearing in mind that I use race to 
refer to relations of domination rather than personal prejudice, at least since the 
sixteenth century when Francisco de Vitoria wrote his treaties, international law 
has justified slavery, conquest, colonialism, commerce, and other forms of 
domination over non-European peoples by European peoples. As Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
scholars have shown, international law legitimized colonial conquest along the 
axes of European/non-European, colonizer/colonized, civilized/uncivilized, and 
modernity/tradition.19 On this view: 
imperial international law was constructed on the basis of White racial 
superiority—as rational stewards of the territories of non-Europeans—and 
on the basis of racist myths of indigenous savagery, primitivism, and 
pathology. Hence, just as slavery dehumanized Blacks as degenerate and 
outside the boundaries of humanity in the construction of the United States 
as a White racial state, European/White international law was constructed to 
relegate non-European peoples who were considered to live outside the 
bounds of humanity and therefore outside of sovereignty.20 
TWAIL scholars argue that notwithstanding international law’s 
commitments to sovereign equality, human rights, and development, it carries 
within it the legacy of economic subordination and hierarchy established in prior 
eras of subjugation, including during slavery and colonial rule.21 Consistent with 
this rejection of clean historical breaks in histories of international law, race 
continues to be a salient analytic category in international law. As Antony Anghie 
argues, understanding the “role of race and culture in the formation of basic 
international law doctrines such as sovereignty is crucial to an understanding of 
 
19  For a leading text demonstrating this, see ANGHIE, supra note 8. 
20  James Thuo Gathii, Writing Race and Identity in a Global Context: What CRT and TWAIL Can Learn 
from Each Other, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1610, 1613 (2021).  
21  See James Thuo Gathii, The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), in 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack 
eds., forthcoming 2021). 
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the singular relationship between sovereignty and the non-European world.”22 In 
addition, to use the example of Black intellectuals, there is a strong Black 
internationalist tradition.23 This intellectual tradition, associated in particular with 
anti-slavery and anti-colonialism, runs from W.E.B. DuBois, who argued the 
problem of the twentieth century was the color line, to contemporary colleagues 
like Ruth Gordon, Henry J. Richardson III, and Adrien Katherine Wing, to name 
a few.24 In addition, in my ongoing research, I continue to uncover other African 
 
22  ANGHIE, supra note 8, at 103. 
23  See generally KEISHA N. BLAIN ET AL., NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE BLACK INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
(2018). 
24  There is also no evidence that the quality of scholarship on race and international law is the reason 
that accounts for this legacy of exclusion. To make such an argument is to claim that scholarship 
on race is inferior or that scholars, especially scholars of color interested in producing this 
scholarship, are lazy and have not produced such scholarship. In fact, there is a strong Black 
tradition of international law. For examples of scholarship on race and international law that prove 
the existence of such scholarship, see Adrian Katherine Wing, Critical Race Feminism and the 
International Human Rights of Women in Bosnia, Palestine and South Africa: Issues for LatCrit Theory, 28 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 337 (1996); Branwen Jones, Race in the Ontology of International Order, 56 
POL. STUD. 907 (2008); Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Economic Order: Critical 
Race Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1 (1999); Ediberto 
Roman, A Race Approach to International Law (RAIL): Is There Need for Yet Another Critique of 
International Law?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1519 (2000); Ediberto Roman, Reconstructing Self- 
Determination: The Role of Critical Theory in the Positivist International Law Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
943 (1999); Edwin D. Davis & Betty Punnett, International Assignments: Is There a Role for Gender and 
Race in Decisions?, 6 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. (1995); Gil Gott, Critical Race Globalism? Global Political 
Economy, and the Intersections of Race, Nation and Class, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1503 (2000); Henry J. 
Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal History: The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine 
and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1091 (2000); Henry J. Richardson III, 
Reverend Leon Sullivan’s Principles, Race, and International Law: A Comment, 15 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 55–80 (2001); Tayyab Mahmud, International Law and the Race-Ed Colonial Encounter: 
Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness: International Dimensions of Critical Race Theory, 91 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 414 (1997); James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity: Book Review, 9 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 184 (1998); James Wilets, From Divergence to Convergence? A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of LGBTI Rights in the Context of Race and Post-Colonialism, 21 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631 
(2010); Jordan Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18 MICH. INT’L L. REV. 659 
(1996); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, The “Third World” of International Law and Critical 
Race Theory, 5 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000); Kim Beneta Vera, From Papal Bull to Racial Rule: Indians of the 
Americas, Race, and the Foundations of International Law, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 453 (2011); Makau Matua, 
Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000); 
Martti Koskenneimi, Race, Hierarchy and International Law: Lorimier’s Legal Science, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
415 (2016); Penelope Andrews, Making Room for Critical Race Theory in International Law: Some Practical 
Pointers, 45 VILL. L. REV. 855 (2000); Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: 
Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000); Robert Knox, Civilizing Interventions? Race, War 
and International Law, 1 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. (2013); Ronit Lentin, Palestine/Israel and State 
Criminality: Exception, Settler Colonialism and Racialization, 5 ST. CRIME J. 32, (2016); Sankaran Krishna, 
Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations, 26 ALTERNATIVES 401 (2001); Siba Grovogui, 
Come to Africa: A Hermeneutics of Race in International Law, 26 ALTERNATIVES 425 (2001); Taylor Natsu 
Saito, From Slavery and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa: An Essay on Race and Property in International 
Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1135 (2000); and Twila Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, 
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American international law scholars who have also remained invisible in the 
casebooks, journal pages, and discussions of international law.25 This includes 
Yusuf Naim Kly, whose monograph International Law and the Black Minority in the 
U.S. was published in 1985.26 His edited book A Popular Guide to Minority Rights 
was published a decade later with the support of the European Human Rights 
Foundation.27 These and many other examples also discount the view that African 
American scholars have not or are not producing international law scholarship. 
To be clear, I do not assume that only African Americans or that all African 
Americans should produce scholarship about race and international law. To make 
such a claim would be inaccurate.28 
So what accounts for AJIL and AJIL Unbound’s extremely limited 
publication of scholarship probing the racist underpinnings of international law, 
as well as the racial hierarchies upon which international law was constructed? 
Why is it that these two publications have had no tradition of publishing 
scholarship that traces international law’s historical and continuing complicity in 
producing racial inequality and hierarchy including slavery, as well as the 
subjugation and domination of the peoples of the First Nations? 
A.  Hypothesis One: Conscious Exclusion of African Americans 
Until Recently  
The 2020 Richardson Report adopted by the American Society of 
International Law, under whose umbrella AJIL is published, concluded that 
“during the first six decades of the existence and growth of the Society,” the 
Society “silently [and] effectively exclude[d] domestic persons of color and others, 
 
Hierarchy, Race and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 101 (1998). For books on the 
topic, see ALEXANDER ANIEVAS, RACE AND RACISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL COLOUR LINE (2015); GEETA CHOWDRY & SHEILA NAIR, POWER, 
POSTCOLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: READING RACE, GENDER AND CLASS (2002); 
and Sundhya Pahuja, Corporations, Universalism and the Domestication of Race in International Law, in 
EMPIRE, RACE AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Duncan Bell ed., 2019). For additional resources, see Jeanne 
M. Woods, Introduction: Theoretical Insights from the Cutting Edge, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 389 
(2010); International Dimensions of Critical Race Theory, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 408 (1997); Henry 
J. Richardson III, African Americans and International Law: For Professor Goler Teal Butcher, with 
Appreciation, 37 HOWARD L.J. 217 (1994). 
25  In that research, I answer the following questions: whether Black scholars are cited by the most 
prominent scholars, and whether the work of Black scholars is not reproduced or acknowledged in 
leading casebooks. 
26  See generally YUSSUF NAIM KLY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE U.S. 
(1985). 
27  See generally A POPULAR GUIDE TO MINORITY RIGHTS (Yussuf Naim Kly ed., 1995). 
28  Just because a scholar is Black does not mean that they represent Black people or, for that reason, 
all Black people. See Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference, 
108 THE PHILOSOPHER 61 (2020) (writing about “standpoint philosophy”). 
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based on their ethnicity, culture, religion or sexual orientation.”29 This factual 
finding is consistent with evidence in other areas of scholarship where scholars 
have argued that decisions to restrict minorities by college chancellors and 
presidents have shaped the current moment in higher education.30 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg also cite a letter written to the editors of AJIL 
in 1999 noting that a then recently published agora of the methods of international 
law did not include any perspectives relating to the concerns of scholars of color.31 
In that letter, Henry J. Richardson III wrote about the exclusion as follows: 
[I] was sadly disappointed that critical race theory/Latino critical legal theory 
(CRT/LCT) was omitted totally from that discussion, even to the absence of 
a single footnote. That omission crucially distorts the symposium by ignoring 
the emergence in the last two decades of new approaches to international law, 
based on determinations by people of color that in order to erase embedded 
systematic discrimination they must become jurisprudential producers and 
not merely remain jurisprudential consumers.32 
Further, it was not until 2014, about 107 years after AJIL was founded, that 
an African American was first elected to sit on its Board of Editors. It can be 
inferred from this history of exclusion, what the report calls the silent and effective 
exclusion of domestic persons of color, that it is not surprising that AJIL has not 
focused extensively on tracing the relevance of race to international law.33 The 
history of AJIL until 2014 (when the first African American got elected following 
changes in AJIL regulations that made this possible) indicates that the emphasis 
on diversifying the Board focused on dimensions, such as “countries of origin, 
primary affiliations . . . current geographical locations . . . the participation of 
women and the involvement of scholars at earlier stages in their careers, as well as 
through attention to scholarship at the intersection of international law with other 
 
29  THE RICHARDSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
30  See, e.g., EDDIE R. COLE, THE CAMPUS COLOR LINE: COLLEGE PRESIDENTS AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR BLACK FREEDOM (2020).  
31  See Henry J. Richardson III, Letter to the Editor, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 99 (2000) (expressing 
disappointment that perspectives of “people of color” were not represented). 
32  Id. For another recounting of this episode, see Woods, supra note 24. 
33  Lori Damrosch, The “American” and the “International” in the American Journal of International Law, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 14 (2006), notes that from its founding until 1944, AJIL did not have a nationality 
restriction as to membership. In 1944, the ASIL imposed a requirement that to be elected, an editor 
had to be American. Id. at 14. Damrosch also notes that the “composition of the board had seen 
little change in decades: more than half of the members serving in 1944 had been elected between 
1910 and 1924 and some went back virtually to the founding in one capacity or another.” Id. at 13. 
The nationality requirement was removed in 1969. Notably, therefore, while editorial membership 
was open to non-Americans for most of AJIL’s history, no African American was elected until 
2014. As Damrosch notes, diversity was understood as “either electing a larger proportion of 
members with a non-U.S. affiliation or … creating a separate category of foreign editors.” Id. at 14. 
Diversity, it seems, was never understood as including domestic minorities such as African 
Americans.  
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disciplines,”34 but not on racial diversity and in particular of domestic racial 
minorities. 
This exclusion of African Americans also likely accounts for the epistemic 
silencing of articles critical of the racist underpinnings of international law. In 
1994, Richardson observed that Black “international lawyers are expected either 
to enter with the same policy assumptions and theoretical approaches held by 
white international lawyers, or over a short time to be socialized into the same 
experience.”35 This exclusion has therefore made it difficult to generate 
scholarship that probes the Eurocentric and racist foundations of international 
law.36 With regard to raising issues of race among American international lawyers, 
Richardson notes: “When a [B]lack lawyer threatens to show other starting points, 
white-shoe lawyers respond with all of the litigational opposition, bureaucratic 
undercutting, and subtle destruction that they throw against their worst 
professional colleagues.”37 
This is a critical insight since African Americans and much of the Global 
South rose up against chattel slavery in the new world and alien, racist colonial 
rule “not by a critique structured by Western conceptions of freedom but by a 
total rejection of enslavement and racism as it was experienced.”38 
A recent study in the completely different field of psychological research 
sought to establish how often scholarship on psychology and race was published 
in top-tier cognitive, developmental, and social psychology journals. It found after 
examining 26,000 empirical articles published from 1974 to 2018: 
First, across the past five decades, psychological publications that highlight 
race have been rare, and although they have increased in developmental and 
social psychology, they have remained virtually nonexistent in cognitive 
psychology. Second, most publications have been edited by White editors, 
under which there have been significantly fewer publications that highlight 
race.39 
In June 2021, it was disclosed that the leading medical journals in the United 
States, including the Journal of the American Medical Association, had rarely addressed 
 
34  Id. at 17. 
35  Richardson, African Americans and International Law: For Professor Goler Teal Butcher, with Appreciation, 
supra note 24, at 221. 
36  As Richardson argues, including “international lawyers of color to the profession is tantamount to 
including non-Eurocentric and non-establishmentarian starting points, procedural emphases, policy 
perceptions and objectives and theoretical preferences.” Id. at 222. 
37  Id. 
38  Robin D.G. Kelley, Foreword: Why Black Marxism? Why Now xvii, in CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, THE 
MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983). 
39  Steven O. Roberts et al., Racial Inequality in Psychological Research: Trends of the Past and Recommendations 
for the Future, 15 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 1295 (2020). But see Chris C. Martin, Equal Representation Is 
Inequality, and Other Fallacies: A Commentary on Roberts Et Al., PSYARXIV (2020), 
https://psyarxiv.com/zusmd. 
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issues relating to race and racism.40 I cite these studies to highlight the striking 
parallels between my findings and those in completely different fields where the 
composition of the editors has been overwhelmingly white and where there have 
also been few publications relating to race. This absence of articles that explicitly 
probe whether international law has anything to do with race constitutes a 
colorblindness that, as I have argued elsewhere, is characteristic of how 
mainstream and even critical scholars avoid analyzing the racial power of law.41 
The absence of scholarly analysis relating to race in the premier international law 
journal in the United States, in my view, makes discussions of race and racial 
domination in international law invisible. These exclusions were also noted in the 
report of the 2014 Governance Reforms Committee of AJIL, appointed by then 
ASIL President Donald Francis Donovan, that noted that there was a perception 
that AJIL was “‘closed shop,’ made up of those with similar ‘mainstream, 
traditional’ perspectives who tend to publish and reproduce themselves, and 
where more ‘innovative scholarship’ is unwelcome.”42 The members of that 
committee were: Jane Stromseth (Chair); Jose Alvarez (Ex Officio); Antony 
Anghie; Mahnoush Arsanjani; Christopher Borgen; Joan Donoghue; Larry Helfer; 
Edward Kwakwa; Natalie Reid; and Richard Steinberg. The deliberations of this 
committee’s report in the ASIL Executive Council, comprising members such as 
Jeremy Levitt and Makau Mutua, set the stage for the election of the first African 
American editor in 2014. When the first African American was elected to the AJIL 
Board, the Executive Council initially rejected the slate because it did not include 
a woman. The AJIL Editorial Board re-did the election to conform the guidance 
from the Executive Council.43 
B.  Hypothesis Two: Exclusion of Critical Scholarship 
Including that Relat ing to Race  
While noting that Marxist scholarship on international law has not been 
accepted in mainstream academic circles, Bhupinder S. Chimni, a leading TWAIL 
 
40  Apoorva Mandavilli, Medical Journals Blind to Racism as Health Crisis, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 
2021), https://perma.cc/VK26-G6GD. 
41  Gathii, supra note 20. 
42  REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON AJIL GOVERNANCE (2013) (on file with author). That 
2013 report noted that as “far as the Committee is aware, an African American has never served on 
the Journal Board of Editors; moreover, only Asian American has served on the Board. This stands 
in sharp contrast to the diversity of talent reflected in the Society’s growing membership.” Id. at 5. 
That report also recommended the amendment of the Lillich Guidelines for selection of articles for 
publication in AJIL. Id. at 6. Those guidelines, in my view, placed an insuperable barrier to 
diversifying the Board. 
43  See Minutes, AJIL Board of Editors, Extraordinary Meeting (June 19, 2014) (on file with author) 
(noting that the AJIL Board had received guidance from the Executive Council to reconsider the 
slate of candidates “to provide for more diversity . . . by accelerating the planned expansion of 
board membership so as to provide an opportunity this year for greater gender diversity”). 
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Marxist scholar, noted that this unacceptability is “a price that critical theories in 
general have to pay for contesting dominant ideas and approaches.”44 He 
continued noting that critical approaches: 
have to confront the ‘subtle censorship of academic decorum.’… the fate of 
other critical theories such as TWAIL, FtAIL, [Feminist Approaches to 
International Law], or NAIL, [New Approaches to International Law,] have 
only been a shade better. Indeed all critical theories are sought to be 
marginalized by MILS [Mainstream International Legal Scholarship]. But it is 
only to be expected as critical theories are ranged against the interests of 
dominant national and international social forces, and therefore often 
portrayed by the mainstream as unacceptable forms of academic dissent.45 
Elsewhere, I have responded to dismissive claims that TWAIL scholarship 
lacks methodological clarity or that it engages in nihilist deconstruction.46 These 
types of critiques of critical international law scholarship are not new in AJIL. A 
1945 review in the journal of W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1945 book, Color and Democracy: 
Colonies and Peace, perhaps sums up the type of skeptical scrutiny about scholarship 
relating to race. P.M. Brown, of the Board of Editors, wrote about the book:  
The hideous cruelties, abominable humiliations, and incredible injustices 
suffered by the colored race have created a bitterness that precludes an 
objective and fair analysis of the whole colonial problem. The author . . . has 
not provided a dispassionate and realistic solution . . . . The author seems to 
reveal a lack of realism in considering the status of the many African tribes 
so obviously unprepared for united political action, self-government and 
independence. He does not credit the colonial powers with sincerity in 
acknowledging their responsibilities as trustees for the education of backward 
peoples for full freedom and international obligations.47 
Those words speak for themselves. They strongly suggest that uncovering 
sensitive issues of race will only sow division and that they constitute pure 
grievance, presumably because it is not possible to speak about race and racism 
 
44  BHUPINDER S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 20 (2017). 
45  Id. 
46  James Thuo Gathii, The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), in 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack 
eds., 2019). 
47  P.M. Brown, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace. By W. E. Burghardt DuBois, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 869, 
869 (1945).  
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objectively.48 In fact, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg make exactly the same claim 
in dismissing the work of those that they call critical scholars.49 
All this suggests that perhaps the proper way to research and write about 
international law is devoid of any emotion or reference to the racial power of law. 
Even more, the reviewer of the DuBois book held the views that the colored 
peoples of the colonies are backward, itself a racist notion, and that W.E.B. 
DuBois failed to give credit to the colonial powers for all they were doing! That is 
certainly an apology for colonialism. I may be accused of anachronism here—that 
I am using my twenty-first century lens to judge what this reviewer meant in 
1945.50 I have two responses to that. First, 1945 was the height of the anticolonial 
and antiracist efforts against colonial rule in most of Asia and Africa, so these 
themes were already present in the intellectual discourse of the time. 51 Second, 
W.E.B. DuBois was one of the leading African American intellectuals of his time 
connecting white domination of African Americans in the United States to what 
he called the global color line.52 So clearly, the questions of race and racial injustice 
were really at the center of discussion and debate in the United States and abroad. 
Second, the fact that not much progress to date has been made in publishing 
scholarship that centers examination of the relationship between international law 
and race seems to have followed the historical trajectory or path dependency of 
no consistent practice of publishing such work. 
 
48  It is notable that it is not only in international law scholarship where a focus on race is dismissed as 
ideologically motivated and subjective. For example, critiques of Derald Wing Sue’s important work 
on microagressions dismiss them as conceptual nonsense and ignore the relevancy of race. See, e.g., 
Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microagressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence, 12 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 138 
(2017). 
49  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2021) (arguing that “at the end of the day, some of the critical calls for 
engagement have tended to place the normative commitments above positive inquiry”). That issues 
relating to race are judged normatively and therefore differently, rather than objectively, is 
consistent with the finding that in law firms, Black associates are judged more harshly than their 
white counterparts by white partners. See ARIN N. REEVES, WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE: 
EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), 
https://perma.cc/644T-JHBQ. 
50  For more on anachronism and TWAIL, see Gathii, supra note 21. See also ANNE ORFORD, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (2021). 
51  For more on this, see ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION (2019). Gethachew studies “the global projects of decolonization Black 
Anglophone anticolonial critics and nationalists spearheaded in the three decades after the end of 
the Second World War.” Id. at 2. See also Christopher Geveers, “Unwhitening the World”: Rethinking 
Race and International Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1652 (2021). 
52  On this, see JENNIFER PITTS & ADOM GETACHEW, W.E.B. DU BOIS’S INTERNATIONAL WRITINGS 
(forthcoming 2021). 
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The data I have unearthed clearly shows that the Black international tradition 
is underrepresented in AJIL and its online companion.53 In my view, it also shows 
that the intellectual authority interests of those interested in issues of race and 
racism in international law, and in particular those Black international lawyers who 
write on these subject areas, have been ignored and therefore not valued in the 
leading international law journal in the United States. Perhaps this research shows 
the relationship between power and knowledge, a topic that Edward Said 
powerfully wrote about in his 1978 book, Orientalism.54 For Said, Orientalism was 
a “sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient.”55 It seems mainstream 
approaches to international law have had a similar power of epistemically erasing 
the perspectives of how racialized minorities have been marginalized by 
international law. 
Further research needs to interrogate the methods of exclusion of work 
relating to race as well as the scholarship of minority scholars to see if this 
scholarship around issues of race was prevented not just by the absence of honest 
racial dialogue, but also by mechanisms of exclusions such as those that pose a 
tradeoff between quality and diversity. Further, it would be great to know if, as an 
imperative to maintain the quality of AJIL and AJIL Unbound, it has been 
necessary to police the boundaries of what is published to prevent the quality of 
the journal being compromised. As I will note in the conclusion, this conversation 
has only just commenced within the Board of Editors of AJIL. 
 
53  For more on Black traditions of international law, see James T. Gathii, Henry J. Richardson III: The 
Father of Black Tradition of International Law, 31 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 325 (2017); Darin E.W. 
Johnson, How U.S. Civil Rights Leaders’ Human Rights Agenda Shaped the United Nations, 1 HOWARD 
HUM. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 33 (2017); H. Timothy Lovelace Jr., Making the World in Atlanta’s Image: 
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Morris Abram, and the Legislative History of the United 
Nations Race Convention, 32 L. & HIST. REV. 385 (2014); FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BLACK 
(INTER)NATIONAL (Charles P. Henry ed., 2000); Joyce Elaine King, Education, Research in the Black 
Liberation: Return What You Learn to the People, 86 J. NEGRO EDUC. 2 (2017). 
54  EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).  
For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever 
ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his own 
circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American 
studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the maid circumstances of his 
actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, 
as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a 
situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however 
dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and 
more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history 
of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.  
 Id. at 19. As an editor on AJIL for the last seven years, my personal experience has been that there 
has been policing of boundaries about what is valuable scholarship and what is not. Scholarship 
probing or critiquing international law’s complicity in colonialism, slavery, and racism has, in my 
experience, not been regarded as a valuable type of scholarship. 
55  Id. at 14. 
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C. Hypothesis Three:  The Big or Defining Debates Abou t 
International Law in the United States Have Focused on 
Issues Other than Race  
The defining debates about international law in the United States, as 
represented in AJIL, have not simply focused on or zeroed in on the role and 
place of race in international law. That means the editors of AJIL focused on 
topics that they considered to be the most important. As a review of AJIL’s first 
century noted, the journal has a “peculiarly messianic and distinctively American, 
vision and thrust” traceable to its founders.56 In effect, scholarship probing the 
role of the U.S. as an empire that mobilized race to repress non-dominant peoples 
in its possessions and territories, but also and most significantly in its domestic 
jurisdiction, has not been a particular focus of international law scholarship in the 
pages of AJIL or AJIL Unbound. For example, African American scholars who 
were particularly interested in how the minority rights system in Europe could be 
a useful international legal analogy for U.S. minorities did not feature in any 
significant way in the pages of AJIL.57 By contrast, for European scholars who 
have dominated writing about the minority rights system in Europe in the interwar 
years, including in AJIL, the focus of their scholarship was mainly descriptive of 
that system outside the United States. That scholarship was never focused on the 
applicability of the minority rights system within the U.S. The inattention to 
applicability of the minority rights system for domestic minorities within 
mainstream international law circles is consistent with the view that civil rights 
apply to domestic minorities and human rights apply outside the United States.58 
This distinction between domestic and international realms has a long legacy of 
limiting international legal scrutiny of racial inequality and racial injustice in the 
United States. This exceptionalism has, in my view, been part of the silencing of 
how domestic minorities have sought to use international law to address their 
racial repression and marginalization from slavery to date.59 In other words, it 
seems that this exceptionalism, in part, explains the absence of any critical scrutiny 
of issues relating to race in AJIL and AJIL Unbound to date. 
In the last couple of years, a non-exhaustive list of examples of some of the 
big themes that have preoccupied international legal scholarship include: 
 
56  Bederman, supra note 7, at 21. 
57  As noted above, the African American scholar Y.N. Kly published at least two books on this 
subject. 
58  That argument is made persuasively by Makau w. Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 589 (1996). 
59  See James Thuo Gathii, Keynote Address at the 2021 Wisconsin Journal of International Law 
Symposium: Race, Racism and International Law: A Repudiation of US Exceptionalism (Apr. 8, 
2021). 
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1. The big culture wars of AJIL were about the place of international law 
within the U.S. legal order, and in particular the debate between the 
modern and revisionist position about the status of customary 
international law as federal common law.60 These debate have centered 
on the “constitutional dimensions of U.S. foreign affairs law” and they 
have straddled the history of the journal from its founding.61 So 
American has AJIL’s focus been that a controversy is reported to have 
emerged within the governing board of ASIL about awarding Hans 
Kelsen the 1952 ASIL annual distinguished scholarship award because 
he “had not adopted a U.S. policy orientation.”62 
2. Another major AJIL theme has been the role of the U.S. in the world. 
This has involved questions of war (including torture, rendition in the 
recent past), national security, as well as humanitarian intervention every 
time there is a discussion about the use of force. In David Bederman’s 
study of the first 100 years of AJIL scholarship, he noted that 
contributors to the journal followed a “common script of interests and 
attitudes” so that when the United States entered into conflict, “the 
journal was a loyal and obedient commentator about American war aims 
and objectives, as befit the communication organ of a society that was, 
at one and the same time, progressive and conservative on this country’s 
legal engagements overseas.”63 
3. AJIL has also focused on the U.S.’s relationship with international 
institutions like the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, 
and the International Court of Justice.64 
4. Another commitment in AJIL has been a “belief in the ultimate 
inevitability of a community of nations living under the rule of law.”65 
 
60  This debate is summarized here: Ingrid B. Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A 
New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2010). Notably, AJIL’s early focus on federalism as 
an analogy to international law a century later anchored the revisionist position about the effect of 
international law within the United States. For this early AJIL focus on US federalism, see Carl 
Landauer, supra note 6, at 338. 
61  See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 7, at 38 (noting the historical continuation of this theme in the early 
Cold War period, 1947–1963). In the later Cold War period, 1964–1989, Bederman noted that “the 
Journal’s preeminence in U.S. constitutional law doctrine and foreign relations law remained 
unchallenged.” Id. at 43. Further, he notes that in the final years of the Cold War was a 
“preoccupation with virtually all aspects of the U.S. law of foreign affairs.” Id. at 47. 
62  Damrosch, supra note 33, at 15.  
63  Bederman, supra note 7, at 49. 
64  Id. at 47 (“[O]ne of the signal aspects of [the final years of the Cold War was] the incredible amount 
devoted to the role of the United Nations (especially the collective security mechanisms of the 
Security Council). This writing harks back to scholarship about the Hague Peace Conferences and 
the League in its formative years.”). 
65  Id. at 23. 
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5. AJIL has been consistently committed to international arbitration and 
institutions for promoting stable and predictable relations between 
states.66 
6. Another of AJIL’s major points of focus has been the type of 
international law questions that characterize the work of the Office of 
the Legal Adviser in the U.S. Department of State, which is charged with 
providing “advice on all legal issues, domestic and international, arising 
in the course of the Department’s work. This includes assisting 
Department principals and policy officers in formulating and 
implementing the foreign policies of the United States, and promoting 
the development of international law and its institutions as a 
fundamental element of those policies.”67 It is important to outline this 
theme at some length. Bederman’s account of the first century of AJIL 
scholarship notes that in “view of the strong connection of some AJIL 
contributors to U.S. government circles, and the historical tradition of 
the journal as a reflection of both the progressive and conservative 
attitudes of ASIL, the U.S. government’s views appear to have had a fair 
hearing in these situations.”68 There indeed has been a rotating door 
between ASIL and the Legal Advisers’ office. In 2006, Lori Damrosch 
observed that “many of the journal’s editors . . . have previously held 
positions in the [State] [D]epartment’s Office of the Legal Adviser or 
other offices concerned with U.S. foreign relations.”69 In fact, Legal 
Advisers and the lawyers who serve in that office are frequently on the 
annual meeting program of ASIL.70 Further, one of the major receptions 
 
66  Id. at 23. Bederman notes that the “first seven volumes of the journal convey an overall impression 
of almost complete dedication to expounding the virtues and possibilities of institutions of 
international arbitration.” Id. at 26; see also Landauer, supra note 6, at 337, 340 (also noting that the 
“particular American investment in ‘assuring the peace of the world’ was a commitment to the 
development of arbitration [that dated back to] the first International American Conference held in 
Washington in 1889-90 as a ‘Magna Carta which abolished war and substitutes arbitration between 
the American Republics’”). Landauer notes that John Bassett Moore, another prominent early 
member of ASIL and “author of the eight-volume digest of international arbitration[,] was a paid 
representative of a U.S. based investment company in a case it filed against the Dominican 
government at a time that Moore was also a paid representative of the State Department and in that 
role ‘steered the membership on the arbitration panel.’” Landauer, supra note 6, at 344. Thus 
concludes Landauer, “the international law advocated by US international lawyers was tied to US 
business interests and there were numerous actual ties between lawyers and those interests.” Id.  
67  Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/Z2Y7-XW6B. 
68  Bederman, supra note 7, at 50.  
69  Damrosch, supra note 33, at 18.  
70  See Harold Koh, Keynote Address: The Obama Administration and International Law, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC., 104, 207–08 (2010).  
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at the ASIL annual meeting is hosted by the Legal Adviser’s office 
hosted for former and current staff of the Legal Adviser’s office and 
their guests. A search of the Legal Adviser on AJIL indicates that the 
Legal Advisers’ opinions feature prominently in its pages over several 
decades. Unsurprisingly, many AJIL editors have served stints in the 
Office of the Legal Adviser. Thus Carl Landauer remarks that “the 
journal’s articles often seem to have been written in an antechamber of 
the State Department.”71 It is notable that AJIL has a long-standing 
relationship to the U.S. State Department. To cite Benjamin Allen 
Coates again, he notes in the early twentieth century there was a “large 
number of government officials in the ASIL’s leadership [and the] State 
Department took out 450 subscriptions to the AJIL . . . and in the 
process improving the society’s financial position.”72 Coates notes that 
James Brown Scott, who was its first Editor in Chief (1907 to 1924) and 
who contributed money to found it,73 wrote AJIL editorials in its early 
years to make sure they did not criticize the Department of State, so that 
those subscriptions were not cancelled.74 Indeed, ASIL’s early history 
was closely linked with American power, as evidenced by the fact that 
the U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root served as ASIL’s founding 
 
First, I have absolutely extraordinary colleagues at the Legal Adviser’s Office, 
which we call “L,” which is surely the greatest international law firm in the 
world. Its numbers include many current lawyers and alumni who are sitting 
here in the audience, and it is a training ground for America's international 
lawyers. (To prove that point, could I have a show of hands of how many of 
you in the audience have worked in L sometime during your careers?) Our 175 
lawyers are spread over 24 offices, including four extraordinary career deputies 
and a Counselor of International Law, nearly all of whom are members of this 
Society and many of whom you will find speaking on the various panels 
throughout this Annual Meeting program.  
 Id. In response, one commentator noted  
[Harold Koh’s] keynote address got a few not-buying-it questions from a couple 
of academics—long may you live, Benjamin Davis and Mary Ellen O’Connell—
but this dissonance was washed away by the warm roar of applause at session’s 
end. A Russian corporate lawyer chum of mine was taken aback by this mellow 
response to a legal justification for Bush-Cheney policies. 
 Chase Madar, How Liberal Law Professors Kill, COUNTERPUNCH (May 14, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/S7XF-3UQ4; see also MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING 
FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010) (discussing the role of the State Department Legal Adviser). 
71  Landauer, supra note 6, at 329. 
72  COATES, supra note 3, at 81–82. 
73  Bederman, supra note 7, at 22. 
74  COATES, supra note 3, at 80, 83. Notably, Landauer, supra note 6, at 341, notes that the pages of 
AJIL were not always “entirely copy for the United States,” in a discussion of criticisms leveled 
against the United States for its hypocrisy of the Drago and Calvo doctrines that featured in the 
pages of AJIL. Id. at 341, 342. 
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President, three of its Vice Presidents were Supreme Court Justices, 
three former Secretaries of State, and a future U.S. President.75 As Carl 
Landauer notes, the early officers of ASIL and editors of AJIL “were 
part of the interlocking directorate of the US legal and international 
relations establishment, and very much part of what has been identified 
as a new American ‘gentry’ class.”76  
D.  Hypothesis Four:  Color-Blindness Has Been the Default  
Mode of International Legal Scholarship  
Another hypothesis is that color-blindness has been the default norm in the 
production of international law scholarship published in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. 
This is consistent with the fact that the U.S. government has a long history of 
limiting scrutiny of its record of domestic racial inequality, racial injustice, and 
ongoing marginalization of women and Indigenous peoples through international 
law.77 In effect, my findings suggest that AJIL and AJIL Unbound consciously or 
unconsciously raise the possibility that they reinforce the white status quo 
understanding of international law.78 
As I have noted elsewhere recently, domestic U.S. law was constructed on 
assumptions that white identity embodied the ideal expression of humanity in 
terms of morality, progress, and civilization. Likewise, imperial international law 
was constructed on the basis of white racial superiority—as rational stewards of 
the territories of non-Europeans—and on the basis of racist myths of indigenous 
savagery, primitivism, and pathology. Hence, just as slavery dehumanized African 
Americans as degenerate and outside the boundaries of humanity in the 
construction of the United States as a white racial state, European and white 
international law was constructed to superintend over “backward” non-European 
peoples who were considered to live outside the bounds of humanity and 
therefore outside of sovereignty.79 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
In this Essay, I have used the social science approach to studying 
international law recommended by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg to show the 
near total silence of issues of race in the pages of AJIL and AJIL Unbound. I have 
 
75  COATES, supra note 3, at 67. Corroborating this is another excellent essay on AJIL’s founding by 
Carl Landauer. Landauer, supra note 6, at 326. 
76  Landauer, supra note 6, at 327. 
77  This point is the subject of another essay. Gathii, supra note 59. 
78  For the same point in another context, see BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION 
AS THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM 12 (1994). 
79  Gathii, supra note 20. 
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hypothesized that the exclusion of issues of race from the pages of the leading 
international law journal can be accounted for along four dimensions. First, this 
absence reflects the conscious exclusion of African Americans in ASIL in the first 
six decades of its existence, as the 2020 Richardson Report found.80 Second, it is 
the result of the stringent scrutiny that international law scholarship relating to 
racial subordination in international law has faced in AJIL and AJIL Unbound. 
Third, the big or defining debates about international law in the U.S. have focused 
on issues other than race. And fourth, color-blindness has been the default view 
of American international law scholarship as represented in the journal. 
This Essay shows two things. First, that Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s 
social science approach can be fruitfully applied to answer questions that critical 
international law scholars are interested in. Second, that in tracing the legacy of 
race in international law, as I have done in this article, Abebe, Chilton and 
Ginsburg’s distinction between the neutrality of the scientific methodology they 
subscribe to, on the one hand, and the normativity of critical approaches that they 
argue characterizes other approaches, on the other hand, cannot be sustained. 
This is because the choice of the subject matter that a social science approach 
takes necessarily excludes other choices. Making that choice is therefore a process 
of inclusion as well as of exclusion. To the extent that a choice must be made, the 
selection itself is normative. In addition, the choice of what gets published and 
what does not, as this Essay has tried to show, can itself be an exclusionary 
process—something that cannot be normatively or ideologically neutral. 
This Essay has shown that AJIL and its companion AJIL Unbound have 
published little on race in over 100 years. Yet, race is heavily embedded in how 
many rules of international law were formulated and the manner in which it is 
applied to date. This absence of articles relating to race reflects choices that have 
effectively discouraged, if not silenced, the production of scholarship on race and 
international law. That outcome, I contend, is not inevitable, natural, and 
necessary, but is perhaps rather a reflection of the choices about what types of 
knowledge in international law matter enough to be published in the pages of 
AJIL and AJIL Unbound. 
So, what can be done about this exclusion of scholarship probing the role of 
race in AJIL and AJIL Unbound? Elsewhere, I have made the case that CRT 
scholars and TWAIL scholars should work together to combat the “all-too-often 
mainstream efforts to provincialize, define, and box critical approaches—
especially when they delve into issues of race and identity—as marginal and 
irrelevant, rather than as significant contributions that challenge expand their 
respective fields.”81 Already a number of recent events have been convened 
 
80  THE RICHARDSON REPORT, supra note 11. 
81  Gathii, supra note 20; see also Tendayi Achiume & Devon W. Carbado, Critical Race Theory Meets Third 
World Approaches to International Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1462 (2021). 
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between TWAIL and CRT scholars to explore their overlapping interests, and part 
of that conversation is set to be published as a symposium issue of the UCLA Law 
Review.82 This is a great start. 
Within AJIL, on October 5, 2020, the Executive Committee of Blacks of 
the American Society of International Law (BASIL)83 wrote to the Editors in Chief 
of AJIL in the following terms:84  
[T]aking into account the progress made since 2014 when the first African 
Americans were elected as Editors of the American Journal of International 
Law, BASIL calls upon the Editors of the American Journal of International 
Law: 
• To continue to make diversity and inclusivity a consideration, particularly 
of African Americans, in those selected for nomination to be AJIL 
Editors; 
• To continue to make diversity and inclusivity a consideration, particularly 
of African Americans, among those elected to be AJIL Editors; 
• To ensure that appointive positions at the discretion of the Editors in 
Chief in the Journal (such as for Section Heads, Associate Managing 
Editors, committee chairs, and other leadership positions) reflect the 
diversity of ASIL’s membership and in particular of African Americans 
and critical race scholars; 
• To in particular ensure that the appointment of Associate Managing 
Editors include African Americans since this has become an informal 
pipeline for election to become Editors and yet no African Americans 
have served in this role; 
• To ensure an open, more transparent application process for Associate 
Managing Editors (comparable to ASIL’s approach to openly advertising 
leadership positions) —e.g., advertised through historically-Black law 
schools, the National Bar Association, BASIL, and other appropriate 
institutions that may provide a gateway for African American and other 
underrepresented lawyers who specialize in international law; 
 
82  For example, Justin Desautels-Stein, James Anaya, and Tendayi Achiume organized the 
“International Law and Racial Justice” workshop at the University of Colorado, Boulder, School of 
Law in August 2018. Another symposium in March 2019 titled “Critical Perspectives on Race and 
Human Rights: Transnational Re-Imaginings” and a workshop immediately thereafter titled “Race, 
Empire and International Law Workshop,” co-sponsored by UCLA School of Law’s Promise 
Institute for Human Rights and Critical Race Studies Program, were held under the guidance of 
Tendayi Achiume and Asli Bali. Following those events, in January 2020, the UCLA Law Review 
Symposium, entitled “Transnational Legal Discourse on Race and Empire,” was held. For the 
introduction to that symposium, see Tendayi Achiume and Asli Bali, Race and Empire: Legal Theory 
Within, Through and Across National Borders 67 UCLA L. REV. 1386 (2021). 
83  Established under the ASIL Honorary Presidency of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, BASIL’s 
goals include (1) increasing the number and influence of Blacks within ASIL, and (2) strengthening 
and affirming the role of Black international lawyers, jurists, and academics in the United States. See 
Letter from BASIL Exec. Comm. to the AJIL Co-Editors in Chief (Oct. 5, 2020) [hereinafter 
BASIL Letter] (on file with author). 
84  See id. 
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• To avoid the types of word-of-mouth (and “old boy’s network”) hiring 
approaches that have been found illegal under U.S. civil rights law, as 
such hiring processes served to exclude, rather than open up the pipeline 
of opportunity; 
• To in particular ensure that the appointment of the Nomination 
Committee for the election of new Editors is inclusive and diverse and, 
to the extent possible, especially when African American editors are 
finalizing their terms of office or when they have decided not to seek re-
election, that African American Editors are part of the Nominating 
Committee; 
• To continue to add to rather than to reduce the number of African 
Americans on the Board of Editors to avoid the legacy of exclusion of 
African Americans in the Board of Editors; and 
• To continue maintaining African American nominees eligible for election 
put forward by the Nominating Committee but not elected for 
consideration in subsequent elections.85 
An ad hoc committee on Diversity in AJIL was convened in late 2020 with 
a mandate to look into “how AJIL should promote racial and other forms of 
diversity in the process for nominations, elections to the Board, and selection of 
section heads and editorial positions on Unbound.”86 Although BASIL’s letter 
noted that “we would be delighted to see articles on the types of issues raised by 
critical race theorists in AJIL that have so far not featured in the pages of the 
Journal,” issues of content were excluded from the remit of the ad hoc committee 
on diversity.87 After several months of intensive consultations, the ad hoc 
committee report to the full AJIL Board in March 2021. The report made eight 
recommendations: 
Recommendation (1): Diversity Statement. Replace the Lillich Guidelines 
with a Diversity Statement that can be used to guide or question future 
decisions: 
Sample language: The American Journal of International Law is committed 
to being the preeminent publication on international law in the United 
States. Toward that end, the Journal will select highly qualified 
individuals, who have diverse backgrounds and perspectives (along 
multiple dimensions), to participate in decisionmaking on the Board of 
Editors and in other management or editorial positions. This 
commitment to diversity is not only in the service of excellence but also 
consistent with fundamental non-discrimination norms in the field of 
international law. 
Send this Diversity Statement to nominees for election to the Board, with the 
statement on active service, in order to establish expectations for Board 
membership.  
 
85  Id. at 2–3. 
86  Email from AJIL Editors in Chief (Dec. 3, 2020) (on file with author). 
87  BASIL Letter, supra note 83, at 3. 
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Recommendation (2): Cultivate Diverse Talent. Work with relevant ASIL 
groups and programs (e.g., BASIL, WILIG, MILIG, and “new voices”) to 
provide mentorship and advice to interested scholars who are of color 
(especially African American) or are not cisgender men. Include a diverse 
range of article reviewers when going outside the Board, as one way to 
identify possible future candidates for the Board. 
Recommendation (3): Transparency in Nomination and Selection 
Criteria. Publicize information about the criteria for being nominated or 
selected to the Board or to other management or editorial positions, so that 
qualified candidates who are not well networked can more easily put 
themselves forward. 
Recommendation (4): Open the Processes for Selecting Section Heads 
and Editorial Positions for AJIL Unbound. Consider publicizing (at least 
to members of the Board) when these positions become available so that the 
pool of candidates can be expanded and diversified. Also consider involving 
some members of the Board in the appointment decisions. 
Recommendation (5): Nomination Committee Diversity 
Consideration. Ensure that the Nomination Committee is diverse and 
require it, when presenting the candidates for selection to the Board, to 
describe the steps it took to include a slate of candidates who are diverse 
among many dimensions, including race (especially African Americans) and 
gender. 
Recommendation (6): Create an Inclusive and Equitable Environment 
on the Board. Provide more opportunities for Board members to interact 
and participate in decisions relating to the Board. For example, consider using 
semiannual meetings to discuss strategic decisions, best practices for 
reviewing manuscripts, or opportunities for future engagement and 
involvement. In addition, encourage Board members to present their own 
ideas for the Journal; avoid creating an environment (actual or perceived) in 
which only a small subset of Board members shape the content of the Journal. 
Recommendation (7): Do Not Backslide. Given the progress that has 
been achieved in diversifying the Board, create the expectation that future 
Board Elections will build on rather than undercut this progress; perhaps use 
as a baseline goal the 2020-2021 composition of the Board. Encourage Board 
members to disclose on a voluntary basis their racial, ethnic or other forms 
of diversity to help the Journal track progress in diversifying the Board. 
Recommendation (8): Regular Diversity Review. Institute a regular 
process for reviewing, perhaps every three years, the diversity on the Board 
and in other editorial and management positions and for recommending 
further action, as necessary. 
Recommendation (9): Diversity in Content. Institute a process for 
considering whether and, if so, how AJIL should try to diversify its content 
such that it includes a broader range of topics and methods of analysis, 
including but not limited to those relating to gender, race, and ethnicity.88 
 
88  AM. J. INT’L LAW, REPORT OF THE AJIL AD HOC DIVERSITY COMMITTEE 5–6 (2021) (on file with 
author). 
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In short, AJIL’s Editorial Board has instituted a process to address many of 
the issues raised in the BASIL letter and which, in my view, have prevented AJIL 
and AJIL Unbound from publishing scholarship critically analyzing the role of race 
in international law. That said, as important as the process is for addressing issues 
of content in AJIL and AJIL Unbound, the measure of success is when AJIL and 
AJIL Unbound regularly publish issues of race and identity as often as they publish 
on black letter law issues. 
The foregoing nascent efforts within AJIL, including the election of two 
female African American editors and the first indigenous American as an editor,89 
may offer some hope that there will be momentum to dismantle to legacy of 
exclusion of content relating to race in the pages of the journal and in AJIL 
Unbound as well. Ultimately, more scholarship needs to probe why issues relating 
to slavery, race, and imperialism, which have all intimately shaped international 
law, have not been featured in any significant way in the pages of AJIL and AJIL 
Unbound. This unfortunate state of affairs has continued even as there continues 
to be a growing body of scholarship on these themes published in leading 
publishing houses as well as articles published in many other reputable journals 
and blogs.90 In fact, it is telling that the international legal ramifications of Black 
Lives Matter were covered by the European Journal of International Law91 and the 
blog Just Security,92 but not by the AJIL or AJIL Unbound in any of any significant 
way. Hopefully, the conversations that have begun within the Editorial Board of 
AJIL and AJIL Unbound will address these more than century-long exclusions and 
silences and begin to overcome them.  
 
89  The two African American female editors elected were Adrien Katherine Wing and Tendayi 
Achiume. The first scholar of indigenous descent, elected on the board on the same day, March 19, 
2021, was James Anaya. See James Thuo Gathii (@JTGathii), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2021, 3:39 PM), 
https://twitter.com/JTGathii/status/1373011376420106241.  
90  For a sampling of such scholarship, see the TWAIL bibliography attached to my 2020 ASIL Grotius 
Lecture. James Thuo Gathii, The Promise of International Law: A Third World View (Including a TWAIL 
Bibliography 1996–2019 as an Appendix) 114 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 165 (2021), 
https://perma.cc/CL73-VM3F. 
91  Black Lives Matter, EJIL: TALK!, https://perma.cc/6HS2-KP8A.  
92  Maryam Jamshidi & Emily Berman, Embracing Diversity and Critical Perspectives in National Security Law, 
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/42L7-BWFX.  
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Abstract 
 
The Limits of International Law received a great deal of criticism when it was 
published in 2005, but it has aged well. The skeptical, social-scientific methodology that it 
recommended has become a normal mode of international law scholarship. And the dominant 
idealistic view of international law that the book criticized is today in shambles, unable to explain 
the turmoil in international politics. This Essay reflects on the book’s reception and corrects 
common misperceptions of its arguments.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Our book, The Limits of International Law1 (Limits), was published fifteen years 
ago. A lot has happened since then, both in international law scholarship, and in 
the world. Here we take a brief retrospective look at Limits, its critics, and the arc 
of international law scholarship and international law since its publication. 
II.  ORIGINS  
The collaboration that resulted in Limits began many years before 
publication, in 1998. That year we wrote A Theory of Customary International Law, 2 
which we published in 1999, and (after revision) incorporated into chapter 1 of 
Limits. The late 1990s was the high-water mark of American exceptionalism and 
optimism about prospects for a benign international liberal order. This optimism 
had seeped into mainstream public international law scholarship, and especially 
American international law scholarship. 
As Limits noted, that scholarship was an improbable combination of idealism 
and doctrinalism.3 The idealism was reflected in the conviction that international 
law was powerful, expanding, and liberal in orientation. The doctrinalism was 
manifest in the traditional lawyerly practice of parsing legal “texts”—treaties, 
judicial decisions, government declarations, and so on—to discern legal 
obligations. The improbability of this combination arose from the tension 
between those texts, associated state practice, and the idealism. The texts tended 
to display either exceedingly narrow compromises hammered out by states that 
jealously guarded their interests, or florid rhetoric that expressed aspirations for a 
better future that most states plainly did not take seriously as binding 
commitments in the here-and-now. Meanwhile, numerous violations of 
international law at the time—and, more frequently, circumventions that revealed 
the narrowness of the actual commitments—were downplayed, explained away, 
or bemoaned. These were the currents of thought that we reacted to, first in the 
1999 article,4 then in two other journal articles,5 and then in the book.6 
Mainstream public international law scholarship of the time had not yet 
caught up with developments in scholarship in American law schools. In the 
 
1  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
2  Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 
(1999). 
3  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3. 
4  Posner & Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
5  Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional 
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral 
and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S115 (2002). 
6  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1.  
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1970s, legal scholarship welcomed influences from other disciplines—including 
economics, history, philosophy, sociology, and psychology. By the 1990s, legal 
scholarship had been transformed. Most influential scholarship became firmly 
grounded in the methodology of the social sciences. While economics was the 
dominant social scientific discipline in and out of law, the transformation was 
broader than that. Legal scholars took from the social sciences a commitment to 
theory and empiricism even while they maintained their traditional normative 
policy orientation, which the social sciences, for the most part, had shunned. 
“Theory” meant that legal scholarship connected its normative claims to a 
recognizable, in-principle-testable theory about how people behave. In law and 
economics, the theory was that people act in an instrumentally rational way, based 
on stable preferences and subject to a budget constraint. “Empiricism” meant that 
legal scholars would look beyond the law as it appears in statutes and judicial 
opinions and evaluate how it influences behavior. In large part, law and economics 
drew on the empirical results in economics. But it also claimed that its normative 
proposals for legal reform would have certain predicted outcomes that could be 
empirically validated. And “normative” meant that legal scholarship made 
proposals for reform or defended existing arrangements. There was a huge 
amount of debate about the appropriate normative criteria.7 While there was not 
as much convergence as one might have hoped, legal scholars did make progress 
by being clearer about their normative assumptions and standards. 
III.  LIMITS  
Limits was a broadside against these prevailing attitudes in international law 
scholarship. In place of the idealism of international law scholarship, we sought 
to approach the topic with the more skeptical style of thinking about institutions 
that we associated with the social science tradition. 
We were not writing on a clean slate. In the field of international trade law, 
law and economics ideas had already made an impact.8 In political science, 
scholars who called themselves “rational institutionalists” (and similar things) had 
begun to apply economic theory to international institutions and law, albeit with 
a focus and approach that were somewhat foreign to the style of legal scholarship.9 
 
7  Law and economics mostly used efficiency as its chief normative criterion. In recent years, scholars 
have become more interested in distributional equity as well. In other areas of law, various other 
normative criteria drawn from political and moral philosophy were common. See Zachary Liscow, 
Redistribution for Realists (Yale L. Sch., Working Paper, Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/FU4Z-
KDDC. 
8  See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
9  See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation 
and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, (1985); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane 
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000). 
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Other methodologies in international relations theory were also beginning to 
influence international law scholarship.10 And some international law professors 
had begun to think about ways that law and economics could be imported into 
international law.11 Little of this work focused on big-picture theoretical questions 
about how public international law operated. And little of it focused on the 
incentive-compatibility issue—the issue of how states’ incentives might affect 
their compliance with international law, and hence their design of international 
law. Much of the brouhaha about Limits resulted from our placement of this 
question—which recalled the tradition of realism in international relations—at the 
center of the study of public international law. 
For theory, Limits drew on economics and game theory. While there was 
nothing particularly sophisticated about our approach, we could not simply draw 
on standard law and economics, which was mostly applied to domestic law, 
because of a distinctive feature of international law—namely, decentralized 
enforcement. Because one cannot assume a relatively neutral and reliable central 
enforcer of international law, as one can for domestic law, the incentives of 
enforcers (states) to comply with, as well as make, international law must be 
accounted for. That is why we used the theory of repeated games. The 
requirement that international law be “incentive-compatible”—that is, consistent 
with the interests of states—puts a significant limit on what international law 
could accomplish, compared to domestic law, where centuries of institutional 
development made possible laws and regulations that could advance broader 
conceptions of the public good.12 
The central claim in Limits was that international law—treaties and 
customs—emerges from and is sustained by states acting rationally to maximize 
their interests given their perception of the interests of other states and the 
distribution of state power. This was a self-consciously reductive claim based on 
reductive assumptions. The goal was to see how much of macro behavior related 
to international law could be explained not on the basis of the field’s standard 
assumptions about a tendency toward law compliance, but rather on the basis of 
simple assumptions about state interests and rudimentary tools of game theory. 
In the introduction to Limits we discussed some of our simplifying 
assumptions. While acknowledging that a rational choice theory of international 
law could, in theory, be built based on assessments of the interests of citizens or 
 
10  See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 
(1998). 
11  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1999); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law, (John M. Olin Program in 
L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 216, 2004). 
12  See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009). 
Limits Fifteen Years Later Goldsmith & Posner 
Summer 2021 115 
domestic institutions, we chose the state as the unit of analysis primarily because 
that is the unit upon which most of international law operates. In doing so, we 
followed mainstream practice in economics and political science, which treated 
states—as well as other collective entities, like corporations, households, political 
parties, and government agencies—as individual agents for purposes of analysis. 
We also acknowledged that a state’s interest—in this context, its preferences over 
international outcomes—was often difficult to discern or contested. Our theory 
assumed that a state’s interest was reflected in the preferences of its leaders. This 
assumption “is a simplification and is far from perfect,” we noted, but we 
embraced it nonetheless “because a state's political leadership, influenced by 
numerous inputs, determines state actions related to international law.”13 
Limits was agnostic about the content of a state’s interest with one important 
exception: we formally excluded a preference for complying with international 
law. We did not claim that leaders and their citizens lack a preference for 
complying with international law. We noted that this was “an empirical question 
that we do not purport to resolve in this book.”14 We excluded this preference 
primarily for methodological reasons. One was that we were exploring how robust 
a theory of international law one could develop without relying on this prevailing 
dogma. Second, as we noted, it “[i]s unenlightening to explain international law 
compliance in terms of a preference for complying with international law,” which 
tells one “nothing interesting about when and why states act consistently with 
international law and provides no basis for understanding variation in, and 
violation of, international law.”15 
On these assumptions, we crafted a theory that sought to explain the 
behaviors associated with international law. Here is the theory in a nutshell: 
International law refers to equilibrium outcomes in games of cooperation and 
coordination among rational, self-interested states. In some cases, these 
outcomes emerge in a decentralized way as states act in reciprocal fashion in 
order to obtain mutual gains. “Customary international law” is the term used 
to refer to the resulting rules of behavior. Because decentralized norms are 
often ambiguous, states also either codify customary international law in 
treaties or draft treaties to address novel problems that customary 
international law does not address. International law can be, and often is, 
effective and stable because once cooperation begins, it is in the rational self-
interest of states to maintain it. But international law can be, and often is, 
violated, as the relative power of states changes, the preferences of states 
change, and new problems arise. Often violations are avoided as states 
anticipate them and renegotiate their obligations; at other times, they occur, 
sometimes on massive scale. International law may be normatively desirable 
for the simple reason that it facilitates mutual gains across states. But it need 
 
13  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6. 
14  Id. at 10. 
15  Id. 
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not be: states frequently act in predatory fashion, and can use international 
law to entrench normatively undesirable outcomes.16 
Parts I and II of Limits applied this framework to various rules of customary 
international law and various treaty and related regimes. We made several general 
claims, including: bilateral cooperation was more robust than multilateral 
cooperation; seeming multilateral cooperation in multilateral treaty organizations 
was best understood as a combination of coordination and pairwise cooperation; 
customary international law is more fragile than treaties; and ratification 
procedures can facilitate cooperation. We did our best to use qualitative empirical 
evidence to support our theoretical claims, or to show how they could be 
supported. 
With respect to normative issues, we imported the efficiency criterion of law 
and economics while expressing skepticism toward the traditional normative 
commitments of mainstream international law scholarship. We took seriously the 
diversity of populations (and thus interests) across states rather than assume that 
deep down, everyone is an American liberal or a European social democrat. We 
also made two normative claims extraneous to law and economics: first, that states 
have no moral obligation to comply with international law contrary to their 
interests; and second, that the cosmopolitan claim that states have a duty to craft 
international law on the basis of global rather than state welfare was incompatible 
with cosmopolitans’ commitment to liberal democracy, which is designed to serve 
the interests of its citizens and almost always produces a self-interested (that is, 
nationalist) foreign policy.17 
IV.  CRITICISMS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP  
In the fifteen years since its publication, Limits has been widely discussed 
and loudly criticized. During the same period, international law scholarship 
changed quite a lot—in the direction of the commitments made in Limits. Here 
we focus on three major criticisms of Limits that relate to the changes in 
scholarship during the period. 
A.  Challenges to Theory 
We noted at the outset of Limits that “[o]ur approach falls closer to the 
political science international relations tradition, and in particular to [rational 
choice] institutionalism, than to the mainstream international law scholarship 
tradition.”18 Indeed, political scientists and economists were unperturbed by the 
 
16  See id. at 4. 
17  See id. at 185–224. 
18  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 16. 
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claims in the book. Lacking any interest in controversies among international 
lawyers, they saw little that was bothersome.19 
But most legal scholars viewed the book with hostility as a radical and 
unhelpful departure from prior scholarship, and as flawed on many grounds.20 
Some of our critics didn’t like the rational choice framework of Limits and 
dismissed it out of hand.21 Others accepted the framework, at least for purposes 
of argument, but criticized our application of it. Some claimed that the state was 
the wrong or incomplete unit of analysis.22 Others stated that more complicated 
models would produce different and better explanations.23 Yet others said that 
that our concept of state interest was too narrow, or too reductive, or too 
flexible.24 Some argued that we used an impoverished notion of reputation in our 
models.25 Many did not like our argument that states lacked a moral obligation to 
comply with international law or to take cosmopolitan action.26 
 
19  See, e.g., Stacie Goddard, Book Review, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 710, 711 (2005) (“[A]lthough political 
scientists may be sympathetic to the study, most will find the argument of limited added utility.”); 
cf. G. John Ikenberry, Book Review, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 150 (2005) (“This elegantly argued book . . . 
has the virtues and liabilities of all simple rationalist theories.”); Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic 
Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (“extend[ing] and modify[ing]” the “interesting 
and useful approach” to international law in Limits). 
20  There were exceptions. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits 
of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253 (2006); David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, “Strategery,” 
and the Limits of International Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2006). 
21  See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008). 
22  See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Book Review, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 106 (2005); David Sloss, Do 
International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 207 (2006); Kal 
Raustiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 430–34 (2006); 
Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 454 (2006). 
23  See, e.g., ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT WAYS 
OF THINKING 274–75 (2017); Andreas L. Paulus, Potential and Limits of the Economic Analysis of 
International Law: A View from Public International Law, 165 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 170, 176 
(2009); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of 
International Law,’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289, 291 (2006). 
24  See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 23, at 172; David Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: 
Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339 (2006); Sloss, 
supra note 22; Edward T. Swaine, Restoring (And Risking) Interest in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 259 (2006); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (2006); Paul Berman, Review Essay: Seeing Beyond the Limits of International 
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006). 
25  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379 (2006). 
26  See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 305, 309 (2006). 
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We anticipated these criticisms in the book,27 and addressed them further in 
a subsequent essay.28 Many of the criticisms were reasonable; others were 
misplaced. A lot of criticisms were generic attacks on the methodology of social 
science. We won’t reiterate these points here, except to make two general 
comments. 
First, our models were self-consciously reductive and simplifying about the 
influences on state behavior related to international law. The aim was to try to 
understand how much of international law can be explained in a rigorous way 
based on the centuries-old view that states act on the international stage on the 
basis of what the state or its leaders see as what is best for the state. Any theory 
must trade off the accuracy of its assumptions in order to achieve possible 
explanation. This is standard social science. Many social science-influenced 
theories since Limits have made these tradeoffs in different ways. None, we think, 
offer as powerful an account of how international law works with such simple 
premises. But it is hard to compare different theoretical frameworks with different 
theoretical and empirical focuses. 
Second, international law has now definitively taken the social science turn. 
As we noted in 2006, Limits was at the broadest level different from the vast 
majority of international law theory that preceded it along six dimensions: (1) it 
made its assumptions explicit; (2) it addressed the limitations and criticisms of its 
assumptions; (3) it separated out positive from normative analysis; (4) it framed 
its claims as testable hypotheses; (5) it addressed alternate hypotheses and made 
an effort to weigh the evidence; and (6) it chose its case studies and other evidence 
carefully.29 We “welcomed” the criticisms of Limits from within the social science 
paradigm because we believed they portended improved “standards of analysis” 
in international law scholarship. “If international law scholarship generally . . . 
comes to embrace the standards of methodological and empirical care that the 
critics demand of Limits,” we wrote, “the discipline would be significantly 
improved.”30 This, in a nutshell, is what happened in the field in the intervening 
fifteen years. 
 
27  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 23–44. 
28  Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
463 (2006). 
29  Id. at 466. 
30  Id. 
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B.  The Real ity of International Law  
A major criticism of Limits was its supposed claim (or implication) that 
international law didn’t matter, was irrelevant, or didn’t exist.31 Many people 
argued that the theory in Limits was incompatible with the existence of so much 
international law, and with the state’s use of international law in international 
relations.32 
It is true that the book has a self-consciously skeptical tone about 
international law (more about which below), and this is likely what misled or 
angered some readers. But the book is not skeptical about international law in the 
sense of arguing that it is a fiction or unimportant, as some realists in the political 
science tradition claim,33 or that international law is not “law,” as some 
philosophers have argued.34 We were (and are) not realists as that term is 
commonly understood by political scientists in international relations theory, who 
believe that international law has no or little importance—though some influential 
realists, like Hans Morgenthau, did take international law seriously—largely 
because their focus has been on broad questions of international structure and 
stability rather than how states cooperate over trade, migration, and related 
matters. The book’s second sentence described the claim that international law is 
not “really” law as “misleading.”35 Limits is skeptical about the claims made by 
international law scholars about international law, not about international law itself. 
Above all, as noted, the book is skeptical about the methodological value of an 
assumption that states experience “compliance pull.”36 
Yet Limits asserted a robust role for international law, and for international 
law negotiations, in fostering international coordination and cooperation (and in 
avoiding losses from a lack of available coordination or cooperation).37 The terms 
of a treaty, or of a rule of customary international law, matter quite a lot to whether 
and how coordination and cooperation are achieved. The book sought to show 
through theoretical argument and case studies how the behaviors associated with 
 
31  See, e.g., JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2008); 
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES FOR THE 
WORLD COMMUNITY 3 (2010); Berman, supra note 24. 
32  See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 287 
(2006); Raustiala, supra note 22, at 429; Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in 
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
33  See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institution, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995). 
34  See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 260 (1832). 
35  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3. 
36  Id. at 13. 
37  We emphasized that it did not follow that “international law is irrelevant or unimportant or in some 
sense unreal,” and indeed that international law “can play an important role in helping states achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes.” Id.  
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international law (including state behaviors consistent with international law) 
could be explained based on simple premises that did not require reliance on non-
instrumental factors. And while we did take an instrumental approach to the 
question of compliance, and thus accounted for when international law violations 
took place, especially with respect to ambitious multilateral treaties, these 
arguments would be meaningless if our thesis had been that international law is a 
fiction. 
We were not surprised by the sharp reaction to our rational choice approach 
because it flew so sharply in the face of the standard orientation of the field at the 
time. But we were surprised that some of the early critics questioned whether the 
non-instrumental accounts of international law that we targeted even warranted a 
response, and that none of them—or later critics—gave these non-instrumental 
accounts a robust defense.38 We speculated at the time that “a major generational 
change is underway” in which younger scholars (then) of international law had 
witnessed the power of political science and economics to bring “fruitful insights 
to international relations,” and had begun to pay “greater attention to the social 
science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and theoretical 
rigor.”39 
And this is what has happened since. A trend that was picking up steam 
before Limits was conceived, and that we drew on in part, is now the dominant 
approach in international law scholarship. There has been a huge outpouring of 
international law scholarship grounded in economics and game theory,40 and in 
other disciplines as well, including sociology and psychology.41 But the most 
remarkable transformation has come in the application of serious empirical 
analysis of international law. 
C. Empirical Work 
Limits was mainly a theoretical and methodological book, but it backed its 
claims with some case studies as well as some quantitative work in economics and 
political science relating to trade and human rights. The case studies on customary 
 
38  See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 28, at 464. 
39  Id. 
40  See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
(2007); EUGENE KONTOROVICH & FRANCESCO PARISI, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2016); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT 
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. 
SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). 
41  See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015); Ryan Goodman 
& Derek Jink, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 
621 (2004); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International 
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011). 
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international law attracted criticism,42 and the published studies that we drew on 
were vulnerable to various methodological challenges. 
Since we wrote our book, there has been an explosion of quantitative 
empirical work on international law. In part this has resulted from the 
accumulation of publicly available data sets made possible by the internet and 
other technological developments and by the development of software and other 
tools that have made it easier to analyze this data. Relatedly, PhDs in the social 
sciences have increasingly moved toward empirical methods because the 
intellectual payoffs seem high. These developments have had a large impact on 
social science scholarship, and that impact has spilled over into international law 
scholarship. 
In 2017, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg wrote a 47-page paper 
describing those developments.43 One can now find empirical work on 
compliance and related aspects of international law in a variety of subfields, 
including human rights, international trade, bilateral investment treaties, 
migration, use of force, customary international law, international courts, and 
international non-judicial organizations.44 This work has benefited from 
collaborations between political scientists like Beth Simmons and Erik Voeten and 
law professors.45 In recent years, law professors with empirical training have made 
contributions on their own. Thanks to this empirical work, the role of 
international law in international relations is clearer than it used to be. The work 
has gone beyond the earlier issue of compliance and shed light on how 
international institutions work, how states design treaties, and much else.46 
This empirical work has focused on discrete treaties or international law 
regimes and has not tested general theories of international law—a difficult task, 
 
42  See, e.g., Golove, supra note 24. 
43  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1. 
44  See, e.g., Vera Shikhelman, Geography, Politics and Culture in the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 845 (2017); Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration 
(George Mason L. and Econ. Research Paper No. 21-01, 2020); Cree Jones, Do Legal Remedies 
Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Investment Treaty Network (Univ. of 
Chicago PhD Dissertation 2017); Cree Jones & Weijia Rao, Sticky BITs, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357 
(2020); Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements, 47 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 545 (2018); Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alexander Weaver, The Global 
Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
731 (2019); Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos, Preferences and Compliance with International Law, 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming); Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, International Law, 
Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture, 3 RSCH. & POL. 1 (2016). 
45  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International 
Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389 (2014); Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, 
The Proof Is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2020). 
46  See generally Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International 
Law, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). 
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to be sure. And in general, theorizing about international law has waned in the last 
decade or so. This decline in theory followed and reflected trends elsewhere in 
law and economics, and economics proper, as the incremental intellectual gains 
from further refining existing theories diminished and empirical questions became 
more interesting and pressing. 
V.  SKEPTICISM AND RECENT HISTORY  
We think that sharp reaction to Limits mainly resulted from its commitment 
to understanding international law as a function of national interest and the 
distribution of power. While the critics who claimed that we argued that 
international law does not exist were wrong, they no doubt picked up on a strong 
skeptical subtext about international law and international law scholarship. That 
subtext includes skepticism about: 
1. The extent to which the norms of international law persist when 
nations’ interests or relative power changes; 
2. The strength of international law, or the capacity of decentralized 
enforcement to constrain states, especially powerful states; 
3. The robustness of multilateral cooperation via international law, as 
opposed to bilateral treaty-making, and relatedly, the capacity of 
international law to resolve major collective action problems as 
opposed to bilateral disputes like border disagreements; 
4. The neutrality and effectiveness of international organizations; 
5. The reality of sovereign equality; 
6. The normative importance of international law in the abstract, as 
opposed to specific international legal regimes which, we argued, must 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; 
7. The Whig-style progressive histories of international law, and 
especially human rights law, which assumed that international law 
inevitably expands and improves; 
8. The claim that international law is necessary for international 
cooperation; and 
9. The claim (more common among American academics than foreign 
academics) that the U.S. plays an essential role in advancing 
international law. 
This skepticism contrasted sharply with the dominant view of international 
law at the time, which, as we noted earlier, saw international law as approximating 
or approaching a domestic legal system in advanced countries.47 That view saw 
 
47  There were some skeptics even then. See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: 
REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE 
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001). But this vein of 
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international law as increasingly universal (rather than bilateral), robust (rather 
than fragile), taken for granted (rather than open to question), constitutionally 
grounded (rather than subject to renegotiation), and teleological (rather than a 
reflection of temporary political arrangements in the international plane). The 
fifteen years since Limits was published have borne out our skepticism. 
In fact, international law moves in cycles, with periods of enthusiasm and 
advance followed by periods of decay and retrenchment. A gradual but real 
development in international law and institutions in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century, collapsed with World War I. 
The League of Nations was followed by fascism and World War II. Another burst 
of international law-making saw the creation of the United Nations, the seeds of 
the human rights treaty regime, and the development of security, economic, and 
financial institutions mainly in the West, but gave way to the Cold War. The post-
Cold War enthusiasm for international law has now collapsed as well. This 
collapse can be traced through a series of crises that began twenty years ago and 
that are now wearisomely familiar: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which flowered into 
an ongoing conflict between the West and Al Qaeda and other violent Islamic 
organizations, and a war in Afghanistan that has not yet ended; the Iraq War that 
began in 2003, that has also not really ended, but rather has extended in various 
ways to Syria and Iran; the financial crises that began in 2008; the ensuing global 
recession; the European debt crisis that reached its peak in 2010 and 2011; the 
Arab Spring and its collapse from 2010 to 2012; a refugee crisis in Europe that 
began around 2015; the Brexit referendum, which threw the European Union into 
turmoil in 2016; and the global pandemic and recession of 2020. These crises 
accompanied and contributed to deepening popular unhappiness with 
globalization and international governance, which in turn generated domestic 
political upheavals as nationalist, nativist, and populist movements made inroads 
on popular opinion. These movements took place both in entrenched liberal 
democracies like the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, 
as well as in developing countries, like China, India, Brazil, and the Philippines, 
where the commitment to liberal democracy is shakier or non-existent. 
Meanwhile, the American-led international order has faced challenges from 
a rising China and a newly aggressive Russia. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, 
China has suppressed democracy in Hong Kong, ratcheted up pressure on Taiwan 
and in the South China Sea, increased domestic repression, committed horrific 
abuses—against more than one million Uighurs in particular—and used its 
economic might to expand its influence in East and Central Asia, Europe, and 
Africa through the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. Russia under Vladimir 
 
literature was less skeptical about the efficacy of international law than the possibility that it has 
unintended negative consequences, or that it reflects the interests and obsessions of elites, a theme 
subsequently taken up by SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012). 
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Putin has also increased domestic repression and put pressure on its neighboring 
countries by going to war in Georgia and Ukraine and using covert operations to 
interfere with elections and government operations in the U.S. and other 
countries. 
These upheavals have had an impact on international law. The U.S. under 
Trump upended the World Trade Organization (WTO) by gutting the appellate 
body and sparking a global trade war.48 It remains unclear which of these moves 
violate the WTO and which simply exploit its loopholes, but either way, the 
weakness of the regime has been revealed. Also revealed is the extent to which 
powerful nations will retreat from global trade rules that no longer serve their 
interests. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Biden administration has accepted 
the Trump administration’s basic critique of global trade rules and has announced 
that it will take a “different” approach to “free trade agreements” that will focus 
sharply on the interests of “American job[s]” and the “interests of all American 
workers.”49 
Whether conceived in terms of violations of international human rights 
treaties or the ostensible customary international law of human rights, the last 
fifteen years have witnessed a similarly broad retreat in respect for human rights. 
The supposedly developing international law right to democracy that was touted 
in the 1990s and early 2000s has been replaced since 2006 with fifteen straight 
years of decline in democratic freedoms.50 According to Freedom House, 
countries experiencing deterioration in democracy in 2020 “outnumbered those 
with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began 
in 2006.” Freedom House concludes that “the long democratic recession is 
deepening.”51 
The U.N. Charter’s injunction to states to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” has also taken a beating.52 To take only the most 
obvious examples: Russia invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and committed a 
number of assassinations in the West. China ceaselessly threatens Taiwan and 
asserts its territorial will in the South China Sea (in part through ignoring a ruling 
 
48  Keith Johnson, How Trump May Finally Kill the WTO, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 9, 2019).  
49  Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, A Foreign Policy for the American People 
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/DLH3-C4WH; see also Jake Sullivan (@jakejsullivan), TWITTER 
(Dec. 30, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://twitter.com/jakejsullivan/status/1344352624385126400?s=20. 
50  See SARAH REPUCCI & AMY SLIPOWITZ, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2021: DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE 
(2021). 
51  Id. 
52  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
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by a tribunal constituted under the Law of the Sea treaty).53 The territorial integrity 
and political independence of many Middle Eastern nations—most notably 
Yemen and Syria—are regularly violated. Other examples include the great power 
fight for control of the U.N.-sanctioned destruction of Libya, the war between 
Ethiopia and the Tigray Region, and clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been many other 
cross-border conflicts in the last fifteen years. And perhaps most significantly, the 
U.S. has so broadly expanded the “self-defense” exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force in the last fifteen years that it now swallows the “rule.”54 
Limits did not predict these developments. But it did provide tools for 
understanding them. The book warned that international law that depended on 
the collective action of numerous states was fragile and devoted two chapters to 
explaining that the international trade and human rights systems were vulnerable 
for this reason. It also argued that when particular rules of international law stop 
reflecting the interests of powerful states—either as a result of shifts in power 
across states, or changing perceptions of national interest—violations will occur, 
and the law itself will change. That seems to be happening as China and Russia 
reassert their security interests, China gains power through economic growth, 
opponents of international economic cooperation obtain influence in various 
states, and governments rethink the value and limitations of human rights and free 
trade commitments in response to internal religious, security, and economic 
pressures. 
Mainstream public international law scholarship from the 1990s, which was 
oriented toward explaining the growth and spread of international law, is not in a 
strong position to explain its contraction. Many international law scholars have 
blamed the backlash against international law on populism. There is certainly 
evidence for this view—and for the view that the neo-liberal elements of 
international law contributed to this backlash. In many notable cases, a state’s 
refusal to comply with a legal norm can be traced to the demands of a domestic 
populist movement.55 But the question is what to make of this evidence. For 
traditional public international law scholars, the temptation is to see the backlash 
as the result of a temporary eruption of irrationality. Populism is not just normal 
politics but collective self-delusion that has no lasting effect. Or, at best, as 
political tactics—mere rhetoric—that will have no effect over the long term.56 On 
 
53  Tom Phillips, Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/GR7F-BQZ9.  
54  See Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare, 39 WASH. Q. 7 
(2016). 
55  See Eric Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, 18 PERSP. POL. 407 (2020). 
56  See generally Heike Krieger, Populist Governments and International Law, 30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 971 (2019). 
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this view, the solution is to preserve valuable international institutions while riding 
out the wave of populism until it crests.57 
By contrast, the view of Limits was that we should expect international law 
to change and even regress as power relations and the interests of states change. 
States’ interests, of course, must be determined through domestic political 
institutions, and populism characteristically arises when a substantial group of 
people believe that those institutions disregard their values and interests. That is 
what has happened as people in many western countries have lost confidence in 
their governments as a result of economic stagnation and other perceived political 
failures—including failures associated with international institutions like the 
WTO. Their distrust of their own governments and elites carries over to 
international institutions and elites as well. On this view, the backlash against 
international law is rational even if unfortunate.58 
We do not mean to suggest, and do not believe, that all of international law 
is in decline. A huge amount of (mostly unstudied, mostly bilateral) international 
law continues to foster cooperation and coordination in normal ways. Our point 
is that one cannot understand the massive changes in and non-compliance with 
major international law instruments alongside this persistent lower-level 
cooperation through the lens of traditional public international law scholarship. 
Another trend in the last fifteen years that Limits provides the tools to 
understand is the notable decline in the use of binding international instruments 
and a rise in the use of “non-binding” political commitments to foster 
international cooperation. This is true for large-scale, ambitious international 
efforts, such as the Iran deal and components of the Paris Agreements, and for 
less ambitious forms of regulatory cooperation. Political commitments are a 
puzzle for traditional international law scholarship because they lack the fairy dust 
of “legal obligation” that supposedly induces compliance. But they are not a 
puzzle for Limits. Indeed, the book began its explanation of binding international 
agreements with an explanation of why states used non-binding political 
commitments so often and how they succeed.59 
The basic answer is that non-legal agreements can set the terms for (and thus 
help achieve) self-enforcing coordination of cooperation among nations without 
ratification and legal obligation. For us, the puzzle was not how are political 
commitments possible, but rather: “If states can cooperate using nonlegal 
instruments, why do they ever enter into treaties governed by international law?”60 
 
57  See, e.g., Anne Orford, International Law and the Populist Moment: A Comment on Martti Koskenniemi’s 
Enchanted by the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 427 (2020). 
58  See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2018). 
59  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 90–91. 
60  Id. at 82. 
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We outlined three possibilities: (1) domestic ratification processes that attend 
binding agreements convey important information about state preferences for the 
agreement; (2) binding agreements implicate certain interpretive default rules; and 
(3) binding agreements by convention signal a more serious commitment than 
nonlegal agreements. We doubt that these three explanations are exhaustive. The 
point is that any theory of international law must explain how cooperation via 
non-binding instruments works and must have an account of what, if anything, 
legalization adds. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
International law scholarship, even more than international law, seems to be 
at a turning point. The field appears to be bifurcating. One branch has fallen back 
on traditional doctrinal scholarship, still cosmopolitan and liberal/progressive, but 
with a chastened tone. The other branch is devoted to quantitative empiricism and 
is beginning to inform questions of treaty design. Old habits die hard, but we put 
our money on the second branch producing more wisdom than the first. 
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international law depends on the purpose the work of an international lawyer seeks to serve. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science approach to international law, as described in the main 
essay by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg (Lead Essay), is at once ambitious and 
modest.1 It is ambitious as it can account for a number of publications that have 
earned awards at the annual conferences of the American Society of International 
Law since 1990.2 In the Lead Essay, the social science approach is held up as a 
way to study and research international law that apparently displaces two 
assumptions3 shared by Oppenheim and the contributors to the American Journal 
of International Law Symposium of 1999.4 It is modest because the social science 
approach is one of the several known approaches for study and research in 
international law; thus, the Lead Essay does not claim to propose a new approach.5 
Moreover, upon closer inspection, the basic methods representative of that 
approach seem to be familiar to international lawyers,6 even if these lawyers may 
not have embraced the methods fully. 
Not to survey and evaluate again the existing approaches in international 
legal scholarship, which have been summarized admirably in both the Lead Essay7 
and the conclusion to the Symposium of 1999, 8  the present author would 
immediately make clear at the beginning of this short Essay that his approach is 
close to Oppenheim’s positivist approach,9 drawing where appropriate on the 
 
1  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). 
2  See id. at 3 n.13. 
3  Id. at 4–5. The two assumptions are (1) the shared omission that international law should be 
conventional social science, and (2) the shared conception that international legal scholarship is 
focused on studying the substantive obligations of international law. 
4  See Symposium On Method in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999) [hereinafter 
Symposium of 1999] for the contributions and the conclusion. See generally Steven R. Ratner & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 291 (1999). 
5  Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 7 (“Our goal is thus not to identify new trends. . .[I]nstead, it is to more 
fully describe and justify this social science approach than prior efforts.”). 
6  See id. at 14–15. It appears that the terms “approach” and “method” are used interchangeably in the 
Lead Essay, as well as in the Symposium of 1999. There may be a fine distinction between these 
two terms, in that the former captures the main feature of the usual way in which a lawyer deal with 
the discipline or issues of international law, whereas the latter seems to signify the actual steps 
undertaken by the lawyer in such dealings. Whether the distinction is correct is open to further 
consideration. 
7  See id. at 7–15. 
8  See generally Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Method Is the Message, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
410 (1999). 
9  In this author’s view, Oppenheim’s list of seven tasks for international lawyers still rings largely true 
today. See L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313, 
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present author’s experience with others. International law, in short, is a profession 
that combines the academic and practical sides. Given past efforts by eminent 
lawyers,10 there is no need to defend the positivist approach in this Essay. Indeed, 
it would be unusual if a positivist lawyer queried whether international law exists 
as law. 
In light of the Lead Essay, two comments will be given. The points which 
they seek to address are first sketched out at this juncture. 
First, a debate about approaches to a discipline is generally interesting, but 
the approach definitive of international lawyers, academic or practicing, depends 
on the purpose their work aims to serve. They learn the ropes by way of study, 
research, teaching, publication, legal drafting, advocacy, and litigation. Their 
approaches are formed over a lifetime, driven by the purpose of their work. 
Second, existing methods, or at least those of some international lawyers, 
may not differ much in nature from those employed by the social science 
approach as advocated in the Lead Essay. The suitability of methods for the study 
and research of international law perhaps depends on the identity of the intended 
audiences, such as students, professors, government lawyers, independent 
counsel, arbitrators, and judges. As different audiences have different expectations 
of this discipline, the presumption is that the motley collection of methods can 
coexist and inform each other. 
The proposition to be established in this Essay is that personal approaches,11 
however defined, may not be suitable for general consumption.12 An approach is 
personal when it is formed through the amalgamation of education, training, work, 
and all other life experiences. It is impossible to replicate, let alone replicate with 
a level of success matching that of those who created the approach. Besides, 
personal approaches affect not only the way international law is studied and 
researched, but also the way the law is practiced. As such, personal approaches do 
 
314 (1908). It remains a remarkable list, considering that he wrote it at a time when there was no 
permanent international court in the world. No guidance, therefore, could be derived by him from 
a standing court’s statute that conveniently set out a list of sources of international law. Article 38 
of the Statutes for the Permanent Court of International Law and the International Court of Justice 
provides the contours of a basic approach to international law as applied by judicial institutions. It 
pushes the positivist approach to the forefront of the discipline. In comparison with other 
approaches, Oppenheim’s remains the one that reflects most closely that basic approach of Article 
38. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38 ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
10  See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibilities of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 306–08 (1999). 
11  These are personal in that they are created and employed by individual writers and have 
subsequently achieved a degree of general recognition in terms of uniqueness or distinction among 
peers or the individual writers’ followers. 
12  See Marti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (1999) (“[T]he 
conventions of academic analysis about ‘method’ would inevitably fail to articulate its reality.”). 
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not fall neatly under a single label, such as positivism or critical legal studies, 
because they grow and change with personal experiences. 13 
II.  APPROACH IS PURPOSE-DETERMINED  
The point of the first comment is that approach is determined by purpose, 
pursued, and perfected throughout a career to which there is a firm commitment. 
Such a purpose supplies the motivation to study and work in this field. 
Consequently, this Essay is more relevant to established lawyers than to 
students—even though this author teaches students his approach with a clear aim 
that they consider careers in light of that approach, but without any pressure to 
adopt it. 
If the purpose is to study, analyze, or critique international law as a discipline, 
the issue of viability of this system of law, which consists in questions of efficacy 
and compliance, would be high on the list of research questions. Many 
approaches, including the social science approach, have attempted to provide an 
answer and, while doing so, reveal their own external views of international law 
both as an academic discipline and as a legal order.14 There is not, and there need 
not be, a consensus regarding which existing approach is better for this (external) 
purpose. 
If the purpose is, however, to be qualified one day to enter practice in this 
field, the approach would be the one chiefly employed by lawyers and legal 
advisors. Here, a solid knowledge about state practice and caselaw is essential but 
not exclusive of other sources, which has been the hallmark of influential 
international law textbooks in the past.15 This characteristic aligns largely with the 
positivist approach. For a practice-minded lawyer, law is for settling and 
preventing disputes, although innumerable issues accompanying the 
interpretation and application of law for that purpose can also be intellectually 
challenging and often require study and research. Some of those issues may indeed 
require in-depth theoretical studies, and most can become points for arguments 
in disputes between states. In this type of situation, intellectual challenges will have 
to be balanced by the practical consideration of the client’s wishes. 
 
13  There might be some truth to the assumption that the approaches displayed during the Symposium 
of 1999 have all grown out of the positivism first championed by Oppenheim and subsequently 
reflected in the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court 
of Justice. The diversion from positivism, as it were, began to appear when external views emerged 
in legal scholarship. 
14  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 13–15. On the internal and external views, see id. at 5 (citing H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961)). 
15  See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); 2 L. 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
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As a personal choice, the present author prefers the latter to the former as 
the purpose that defines his own approach to international law. This must be 
qualified by saying that his choice has been consequent upon personal 
circumstances, and that he has no intention to assert it as a general approach. 
Moreover, that approach has gradually come to reflect elements of both purposes 
mentioned above. In spite of that convergence, the purpose with practice looming 
large in the background clearly has a greater influence. Ultimately, even the 
purpose of study, research, and teaching is supposed to assist in the realization of 
the grand design of international law as a tool to order international relations and 
settle interstate disputes. That settling disputes and keeping order can be a purpose 
for studying and researching in this discipline may not be surprising given that the 
international relations of today’s world are still dominated by the international 
relations of nation-states, as they were a century ago. This domination is even 
more conspicuous in times of global crisis. While it is recognized that, from a 
doctrinal perspective, different approaches provide interesting and often 
contrasting insights into the nature of this discipline, interest of that kind per se is 
not likely to sustain itself for so long that it leads to persistent efforts in applying 
a particular approach, unless the object of that interest, international law, is also 
useful as a living system of law. On that account, international law cannot exist as 
a pure science, insulated from the real events that are its lifeblood. 
III.  THE POSITIVIST PURPOSE VIEWED INTERNALLY  
The purpose of keeping order and settling disputes primarily among states 
distinguishes international law from municipal law. The constant comparison 
between municipal and international law often hinges upon the relative utility of 
these two bodies of law with respect to similar problems. That may be the cause 
for the rivalry, if any, between them.16 But progressive dualism considers this an 
unlikely scenario, for each operates for its own purpose and within its own context 
without necessarily encroaching upon the purpose the other seeks to uphold.17 
Taking an internal view of the discipline of international law, the positivist 
can, in the course of study or practice, analyze and apply substantive and 
procedural rules of international law covering diverse areas of interests, like 
climate change, the law of the sea, territorial changes, state responsibility, 
international trade practices, international institutions, international human rights, 
and so forth. A study carried out in this broad way is obviously expansive in scope, 
where the existence of a discipline can be quantitatively discerned and qualitatively 
recognized. Moreover, the expansiveness of the subject of international law is 
 
16  See 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (COLLECTED PAPERS) 510–18, 548–49 (1975). 
17  See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 68, 71, 
79 (1957). 
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equally palpable to practitioners, as testified to by, among others, the numerous 
intergovernmental organizations that build up practices in a great variety of areas 
of specialty.18 
IV.  APPROACH EVOLVES WITH EXPERIENCE 
The point of my second comment is the following. A personal approach is 
akin to a personal habit, formed in the course of personal development. It would 
be wrong to see it as fixed after the defining work comes out or the approach has 
become a habit. As it evolves with experience, the approach cannot, a priori, 
discriminate among the existing approaches or methodologies; rather, it will be 
likely to absorb elements of the approaches or methodologies along the way, as 
required by the circumstances of current work. 
Some years back, the present author began to work in the area of 
international criminal law, when he came upon a case in which the policy-oriented 
approach had played a decisive role because customary law was silent with respect 
to a particular legal issue arising in the case. The positivistic instinct might be to 
pronounce a non liquet; whereas, in the proceedings, no judge was willing to do 
that, for the personal freedom and individual responsibility of a defendant, as well 
as the credibility of the judicial institution, were on the line. The majority finding 
was reached through a combination of the positivist methodology and a healthy 
dose of policy considerations.19 As a consequence, the personal approach of the 
present author was changed in a way that he never anticipated, and the change, 
albeit in a limited sense, was wrought by the circumstances of that particular case. 
But this recourse to another approach was only possible when the purpose of the 
work demanded an answer. 
V.  RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE 
POSITIVIST APPROACHES  
Labels, such as the ones used in the heading, are used for the sake of 
convenience only. They may conveniently describe the principal characteristics of 
approaches without signifying the comparative worth of a particular approach. It 
is conceivable that there are lawyers who do not care much about the suitable label 
under which they may characterize themselves. 
The social science approach, as described in the Lead Essay,20 is not different 
from the positivist approach in terms of two methods: first, the setting of a 
 
18  See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in the World of Ideas, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 57 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi, eds., 2012). 
19  See Bing Bing Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law, 382 RECUEIL DES COURS 
175, 322–25 (2015). 
20  See Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 5–6. 
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research question; and second, the empirical way to test a hypothesis developed 
from the research question. This may be demonstrated by an example in which a 
government relies on the right of passage through international straits to justify 
continuing use of a waterway bordered by another state. 21 
The positivist starts by focusing on an issue or research question, like 
whether a legal right of passage applies in that particular waterway. No empirical 
research is necessary for claiming the right, which is generally recognized in Part 
III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.22 However, 
an empirical study would be required to test the hypothesis that the waterway in 
question has been used as an international strait, including an assessment of the 
volume of international shipping plying the waterway over a period of time. Here, 
a problem arises in whether the social science approach will pursue the same 
research question. Perhaps that approach is more likely to focus on the question 
of why the coastal state had allowed international shipping to use the waterway 
for a period of time in the past and discontinued it prior to the emergence of the 
dispute. But the positivist will be less concerned with that question than with the 
legal consequences of the discontinuance of the status quo ante. 
In short, methodologically, it may not be easy or necessary to draw a bright 
line between the two approaches. The difference between them probably lies in 
the different research questions posed from the perspectives of international law 
and social science,23 for lawyers and social scientists are interested in different 
aspects of a situation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION :  A  MATTER OF PERSONAL CHOICE  
The starting point for this Essay is the purpose a lawyer seeks to attain 
through studying and working in international law. It is not necessary that lawyers 
always treat the discipline as if they were engaged in practice. To combine study 
and research with practice is, however, an approach that may serve both academic 
and practical purposes. Such an approach can be enriched by borrowing from 
other approaches where appropriate. While it may be unscientific to conclude that 
an approach to this discipline is individualistic, that realist view at least leaves the 
field open to all past, present, and future approaches, so that no lawyers feel 
constrained in pursuit of the purpose they seek to attain in this discipline. 
 
21  See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. 
v. Russ.), No. 2017-06, Written Observations and Submissions of Ukraine on Jurisdiction, Perm. 
Ct. Arb., ¶¶ 9, 78 (Nov. 27, 2018). 
22  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
23  This author is aware of the fact that the 1999 Symposium posed a single question of substantive 
law to all contributors and wonders what might be the answer given by a social scientist. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science method offers an important tool in advancing the power 
and purpose of international law. The argument in favor of social science 
presented by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg in their Lead Essay is confirmed here, 
but their points are also placed in a broader context.1 While social science can play 
a useful role, that role is ultimately limited and non-essential. The social science 
method can provide information about the impact of law on human behavior as 
well as facts about the origins of law.2 Social science does not explain what law is 
or what law should exist as a normative matter. The answers to these questions 
require humanistic and even transcendent approaches. Law is an ideational 
construct. It is the result of the human reasoning process. It does not exist in the 
natural, material world open to scientific study.3 Ideas impact behavior, and 
behavior can be investigated using the qualitative and quantitative methods of 
social science. Ideas themselves are formed and changed through non-material 
processes. The social science approach cannot measure these aspects of law, 
which are more artistic and humanistic than materialistic or scientific. 
This Essay begins by defining law and its humanistic character. It then 
discusses the problem of declining knowledge of humanism in legal analysis, 
particularly regarding natural law theory. This decline has left the understanding 
of law impoverished and correlates with the evident decline in respect for 
international law and law in general.4 The Essay then turns to the social science 
method, confirming its usefulness but adding the important caveat that the 
approach is only as reliable as the assumptions and data used to reach its 
conclusions. If the characterization of law is inaccurate, the social scientific results 
will be flawed. The social science approach depends on the humanistic 
understanding of law. Humanism does not depend on social science. 
 
1  See Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 
22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021).  
2  Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg focus on the second of these social science contributions. See id. at 
4 n.11–12 and accompanying text.  
3  See id. at 3 n.4–8 and accompanying text. 
4  Considerable evidence exists of declining respect for law. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, GOP 
Leaders’ Embrace of Trump’s Refusal to Concede Fits Pattern of Rising Authoritarianism, Data Shows, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/LHY2-2HXY. 
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II.  THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW THROUGH HUMANISM  
Law is “the concrete expression of transcendent norms.”5 Law is not 
science.6 Law is not even social science.7 It is a feature of social life and thus open 
to study by social scientists, but law per se is best categorized with the human 
pursuits associated with the humanities—art, music, literature, religion, theology, 
and philosophy. These are all areas of intellectual endeavor invented by people. 
So is law. The discernment of transcendent norms occurs through the human 
reasoning process incorporating non-material sources of knowledge. Social 
scientists and humanists alike tell us that law is a “social phenomenon,” a 
“complex, intricate aspect of human culture” but, like religion, is also a “normative 
social practice” for guiding human behavior, giving rise “to reasons for action.”8 
Law is one of the “normative domains,” a field of intellectual endeavor that 
depends for its intelligibility on other normative domains.9 
Social science, by contrast, is “any branch of academic study or science that 
deals with human behavior in its social and cultural aspects. Usually included 
within the social sciences are cultural (or social) anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, political science, and economics.”10 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
focus on a narrower understanding of social science because of their interest in 
particular methods of data analysis.11 They recognize that social science methods 
vary but argue that they have certain features in common, including “defining 
 
5  Charles J. Reid, Jr., Foreword to JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW, at 5 (Charles J. Reid, Jr. 
ed., Liberty Fund 1998) (1927); see also Andrei Marmor & Alexander Sarch, The Nature of Law, in 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2019), https://perma.cc/4UNG-HR45. 
6  Modern science emerged in the eighteenth century and as it did, some legal scholars attempted to 
characterize law among the subjects of scientific study. They did so by dismissing non-material 
aspects of law. For an account of this attempt, see generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). By the early twentieth 
century, some scholars believed the effort had succeeded. William Rainey Harper, the founding 
dean who opened the University of Chicago Law School in 1902, held that “education in law 
‘implies a scientific knowledge of law and of legal and juristic methods.’” History of the Law School, 
U. CHI. L. SCH., https://perma.cc/4VPV-Q4K5. In international law, as Abebe, Chilton, and 
Ginsburg point out, Lassa Oppenheim was an adamant proponent of international law as science. 
See generally L. Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 
(1908), cited in the Lead Essay. But Oppenheim was already behind the times as legal scholars were 
abandoning the “hard” sciences for the new “social” sciences by the early twentieth century. See 
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE ART OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 20–33 (2019). 
7  Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg title Part III of their Lead Essay, “International Law as Social 
Science.” Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 15. But see infra notes 7–15 and accompanying text. 
8  Marmor & Sarch, supra note 5. 
9  Id. 
10  Social Science, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/5527-ZLWE. 
11  Carl Landauer, Remarks at the 2021 CJIL Symposium (Feb. 26, 2021) (discussing the narrowness 
of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s definition of social science) (recording available on the 
University of Chicago Law School website). 
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research questions, developing hypotheses, using data to test those hypotheses, 
etc.”12 
Humanistic approaches focus on ideas and non-material sources of 
knowledge, not data. The social science approach is newer, dating from the early 
twentieth century. Ancient fields like history and law that long pre-date social 
science began adding social science methodology to existing humanist approaches 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.13 Legal historians using social 
science methods were joined by sociologists and anthropologists in investigating 
the origins of law in this same period. The early twentieth century scholar of law 
and sociology, Roscoe Pound, identified law’s origins in humanity’s search for 
harmonious social order. He found that law offered “a body of rules by which 
controversies [are] adjusted peaceably.”14 John Maxcy Zane, a late member of the 
first generation of legal historians to adopt social science,15 found evidence of  
law’s origins with “primordial men” and their “social instinct . . . that every 
member of the community must not be guilty of conduct . . . that . . . would 
endanger the social existence.”16 Zane found violence perpetrated by individual 
against individual or tribe against tribe as the primary danger to society.17 It is a 
danger that law is uniquely suited to counter. 
With the development of kinship groups and families, the hierarchical 
authority commanded by fathers, and later, by priests, allowed them to impose 
order. From there, Henry Sumner Maine famously saw a development in the law 
from status to contract—in other words, from hierarchy to equality.18 Like Maine, 
Zane wrote of the early adoption of the general legal principle of equality as the 
 
12  Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 7. The methods listed are “the use of large-N observational data, text 
analysis, survey experiments, field experiments, and qualitative field research.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
13  See David Landes & Charles Tilly, History as Social Science, SSRC (1971), https://perma.cc/2AM8-
37FD. 
14  Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 199 
(1914).  
15  Reid, supra note 5. 
16  ZANE, supra note 5, at 27–30.  
17  See id. Zane found the earliest “raw material” of law as 
fundamental physical factors, the raw human animal, the social community, the 
deep-seated, ingrained social instincts, the gradually expanding factors of 
civilization, the matriarchal family, the fixed domestic relations, the patriarchal 
family, the invention of a weapon, the expanding social type of mind, the 
development of the fighting instinct, the deep-seated acquisitive instinct for 
gathering and holding property, all modified by the slowly developing moral 
ideas of right and justice . . . . 
Id. at 44. 
18  HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY 
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (Beacon Press 1963) (1861). 
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very basis of social justice.19 This type of social science research continues. 
Anthropologist of law Fernanda Pirie, for example, has shown in her scholarship 
that law is not dependent on the existence of government.20 It is dependent on 
the existence of a society or community and the natural inclination for peace. Pirie 
concludes on the basis of factual evidence that international law is undoubtedly 
law.21 
Anthropologists and other social scientists have plainly contributed to legal 
knowledge. Their starting place is the concept of law created through the humanist 
idea of natural law. Natural law theory reveals that law’s transcendent norms take 
concrete expression most often in the form of positive law, formed by consent 
confirmable with material evidence.22 The rest of law does not rely on material 
evidence. It involves the legal theorist, judge, or law-maker observing the natural 
world, using their reasoning capacity while remaining open to inspiration about 
the conclusions to draw in the reasoning process.23 It is well known that Hugo 
Grotius, considered the father of modern international law, was a natural law 
scholar in the Scholastic tradition of Thomas Aquinas.24 Aquinas, Grotius, and 
other Scholastics looked for inspiration in reasoning about the natural world from 
scripture, divine revelation, and the beauty of the natural world.25 Using theology, 
they identified legal norms. With the suppression of theology in public intellectual 
discourse in the West by the early twentieth century, knowledge of natural law 
ideas that constitute law began to fade.26 
Law is dependent on these ideas, and they continue in the form of tradition.27 
The crisis of law and democracy of the 2020s is traceable, however, to the fading 
tradition of respect for the rule of law originally built on humanistic thought. 
Education in these ideas of the selflessness of natural law is increasingly replaced 
by the economic concept of self-interest. Law is based on the principle of equality, 
which requires altruism and trust. These are humanist, not economic, principles 
 
19  See id. at 39. 
20  See generally FERNANDA PIRIE, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW (2013). 
21  See id. at 206–15. 
22  See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Caleb Day, Sources and the Legality and Validity of International Law: Natural 
Law as Source of Extra-Positive Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 562, 578 (Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2017).  
23  See id. at 566–68. 
24  See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 146–66 (2014). 
25  See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pts. I–II, questions 90–108 (Fathers of the Eng. 
Dominican Province, trans., Complete Eng. ed. 1948) (1485). On Hugo Grotius’s view of natural 
law, see Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., supra note 5, pt. 3, 
https://perma.cc/7VDA-AD6A. See also Marmor & Sarch, supra note 5. 
26  O’CONNELL, supra note 6, at 4–6, 20–23. 
27  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY LAW 177–78 (revised ed. 2006); see also Mark Greenberg, 
The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L. J. 1288, 1288 (2014). 
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for which the humanities are needed. In place of contested theologies, secular 
fields of philosophy and other arts disciplines are available to update the insights 
of past centuries to explain the law and its transcendent norms.28 
III.  THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE WITHOUT HUMANISM  
The disappearance of humanist ideas of law in legal scholarship is significant 
for legal education because these ideas explain what is needed for the rule of law 
to succeed. Humanist ideas are also significant for the social science approach to 
law. This Section provides a brief illustration of how the quality of social scientific 
contributions depends on the social scientist’s understanding of the object of their 
study. The Internationalists is a book written by law professors, in which they present 
social science data on the declining incidence of sovereign state acquisition of 
territory through the use of military force.29 The authors claim that the decline is 
traceable to the 1928 Treaty on the Renunciation of War, also known as the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact.30 
The authors assert: “Before 1928, every state accepted . . . [that war] wasn’t 
a departure from civilized politics; it was civilized politics.”31 They then 
hypothesize that the treaty “outlawing” war had a significant impact on behavior 
and set out to prove this by graphing territorial acquisition through military force 
around the date 1928. The authors take their facts as to territorial conquest from 
the Correlates of War (COW) dataset32 and conclude their graph shows that 
“[c]onquest, once common, has nearly disappeared. Even more unexpected, the 
switch point is that now familiar year when the world came together to outlaw 
war, 1928.”33 In footnotes, the authors point to the need to “correct” errors in the 
dataset and to adapt data around the issue of what entities qualify, presumably 
under international law, as sovereign states. They also acknowledge that other 
social scientists conclude the “switch point” occurred in 1945, not 1928. Nearly 
all work on the decline of conquest “treats 1945 as the relevant break point in the 
twentieth century.”34 After the bold pronouncement at the outset of the chapter 
about 1928, the chapter ends more modestly: The Kellogg-Briand Pact “formed 
the background of rules and assumptions against which the rest of the new system 
 
28  O’CONNELL, supra note 6, at 26–33, 42–49. 
29  OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO 
OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017). 
30  See generally id. 
31  Id. at xiv. 
32  Id. at 530 n.8. 
33  Id. at 313. 
34  Id. at 530 n.9. 
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[of 1945] operated.”35 This is undoubtedly true, but it is also true of the ancient 
peremptory norm prohibiting force, which pre-dates 1928 by centuries. 
The new development in 1928 was not the outlawing of war. It was the 
policy, being developed at the League of Nations, of refusing to recognize legal 
title to territory taken using unlawful force.36 The Internationalists describes how the 
United States, a non-member of the League, promoted the policy of non-
recognition as a way to enforce Kellogg-Briand.37 The treaty itself does not require 
non-recognition. The 1945 United Nations Charter, the next important codified 
version of the prohibition on the use of force, does not do so either. The 
experience of World War II, however, and the rampant conquest by Japan, 
Germany, and Italy—after 1928—left the international community convinced of 
the need for a Security Council to enforce the prohibition. The Council continued 
the practice of calling for non-recognition, so that it crystallized as a corollary duty 
to the prohibition on force. U.N. members codified the corollary in the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations. The Declaration mandates that “[n]o territorial 
acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”38 
Non-recognition is also required respecting territory held in violation of the 
principle of self-determination. 
The prohibition on force, in contrast to the duty of non-recognition, has 
been a principle of international law since the modern system emerged in 1648.39 
The peace treaties of Westphalia, which brought a formal end to Europe’s Thirty 
Years’ War, incorporated the Just War Doctrine’s prohibition on force, along with 
an enforcement mechanism requiring all treaty signatories to join in military action 
against a transgressing party.40 The Doctrine holds that war is prohibited except 
for a few just causes and, even then, only when it is necessary and can be waged 
 
35  Id. at 335. 
36  See Anna Spain Bradley, Book Review, The Internationalists: How A Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade 
the World, 112 AM. J. INT’L L 330 (2018) (citing GARY GOERTZ, PAUL F. DIEHL & ALEXANDRU 
BALAS, THE PUZZLE OF PEACE: THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 108, 
109 (2016)). 
37  See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 173–74. 
38  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(Oct. 24, 1970). 
39  See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peace and War, in The HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (B. Fassbender & A. Peters eds., 2012). For additional evidence that the 
prohibition on the use of force was certainly in existence in the nineteenth century, see Agatha 
Verdebout, The Contemporary Discourse on the Use of Force in the Nineteenth Century: A Diachronic and 
Critical Analysis, 1 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 223 (2014). 
40  Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, in 1 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ORGANIZATION 3, 7 (1984) (citing 2 DAVID JAYNE HILL, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE 602 (1925)). 
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proportionately to the injury received.41 The only theory of law in existence in 
1648 to explain the prohibition on war or any other aspect of international law 
was natural law. Natural law theory recognizes that most legal rules and principles 
fall within the category of positive law, which requires express or implicit consent 
and includes two of the three primary sources of international law, treaties, and 
customary international law.42 Legal principles and norms not based on consent 
are discerned through natural law methodology. These include most of the general 
principles of law, such as equality, fairness, good faith, necessity, and 
proportionality, as well as the peremptory norms or jus cogens, including, the 
prohibitions on the use of force, torture, slavery, apartheid, genocide, and 
widespread extra-judicial killing.43 
The Internationalists leaves out the natural law and peremptory status of the 
prohibition on force. The book includes a lengthy treatment of Grotius, who used 
natural law methodology, but emphasizes his paid work, never completed, as a 
young jurist on behalf of the Dutch East India Company over his seminal 
published work as a mature scholar, The Law of War and Peace.44 In The Law of War 
and Peace, Grotius makes clear that war is prohibited under the Just War Doctrine. 
It is not only unlawful; it is immoral.45 As such, war is prohibited as jus cogens. 
Grotius was not only a jurist and diplomat, he was also a Christian theologian. He 
drew upon and valued the insights of other faith traditions in addition to his own. 
Like Aquinas before him, Grotius accepted that norms found in multiple cultures 
are more reliable principles of natural law discernment than those found only in 
one or two. The prohibition on war is such a norm. Omitting the humanist aspects 
of Grotian thought, The Internationalists depicts Grotius as a materialist proponent 
of “might is right.”46 The authors prove this by pointing to evidence that Grotius 
failed to demand the return of conquered territory or property as the necessary 
remedy for unlawful war. Their position, however, conflates the prohibition on 
force with the legal consequences of violating the prohibition, such as the 
requirement of non-recognition. 
Grotius clearly understood resorting to war to be prohibited under natural 
law. In an article published in 1946, Hersch Lauterpacht, who is extolled in The 
Internationalists, writes of Grotius as the quintessential proponent of right over 
 
41  Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 
665, 669 (1939). 
42  O’Connell & Day, supra note 22. 
43  Id. 
44  See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., James Brown 
Scott ed., Oxford U. Press 1925) (1625).  
45  See id. at 21–23.  
46  HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 24–25. 
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might.47 Lauterpacht also explains the importance of natural law to all law, but 
emphasizes that for international law, with its lack of governmental institutions, 
knowledge of natural law is critical.48 Another hero in The Internationalists is the 
legal philosopher Hans Kelsen, who wrote that the Just War Doctrine of Aquinas 
and Grotius was codified in the Kellogg-Briand Pact.49 As jus cogens, the prohibition 
on the use of force endures with or without the doctrine of non-recognition. 
The American non-recognition policy that followed the adoption of 
Kellogg-Briand may or may not account for the decrease in territorial conquest 
found in the COW dataset. That study has not been undertaken. The study that 
was done assumes war was first outlawed by Kellogg-Briand. Humanist 
knowledge of the prohibition indicates otherwise and draws into question the 
study’s results. Designing a social science study of law requires humanistic 
knowledge of law as a preliminary matter. This is true whether the phenomenon 
is the sanctity of a common law contract promise or the imperative duty to forego 
war. Law is constituted through ideas. It is oriented toward social peace for the 
common good. It balances the seeking of self-interest with the need for 
selflessness. Social science can provide factual information about the origins and 
impacts of these ideas but not law’s constitution or its normative purpose. 
What this observer says about the dual approaches of the arts and social 
sciences to understanding humanity’s past also applies to humanity’s law: 
[S]tudents of history as social science will always need training in all aspects 
of the discipline. If anything, the growing sophistication of social scientific 
techniques makes it all the more important for practitioners of these 
techniques to know and appreciate the humanistic approach to historical 
knowledge. We cannot afford to gain a world of numbers and models, only 
to lose our historical souls in the process.50 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg confirm in their Essay high levels of interest 
in social science approaches to law. While this bodes well for gaining information 
about law and society, if the trend excludes knowledge from the humanities, social 
scientists may produce results of questionable value. Law, the practice of law, and 
the study of law are more art than science. In this respect, law is closer to the study 
of history than economics: “If historiography is art, it cannot and must not be 
reduced to some kind of routine.”51 The reference to “routine” is to a numbers-
based repeated use of the social science methods, such as survey and regression 
 
47  See H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 51 (1946). 
48  See generally id. 
49  See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 330 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945). 
50  Landes & Tilly, supra note 13. 
51  Id. 
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analysis. Assessing numerical data related to law is useful; understanding the object 
of study is essential. There is another trend in international legal scholarship, one 
toward rediscovering humanistic knowledge. It is a trend toward scholarship with 
transcendent potential.52 
 
52  See O’CONNELL, supra note 6, at 5 n.23. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The social science approach provides much insight into the dynamics, reality, 
and day-to-day functioning of international law. It goes beyond historical and 
normative description and moves toward developing generalizable theories. In 
particular, the social science approach elucidates the inherently comparative 
nature of international law by explaining the nexus between international and 
domestic legal traditions. In this Essay, I advocate for the use of the social science 
approach in the study of international law. I use the example of comparative 
international law—specifically, Islamic law states’ (ILS)1 views of the global 
order—to illustrate the benefits and insights that social science methodology can 
provide. 
II.  SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
To be sure, there are some questions within the study of international law 
that do not lend themselves to the social science approach. For example, tools 
offered by social science are not needed—and thus, not well-suited—to describe 
what international law is. Yet, depending on the question asked, methods of 
scientific inquiry as offered by social science may indeed be very useful in 
furthering scholarly efforts to understand the reality of international law. A variety 
of questions may be gauged empirically. Is international law effective? How does 
international law work in different contexts? How do considerations of strategy 
and power politics commingle to curtail the effectiveness of international norms 
and organizations? Understanding, theorizing, and scientifically exploring how 
different states, different geographic regions, and perhaps more broadly, the 
various domestic legal traditions conceive of international norms and institutions 
constitutes a worthy scholarly effort. Ultimately, the reality of the global order and 
its underlying normative framework—international law—are interpreted via the 
 
1  Following my previous work, I define an Islamic law state as  
a state with an identifiable substantial segment of its legal system that is charged 
with obligatory implementation of Islamic law in personal, civil, commercial, or 
criminal law, and where Muslims constitute at least 50 percent of the population. 
This definition does not depend solely on the religious preferences of citizens, 
but rather fundamentally relies on the characteristics of the official legal system 
upheld by the state. 
 EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL, ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF 
DISPUTES (2020). The ILS category includes Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Brunei, 
Comoros, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. I purposefully avoid the terms “Muslim world,” or 
“Islamic world,” recognizing that they are simplistic and misleading in nature. See generally CEMIL 
AYDIN, THE IDEA OF THE MUSLIM WORLD: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2017). 
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lenses of those who use it. The social science approach lends itself naturally to 
scholarly efforts at understanding this reality. 
There are many ways in which the scope of international law is general. By 
design and by practice, international law constitutes a dynamic and continuously 
evolving legal system. Its genesis and evolution are firmly rooted in an assumption 
that a common, all-embracing legal framework should govern behavior of all 
states and other subjects of international law. Indeed, sources of international law, 
such as treaties, general principles of law, custom, writings of the publicists, and 
judicial decisions, lay out general pathways for actors’ behavior. As such, 
international law generates expectations of relatively unified or somewhat 
monolithic behavioral output in terms of interstate relations. Yet in reality, states’ 
behavior is subject to the realities of politics, state-specific strategic 
considerations, domestic institutions, culture, and so on. Domestic customs, laws, 
and norms affect how states view international law. The influence of domestic 
beliefs about morality, justice, and law is clearly seen throughout history, such as 
in the genesis and evolution of international institutions, specific legal solutions 
adapted as parts of the global order, and the entire body of international law.2 No 
part of international law has been created in a legal vacuum. Instead, it bears an 
imprint of “the history of a divided and unjust world.”3 Indeed, the design of 
international institutions and logic and structure of international rules are directly 
informed and shaped by principles and norms stemming from domestic legal 
traditions. Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
stated: “It is not a paradox to say that the universality of international law depends 
on diversity. Indeed, in the case of international law, universalization and 
globalization do not reduce diversity; they actually promote it. For international 
law, universalization means borrowing and adapting concepts and principles from 
different legal traditions.” 4 
Issues of comparative international law—including the diffusion of 
international law knowledge through filters/lenses of domestic education, local 
norms, customs, legal traditions, and so on—frequently call for the methodology 
 
2  See, e.g., SARA MCLAUGHLIN MITCHELL & EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL, DOMESTIC LAW GOES 
GLOBAL: LEGAL TRADITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2011); DANA ZARTNER, COURTS, 
CODES, AND CUSTOM: LEGAL TRADITION AND STATE POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2014); Dana Zartner Falstrom, Thought Versus Action: The 
Influence of Legal Tradition on French and American Approaches to International Law, 58 ME. L. REV. 338 
(2006). 
3  Martti Koskenniemi, Foreword to ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?, at 
xvi (2017). 
4  Abdulaqawi Yusuf, Diversity of Legal Traditions and International Law, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 681, 683 (2013); POWELL, supra note 1, at 135.  
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offered by social sciences.5 In an important way, comparative international law 
asks questions that deal with an “external” view of international law, as referenced 
by H.L.A. Hart, and reiterated by Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg.6 If indeed 
international law is not taught, written about, understood, and thus, practiced in 
the same manner across the world, then we must be seeking answers to questions 
such as, “Why do certain states sign certain treaties and avoid others?” or “What 
effects do international institutions and treaties have in the various geographic 
regions of the world?” The social science approach provides tools that enable 
scholars to theorize about as well as operationalize the uniqueness and 
contextualized dynamics of international law. The use of large-N observational 
data, field experiments, and qualitative field research—tools inherent to the social 
science approach—allow for testing specific hypotheses stemming from 
theoretical frameworks in instances when questions asked call for such an 
approach. 
In this context, it is crucial to recognize that no application of the social 
science approach will be useful without a sound theory. A researcher must identify 
a concrete research question, state it clearly, and think carefully about the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses. In other words, a sound way to 
incorporate the social science approach in the study of international law should 
involve testing hypotheses flowing from specific theoretical expectations in a 
rigorous scientific manner. Such a process can entail, for example, applying 
statistical techniques to large-N datasets where the models chosen simultaneously 
control for a host of confounding factors. Indeed, a multiplicity of factors 
commingle to shape states’ preferences, and, subsequently, their actions toward 
international law. It is not merely the substantive content of international law that 
informs state behavior. One should not delegitimize the impact of other 
influences, such as power, or cost-benefit calculations. As subjects of international 
law who interact with each other, states pursue their strategic interests. The social 
science approach allows a scholar to control for all these factors. Yet, combining 
insights provided by analysis of large-N data with qualitative methodology is very 
informative since such multi-method research design allows for contextualization 
 
5  See, e.g., ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017); Anthea Roberts, Paul 
B. Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, Comparative International Law: Framing the Field, 
109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467 (2015); COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 
2018); POWELL, supra note 1; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUASION (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011); NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW (Janne E. Nijman & 
André Nollkaemper eds., 2007); INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: 
UNIFORMITY, DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE (Helmut Philip Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016). 
6  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2021) (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961)).  
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of the general statistical patterns in the context of specific social environments.7 
As King, Keohane, and Verba write, “social science research should be both 
general and specific: it should tell us something about classes of events as well as 
about specific events at particular places.”8 
In this context, therefore, it is paramount to note that one cannot reduce the 
concept of the social science approach merely to the usage of quantitative large-
N datasets with numerous cross-sectional time-series observations. Indeed, the 
use of qualitative field research, case studies, or even purely theoretical approaches 
lie at the core of the social science approach. For instance, case studies allow us 
to determine whether certain states or certain geographic regions as a group are a 
hard case for international law and international courts.9 Usually, it is the 
combination of both methods—qualitative and quantitative—in the context of a 
particular research question and a specific theoretical framework that brings out 
the most insights into the dynamics of international law. Undoubtedly, there are 
limitations to the insights that a purely quantitative data can generate. To be sure, 
there is a danger of overgeneralization. Additionally, statistical relationships can 
be misidentified. However, guided by a sound theory, statistical models can reveal 
many interesting patterns that may be harder to tease out via purely qualitative 
case studies. As Beth Simmons writes, quantification “is an effort to document 
the pervasiveness and seriousness of practices under examination.”10 In an 
important way, results of such statistical analyses “provide direct evidence to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis.”11 The social science approach embraces 
methodological pluralism. 
Research that relies on the social science method does not purport, as a 
whole, to be a conclusive and uncontested statement with regard to a specific topic 
or issue under investigation. Largely, social sciences operate on the basis of 
likelihood and probabilities. This is particularly true about large-N analyses, which 
go beyond the context of concrete countries, specific policymakers, and so on. 
Also, the social science method is particularly useful in developing and testing 
midrange theories, and not meta-theories. Are the effects of international law 
 
7  See generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
8  GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC 
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 43 (1994). 
9  See generally id.; Jason Seawright & John Gerring, Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A 
Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options, 61 POL. RSCH. Q. 294 (2008); Emilia Justyna Powell, Islamic 
Law States and the Authority of the International Court of Justice: Territorial Sovereignty and Diplomatic 
Immunity, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (2016). 
10  BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 11 (2009).  
11  Abebe et al., supra note 6, at 16. 
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similar or dissimilar in different contexts?12 These contexts are, of course, different 
for every study. Yet the social science approach enables us to understand specific 
fragments of international law through the lenses of state practice. The 
simultaneous use of qualitative and quantitative methodology homes in on 
decision-making processes that produce patterns and regularities, which are later 
reflected in statistical results, field experiments, survey experiments, or qualitative 
field research. In many ways, it is the togetherness of human experience and many 
individual-level decisions—those of state leaders, policymakers, practitioners of 
international law, etc.—that combine to generate states’ preferences, and 
consequently choices, vis-à-vis norms of international law. The social science 
approach recognizes the multiplicity of factors at work that amalgamate in shaping 
the relationship between international law and its subjects. 
I found the social science approach to be particularly useful in explaining 
how ILS perceive international law. The Islamic legal tradition present in ILS has 
its own somewhat distinctive way of conceptualizing and understanding 
international law. In a way, this characterization refers also to these states’ 
perception of the global order. Of particular importance to international law is the 
Islamic logic and culture of justice anchored in nonconfrontational approach to 
dispute resolution. In many ILS, Islamic law replaces, augments, or informs 
secular rules in state governance and influences these countries’ perceptions of 
the global order.13 Though outlining the broad similarities and differences between 
international law and the Islamic legal tradition is certainty useful, one cannot 
ignore the reality that the ILS category is not a monolith. Therefore, not all ILS 
are “Islamic” in the same manner. It is certainly the case that the Islamic legal 
tradition and international law may diverge on some issues.14 Yet, it is also the case 
that these two legal traditions have in common more features than it is often 
 
12  See generally Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 7. 
13  See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Conceptualizing Shari’a in the Modern State, 56 VILL. L. REV. 803 (2012); M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARI’A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN TIME OF WAR AND PEACE 
(2014); AHMED AL-DAWOODY, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF WAR: JUSTIFICATIONS AND REGULATIONS 
(2011); Mohammad Fadel, International Law, Regional Developments: Islam, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW  (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012); see also Julie Frazer, 
Exploring Legal Compatibilities and Pursuing Cultural Legitimacy: Islamic Law and the ICC, in 
INTERSECTIONS OF LAW & CULTURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Julie Frazer & 
Brianne McGonigle Leyh eds., 2020). 
14  Some of the divergences concern some aspects of human rights, especially those concerning 
women’s rights and freedom of religion. See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Human Rights in the 
Arab World: A Regional Perspective, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 701 (2001); Mohammad H. Fadel, Public Reason 
as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law, 8 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007); Najma Moosa, Islamic State Practices in the Framework of Islamic and International 
Human Rights Instruments., 12 J. ISLAMIC ST. PRAC. INT’L L. 22 (2016). 
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recognized.15 Interestingly, in the context of international dispute resolution, some 
ILS readily accept the jurisdiction of international courts, while others avoid them. 
These patterns suggest that at the core of the relationship between Islamic law 
and international law is not a fundamental, irreconcilable collision of values. 
Consequently, while conceptualizing this relationship, it is unfitting to formulate 
blanket, all-encompassing statements about ILS’ practices. Instead, each 
relationship is fundamentally context-specific. The structure of domestic laws, 
customs, and practices is unique within each Islamic law state. This reality holds 
true not only across space, but also across time. Secular and religious laws merge 
in a different fashion in different domestic jurisdictions. The combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods of scientific inquiry shows that ILS whose 
domestic legal systems are permeated with a version of Islam adhere most firmly 
to those elements of the global order that are similar to principles embraced by 
the Islamic legal tradition and culture.16 By way of illustration, international 
nonbinding third-party methods of peaceful resolution—in particular, mediation 
and conciliation—are procedurally similar to sharia-based dispute resolution.17 
Thus, there is a natural synergy there. International legalized methods of dispute 
settlement—arbitration and adjudication—are more attractive to ILS whose 
domestic legal systems incorporate strong secular laws.18 In sum, different ILS are 
naturally attracted to different international settlement mechanisms. 
The social science method is at the core of this research. In answering my 
research questions, I embrace methodological pluralism. To elucidate, inform, and 
visualize statistical results stemming from large-N cross-sectional time series data, 
my theoretical argument, as well as empirical implications, are immersed in 
multiple qualitative interviews with Islamic law scholars and practitioners of 
international law, including judges of the ICJ, states’ legal counsels, and several 
policymakers and religious leaders.19 These conversations allowed for in-depth 
examinations of causal factors and mechanisms shaping ILS’ attitudes toward 
international law and international institutions. 
Importantly, my research does not deal with how states—in my case ILS—
should behave toward international law, the ICJ, or other methods of dispute 
resolution. In contrast, I focus on reality, the day-to-day practice of international 
law, ILS’ attitudes toward the particular aspects of the global order, and their 
 
15  See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 1; Emilia Justyna Powell, Islamic Law States and Peaceful Resolution of 
Territorial Disputes, 69 INT’L ORG.777 (2015); Emilia Justyna Powell, Not So Treacherous Waters of 
International Maritime Law: Islamic Law States and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea , in 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 571 (Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter Not So Treacherous Waters]. 
16  See POWELL, supra note 1; Not So Treacherous Waters, supra note 15. 
17  POWELL, supra note 1. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
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perception of the ICJ’s jurisprudence. The social science method enables me to 
ask, “How do ILS assess the various aspects of international law?,” “Do they see 
it as neutral and legitimate?,” “What do policymakers and Islamic law scholars 
think of the nexus between Islamic law and international law?” One cannot 
understand the realities of the relationship between international law and Islamic 
law without moving beyond the question of how this relationship should be. Thus, 
there is a need for an empirical assessment. Why would ILS commit to resolving 
their contentions at the ICJ via signing the Optional Clause or becoming part of 
treaties with compromissory clauses? We cannot assume the effect of international 
law on ILS. The social science approach allows me to demonstrate that this effect 
is context-specific, hinging on the nexus between secular law and religious law 
within ILS’ domestic jurisdictions. There is no one way in which the Islamic legal 
tradition is practiced, and this reality fundamentally impacts the relationship 
between the Islamic legal tradition as a whole and international law. Thus, all else 
equal, the efficacy of international law depends on features of domestic legal 
systems operating within these states. 
Though my theory and empirical results capture central aspects of ILS’ 
behavior, a multiplicity of dynamics remain unexplored or underexplored. Any 
data collection effort involves judgment and some measurement error. Like other 
methodologies, the social science approach is not perfect, but has inherent 
shortcomings and limitations. The relationship between international law, religion, 
domestic notions of justice, and politics with regard to any group of states requires 
much in-depth theoretical development. Nevertheless, I believe studying the 
nexus between the Islamic legal tradition and international law via the social 
science method constitutes an important step in the scholarly efforts to 
understand the practice of international law by a unique group of states. 
III.  CONCLUSION  
The social science approach has already shed much light on our perception 
of the way that international law is practiced and viewed across the globe. It is 
good to be skeptical about any methodological approach one adapts to study a 
research question. Human behavior—which in turn translates to outcomes on 
state-level behavior vis-à-vis international law—is inherently difficult to gauge. 
Yet, along with other methods, the social science approach can bring much to our 
understanding of international law and its efficacy. If grounded in solid theoretical 
framework and non-judgmental observational evidence, the social science 
approach adds important insights. 
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Building on Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton and Tom Ginsburg’s call for more social 
science research in international law, this Essay discusses ways in which social science research 
can be applied to inform reforms of international institutions.  In the face of significant challenges 
to the current international legal order, active reform discussions have been ongoing concerning a 
number of international institutions. This Essay posits that in developing proposals to reform 
these international institutions, more attention should be paid to identify the causes of existing 
problems, which is important in an international setting where decision-making requires the 
consensus of multiple stakeholders. The social science approach can be useful in this regard. Using 
investor-state dispute settlement as an example, this Essay discusses how the social science 
approach can be applied to help understand the causes of the problem of excessive duration and 
costs of investor-state arbitration proceedings. Findings from social science research highlight the 
importance of mechanisms which insulate respondent state decision makers from domestic political 
pressure.  These mechanisms deserve more attention in ongoing ISDS reform discussions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
After a period of robust growth with the creation of a significant number of 
new international courts and tribunals, international law has now come to a phase 
of backlashes and recalibration. Several African countries have withdrawn from 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) amid criticism of the court’s bias against 
African countries.1 One of the rallying points during the Brexit campaign was the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU’s) jurisdiction over the United 
Kingdom, jurisdiction which has come to an end following the finalization of 
Brexit.2 Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have 
withdrawn from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) Convention after a series of claims being filed by foreign investors against 
these countries at ICSID.3 Other countries have, en masse, terminated the bilateral 
investment treaties into which they entered. 4  Even the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system, which was once viewed as the 
“crown jewel” of the WTO, has now become partially paralyzed because of the 
United States’ continuous objections to the reappointment of Appellate Body 
Members.5 
In the meantime, countries are actively engaging in discussions of reforming 
international courts and tribunals. More than forty-five countries are participating 
in discussions of possible reforms of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
under the auspices of Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 6  Major WTO member countries also 
agree that the system needs reform and have started dialogues on this topic.7 
 
1  South Africa: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
CN.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 25, 2016); Burundi: Withdrawal from Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016); 
Gambia: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 11, 2016).  
2  Eleanor Bennett, UK Government Trumpets Renewed ‘Control of Our Laws’ and End of ECJ Jurisdiction 
After Making EU Brexit Deal, JURIST (Dec. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZDG4-L363. 
3  Matthew Weiniger, Christian Leathley & Joanne Greenaway, Venezuela Follows Bolivia and Ecuador 
with Plans to Denounce ICSID Convention, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/RSE4-7CU4. 
4  Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls Its Investment Treaty Regime, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/GPR7-BNHU; see also Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More 
than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/BVQ4-PUKR. 
5  Cosette Creamer, From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to Its Crown of Thorns, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 51, 51 
(2019). 
6  Julian Arato, ISDS Reform: Working Group III Gets Down to Brass Tacks, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/7KEZ-H29J.  
7  Isabelle Icso, USTR Nominee on the WTO: U.S. ‘Can’t Afford’ Continued Disengagement, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Feb. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/3QLV-P2HD; Hannah Monicken, EU Moves Closer to 
U.S. on Appellate Body, Other WTO Reforms In New Strategy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 18, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/U4L7-B7UB. 
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Other international courts such as the ICC and CJEU have also been the subject 
of reform proposals propelled by criticism against these institutions.8 
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, the evolution of 
scholarship on international law has always been influenced by real-world 
problems.9 While earlier literature takes a largely theoretical approach to studying 
problems arising from international law practice, in the past two decades, there 
has been an empirical turn in international law scholarship.10 Nevertheless, until 
recently, this line of empirical research has been largely motivated by high-level 
questions from prior theoretical debates, such as how international law is 
produced and whether international law matters.11 While empirically assessing 
these issues can have implications for larger normative questions, it often does 
not speak directly to which normative prescriptions should be adopted to address 
real-world problems in international law. 
This Essay argues that the backlash international law is currently facing, and 
the ongoing reforms of international institutions underscore the need for more 
social science research that is geared toward examining the causes of existing 
institutional problems. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg describe social science 
research as identifying a research question, developing a specific hypothesis that 
can be empirically assessed, identifying a research design and data to assess the 
validity of the hypothesis, and presenting results while acknowledging the 
assumptions upon which they are based and the level of uncertainty associated 
with those results.12 Building on their framework, this Essay proposes that to help 
inform the reform of various international institutions, more social science 
research should approach an existing institutional problem by asking which 
factors may have caused the problem, generating testable hypotheses based on a 
potential cause, and developing a research design that allows one to draw causal 
inferences about the effect of this cause. 
Understanding the causes of a problem helps inform more tailored 
institutional reforms that specifically address these underlying causes. This is 
particularly important in the context of reforms of international legal institutions 
because of the wide variety of stakeholders. For example, during the ISDS reform 
discussions at UNCITRAL Working Group III, while countries generally agreed 
that the existing ISDS system needs reform, their positions diverged considerably 
 
8  Douglas Guilfoyle, Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is It Time for the Assembly of State Parties to 
Be the Adults in the Room?, EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/CYS3-4RGQ. 
9  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2021). 
10  Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012). 
11  See id. at 2–3, 12. 
12  Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 12–13.  
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as to which reforms to pursue.13 After multiple rounds of discussions over the 
past three years, countries have identified six major areas of concerns over ISDS: 
“excessive costs, excessive duration of proceedings, lack of consistency in legal 
interpretation, incorrectness of decisions, lack of arbitral diversity, and lack of 
independence, impartiality, and neutrality of ISDS adjudicators.”14 With respect to 
each of these concerns, the Working Group has put forward various reform 
options.15 Countries have expressed divergent views on these options and have 
yet to reach consensus on the adoption of any reforms.16 Social science research 
that clearly identifies the causes of existing problems will help facilitate consensus 
building amongst countries and provide guidance in terms of which reform option 
may be best suited to address a particular problem. Indeed, each reform option 
comes with its own trade-offs.17 This makes it even more important to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the existing problem first, instead of rushing to 
implement reforms that may not get at the real causes of the problem. 
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, social science research 
is pluralistic in methods. 18  Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
instrumental in enhancing our understanding about the causes of a particular 
problem in the study of international law. However, the emphasis of these two 
types of methods is slightly different. Qualitative methods are more often applied 
to locate the potential causes of a problem, whereas quantitative methods are 
more often applied to assess the effect of a particular causal factor.19 For example, 
one may conduct interviews to understand what has caused a particular problem 
and, on the other hand, apply a reduced-form analysis using observational data to 
identify the effect of a potential cause. Social scientists should embrace the use of 
both methods and, as Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg suggest in their article, pick 
the method most appropriate to the problem at hand.20  
In applying quantitative methods to the study of international law, one major 
challenge is causal identification. International law, by its nature, is influenced by 
various forces working together. It can be difficult to tease out the effect of a 
 
13  Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systematic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 410, 414–15 (2018).  
14  Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford & Laura Letourneau-Tremblay, Empirical Perspectives on Investment 
Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, 21 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 188, 190 (2020). 
15  Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., 
https://perma.cc/DKT7-A97T.  
16  See id. 
17  Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 361 (2018). 
18  Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 4. 
19  See Hebert Smith, Effects of Causes and Causes of Effects, Some Remarks from the Sociological Side, 43 SOCIO. 
METHODS & RSCH. 406, 409 (2014).  
20  See Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 15–17. 
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particular factor in a clean manner. In addition, unlike studies evaluating policy 
merits or effectiveness in the domestic setting that can leverage variations at the 
jurisdictional level (for example, a difference in differences study examining the 
employment effect of minimum wage increases in New Jersey versus 
Pennsylvania), it is difficult for international law scholars to find such variations 
to figure out whether a policy or institutional option is desirable or not, as 
international law is meant to be international and universal. 
That said, this does not mean causal identification is impossible in the study 
of international law. As Shaffer and Ginsburg pointed out almost a decade ago, 
empirical work in international law should be guided by conditional international 
law theory, which focuses on the conditions under which international law is 
produced and has effects.21 One empirical strategy for conditional international 
law theory is to leverage variations in the contexts in which international law 
operates, such as variations in the underlying treaty provisions, in the legal claims 
advanced during dispute settlement, and in the international law participants 
themselves. With the increased availability of fine-grained international law data 
and the development in identification strategies, one can employ a research design 
that exploits variations in the aforementioned dimensions to draw causal 
inferences in studying questions related to existing problems, such as why certain 
countries chose to terminate the international investment treaties they signed or 
what has led to prolonged proceedings in ISDS and WTO dispute settlement.  
Importantly, one should always be clear about the assumptions being made 
and any limitations associated with the methodology or results. Because 
international law actors may not be familiar with sophisticated statistical methods, 
transparency on methodology and caution against overclaiming can help alleviate 
potential concerns about the credibility of the results.  
The challenges of causal inferences in the international law context make it 
important to combine quantitative analysis with qualitative methods which 
contribute to the development of theories guiding quantitative research and 
provide valuable insights where quantitative methods have limitations.  Another 
area that awaits more future work is the replication of prior research findings, 
which will generate more confidence that reform proposals made on the basis of 
existing social science research are, in fact, supported by robust empirical evidence. 
In the remainder of this Essay, I use the excessive duration and costs 
problem of ISDS proceedings as an example to discuss how social science 
research may be applied to explore causes of a problem and shed light on potential 
solutions. 
 
21  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1.  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 162 Vol. 22 No. 1 
II.  SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE EXCESSIVE 
DURATION AND COSTS PROBLEM OF ISDS 
ISDS is a dispute settlement mechanism that allows foreign investors to 
bring claims against sovereign states before arbitral tribunals for alleged violations 
of the latter’s investment protection obligations. ISDS has long been criticized for 
its lengthy and costly proceedings.22 According to UNCITRAL, an average ISDS 
case lasts for approximately 3.75 years, which translates into average litigation and 
arbitration costs of millions of dollars for each side of the dispute.23 The excessive 
length (and relatedly, excessive costs) of investor-state arbitration, which was 
designed to be a cost- and time-effective dispute settlement system, has given rise 
to wide criticism from countries participating in the process.24 However, while 
there has been a recent increase in empirical research documenting this problem,25 
few studies have empirically examined the causes of the excessive duration and 
costs problem. 26  Different diagnoses of the causes may point to different 
prescriptions to address the problem. In particular, if one cause for prolonged 
proceedings is that countries are unwilling to settle cases because of domestic 
political pressure, then perhaps more institutional reform efforts should be 
focused on dispute prevention and mitigation at the domestic level rather than 
case management reforms or other procedural changes at the international level. 
In a new article, I examine this potential cause by exploring the influence of 
domestic political pressure on state settlement behavior in ISDS cases. 27 The 
overall settlement rate in ISDS is much lower than what is typical in other litigation 
settings—only around twenty percent of all concluded ISDS cases were settled.28 
News reports and surveys of ISDS practitioners show that states are averse to 
settlement, which tends to generate public criticism for capitulating to the 
demands of foreign investors and “selling out” using public money.29 In a 2018 
 
22  See generally SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION (2019). 
23  Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
— Cost and Duration: Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 48, 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153 (Aug. 
31, 2018). 
24  FRANCK, supra note 22, at 181–84. 
25  See, e.g., José Manuel Álvarez Zárate et al., Duration of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 21 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 300, 303–04 (2020).  
26  For an exception, see Behn et al., supra note 14, at 18–21. 
27  Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration, J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming). 
28  Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://perma.cc/L989-QYAN (last updated 
Jul. 31, 2020).  
29  See, e.g., Bette Hileman, Canada Capitulates on MMT, Settles with Ethyl, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Jul. 27, 
1998), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/cen-v076n030.p013a; Uchenna Awom & Patience 
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survey of ninety-seven experienced practitioners and government officials who 
have participated in ISDS proceedings, the most frequently mentioned obstacle 
to settlement in investor-state disputes was the desire to shift the blame to a third-
party adjudicator, so that the government would not have to take responsibility 
for compensating foreign investors with public money. 30  These qualitative 
findings suggest that domestic political pressure may have caused respondent 
states to delay settlement or forego settlement opportunities altogether, which has 
the effect of substantially extending the length of arbitration proceedings. 
To identify the effect of anticipated domestic public pressure on case 
settlement, I exploit variation in election timing in the respondent states and use 
it as a proxy for the government’s sensitivity to domestic public pressure. Electoral 
disapproval is more likely to translate into loss of political power as elections 
approach. Hence, elected officials likely become increasingly cautious with settling 
with foreign investors in the run-up to elections. On the other hand, the time left 
until the next election should be exogenous to case quality. Thus, the research 
design allows one to draw causal inferences about the effects of domestic political 
pressure on state settlement decisions. 
In the article, I find that a state becomes less likely to settle an ISDS case as 
it gets closer to the next election of the state leader. This finding suggests that 
state settlement decisions in ISDS are not made solely based on case merits.  
Instead, case settlement also appears to be affected by a political calculus which 
fluctuates based on election timing. Such political influence leads to delay, and in 
cases where domestic political pressure is high enough, a failure to settle. This 
corroborates prior qualitative findings and points to domestic political influence 
on state settlement decisions as a cause of lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings. 
This finding has direct normative implications regarding pursuing reforms 
to address the problem of excessive duration (and relatedly, excessive costs) 
associated with ISDS proceedings. UNCITRAL has identified several possible 
measures to address concerns about excessive duration and costs, including 
promotion of dispute prevention and mitigation policies, implementing stricter 
timelines, adding new procedural rules to prevent disputing parties from delaying 
the process, establishing advisory centers to provide legal advice to countries, and 
providing arbitrators with case management training. 31  A majority of these 
measures aim to shorten case duration and reduce associated costs through 
 
Akpuru, Nigeria: Malabu Deal Latest—Shell’s Dirty Lies, ALLAFRICA (May 24, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/D7DH-HN4U; Seraphina Chew, Lucy Reed & J Christopher Thomas, Report: 
Survey on Obstacles to Settlement of Investor-State Disputes 1 (NUS Ctr. for Int’l L. Working Paper, Paper 
No. 2018/022, 2018), https://perma.cc/8V28-SEUS. 
30  Chew et al., supra note 29, at 12. 
31  Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., supra note 23, ¶ 101. 
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reforming various procedural aspects of ISDS.32  While such procedural reform 
efforts can be valuable, the finding that countries’ settlement decisions are affected 
by domestic political pressure highlights the importance of mechanisms that 
insulate respondent state decision makers in ISDS proceedings from such 
domestic political pressure. Without such mechanisms in place, even if reforms 
are made to improve case management and streamline the proceedings, case 
duration and costs may not be substantially reduced when domestic political 
pressure forces respondent states to continue litigation without settlement.  
One way to insulate settlement decision makers from domestic political 
pressure is to delegate the decision-making power to a specialized agency or 
commission and have legal experts there issue detailed reports to explain the 
reasoning behind the settlement decision, illustrating why settlement is the 
desirable strategy in a particular case. These legal experts should be less susceptible 
to domestic political pressure as compared to politicians, and collective decision 
may further relieve them of concerns about potential repercussions from the 
domestic public. An expert report with detailed reasoning also helps elected 
officials justify the settlement decision to domestic audiences, which can mitigate 
potential domestic backlash against settlement with foreign investors. 
A few Latin American countries have already established mechanisms 
serving similar purposes. 33  Peru, for example, established an inter-agency 
commission, Coordination and Response System for International Investment 
Disputes (SICRECI), which specializes in the prevention and handling of 
investor-state disputes.34 Among other things, this commission is responsible for 
“assessing the possibility of reaching a settlement in the direct negotiation stage 
and participating in these negotiations.” 35  The work of the commission is 
supported by a Technical Secretariat, whose core functions include “conducting 
an initial assessment of the dispute and preparing a preliminary report that is 
submitted to the other members; preparing reports on courses of action and 
strategies and any other information necessary for the Commission to perform its 
 
32  Addressing concerns about time and costs through procedural reforms has also been the focus of 
ICSID’s ongoing rules amendment project. See Meg Kinnear, Continuity and Change in the ICSID 
System: Challenges and Opportunities in the Search for Consensus, https://perma.cc/98ZQ-
3CPA. 
33  See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO ARBITRATION, at 86, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 
(2010) https://perma.cc/66C3-NCES.  
34  Ricardo Ampuero Llerena, Peru’s State Coordination and Response System for International Investment 
Disputes, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/WK9T-56WR.
 
35  See id. 
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duties.”36 In addition, the commission also works closely with the Peruvian entities 
responsible for concluding investment agreements to impose new requirements 
on foreign investors. Under these new requirements, investors have to present 
detailed information about the dispute at the time of dispute notification, so as to 
“facilitate the complete and full understanding of the dispute by the Special 
Commission . . . [to] increase the possibility of achieving a satisfactory outcome 
in the negotiation stage.”37 
By requiring legal experts in the Special Commission to issue reports 
detailing the reasoning for the litigation (or settlement) strategies, based on all of 
the available information about the dispute, these institutional arrangements have 
the potential of insulating the decision makers from domestic political pressure so 
that they can make settlement decisions based on case merits rather than political 
whims. In this way, more cases, which otherwise would not be settled due to 
intense domestic political pressure, will be settled, likely at earlier stages of the 
dispute.  Indeed, Peru credits its system with averting around 300 potential 
arbitration proceedings. 38   The facilitation of early settlement (when it is 
demonstrated to be more desirable than litigation) relieves respondent states of 
the burden of spending considerable public funds and resources defending 
investor claims, therefore contributing to the reduction of duration and costs of 
ISDS proceedings. 
Another mechanism that may serve similar purposes is to have a third party 
independently assess the facts of a dispute and issue a report of its fact findings, 
upon which respondent state governments can rely to make settlement decisions. 
In this regard, ICSID’s most recent rules amendment proposals contain a stand-
alone set of rules for fact-finding, which offer states and investors the opportunity 
to constitute a committee to make objective findings of fact that could resolve 
their dispute.39 Reports resulting from these fact-finding proceedings can provide 
basis for respondent state governments’ settlement decisions and therefore 
alleviate their concerns about domestic backlash (to the extent that the report 
implies settlement is likely more desirable than litigation). Of course, strict time 
limits need to be imposed so that the fact-finding will not become another costly 
and drawn-out process itself. 
 
36  Id.; see also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., BEST PRACTICES IN INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
HOW TO PREVENT AND MANAGE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: LESSONS FROM PERU, at 35 (2011) 
https://perma.cc/5H2H-7JGG. 
37  See Llerena, supra note 34.    
38  See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 118 (2013). 
39  ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules Working Paper 4 (2020), 193–204, 
https://perma.cc/9NXJ-DLNS.   
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III.  SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND OTHER ASPECTS OF 
ISDS  REFORM  
The social science approach can be extended to study a broader range of 
problems in the international investment law sphere that are pertinent to ongoing 
ISDS reform discussions. For example, many critics consider the recent explosion 
of ISDS cases to be a major factor in contributing to a number of countries’ 
terminations of bilateral investment treaties. 40  Countries learn about the 
consequences of their treaty commitments through their experiences in ISDS 
disputes, which propels them to terminate these treaties.41 This has brought a lot 
of blame and controversy to ISDS, which is now at the center of a legitimacy crisis. 
However, an alternative or additional cause of the problem may be that these 
countries did not carefully negotiate the terms of these treaties and, as a result, are 
more likely to renege on their prior commitments. These two causes implicate 
different reform options to address the problem. While one suggests that more 
should be done to improve the fairness and quality of ISDS decisions, which is 
what most reform proposals in the area have centered on so far, the other points 
to the importance of having countries spend more effort and use more expertise 
in negotiating treaties. More social science research on this issue will help redirect 
reform efforts to needed places. 
As another example, also in the context of ISDS reform, while countries 
share concerns over lack of impartiality and independence among arbitrators, their 
views diverge when it comes to deciding which reforms to pursue to address this 
problem. Some countries advocate for an overhaul of the ISDS system by 
replacing investor-state arbitration with a multilateral investment court, whereas 
other countries favor retaining the existing system but instituting more 
incremental reforms that redress these specific concerns.42 More social science 
research on what causes biased decisions can help provide states with a clearer 
picture regarding which path to pursue. For instance, if there is no evidence that 
reappointment incentives per se, which are inherent to ad hoc appointment—the 
defining feature of arbitration—lead to biased decisions, then perhaps more 
incremental reforms, such as refining the arbitrator’s code of conduct, address the 
problem better than a systematic overhaul does.43 
 
40  See Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate Investment Agreements? The 
Impact of Arbitration, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 25, 33 (2018). 
41  See id. 
42  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 411. 
43  See Weijia Rao, Are Arbitrators Biased in ICSID Arbitration? A Dynamic Perspective, 66 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2021). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION  
In a time when international law is facing significant challenges and 
undergoing rapid changes, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for more social 
science research in the field is timely and important. The social science research 
on international law has so far largely focused on documenting existing problems 
and examining high-level theoretical questions. This Essay posits that to inform 
reforms of international institutions, more social science research should be 
focused on identifying the causes of these problems and proposing policies or 
reforms that specifically address those underlying causes. This requires us to 
explore new frontiers of the conditional international law theory and exploit 
variations in both the substance of international law and international law 
participants. In an international setting where decision-making requires the 
consensus of a wide range of stakeholders, obtaining a comprehensive 
understanding of what caused existing problems is both important and necessary 
for implementing tailored reforms that help the field of international law 
overcome challenges at a pivotal time. 
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This Essay elaborates in three ways the call for a renewal of social science approaches to 
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg. First, while 
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis testing, we argue 
that it can and must be complemented by several other well-institutionalized social science 
approaches to international law. Second, we loosen the conventional “internal”/“external” 
distinction in legal scholarship and make the case that conceptualization and empirics are integral 
to both approaches. Third, we propose that the full promise of social science approaches to 
international law can only be realized when the international is held in dynamic and temporal 
tension with the national and local. Expanding scholarship on transnational legal orders and 
ordering brings theory and research on international law (including conventional “internal” 
approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of socio-legal research and scholarship 
(the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits for both. The Essay illustrates the promise 
of the transnational legal order framework with two illustrations, one from international trade 
law through the World Trade Organization and the other from international commercial law 
created and promulgated by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
This Essay responds to the call for a renewal of social science approaches to 
international law advanced by Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton, and Tom Ginsburg.1 
In their framework essay to this symposium, they define “the conventional social 
science approach to law” as “clearly stating a research question, developing 
hypotheses, using a research design to test that hypotheses based on some form 
of qualitative or quantitative data, and presenting conclusions, all while 
acknowledging the assumptions upon which they are based and the level of 
uncertainty associated with those results.”2 They label this form of research an 
“external approach to law,” which they (conventionally) contrast with “internal,” 
“doctrinal” scholarship that is “descriptive” and “normative.”3 They then illustrate 
their argument with empirical studies of international law involving such issues as 
whether Bilateral Investment Treaties lead to increased investment flows between 
the countries that sign them, the effectiveness of international human rights 
agreements, and the efficacy of international dispute resolution.4 
Our Essay elaborates their call for social science in three ways. First, while 
we affirm the importance of what they call the “scientific method” of hypothesis 
testing, we argue that it can and must be complemented by several other well-
institutionalized social science approaches to international law. Second, we 
reconceive the links between internal and external approaches to international law 
by proposing that conceptualization and empirics are integral to both approaches. 
We thus loosen the conventional “internal”/“external” distinction in legal 
scholarship, which is reflected in their essay and in critiques of the empirical 
approach that they advocate. Third, we propose that the full promise of social 
science approaches to international law can only be realized when the international 
is held in dynamic and temporal tension with the national and local, thus also 
permeating the international/national law dichotomy as reflected in 
methodologically nationalist scholarship. Processes of transnational legal ordering 
and the rise and fall of what we conceptualize as “transnational legal orders” 
(TLOs) bring theory and research on international law (including conventional 
“internal” approaches) into productive engagement with growing bodies of socio-
legal research and scholarship (the so-called “external” view), with mutual benefits 
for both. In these ways, our approach can provide a bridge between those 
 
1  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law and Its 
Applications, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021). As they note, such empirical study was earlier extensively 
surveyed and assessed in Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Law 
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
2  Abebe et al., supra note 1, at 5.  
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 16–17, 21.  
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adopting internal (doctrinal) and external (empirical) approaches to international 
law. 
II.  AMPLIFYING “THE SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW”  
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg present a particular version of “social science” 
based on deductive reasoning in which hypotheses are developed and tested. 
There are clear advantages to the deductive approach that they highlight. The 
researcher aims to be objective, posits a hypothesis, gathers data, and lets the data 
speak, either confirming or disproving hypotheses. In the process, this work can 
(and should) inform social decision making. 
While this aspect of social-science engagement with law has many merits and 
is a critical component of a comprehensive project, a review of the extensive 
anthropological,5 sociological,6 political science,7 economic,8 and sociolegal9 
literatures on international law and institutions demonstrates that a multiplicity of 
methods and theories compose the richly textured promise of social science for 
the study and practice of international law. First, the complementarity of other 
empirical approaches is necessary because frequently, the most important 
questions cannot readily be reduced to quantitatively measurable variables. Even 
if they can be, there is an absence of valid and reliable data on cross-sectional or 
time-series studies of states and supranational institutions. Second, this 
complementarity is necessary because the ability to produce a verifiable theory 
relies on prior stages of understanding, concept development, and hypothesis 
production, and likewise depends upon later types of empirical research to make 
meaning of results that all too often are conflicting, ambiguous, or lacking in much 
 
5  See, e.g., GALIT SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE 
WORLD BANK (2012); SALLY MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
6  See, e.g., GREGOIRE MALLARD, FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE 
(2014); JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE 
TRIBUNALS (2003); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). 
7  See, e.g., ABRAHAM NEWMAN & HENRY FARRELL, OF PRIVACY AND POWER: THE TRANSATLANTIC 
STRUGGLE OVER FREEDOM AND SECURITY (2019); BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Emilie Hafner-Burton & James Ron, 
Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360 (2009). 
8  See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, ECONOMICS RULES: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE DISMAL SCIENCE 
118, 144 (2015) (stressing that useful economic analysis requires choices among models that involve 
both science and craft). 
9  See, e.g., GREGORY SHAFFER, EMERGING POWERS AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE PAST 
AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (forthcoming 2021); Alexandra Huneeus, 
Pushing States to Prosecute Atrocity: The Inter-American Court and Positive Complementarity, in THE NEW 
LEGAL REALISM: STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY VOL. II 225, 228–29 (Heinz Klug & Engle Merry eds., 
2016). 
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explanatory power.10 Hypothesis testing therefore is neither the starting point nor 
the ending point of social science work, but rather one important component of 
ways that social science can address law’s relationships with society, politics, and 
the economy. 11 
The embeddedness of hypothesis testing in a wider multi-faceted enterprise 
of social science can be seen in the development of an extensive body of 
interdisciplinary scholarship in the past several years on the normative 
development, rise, contestation, and fall of TLOs.12 This line of research and 
theory arose from an intuitive sense that a new framework was needed to 
understand and address the scope and diversity of social, economic, civil, health, 
environmental, and other problems that engage law across national frontiers, and 
in which international law is a component. The empirical realities of legally salient 
issues within and beyond the state required a theoretical framework that could 
reach across the entire landscape of problems purported to be susceptible to 
resolution or mitigation with the assistance of international hard and soft law. In 
addition, the diversity and dynamism of real-world issues demanded a framework 
that synchronically and diachronically embraces international, national, and local 
law, because normative development within these planes is inextricably 
intertwined in practice in ways that have grown over time. 
From a social science perspective, the TLO framework emerged initially with 
an awareness that specific hypotheses or highly abstract frames respectively 
provided no systematic way to compare, contrast, and learn from developments 
in areas of law involving social problems from which one could build conditional 
theory subject to empirical confirmation, refinement, or disconfirmation, 
including for purposes of problem-solving.13 We began with a high-level concept, 
“order,” and both processual (“ordering”) and institutional (“orders”) expressions 
of this concept, which could bring sociological and legal frames to encompass the 
bewildering diversity of social problems and their relation to law, regulation, and 
governance. Here we consciously displaced an exclusive focus on international law 
by situating international law within the frame of transnational legal ordering. We 
 
10  See, for example, studies on the question of whether international investment agreements induce 
greater flows of foreign direct investment, a topic raised both in Abebe et al., supra note 1, and 
Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1. But see JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN 
& MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 155–79 
(2017). 
11   But see CARLO ROVELLI, SEVEN BRIEF LESSONS ON PHYSICS 23 (2014) (“Science begins with a vision. 
Scientific thought is fed by the capacity to ‘see’ things differently than they have previously been 
seen.”). 
12  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
13  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of developing conditional theory in 
the study of international law). 
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brought old (“institutionalization”) and new (“recursivity”)14 social science 
concepts to channel empirical research across and within conventionally defined 
subject areas of law, which then could be compared for the purposes of broader 
theory development.15 We refined these further with the specification of 
inductively derived mechanisms that have been observed to drive cycles of legal 
change beyond the state until they reach a kind of moving equilibrium (or relative 
“settlement”) in what we characterize as a TLO. 
While we elaborate further elements of this framework for social science 
engagement with international law below, suffice it to say here that this phase of 
theory development owes more to a Weberian genre of social science research on 
law than to a particular genre of strict hypothesis testing in contexts where 
quantitative data are already available or can be constructed.16 It is a phase of 
inductive extrapolation and synthesis, of concept development and invention, of 
proposals for encompassing theory that may offer frames, then propositions, and 
press ultimately toward specific hypotheses that may be tested. In fact, in the first 
round of case studies using TLO theory, scores of hypotheses emerged, all 
susceptible to some form of historical, qualitative, or quantitative examination, 
that can be pursued in the refinement of such theory.17 Therefore, we contend 
that social science approaches importantly include framework construction, 
concept elaboration, as well as hypothesis generation and testing, involving both 
deductive and inductive reasoning. 
This expansive understanding of social science extends to methods.18 While 
we share with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg an appreciation of multiple social 
 
14  Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1135 (2007). 
15  For studies across different areas, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12; 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013). For studies 
within a particular area of law, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(Gregory Shaffer & Ely Aaronson eds., 2020); Tom Ginsburg, Terence C. Halliday & Gregory 
Shaffer, Constitution-Making as Transnational Legal Ordering, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 1 (Gregory Shaffer, Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday eds., 
2019); Seth Davis & Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, 
TRANSNAT’L & COMPL. L. 1 (2020) (introducing a symposium issue). For a study of the globalization 
of legal education that reflects and feeds into these processes, see BRYANT GARTH & GREGORY 
SHAFFER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION: A CRITIQUE (forthcoming 2021). 
16  See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils trans., 
Harvard University Press 1954) (1925). 
17  See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 518–24. On the importance of emergent analytics involving 
“discovery,” see Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World 
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 85, 119–21, 131, 136–37 (2009). 
18  There are debates within the social sciences regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
deductive and inductive approaches, as well as whether social science can aspire to theory testing 
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science methods, we posit that the methodological norm in social science research 
embraces an array of qualitative methods as commonly as quantitative methods, 
which do not necessarily involve hypothesis testing, but also concept 
development, hypothesis formulation, and discovery. Systematic interviewing, 
participant observation, archival research, and systematic textual analysis, among 
others, are conventionally deployed in leading schools of the social sciences with 
the recognition that a privileging of a particular method leads less to a richer 
empirical understanding of issues than to a constriction of realms of empirical 
inquiry. But what is common to all these methods is that they form part of a larger 
process of social inquiry that includes some form of empirical verification, even if 
a problem, data set, or method cannot yield a hard quantitative result. 
In sum, where we have common ground with Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg 
is, first, in their call for empirical research that includes hypothesis testing. Second, 
we agree that such research should start with a social problem, not a mere 
intellectual one. We stress, however, that researchers should recognize that the 
very conception of social problems involves social constructions implicated by 
ideology, politics, and social positioning, reflecting a researcher’s background, 
interests, and proclivities.19 Just as Anthea Roberts noted how international law is 
not “international” in that different national traditions reflect and propagate 
different conceptions of international law,20 so the conceptualization of social 
problems and thus the variables that measure how effectively problems are 
addressed will reflect a researcher’s positioning. The very framing of an issue as a 
problem constitutes an intervention in the world to the extent that the researcher 
intends her research to be relevant and useful. 
III.  PERMEATING THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL BINARY FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF PRACTICE  
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg build upon a longstanding distinction 
between “internal” views of international law, which are characterized by 
descriptive, normative, and doctrinal analysis, and “external” approaches, which 
 
in the same way as the natural sciences. See, e.g., BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE 
MATTER (2001); IAN SHAPIRO, THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005). In 
practice, inductive and deductive work always interact. Inductive probing leads to new hypotheses; 
and hypotheses inform inductive probing. As John Dewey stressed, researchers revise hypotheses 
through experience in response to the social problems they study. John Dewey, Logical Method and 
Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 24–26 (1924). 
19  Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Participant Objectivation, 9 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 281, 283 (2003) 
(“What needs to be objectivized [ ] is . . . the social world that has made both the anthropologist 
and the conscious or unconscious anthropology that she (or he) engages in her anthropological 
practice.”). 
20  See generally ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? (2017). 
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examine the law from the outside, how it came to be, and its consequences.21 Our 
research indicates that it may be time to loosen this distinction from the 
perspective of actual practice. To start, breaking down this binary will 
constructively expand the contributions that social science can make to internal as 
well as external legal questions. In addition, from a pragmatist perspective of social 
science and social action, both internal and external approaches have more in 
common than indicated by a strict separation. In particular, both operate within 
particular social contexts, and both conceptualize and aim to address perceptions 
of particular social problems. 
On the one hand, for too long sociologists and other social scientists treated 
the internal processes of lawmaking, and, even more, the very substance and form 
of international law itself, as a black box—a region of activity colonized by lawyers 
and left to their exclusive epistemological claims. This separation of study suited 
the lawyers because it erected a fence around their mostly invisible doings. Our 
work, in part, aims to show how the social scientist can constructively open up 
this black box and reveal how doctrinal development can be leveraged as instances 
of behavior subject to social science inquiry. 
Extending a line of scholarship on the rhetorical properties of global legal 
norms and scripts,22 Block-Lieb and Halliday show that the varieties of law 
produced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)—legislative guides, model laws, treaties—comprise a repertoire of 
rule-types, embedded in other rhetorical contexts such as preambles and 
glossaries.23 These texts reflect, on the one side, an adaptation to the political 
challenge of finding global consensus on legal norms, and, on the other side, a 
prospective anticipation of what institutions (courts, executive agencies, 
legislatures) in nation-states could accept as international normative guidance to 
bring national law into concordance with such global norms. 24 
This work illustrates how a mere description of either the substantive or 
doctrinal elements of international hard and soft law fails to capture the fullness 
 
21  Taking from H.L.A. Hart, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg define “an ‘internal’ view of international 
law,” as “an approach that, whether descriptive or normative, is at its core a doctrinal exercise—as 
opposed to an ‘external’ view of international law—that is an approach that examines the law from 
outside, seeking how it came to be or what its consequences might be in the real world.” Abebe et 
al., supra note 1, at 5. 
22  See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 227 (2017); Terence C. Halliday, Susan 
Block-Lieb & Bruce G. Carruthers, Rhetorical Legitimation: Global Scripts as Strategic Devices of 
International Organizations, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 77 (2010); Alexander E. Kentikelenis & Leonard 
Seabrooke, The Politics of World Polity: Script-writing in International Organizations, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 
1065 (2017). 
23  See generally BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 22. 
24  See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND 
SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009). 
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of ideological, political, and problem-solving work internalized in the very formal 
character of the law itself, whether looking back on where the law came from or 
looking forward to where the law is directed. When the substantive provisions of 
these laws are matched with the normative and material interests of lawmakers 
and the ecological dynamics of lawmaking processes, the normativity of law opens 
up more fully to social scientific exploration. In a pragmatic logic almost as strong 
as the “should” in normative approaches to law, a close examination of 
international law’s doctrinal content and form can be posed by the social scientist 
as a contingent proposition: if actors want a given outcome (as a normative ideal 
or pragmatic aim), what will be the substantive and formal properties of the law 
most likely to bring it about? This task is firmly within the epistemological 
mandate of both the social sciences and internal participants in legal processes. In 
other words, “internal” actors developing, interpreting, and critiquing 
international hard and soft law texts are highly interested in so-called “external” 
questions. Additionally, empirical research can be valuable for understanding and 
adapting the doctrine to dynamic changes in the world with which law interacts. 
Similarly, through systematic interviewing, Shaffer found that internal actors 
are equally interested in understanding the processes that he studies, as they were 
“themselves engaged in quasi-social scientific ‘studies’ of the same processes.”25 
They too wished to understand and respond to legal processes and the issues that 
they address. They too aimed to “make sense” of developments in the trade law 
world that he studied, as they must respond to a continuously unfolding present 
on partial information in real time. They were interested in his work for the 
insights it might provide for the tasks before them.26 Internal work, from this 
perspective, involves more than doctrine, but includes the relation of doctrine to 
concrete areas of legal practice. 27 
As legal realists have long stressed, internal and external approaches often 
mesh in practice.28 Within the concept of internal approaches, we include both 
 
25  Shaffer, supra note 9, at xiv (quoting Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Para-Ethnography, in 
2 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 595 (Lisa M. Given ed., 2008)) 
(“By treating our subjects as collaborators, as epistemic partners, our analytical interests and theirs 
can be pursued simultaneously, and we can share insights and thus develop a common analytical 
exchange.”). 
26  Stewart Macaulay earlier documented the dilemma lawyers found in developing, applying, or 
ignoring contract law in the U.S. domestic context in relation to business goals. Stewart Macaulay, 
Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963). 
27  BRIAN TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 194 (1995) (“The notion of practice is an 
essential concept for a realistic approach because it joins behavior (activity) with interpretation (the 
meaning which informs the activity).”). Tamanaha nonetheless conceived of an internal/external 
divide in terms of the observer (participant or non-participant) and the observed (internal or 
external view of the practice). Id. at 177. 
28  See Gregory Shaffer, The Legal Realist Approach to International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., forthcoming 2021). 
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positivist doctrinal approaches and the internal work of instrumental actors that 
draft and interpret legal texts.29 Instrumental actors, by definition, aim to define, 
interpret, and shape legal norms in light of their conception of a problem, and 
thus are concerned with assessing the empirical implications of norm formulation 
and norm application. Doctrinal internal approaches may purport not to be 
instrumental, but even so, they vary in the extent to which they expressly or 
implicitly take context into account. Legal positivists such as H.L.A. Hart address 
the social meaning of texts which implicitly reflects context.30 Even Ronald 
Dworkin can be viewed, in part, as adopting a Weberian concept of verstehen (or 
understanding) when he characterizes an “internal point of view” as that of those 
engaged in legal argumentation—that is, those participants engaged in the 
“constructive interpretation” of law’s meaning.31 In a related Weberian vein, 
sociologist Roger Cotterrell contends that “in order to understand law, the legal 
sociologist has to understand it as a participant, or as a participant does, or rather 
as many different kinds of participants do—lawyers or citizens, for example, living 
in the world of law.”32 We would not go so far as to say “must,” as the stance 
depends on the empirical question asked, and whether one adopts a Weberian-
interpretivist or Durkheimian-positivist position on social science. As argued in 
Section II, we call for a broad tent in conceptualizing social science approaches to 
law. Nonetheless, many social science studies of law would benefit from a closer 
understanding of the legal process. 
Those adopting an internal approach participate in a social process in which 
they aim to contribute to the understanding and elaboration of legal norms. They 
help define, explicate, elaborate, and otherwise shape the meaning of legal norms 
as applied to different contexts. They do so at the international level, whether 
through the presentation of legal briefs and arguments before international 
tribunals and the rendering of decisions by these tribunals, or at other stages in 
the legal process, whether through treaty drafting, the development of non-
 
29  Charles Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1203, 1209–10 (2015) (noting that Hart also characterized the distinction as between genuine versus 
instrumental rule followers). 
30  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW vii, 113 (1961) (explaining that one of the two 
“minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system” is that “its rules 
of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must 
be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials” and 
characterizing this work as “descriptive sociology”). 
31  Compare RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13, 52–53 (1986) (discussing constructive 
interpretation involving justification and fit), with MAX WEBER, SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 18–
19 (W.G. Runciman ed., Eric Matthews trans., 1978), and MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 88 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons 
trans., 1964) (defining verstehen). Similarly, the philosopher John Rawls stresses the role of “reflective 
equilibrium” in theorizing. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20 (1971). 
32  ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY 369–70 (1996).  
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binding model agreements and guides for national legislators, the formulation of 
indicators to measure national and business compliance with legal norms, or the 
drafting of studies (such as by the U.N. International Law Commission presented 
to the U.N. General Assembly or by U.N. Special Rapporteurs presented to the 
U.N. Human Rights Council). Other bodies reference these texts at the 
international, national, and local levels (including domestic courts), further 
conveying, embedding, and reshaping legal norms as part of a transnational 
process. Scholarly doctrinal analysis, in turn, aims to further critique, refine, and 
otherwise influence such normative development. 
Legal realists, working in the pragmatist tradition, contend that all norms are 
developed in social and political contexts and they must be subject to constant 
evaluation based on experience, which drives norm development.33 Hanoch 
Dagan, for example, conceptualizes the legal realist understanding of law in terms 
of the constitutive tensions between internal and external factors, namely those of 
reason and power, legal craft and empirics, and tradition and progress.34 Legal 
realists combine empirical analysis of law with internal decision making and 
critique in light of the social context to which law is applied.35 Empirical work can 
be ignored, diagnostics can be based on plausible folk theories,36 and law can be 
 
33  Those working in a legal realist tradition, from Holmes, Cardozo, and Llewellyn, to contemporary 
legal scholars, focus on the application of texts to social facts. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (establishing the bad man theory of law), with BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921) (contending law is subject to an 
“endless process of testing and retesting”), KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960) (studying law “as it works”), and Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 17 (on 
the importance of conditional theory and emergent analytics in relation to social facts). 
34  Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607 (2007). Relatedly, Brian 
Tamanaha shows how legal realists have been mislabeled as radical skeptics of law, whereas, 
although they were critical of legal doctrine not adapted to social context, they believed that law 
can serve as an “instrument” to advance “the social good,” and they “fervently labored to improve 
it.” BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN 
JUDGING 93–94 (2010). 
35  In this vein, the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey stressed the importance of combining internal 
principles and external analysis in legal decision making, writing: 
For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable consequences, general 
principles can only be tools justified by the work they do. They are means of 
intellectual survey, analysis, and insight into the factors of the situation to be 
dealt with. Like other tools they must be modified when they are applied to new 
conditions and new results have to be achieved. Failure to recognize that general 
legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to be constantly 
tested by the way in which they work out in application to concrete situations, 
explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the liberalism of one 
period often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era. 
 Dewey, supra note 18, at 26. 
36  Terence C. Halliday, Plausible Folk Theories: Throwing Veils of Plausibility over Zones of Ignorance in Global 
Governance, 69 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 936 (2018). 
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simply expressive and symbolic,37 which is why empirics are important. 
Nonetheless, when actors aim to develop norms to shape behavior, they benefit 
from empirics. A realistic conception of law is not either/or (internal reason or 
external agency and structure), but both at once. Such an approach is particularly 
important for the development of processual theorizing and pragmatic problem-
solving in which social contexts change. 
Most importantly, the danger of insisting on too tight of a dichotomy for 
both doctrinal and empirical scholarship is that it cuts off inquiry, rather than 
opening up new spaces for investigation and critique. As Charles Barzun writes, 
the internal/external distinction 
rarely serves as a useful conceptual tool to clarify issues or open up avenues 
of inquiry. Instead, it operates mainly as a rhetorical weapon whose function 
is to insulate particular substantive views from arguments deemed to be 
threatening to it. Its tendency has thus been to cabin scholarly debate about 
the nature and purposes of law, rather than to widen it, and to dampen 
original thinking about such questions, rather than to stimulate or 
provoke it.38 
By loosening the distinction, more legal issues become relevant for empirical 
inquiry, and better understanding of legal practice will inform more nuanced 
empirical analysis. 
IV.  RESEARCHING TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS AND 
ORDERING  
The framework of studying norm development and change through 
transnational legal ordering processes illustrates the rich possibilities open to 
empirically oriented scholars. Traditionally, international law focused 
predominantly on interstate relations—“the law of nations”—such as regards 
territorial sovereignty, the treatment of foreign nationals’ person and property, 
and war and peace.39 Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s essay, though grounded in 
our time, still tends to focus on traditional international law between nation-states. 
Over time, however, the scope of international law expanded to cover most 
substantive areas of law, from human rights and criminal law to regulatory law 
and business transactions. In parallel, the scale of international norm-making 
swelled, as actors aimed to use international hard and soft law and processes to 
 
37  MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964). 
38  Barzun, supra note 29, at 1209–10; see also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 801, 920 (1991) (“[T]he rhetorical conventionality of the inside/outside distinction and its 
derivative, the internal/external perspective, have enabled controversial matters to be assumed into 
and out of existence without being questioned.”). 
39  Read, for example, the table of contents of 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, 
PEACE (1905) and 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 
(1906). 
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reach deep into state law and institutions.40 Today, international law is an 
instrument for social ordering that involves much more than relations among 
states, as international law now addresses most areas of social life. The expanded 
scope and scale of international law—its breadth and depth—opens a vast array 
of subject areas for empirical study. 
To study these developments, we created a theoretical framework that places 
international law in a broader transnational perspective, one that builds from 
empirical work and, in turn, develops hypotheses for further empirical 
investigation. In this work we develop a framework for the study of the 
transnational development of legal norms in which international law plays a role. 
By transnational legal ordering, we refer to the processes through which legal 
norms are framed, propagated, settled, institutionalized, contested, and changed 
transnationally. These processes can give rise to what we call a TLO—a collection 
of legal norms and associated organizations and actors that shape the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions in a particular field.41 These norms 
are not static, but dynamically and recursively change within a transnational 
context in which norm making and practice at the international, national, and local 
levels interact. In a series of books and articles, we have applied this framework 
with others to a broad array of issue areas, ranging from regulatory and private 
law to constitutional and human rights law. 42 
The TLO framework, with its emphasis on legal orders and ordering, brings 
an integrated sociolegal vocabulary and method to international law thoroughly 
grounded in social science. Researchers begin by identifying how agents of legal 
change frame a problem to be mitigated by law, a characteristic method of 
sociologists and anthropologists. If a settled TLO is the goal of policy 
entrepreneurs, researchers must discover which longer-term facilitating 
circumstances and shorter-term precipitating conditions thrust an issue onto 
policy agendas beyond nation-states. Through different empirical research 
methods, law and social science scholars observe how actors mobilize to address 
economic, social, political, and other problems through means that entail 
international law. Research will reveal which combinations of substate, state, and 
supra-state actors, together with non-state, civil society and market actors, engage 
each other in a bid to produce legal responses. Reflecting normative and material 
interests, actors at different levels of social action—local, national, and 
 
40  Gregory Shaffer & Carlos Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, from Transnational 
Law to Transnational Legal Orders, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL 126 (Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020). 
41  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 5 (defining a TLO as “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions”). 
42  See supra note 15. 
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international—engage in transnational legal-ordering processes often through a 
mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict. 43 
An empirically grounded conditional theory will assess the circumstances in 
which an institutionalized TLO emerges. A TLO consists of more than a codified 
body of international law; it exhibits perceptible concordance of legal norms 
across transnational, national, and local levels of lawmaking and practice. Such 
legal ordering is constantly in motion. Legal change within a state or by a state can 
impel change in international law, just as change in international law can influence 
law reform by states and local institutions. Empirical research will reveal the 
degree to which relatively settled law results both formally and in practice, so that 
the law is predictable for practitioners and regulatory subjects. 
We derive from TLO research on business and finance, human rights, and 
regulation in international law an extensive array of hypotheses which serve at 
least two purposes.44 One is to underline the contingencies of TLOs: the 
conditions under which they rise and decline, and cooperate and compete; the 
circumstances in which they are propagated and resisted, and adapted and 
rejected; and the varieties of forms they can take in different issue-areas and in 
their temporal and geographical manifestations. Another is to display the 
extensive breadth of empirical inquiries, accompanied by the full panoply of social 
science methods, that open up for social scientists and legal scholars in mutually 
respectful partnership. TLO theory brings social science disciplines into 
conversation with law, and concomitantly brings scholars studying domestic legal 
change into engagement with counterparts studying international and 
transnational legal change. 
V.  EXEMPLIFYING SOCIAL SCIENCE SCHOLARSHIP ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITHIN A TLO  FRAMEWORK 
We now briefly summarize two research projects that illustrate the empirical 
study of transnational legal ordering and the settlement and unsettlement of 
TLOs. 
 
43  Compare Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and 
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010) and TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS, supra note 12 (discussing different forms of cooperative, competitive, and antagonistic 
alignment of legal-ordering processes), with BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23 (highlighting 
cooperation, competition, competitive cooperation, and conflict). 
44  See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 12, at 475, 518–24. 
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A.  Illustration One: International Trade Law as “Public Law” 
and Practice 
Gregory Shaffer’s forthcoming book, Emerging Powers and the World Trading 
System, exemplifies how international trade law developed through recursive 
interaction between domestic and international law and practice.45 On the one 
hand, the United States had the greatest impact in shaping WTO norms. Many of 
its norms came out of U.S. law and practice, ranging from intellectual property 
and import relief law to the timelines for WTO dispute settlement and the 
organizing principles for WTO negotiations. Other countries, such as Brazil, 
India, and China (which are the three case studies covered in the book) adapted 
their laws, institutions, and professions in light of WTO norms. When they 
became adept at international trade law, they successfully challenged U.S. practices 
and resisted U.S. pressure on them, which helped catalyze U.S. disenchantment 
with the liberal economic order that it had been central in creating. Shaffer’s 
empirical study started with a problem—the role of trade law capacity in shaping 
norms and affecting outcomes. The work included a quantitative study based on 
an original survey, and systematic interviewing and participant observation over 
time.46 It traced the contribution of legal capacity to the settlement and 
unsettlement of national and international trade law norms and practices within 
and across these major countries, implicating the broader international trading 
system. 
B.  Illustration Two: International Trade Law as “Private Law” 
and Practice 
In Global Lawmaking, Block-Lieb and Halliday show how a social science 
approach to lawmaking by UNCITRAL, one of the leading international 
organizations that creates international private law, affirms and extends the call by 
Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg for applying social science to the study of 
international law, while exemplifying the potential of alliances between social 
science and legal scholars.47 They begin with three transnational problems, which 
are framed by ecologies of actors: to save failing businesses, especially those whose 
assets and liabilities cross borders; to free up capital for investment in transitional 
and developing economies; and to forestall the emergence of regional blocs that 
 
45  SHAFFER, supra note 9. 
46  Id. The work illustrates the benefits of partnering with those in other disciplines (such as political 
science) and those embedded in other national settings (such as in Brazil, China, and India). The 
book’s case studies were written with Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin (Brazil), Henry Gao (China), 
and James Nedumpara and Aseema Sinha (India). The underlying survey and its analysis were 
conducted with political scientists Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt. 
47  BLOCK-LIEB & HALLIDAY, supra note 23. 
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govern transport of goods through international waters. They demonstrate 
empirically that close attention to the process of developing transnational legal 
orders in three areas of commercial law to address these problems—corporate 
bankruptcy, secured transactions, and carriage of goods by sea—shows that the 
distinction between the “external” and “internal” substantially dissolves. 
Quantitative measurement of delegations’ participation in lawmaking and 
rhetorical analysis and counts of substantive rule-types demonstrate ways that the 
external penetrates almost entirely inside the internal such that codified doctrine 
both reflects and anticipates the economic and social and political contexts in 
which it orders behavior through legal norms. The study exemplifies the necessity 
of triangulating methods: archival research, participant observation, interviews, 
textual analysis, and coding and quantitative analysis of official records and official 
proceedings. In so doing, it responds less to a specific hypothesis, nor is it intent 
on presenting new hypotheses readily tested by quantitative methods. Rather, it 
endeavors to amplify the power of the TLO framework, expanding and refining 
its theoretical elements, and presents findings about efforts to institutionalize new 
legal orders that approach the pragmatics of innovative global governance. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
In sum, we contend that law should no longer be studied in a 
methodologically nationalist perspective involving a sharp dichotomy of 
international and national norm development and practice, as reflected in 
predominant internal and external scholarly approaches. The national and 
international development of legal norms and practices transnationally intertwine 
and beckon for empirical study. The process of creating and elaborating the TLO 
framework itself demonstrates the richness of possible social science engagement 
with international law, including internal approaches to international law. It 
emerged as a way to bring some theoretical coherence to an enormously 
heterogeneous body of international law scholarship on a diverse array of issues 
framed as problems to be addressed through law. It involved the creation of new 
concepts—transnational legal ordering, transnational legal orders—and the 
incorporation of other concepts (recursivity, concordance, settling, alignment) 
into an integrated framework. That in turn has been creatively and critically 
applied by social scientists and international law specialists to business and 
finance, health and medicine, human rights, climate change, international crime, 
and fiduciary relationships. From these applications, scholars have generated 
scores of hypotheses and propositions on framing, rising and falling, propagating 
and resisting, and institutionalizing and structuring TLOs. The “testing” of these 
hypotheses has often not been possible by quantitative methods. More often the 
theory has been advanced by historical and qualitative social science empirical 
research. In this respect the TLO framework holds the promise of substantially 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 184 Vol. 22 No. 1 
enhancing social science engagement with international law with the prospect of 
mutual enrichment. In so doing, it amplifies the spirit—and widens the scope—
of Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for scholarship on international law 
enriched by social sciences. 
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International Law After Dark: How Legalized Sex Work 
Can Comport with International and Human Rights Law 
Joshua A. Fox 
Abstract 
 
Prostitution is often criminalized, but it should not be. While it is undisputed that 
criminalization assists in shrinking the sexual service industry and decreasing the prevalence of 
sex trafficking, countervailing evidence suggests that legal and regulated sex work is far safer for 
all involved. Indeed, the international law on the subject, which calls for an end to exploitation, 
violence, and trafficking, does not outlaw sex work in all of its forms. This Comment argues that 
legal sex work, when regulated adequately, comports with international law and promotes the 
human rights of sex workers that are curbed when the practice is outlawed. Drawing on recent 
analyses of the most common means of sex work regulation and criminalization, this Comment 
proposes a novel form of sex work regulation—rooted in the state of Nevada’s centuries-old 
brothel system—that best follows international law and promotes human rights. Using this 
framework, states can reconcile the often (and, at first blush, paradoxically) conflicting aims of 
protecting human rights and combatting human trafficking. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Prostitution1 is often called the “oldest profession in the world.”2 Whether 
or not this is actually the case, that the trade has had a long and tumultuous history 
is undisputed. Historians and anthropologists trace its origins at least as far back 
as the brothels of ancient Egypt, but it is possible they extend much further.3 Even 
so, since the time of the pharaohs, prostitution has been outlawed on numerous 
occasions.4 Indeed, as recently as July 2020, Israel became the latest state to join 
the ranks of those that have attempted to outlaw the profession over the millennia. 
In fact, Israel is the most recent state to adopt the increasingly common Nordic 
Model for regulating prostitution,5 a system developed in Sweden that aims to 
“end, rather than regulate, sex work” by criminalizing “buyers of sex.”6 While it 
has gained popularity in the last two decades, 7 the Nordic Model is not the only 
means by which states regulate or outlaw prostitution. There are at least four 
 
1  Herein, a number of terms are used that—while superficially similar—are different. “Prostitution” 
and “sex work” are used interchangeably to mean the voluntary engagement in sexual acts for 
remuneration. The latter is the preferred term for many in the industry, but the former is frequently 
used by lawmakers, so they are both used in this Comment. “Forced prostitution” or the 
“exploitation of prostitution,” on the other hand, can be defined as any sexual act, performed for 
money, that is done by way of the threat or use of force, coercion, deception, fraud, abduction, 
and/or abuse. This definition is adapted from those of human trafficking put forth by the United 
Nations (U.N.) in treaties such as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children, Dec. 12, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, 
https://perma.cc/2UTM-X6C9.  
2  Yugank Goyal & Padmanabha Ramanujam, Ill-Conceived Laws and Exploitative State: Toward 
Decriminalizing Prostitution in India, 47 AKRON L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2015). 
3  See A Brief History of Brothels, THE INDEP. (Jan. 21, 2006), https://perma.cc/6G7G-2BCY (tracing 
“[t]he first brothels proper” to ancient Egypt).  
4  See id. (“Throughout the ages, there have been plenty of folk determined to outlaw the trade.”). In 
this Comment, several legal schemes relevant to prostitution are discussed. Among the most 
pertinent are the Nordic Model (abolitionism), which criminalizes the buying of, but not the selling 
of, sexual services, decriminalization, which aims to fully deregulate sex work, legalization, which 
legalizes sex work in a limited and regulated manner, and prohibition, which fully outlaws sex work.  
5  See Toi Staff, Seeking Prostitution Services Is Now Illegal in Israel, TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/F65D-76VS (“Punishing prostitution clients was first introduced by Sweden in 
its 1999 Sex Purchases Act.”). For a discussion of another state’s attempt to institute the Nordic 
Model in 2020, see, for example, Vic Parsons, Labour MP Tables Controversial Bill to Criminalise Buying 
Sex. Sex Workers Say It Would Put Their Lives in Danger, PINK NEWS (Dec. 9, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/9W8R-5HG2. 
6  Rachel Marshall, Sex Workers and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of Laws Regarding Sex Work, 23 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 58 (2016). 
7  See What is the Nordic Model?, NORDIC MODEL NOW!, https://perma.cc/8CMT-MQG2 (explaining 
what the Nordic Model is, noting the eight states where it is the law, and outlining why other states 
should enact similar legislation).  
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“legislation typologies” present in Europe and North America alone, and within 
each the law varies widely.8 
Much of the development in prostitution law over the past century has been 
shaped by—and has shaped—international law. As a result, “international law has 
approached prostitution inconsistently.”9 In the mid-twentieth century, for 
instance, the international community largely committed itself to prohibiting 
prostitution.10 Less than a century later, a lot has changed, and the debate over the 
best legal framework for addressing prostitution continues. Thus, while eight 
states have adopted the Nordic Model, others approach sex work much 
differently. Germany, for example, enacted the Law Regulating the Legal Situation 
of Prostitutes in 2001, which “removed the morality language” from the nation’s 
prostitution laws and thereby granted sex workers access to “health insurance, 
public benefits, and labor rights law.”11 Even prior to this, however, sex work was 
widely legal in Germany.12 A number of other approaches exist within the 
European Union (E.U.) as well. Some states therein allow both indoor and 
outdoor prostitution but “prohibit the existence of brothels,” while others 
“tolerate prostitution and [typically do] not intervene in it.”13 Across the Atlantic, 
the United States (U.S.) takes yet another approach. In the U.S., “there is no 
federal law banning sex work,” so laws “vary from state to state and even city to 
city,” with Nevada being the only state to legalize—in a limited fashion—sex 
work.14 Nevada’s model, discussed in greater detail below, takes a brothels-only 
approach to sex work and, as this Comment will argue, is among the best in the 
world in terms of promoting human rights and comporting with international 
prostitution law. 
 
8  See generally ANDREA DI NICOLA, ISABELLA ORFANO, ANDREA CAUDURO & NICOLETTA CONCI, 
TRANSCRIME, STUDY ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON PROSTITUTION AND THE TRAFFICKING IN 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN (2005), https://perma.cc/XK83-5HVZ [hereinafter TRANSCRIME] 
(presenting an overview of abolitionism, new abolitionism, prohibitionism, and regulationism as 
they exist in the E.U.).  
9  Tamarah Provost, Comment, Shaky Ground: How Wavering Approaches to Prostitution Law Have 
Undermined International Efforts to End It, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 615, 616 (2016). 
10  See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others arts. 1–2, July 25, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter CSTPEPO]. 
11  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 57 (citing Katherine Koster, Legal in Theory: Germany’s Sex Trade Laws 
and Why They Have Nothing to Do with Amnesty Sex Work Proposal, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/MBV4-CQJY). 
12  See id. 
13  See TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at viii. 
14  Anna North, The Movement to Decriminalize Sex Work, Explained, VOX (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/772L-B5R6 (explaining that many sex workers in the U.S. want the industry to 
be decriminalized in order to avoid the issues and stigmatization that come with arrests and legal 
complications from engaging in the practice).  
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All of the aforementioned regulatory frameworks, from total criminalization 
to complete decriminalization,15 do not exist in a vacuum, however. The states 
that enact them are largely United Nations (U.N.) members that share the goal of 
protecting the human rights outlined in the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which is part of global customary law.16 Indeed, many of 
these nation states are party to later treaties and conventions that were inspired by 
the UDHR and focus explicitly on prostitution and human trafficking. These 
states share the international community’s aim of ensuring that all people have 
“the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights” that are the “foundation 
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”17 They recognize that the ability to 
choose one’s employment and to work freely and “without any discrimination” in 
“favourable conditions” is fundamental to achieving these goals.18 Ultimately, 
however, the states that are party to the UDHR and its progeny address these 
goals quite differently, including in the realm of sex work. 
On the ground, the effects of these inconsistent policies are made clear by 
the sex workers’ rights movement, which continues to grow globally.19 This 
movement “exists to uphold the voice of sex workers” and promote the 
“acceptance of sex work,” while at the same time opposing “all forms of 
criminalization.”20 While not all sex workers agree with the aims of the movement, 
its existence highlights the increasing pressure on governments to find balance 
between ending human trafficking and ensuring that the universal human rights 
of all citizens, including the right to work, are protected.21 In addition, not only 
must the aforementioned domestic legal frameworks promote human rights, they 
must also comport with the inconsistent intricacies of the many international 
conventions and covenants pertinent to sex work and human trafficking. 
Fortunately, over the last three decades the international community has—at least 
 
15  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 56 (describing New Zealand’s novel approach to fully decriminalizing 
sex work).  
16  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(encompassing much of the human rights language included in the later and broader International 
Bill of Human Rights). 
17  See id. 
18  Id. art. 23.  
19  Who We Are, GLOBAL NETWORK OF SEX WORK PROJECTS (NSWP), https://perma.cc/W3N9-
54LW [hereinafter NSWP] (explaining that this intercontinental group is campaigning for 
“[a]cceptance of sex work as work,” the end to the criminalization of sex work, and the self-
determination and self-organization of sex workers). 
20  See id. 
21  See UDHR, supra note 16. 
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in part—come to view sex work as not inherently in conflict with human rights.22 
As such, the earliest international conventions, which at one time called for the 
complete prohibition of prostitution,23 have become increasingly irrelevant.24 In 
the current legal landscape, then, it is possible to craft policy that protects human 
rights, combats human trafficking, and complies with international law by 
regulating prostitution rather than outlawing it. 25 This piece proposes such a 
solution. 
This Comment argues that legalization, not the extremes of full 
decriminalization or abolition, best comports with international law and furthers 
the goals of human rights law. Further, it recommends that the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), upon request by an authorized agency concerned with the rights 
and health of sex workers, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), issue 
an advisory opinion advocating for the broad implementation of a legalization 
scheme similar to Nevada’s but with several important modifications. While the 
ICJ’s promotion of a modified version of Nevada’s system might confound 
policymakers at the outset, as the forthcoming comparative analysis reveals, the 
state’s method of legalization has profound benefits both in terms of human rights 
and international legal compliance. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Section II introduces the current 
debate over the criminalization and legalization of sex work by exploring the 
modern sex workers’ rights movement. It notes the changing legal landscape with 
respect to prostitution and highlights that international and domestic prostitution 
law, the sex workers’ rights movement, and human rights law all aim to end 
exploitation and give a voice to marginalized groups. Section III delves into the 
current state of the law. This Section summarizes international law and human 
rights law as they pertain to prostitution before covering the major domestic legal 
frameworks that are currently in place. Section IV outlines the intricacies of 
 
22  See Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 678 (2004) 
(“U.N. processes have recently accepted some distinction between voluntary and forced 
prostitution, at least in the case of adults, which implies that some forms of prostitution . . . may be 
acceptable by human rights standards.”). 
23  See generally CSTPEPO, supra note 10. 
24  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Feb. 23, 
1994) [hereinafter DEVAW] (including the word “force” in defining the type of prostitution 
considered to be “violence against women”); see also G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children art. 3 (Nov. 15, 2000) 
[hereinafter The Palermo Protocol] (considering the exploitation of prostitution part of human 
trafficking, but not prostitution itself). 
25  Compare, e.g., Ane Mathieson, Easton Branam & Anya Noble, Prostitution Policy: Legalization, 
Decriminalization and the Nordic Model, 14 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 367 (2015) (concluding that the 
Nordic Model is the best policy for Seattle, Washington), with Marshall, supra note 6 (arguing in 
favor of a broad system of decriminalization created in consultation with sex workers and advocacy 
groups). 
International Law After Dark Fox  
Summer 2021 191 
Nevada’s current regulatory scheme and explains how they help it to comply with 
international law and promote human rights. This Section also compares Nevada’s 
system in those respects to systems present elsewhere in the world. Section V 
introduces two modifications to Nevada’s current system that, if made, would 
make the state’s legal framework the best at both protecting human rights and 
comporting with international prostitution law. Finally, Section VI proposes a 
potential pathway for implementing a modified Nevada Model elsewhere in the 
world. 
II.  SEX WORKERS ’  RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY  
The sex workers’ rights movement, although diverse due to its immense 
scale, generally advocates for “rights, not rescue.”26 As summarized by the Global 
Network of Sex Work Projects (NSWP), the “three core values” of the movement 
include working toward the “acceptance of sex work as work,” as well as opposing 
“all forms of criminalisation . . . [and] supporting [the] self-organisation and self-
determination of sex workers.”27 Through these binding principles, sex workers 
pursue the freedom to safely ply their trade without interference from law 
enforcement. 
Beyond sex workers themselves, the movement consists of a “wide array of 
individuals and groups,” as well as many large organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, the WHO, and UNAIDS.28 A large number of these groups, 
including NSWP, call for the decriminalization of sex work as a means of 
promoting many of the human rights outlined in the UDHR. Indeed, NSWP’s 
Consensus Statement on Sex Work, Human Rights, and the Law tracks the UDHR in 
many ways, including through its promotion of the “right to be free from 
discrimination,” as well as the rights to “free choice of employment” and “to move 
and migrate.”29 These can be found almost verbatim in the UDHR’s Articles 
Seven, Twenty-Three, and Thirteen, respectively.30 In addition, NSWP is not alone 
in calling for the decriminalization of sex work in order to promote human rights. 
DECRIMNOW, a Washington, D.C.-based “campaign and movement to 
 
26  See Ine Vanwesenbeeck, Sex Work Criminalization Is Barking up the Wrong Tree, 46 ARCHIVES SEX 
BEHAV. 1631, 1632–36 (2017).  
27  NSWP, supra note 19. 
28  See Catherine Murphy, Sex Workers’ Rights are Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2B8S-Y6GF (“[W]e are not [the first to address this issue].”).  
29  See Consensus Statement on Sex Work, Human Rights, and the Law, NSWP (2013), 
https://perma.cc/6P8W-UZFL [hereinafter NSWP Consensus Statement] (sharing the thoughts 
of the “over 160 sex worker organisations in over 60 countries” that make up NSWP with respect 
to eight fundamental rights sex workers should/do/must have). 
30  UDHR, supra note 16 (including Article 7’s statement that “[a]ll are . . . entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law,” Article 13’s guarantee of the “right to work, [and] to 
free choice of employment,” and Article 23’s protection of “the right to freedom of movement”).  
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decriminalize sex work” is another example of the many groups that argue that 
decriminalization is necessary in order to promote “human rights, civil rights and 
liberties, health, [and] safety” among sex workers.31 The sex workers’ rights 
movement is therefore full of groups that demand decriminalization in the name 
of promoting human rights.32 
Similarly, those states that legalize and/or decriminalize sex work argue it is 
the best path forward for promoting human rights. New Zealand, which is among 
the first states to fully decriminalize sex work, for instance, did so “with the stated 
aims of [s]afeguarding human rights” and “[p]rotecting sex workers,” as well as 
“[c]reating an environment conducive to public health.”33 Interestingly, however, 
there are many governments and advocacy groups that argue that the abolition of 
sex work, rather than its decriminalization, is the best way to promote human 
rights. 
A.  Opposition to the Sex Workers’  Rights Movement  
Those who support the Nordic Model, which is outlined in greater detail in 
Section III below, do so because they believe that “buying human beings for sex 
is harmful, exploitative, and can never be safe.”34 Many who promote the Nordic 
Model and similar abolition schemes argue that all “prostitution is a human rights 
issue.”35 In the same way that many in the sex workers’ rights movement allude to 
the UDHR in asserting that decriminalization promotes human rights, those who 
oppose prostitution use similar strategies to make the opposite argument. The 
advocacy group Nordic Model Now!, for instance, notes that there must be a “new 
social consensus that recognizes the harm and violence intrinsic to prostitution.”36 
Harm and violence run directly counter to the UDHR’s assurance that all people 
have the right to “life, liberty, and security of person,” as well as the right not to 
be subjected to “torture or to cruel . . . treatment.”37 In addition, states that outlaw 
 
31  See DECRIMNOW in Policy, DECRIMNOW (2018), https://perma.cc/48SH-7HWG.  
32  See e.g., Melissa Gira Grant, Amnesty International Calls for an End to the ‘Nordic Model’ of Criminalizing 
Sex Workers, THE NATION (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/W9EV-KCX5 (explaining Amnesty 
International’s updated stance calling for an end to the Nordic Model); see also About Us, INT’L 
COMM. ON THE RTS. OF SEX WORKERS IN EUR. (ICRSE), https://perma.cc/G4NW-RX7Z 
(“ICRSE opposes all forms of criminalisation of sex work . . . [and] seek[s] to put forward a labour 
rights’ perspective of sex work, whereby . . . [the] human rights of all sex workers are recognized.”). 
33  See Prostitution law reform in New Zealand, N.Z. PARLIAMENT (Jul. 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/2Z7Y-
LB8F. 
34  See NORDIC MODEL NOW!, supra note 7. 
35  Mary Ann Peters, Nordic Model Key to Beating Exploitation of Sex Workers, THE CARTER CTR. (Apr. 18, 
2016), https://perma.cc/2LGF-JU63 (contending that the Nordic Model is successful in 
promoting human rights). 
36     About Us, NORDIC MODEL NOW!, https://perma.cc/3CP4-AWD5. 
37  UDHR, supra note 16, arts. 3, 5.  
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sex work often do so for similar reasons.38 Israel’s Prohibition on Prostitution 
Consumption Law, for example—which instituted the Nordic Model in the 
Jewish state—begins by acknowledging the “harmful aspects of prostitution and 
the damages it involves.”39 Thus, it is clear that the sex workers’ rights movement 
and other decriminalization advocates, as well as those who promote the abolition 
of prostitution, frequently share the goal of safeguarding human rights. 
It is notable that groups with such similar aims have come to such different 
conclusions. Although there is no clear reason as to why this is the case, one 
suggestion is that those who advocate for decriminalization see a distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary prostitution, while those who call for the 
complete prevention of the practice do not. The Swedish government has 
acknowledged the existence of this debate and has pushed back on the 
contemporary view that voluntary sex work can be safe, noting that “[t]hose who 
defend prostitution argue that it is possible to differentiate between voluntary and 
non-voluntary prostitution,” before concluding that “the distinction . . . is not 
[actually] relevant.”40 Regardless of the reason for this difference, it is important 
to recognize that the aim of many of those involved in the debate over sex work 
policy is to protect human rights. With this context in mind, it becomes possible 
to imagine a legal regime that takes into account the concerns of all sides—
regulators, sex workers, and advocates—and ensures that human rights are 
protected, international law is followed, and public health is championed. In the 
forthcoming sections, this Comment argues in favor of one such framework, 
modeled after Nevada’s brothel system, that might best accomplish these goals. 
III.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SEX WORK 
The state of prostitution law in the world is complex. Although the primary 
international law on the subject can be found in documents from only a few key 
conventions and treaties, attempting to organize the myriad domestic legal 
frameworks is far more difficult.41 Thus, after first exploring the relevant 
 
38  See e.g., English Summary of SOU 2010:49, THE GOV’T OFFS. OF SWED., https://perma.cc/GX84-
FXKF [hereinafter Summary of SOU] (“The ban [on the purchase of sexual services] was intended 
to fight prostitution and its harmful consequences.”).  
39  Prohibition on Prostitution Consumption Law, 5779-2019, §1 (2019–20) (Isr.).  
40  Summary of SOU, supra note 38, at 31. It is notable that modern international law, discussed at 
length in Section III, distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary sex work in speaking of the 
risks associated with the sale of sex. Indeed, as highlighted below, international law would conflict 
with international human rights law, which promotes the right to free choice of employment, were 
it to continue to call for the prohibition of voluntary sex work as it did in the last century.   
41  Compare, e.g., Marshall, supra note 6, at 52–53 (citing Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and 
Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J 1178, 1205 (2010)) (“There are four types of legal 
regimes used to address sex work: prohibition, legalization, abolition, and decriminalization.”), with 
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international legal documents, this Section takes a broad approach in categorizing 
domestic prostitution laws in order to provide a sufficient overview of the most 
popular regimes and facilitate a comparison between them. In turn, Sections IV 
and V will propose a novel regulatory framework that both capitalizes on the 
successes of the systems discussed herein and attempts to mitigate their failures. 
A.  International Law Since 1949  
As noted in Section I, international prostitution law has changed dramatically 
since 1949, when the first major U.N. convention on the subject took place. 
Although the most relevant documents are those that are most recent and reflect 
modern views of sex work and human trafficking, those that came earlier provide 
the foundation for the contemporary legal landscape, and so are worth noting. 
In 1949, the U.N. General Assembly approved the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution 
of Others (CSTPEPO) and, in doing so, began a new age in sex work law.42 One 
of the foundational documents in the modern history of prostitution law,43 
CSTPEPO took a hardline view of the practice. The widely ratified convention, 
which went into force in 1951, called out the “evil of the traffic in persons for the 
purpose of prostitution” and required signatories to punish all people who 
procured another person “for [the] purposes of prostitution,” even “with the 
consent of that person.”44 It further made illegal the operating and financing of 
brothels.45 In sum, those states—notably absent from which are the U.S., United 
Kingdom, and Germany—“that have signed, ratified, and implemented 
[CSTPEPO]” aim to “prevent[] prostitution.”46 
CSTPEPO has not stood the test of time, however. Many of its provisions—
including those defining human trafficking and those equating all forms of sex 
work with trafficking—are no longer followed. Indeed, in explaining the lasting 
impact of CSTPEPO, the European Commission noted that “the definition of 
trafficking of this convention was departed from in the Trafficking protocol to 
the U.N. Convention against Transnational Crime,” which is outlined later in this 
 
TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at viii (breaking E.U. member policy regarding sex work into four 
groups: abolitionism, new abolitionism, prohibitionism, and regulationism). 
42  See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others , 
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (OHCHR), https://perma.cc/4BY4-
W2YT?type=image. 
43  See International Instruments Concerning Trafficking in Persons, OHCHR (Aug. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/9R45-XZ7J (listing CSTPEPO as one of the “main international instruments 
used to combat human trafficking”). 
44  CSTPEPO, supra note 10, at art. 1. 
45  Id. art. 2. 
46  See Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 
ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR., https://perma.cc/V7SP-DMZD. 
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Section.47 With respect to CSTPEPO’s discussion of prostitution, many of the 
ideas expressed therein were also departed from later in the twentieth century as 
the U.N. adopted some of the views advocated for by the sex workers’ rights 
movement. 
Among the more recent and more relaxed international documents 
pertaining to sex work is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).48 CEDAW, adopted in 1979 for the 
purpose of eliminating “discrimination [against women] in all its forms and 
manifestations,” contains provisions concerning sex work.49 Unlike CSTPEPO, 
however, this convention features “pro-sex-worker language” that illustrates “a 
rising recognition that states must safeguard sex workers’ rights.”50 Scholars 
consider CEDAW representative of a small but pivotal moment in the long 
history of sex work, in which the international community shifted, even if only 
slightly, “from an abolitionist mindset to one that recognizes the human rights of 
sex workers.”51 
The text of CEDAW illuminates this change. Article 6 of the convention 
proclaims that “[s]tates [p]arties shall take all appropriate measures . . . to suppress 
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”52 When 
compared with CSTPEPO—which called for the prohibition of sex work 
regardless of the consent of the sex worker—CEDAW’s Article 6 represents a 
major shift. Not only does Article 6 distinguish between trafficking and 
prostitution rather than consider sex work “the traffic in persons for the purpose 
of prostitution,”53 it refers to trafficking and prostitution as separate acts, noting 
that the issue is with the exploitation of prostitution and not prostitution itself.54 
This pivot from the abolitionist thinking of CSTPEPO is further illustrated by 
CEDAW’s legislative history, during which “Italy and the Netherlands expressly 
rejected” Morocco’s attempt to include an amendment calling for the 
“suppression of prostitution” generally.55 Thus, CEDAW is the first major 
international document that refers to sex work but does not call for its prohibition. 
 
47  Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, E.U. 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://perma.cc/6HU3-WU7Y?type=image. 
48  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 1, Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
49  Id. 
50  Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J 1178, 
1201 (2010). 
51  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 53. 
52  CEDAW, supra note 48, art. 6 (emphasis added). 
53  CSTPEPO, supra note 10, art. 1. 
54  CEDAW, supra note 48, art. 6. 
55  See Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1201.  
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This is illustrative of a changing view of sex work that emphasizes the importance 
of safeguarding the human rights of those involved in it.56 
Just over a decade after CEDAW went into force, the U.N. General 
Assembly “recogniz[ed] the urgent need for the universal application to women 
of . . . rights and principles with regard to [the] equality, security, liberty, integrity, 
and dignity of all human beings” by creating the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women (DEVAW).57 Although DEVAW does not address 
sex work at length, it does continue the U.N.’s trend—which emerged in 
CEDAW—of marking a “clear distinction between forced and voluntary 
prostitution.”58 Indeed, Article 2 of DEVAW states that “[v]iolence against 
women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to . . . trafficking in 
women and forced prostitution.”59 Through its use of the modifier “forced,” Article 
2 is the U.N.’s “first clear departure from the abolitionist view of prostitution.”60 
The “absence of a general reference to prostitution” indicates the international 
community’s shifting perspective on sex work.61 Today, nearly three decades after 
DEVAW, it is common to promote sex work as a means of safeguarding human 
rights and combatting trafficking.62 Such an argument was almost unheard of on 
the international scale at the time of CSTPEPO, however.63 
Further, in 2003, ten years after DEVAW, the U.N. Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, which contained the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol), went into force.64 The Palermo 
Protocol aims to “prevent and combat trafficking in persons” and to “protect and 
assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights.”65 
Like DEVAW and CEDAW before it, the Palermo Protocol does not consider 
prostitution alone exploitation, rather it alludes to “the exploitation of [ ] 
prostitution” in its definition of “trafficking in persons.”66 The Palermo Protocol 
therefore only considers “the exploitation of [ ] prostitution,” rather than all sex 
 
56  Id. (referring to “CEDAW general recommendation 19,” which recognizes the need to promote 
equal protection under the law for sex workers). 
57  DEVAW, supra note 24, pmbl. 
58  Marshall, supra note 6, at 53.  
59  DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 2 (emphasis added).  
60  Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1201. 
61  Id. 
62  See NSWP, supra note 19.  
63  See Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1200 (acknowledging that CSTPEPO established an 
“antiprostitution position” to safeguard human dignity and worth).  
64  The Palermo Protocol, supra note 24. 
65  Id. art. 2(a)–(b). 
66  Id. art. 3(a) (emphasis added). 
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work, to be trafficking.67 Further, it is notable that while the Palermo Protocol 
states that the “consent of a victim of trafficking . . . shall be irrelevant,” such is 
only the case where “threat[s] or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent” are used.68 Therefore, where consent is freely given, it is not only relevant 
to whether the transaction is considered trafficking and/or exploitation, it might 
well be conclusive evidence that the transaction is sex work rather than trafficking 
or exploitation. Even under the potentially concerning language of the Palermo 
Protocol, then, sex work is a legal practice. 
Overall, modern developments in the international law governing sex work 
have seemingly followed the trajectory set by CEDAW’s recognition of the human 
rights of sex workers. Indeed, recent legal documents such as DEVAW and the 
Palermo Protocol appear far more concerned with outlawing forcible and coerced 
sexual contact, including trafficking, than voluntary sex work. Thus, the 
legalization scheme proposed in Sections IV and V of this Comment, which builds 
upon that currently in place in Nevada in order to best protect the human rights 
of sex workers, fits well into the international community’s current views of the 
practice. 
B.  Pertinent International Human Rights Law  
While there are a number of major human rights documents that might be 
useful in surveying the modern human rights landscape, the UDHR stands alone 
as a “milestone document in the history of human rights.”69 It is so significant, in 
fact, that it figures prominently in the International Bill of Human Rights.70 
Further, the UDHR, because of its broad applicability and immense importance, 
is of great use in discussing the rights of sex workers. 
Although some of the UDHR’s more philosophical portions apply to the 
plight of sex workers, including Article 1’s assurance that “[a]ll human beings are 
born free . . . and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” and 
Article 2’s guarantee that all of the “rights and freedoms” discussed are applicable 
to all people, it is the substantive portions of the UDHR’s later articles that are 
most relevant.71 Article 5, for instance, states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
 
67  Id. 
68  Id. art. 3(b). 
69  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, OHCHR, https://perma.cc/N53B-J96P. 
70  See The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR, https://perma.cc/Z5WS-V7J8. The 
International Bill of Human Rights consists primarily of the UDHR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
71  UDHR, supra note 16, arts. 1–2. 
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torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”72 This is 
germane to sex work, where abuse and violence can be commonplace.73 Perhaps 
even more applicable to sex workers and the laws criminalizing their behavior and 
the industry generally is Article 12, which declares that no one “shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy.”74 Further, Article 13 secures the “right 
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state,” and 
Article 19 protects “the right to freedom of opinion and expression.”75 Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly for sex workers, Article 23 of the UDHR 
guarantees “the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment,” while Article 25 
supplements this by guaranteeing that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including . . . housing and medical care.”76 Thus, the UDHR aims to ensure that 
the “inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” including sex 
workers, are protected and promoted.77 
C. Significant Domestic Lega l Frameworks 
The common systems for regulating and deregulating sex work can be 
grouped into four broad categories: abolition, legalization, decriminalization, and 
prohibition.78 While abolition and legalization are quickly becoming among the 
most common systems globally, perhaps due to the growing recognition that sex 
work is not inherently criminal, all four schemes are important because lawmakers 
hoping to create an optimal system might well borrow from each. Indeed, the 
framework proposed by this Comment in the forthcoming sections is itself rooted 
in analyses of the four systems outlined below. 
1. Abolitionist legal frameworks, like the one in Sweden, often take a 
hybrid approach in an effort to end sex work 
Under an abolitionist approach to sex work, “[p]arties involved in 
prostitution can be liable to penalties, including in some cases, the clients.”79 In 
fact, abolitionist countries typically “criminalize buyers of sex, but not sex workers 
 
72  Id. art. 5. 
73  See, e.g., Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1180 (discussing the “physical and sexual abuse” 
experienced by African sex workers).  
74  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 12. 
75  Id. arts. 13, 19. 
76  Id. arts. 23, 25. 
77  Id. pmbl. 
78  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 56. 
79  TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at viii. 
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themselves” in what has been called a “hybrid approach.”80 This system targets 
“the demand for sexual services” in an attempt to “help fight prostitution and its 
harmful consequences.”81 Sweden, the first country to enact this sort of law, 
hoped it would foster a more “gender equal society,” deter “prospective 
purchasers of sex[,] and serve to reduce the interest” of foreign groups in creating 
an organized sex industry in Sweden.82 While there are disputes over whether 
Sweden’s system—dubbed the Nordic Model—is as effective as initially hoped, 
evidence does suggest it has had at least some impact in shrinking the state’s sex 
work industry.83 
Supporters of abolition, including the European Parliament,84 champion the 
Nordic Model and systems like it as useful in making “advances in gender 
equality”85 and as effective in combatting both human trafficking and the 
“immense damage prostitution has on all women.”86 The government of Sweden, 
which—as noted above—set out to achieve these goals in authorizing this system, 
“released a report [in 2010] touting the effectiveness of the legislation.”87 The 
results contained within this report were questionable,88 however, and other 
studies suggest the criminalization of the purchase of sex has had generally 
negative consequences for all parties involved, in part because it “relegates sex 
workers to the shadows” where abuse and violence are prevalent and are 
exacerbated by inadequate access to medical care.89 Overall, it can be said that the 
 
80  Marshall, supra note 6, at 58.  
81  Summary of SOU, supra note 38, at 29.   
82  Id. 
83  See, e.g., TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at 102 (discussing some of the successes of Sweden’s 
approach, including an observed decline in the market for trafficking victims).  
84  Ashleigh M. Kline, Note, The Fallacy of Free Will in Prostitution: Encouraging Prostitution Reform to Prevent 
the Repeated Victimization of Vulnerable Persons, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 665, 689 (2017) (citing 
Heather Monasky, Note, On Comprehensive Prostitution Reform: Criminalizing the Trafficker and the Trick, 
but Not the Victim—Sweden’s Sexkopslagen in America, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1989, 1995 (2011)) 
(advocating for the implementation of the Nordic Model, or a system like it, in the U.S.).  
85  See Mathieson, Branam & Noble, supra note 25, at 428 (concluding that the Nordic Model is the 
best policy for Seattle, Washington).  
86  Kline, supra note 84, at 687.  
87  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 61.  
88  Id. (citing Ann Jordan, The Swedish Law to Criminalize Clients: A Failed Experiment in Social Engineering, 
4 CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & HUMANITARIAN L. 1, 6 (2012)) (“The report was immediately criticized 
upon release, with experts noting the evaluation completely lacked any scientific rigor.”). 
89  See May-Len Skillbrei & Charlotta Holmström, The ‘Nordic Model’ of Prostitution Law Is a Myth, THE 
CONVERSATION (Dec. 16, 2013), https://perma.cc/GEX4-QGG4 (arguing that the studies 
depicting Sweden’s prostitution laws as a success “report on specific groups . . . not the state of 
prostitution more generally” and therefore are misleading because they leave out “[m]en involved 
in prostitution, women in indoor venues, and those selling sex outside the larger cities”); see also 
Vanwesenbeeck, supra note 26, at 1632–36 (arguing that the criminalization of sex work is 
ineffective and harmful to those involved); Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1206. 
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goal of the Nordic Model is to promote human rights and equality through 
inducing a “fear of arrest [in,] and [an] increased public stigma” among, purchasers 
of sex.90 The successes and failures of this approach are outlined in greater detail 
in Section IV below. 
2. Legalization regimes permit sex work in a limited manner 
Legalization is perhaps the broadest category discussed herein. For instance, 
while the term “abolition” often applies to the hybrid approach embodied in the 
Nordic Model, the term “legalization” encompasses a wide swath of regulatory 
schemes, from that in Germany to that in Nevada and beyond. Indeed, the general 
term “legalization” is so sweeping that the E.U. split up its member states that 
have such systems into multiple groups in order to foster a clearer analysis.91 For 
the purposes of this Comment, however, this distinction is immaterial. What is 
most important is that legalization in its broadest sense be contrasted with 
decriminalization and abolition. 
Germany is perhaps the European country most famous for its legalization 
of sex work. Germany allows all prostitution “if exercised according to the 
regulations” proscribed at the state (Länder) and national level.92 Further, as of 
2002, the country began considering sex work as “work,” thereby granting sex 
workers access to “social security measures (unemployment, health insurance and 
pension schemes)” that they previously were not eligible for.93 The aim of 
Germany’s scheme is to ensure sex work can continue while controlling “the 
excesses, abuses, disorders, and other undesirable social and public health 
consequences associated with [it].”94 In much the same way, Nevada’s long history 
of legalized sex work95 has contributed to its continued embrace of the practice, 
particularly because the state government has found that “[l]egal sex workers 
report less violence and a heightened sense of security working in the brothel 
industry than plying their trade illegally.”96 The Nevada system, different than that 
in Germany in many respects, including its requirement that sex work only occur 
in registered brothels and its mandate that “legal prostitutes . . . undergo 
 
90  Ann Jordan, The Swedish Law to Criminalize Clients: A Failed Experiment in Social Engineering, 4 CTR. 
FOR HUM. RTS. & HUMANITARIAN L. 1, 1 (2012). 
91  See TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at viii (explaining the difference between “new abolitionism,” 
“abolitionism,” and “regulationism”).  
92  Id. at 25. 
93  Id. at 110. 
94  Marshall, supra note 6, at 62 (quoting Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1208).  
95  See Michelle Rindels, The Indy Explains: How Legal Prostitution Works in Nevada, THE NEVADA INDEP. 
(May 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/6AVS-C4M3 (“The state’s earliest brothels date back to 
Nevada’s early mining days in the 19th century.”). 
96  Jennifer Heineman, Rachel T. MacFarlane & Barbara G. Brents, Sex Industry and Sex Workers in 
Nevada, UNLV REPS. (2012), https://perma.cc/593R-NAHU.  
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mandatory health checks” at regular intervals, is therefore yet another “legal 
system of prostitution.”97 
Much like the Nordic Model and similar systems of abolition, legalization 
schemes are subject to both praise and criticism. While both responses will be 
addressed substantially in Sections IV and V, it is worth noting that a recent study 
of the legalization system in Nevada concluded that “the legalization of 
prostitution brings a level of public scrutiny, official regulation, and 
bureaucratization to brothels that decreases . . . systematic violence.”98 Further, 
there are other studies that support—at least in part—the modes of legalization 
present in states like Germany and Nevada,99 but there is no shortage of those that 
oppose them as well.100 
3. Decriminalization removes almost all regulation from the sex work 
industry 
As of writing, New Zealand is the only state to have fully decriminalized 
prostitution.101 In doing so, New Zealand removed “all [previously enacted] laws 
related to sex work.”102 Further, through New Zealand’s Prostitution Reform Act 
(PRA), the country’s legislature legalized sex work “for any citizen over the age of 
eighteen,” and allowed brothels with fewer than four workers to operate without 
a license.103 Widely considered a success, the PRA “provides several protections 
for sex workers, which means that their human rights and citizenship can be 
safeguarded.”104 These protections include the ability to sue, for instance, when a 
client deliberately removes “his condom without [the worker’s] consent during 
 
97  Id. at 1, 9. 
98  Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck, Violence and Legalized Brothel Prostitution in Nevada: Examining 
Safety, Risk and Prostitution Policy, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 270, 270 (2005).  
99  See, e.g., David H. Rogers, The Viability of Nevada’s Brothels as Models for Regulation and Harm Reduction 
in Prostitution, FSU LIBR., at 16 (2010), https://perma.cc/2LXA-7NT7 (citing Crime and Justice in 
Nevada, NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (2008)) (“[T]he vast majority of prostitution 
arrests [in Nevada] . . . happen[ed] in counties with no legal venue for prostitution.”). 
100  See TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at 110–16 (noting that “Germany is a major country of destination 
for human trafficking”). 
101  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 56. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 59 (citing Fraser Crichton, Decriminalising Sex Work in New Zealand: Its History and Impact, 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Aug. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/7DQE-QLEG).  
104  See Gillian M. Abel, A Decade of Decriminalization: Sex Work ‘Down Under’ but Not Underground, 14 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 580, 581 (Nov. 2014). 
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penetrative sex.”105 Thus, in its first seventeen years, New Zealand’s PRA has 
helped show that the decriminalization of sex work can be beneficial.106 
Of note, however, are the unique circumstances that may help drive the 
PRA’s success. Although certainly not the only reasons for the impressive track 
record of the PRA, New Zealand’s small size, small population, relative isolation, 
and strict borders likely contribute to the law’s success.107 Further, there have still 
been some issues since the PRA went into force. Sporadic difficulties with 
underage sex workers have arisen, for instance, as have allegations of a “major 
trafficking problem” stemming from the near-total lack of regulation of the 
industry.108 Thus, while there are those who suggest that full decriminalization as 
New Zealand has done is the optimal method for “regulating” sex work,109 many 
of those individuals also admit that New Zealand is a test case that may not be 
indicative of how such a system would function in a larger, more diverse, and less 
isolated state like those in continental Europe or North America.110 
4. The complete prohibition of sex work is not viable 
Although there remains skepticism by some in the general public,111 experts 
on all sides of the modern sex work debate tend to recognize that there is little 
 
105  Id. at 586. 
106  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 59–60; see also Gillian Abel, Lisa Fitzgerald & Cheryl Brunton, The 
Impact of the Prostitution Reform Act on the Health and Safety of Sex Workers (2007) (finding “many positive 
outcomes” and “few, if any, negative consequences” from the PRA).   
107  See Abel, supra note 104, at 581.  
108  See, e.g., Fraser Crichton, Decriminalising Sex Work in New Zealand: Its History and Impact, 
OPENDEMOCRACY (Aug. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/7DQE-QLEG (discussing certain issues 
with the PRA, such as “some recent controversy regarding under-age street workers in Auckland”); 
see also Thomas Coughlan, NZ’s Approach to Sex Work Under Fire, NEWSROOM (Nov. 22, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/MQB6-7PJZ (“[T]he United States State Department . . . report on trafficking 
accuses New Zealand of having a major trafficking problem, which authorities have been slow to 
address.”). 
109  Marshall, supra note 6, at 64 (“While one country’s experience with decriminalization . . . is not 
necessarily indicative of all [such] efforts . . . countries considering how to address sex work under 
the law would benefit from studying New Zealand.”); see also Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 
270 (“[P]roponents of decriminalization . . . [sometimes] argue that state regulation, as in the 
legalized brothel industry, just replace illegal pimps with legal ones.”).  
110  See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 6, at 64; Giulia Magri, Full Decriminalisation Would Be Disaster for Malta – 
Prostitution and Sex Trafficking Survivors, THE INDEP. (Oct. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/669F-4PZA 
(recognizing the characteristics of Malta, including the large size of its migrant community, that 
render it an unlikely candidate for success at full decriminalization).  
111  For a discussion of the views of Americans on the criminalization of sex work, see, for example, 
Elizabeth Nolan Brown, What Americans Think About Prostitution Laws, REASON (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/L233-Y59W (finding that 52% of Americans, including 66% of those between 
the ages of 33 and 44, favor the decriminalization of prostitution); Peter Moore, Significant Gender 
Gap on Legalizing Prostitution, YOUGOV (Mar. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/A8JQ-GW9P 
(“Americans narrowly say that accepting money for sex should be illegal (43%) rather than legal 
(40%).”). 
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merit to arguments in favor of complete prohibition. Indeed, one recent study 
ignored the subject altogether because “most human rights scholars and activists 
agree” that such strict policies are detrimental to human rights and, as a result, fail 
to meet the standards set out by international human rights law.112 Further, these 
policies “relegate[] sex workers to the shadows of society, where they are 
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.”113 As such, they fail to promote human 
rights and do little to comport with international prostitution law as it pertains to 
protecting people from exploitation and violence.114 
IV.  CURRENT NEVADA LAW  
The Nevada Revised Statutes contain several provisions relevant to a 
discussion of sex work and human trafficking.115 This Section provides an in-depth 
look at Nevada prostitution law as compared to those models discussed above in 
order to show that—at present—the state’s system complies with existing 
international law and creates several positive externalities that promote human 
rights. There are gaps where Nevada’s legal framework could improve, however, 
and they are covered in Section V. 
A.  Attempts to Outlaw Sex Work are Ineffective  
Prostitution, “whether ‘actively prohibited, tacitly condoned, [or] formally 
regulated’ . . . remains a thriving industry regardless of its legal status.”116 Its long 
history, outlined briefly in Section I, is proof of this. Yet, there are still many who 
argue that the most sensible way to address the practice is to continue to 
“develop . . . strateg[ies] to combat” it.117 In observing the repeated history of 
failed attempts to ‘fix’ the prostitution ‘problem’ by outlawing the practice, one is 
reminded of a quote long misattributed to Albert Einstein: “The definition of 
insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different 
 
112  Marshall, supra note 6, at 57 n.77.  
113  Mgbako & Smith, supra note 50, at 1206. For a discussion of the reasons that myriad human rights 
and public health organizations oppose the criminalization of sex work, see, for example, Why Sex 
Work Should Be Decriminalized, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/A2MD-Y89A 
(concluding, after studies in Cambodia, China, Tanzania, and the U.S., that sex work must be 
decriminalized to protect “personal autonomy and privacy”); Bryan Lufkin, Should Prostitution Be a 
Normal Profession?, BBC, https://perma.cc/SL6M-C3F6. 
114  See, e.g., DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 2 (defining “violence against women” as, among other things, 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution). 
115  See generally NRS 201.295–440. 
116  Goyal & Ramanujam, supra note 2, at 1073.  
117  Margot Wallström, We’re Taking Up the Fight Against Prostitution, SWED. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. 
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/9JJZ-R3U4. 
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results.”118 In fact, the results of current attempts to outlaw sex work are at best 
categorized as inconclusive and, at worst, are indicative of “a failed experiment in 
social engineering.”119 
Turning to the Nordic Model, which is perhaps the most popular system for 
outlawing sex work in the West, the Swedish government frequently states that its 
approach to sex work “has been effective in reducing the demand for 
prostitution,”120 yet there is evidence that its legislation actually “failed to 
accomplish a decrease in the number of sex workers.”121 Further, the Swedish 
government’s main study indicating the success of the Nordic Model—the 
Skarhed Report—contains “[n]o evidence the law reduced the number of sex 
buyers” or sex workers.122 Similarly, the “[Swedish] government does not know 
whether there has been any change in the number of ‘exploited sex workers,’” 
which includes victims of sex trafficking, in the years since the enactment of the 
Nordic Model.123 Finally, any declines in sex work in Sweden since 1999 are 
difficult to attribute to the ban.124 
As this Comment aims to explore the successes and failures of Nevada sex 
work law as compared to its counterparts elsewhere in the world in order to 
promote the implementation of the former, what is most important is whether the 
Nordic Model comports with international law and promotes human rights. First, 
with respect to promoting human rights and upholding international law by 
ending trafficking, the impact of the Nordic Model is questionable. In the wake 
of the ban on the purchase of sex, for instance, the Swedish government has 
admitted to not having accurate data on the occurrence of human trafficking in 
and across the nation’s borders.125 In addition, there is evidence that the ban on 
the purchase of sex work has “caused an increased risk of violence” for sex 
 
118  Sarah Pruitt, Here Are 6 Things Albert Einstein Never Said, HISTORY (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/G6JH-5TNE. 
119  Jordan, supra note 90, at 1. 
120  Wallström, supra note 117.  
121  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 61 (explaining that the increased risk of violence stems from “greater 
competition among women for fewer clients”). 
122  Jordan, supra note 90, at 6. 
123  Id. at 8. 
124  Susanne Dodillet & Petra Östergren, The Swedish Sex Purchase Act: Claimed Success and Documented 
Effects, THE HAGUE (Mar. 3–4, 2011), https://perma.cc/7Y3L-HXR2 ([R]eports and documents 
that have a scientific rather than ideological basis do not support these success claims.”); see also 
Michelle Goldberg, Swedish Prostitution Law Is Spreading Worldwide—Here’s How to Improve It, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/H6XL-6DNW. 
125  See Jordan, supra note 90, at 8. 
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workers as they compete for business.126 Research also suggests that there is 
“routine harassment by police” under the Swedish law.127 With respect to general 
international and human rights law, then, the Nordic Model has not been as 
successful as touted by the Swedish government. 
Further, as noted in Section II, much of the specific international law 
pertaining to prostitution aims to end “violence against women,” including 
“forced prostitution.”128 Both DEVAW and CEDAW, as well as the Palermo 
Protocol, attempt to do so by making it a crime to subject women to violence, 
forced prostitution, and/or prostitution that is exploitative.129 While those who 
enacted the Nordic Model aimed to end all such forms of cruel treatment, it is 
entirely unclear whether the law has done so.130 Thus, there is no indication that 
the Nordic Model—at least as applied in its home country—makes strides to 
comport with the antitrafficking and forced prostitution provisions of 
international law. The same is true when the Nordic Model is assessed through a 
human rights lens. 
Returning to a few key provisions of the UDHR, it is clear that the Nordic 
Model is unsuccessful in promoting the human rights of sex workers. With respect 
to the universal “right to work” and to “free choice of employment,”131 effectively 
outlawing an entire industry by criminalizing its consumers fails to protect these 
rights. Further, while the UDHR demands that all people have the “right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, 
including . . . housing,”132 sex workers living in Nordic Model countries are 
“tormented by the threat of eviction” because landlords “are [often] vulnerable to 
pimping charges if they collect money earned from” sex work.133 Such conditions, 
along with “an increase in stigma,” “an increase in unprotected sexual services,” 
 
126  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 61 (explaining that the increased risk of violence stems, in part, from 
“greater competition among women for fewer clients”). Both Marshall, supra note 6, and Jordan, 
supra note 90, acknowledge that it is probable that some buyers have changed their behavior in light 
of the creation of the Nordic Model but assert that how many and to what extent is unknown. 
Thus, the increased risk of violence cited by Marshall is likely due to a combination of factors, such 
as fewer clients and a less clear path for legal recourse against abusers, rather than fewer clients 
alone.  
127  See Grant, supra note 32.  
128  DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 2. 
129  See, e.g., The Palermo Protocol, supra note 24, art. 3. 
130  See Dodillet & Östergren, supra note 124, at 3 (“[W]hen reviewing the research and reports available, 
it becomes clear that the [Swedish] Sex Purchase Act cannot be said to have decreased prostitution, 
trafficking for sexual purposes, or had a deterrent effect on clients to the extent claimed.”); see also 
Jordan, supra note 90.  
131  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 23.  
132  Id. art. 25. 
133  Goldberg, supra note 124.  
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and violence at the hands of police and clients,134 might well be considered 
“cruel . . . or degrading treatment” in violation of Article 5 of the UDHR as well.135 
Thus, it is not at all clear that the Nordic Model—despite its good intentions—
comports with international law or promotes human rights pursuant to the 
UDHR. 
B.  Nevada Law Promotes Human Rights and Comports with 
International Law 
1. Nevada law legalizes sex work in a limited manner 
Besides the Nordic Model, one of the other main legal frameworks for 
handling prostitution in the West is legalization. Thus, it is important to compare 
the two in order to understand which better promotes human rights and complies 
with international law. As the legalization schemes currently in place are diverse, 
this Comment explains only one—that present in Nevada. Throughout this 
Section, however, the Comment addresses where Nevada law diverges from other 
such schemes, particularly that in Germany. 
Nevada’s sex work laws are statutorily defined.136 In general, the state makes 
it “unlawful for any person to engage in prostitution or solicitation therefor, 
except in a licensed house of prostitution,” colloquially known as a brothel.137 
While sex work is legal in such houses, there are additional restrictions on who 
can take part in the industry. By statute, an individual who engages in sex work in 
a licensed house of prostitution “after testing positive” in a state-sanctioned HIV 
test is guilty of a felony, for instance.138 This provision is particularly impactful 
because the state health department requires sex workers to have state health cards 
and undergo “weekly exams and monthly blood testing,” although these measures 
are at the worker’s expense.139 Similarly, condoms are required at all of Nevada’s 
houses of prostitution.140 Further, any individual who compels another to “reside 
in a house of prostitution” or engage in prostitution, a practice known as 
 
134  Sandra K. Chu & Rebecca Glass, Sex Work Law Reform in Canada: Considering Problems with the Nordic 
Model, 51 ALBERTA L. REV. 101, 107 (2013). 
135  UDHR, supra note 16, at art. 5. 
136  See generally NRS 201.295–440. 
137  NRS 201.354(1). 
138  NRS 201.358.  
139  Rogers, supra note 99, at 11; see also Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 276 (noting that “each 
person who applies for employment as a prostitute must take a . . . test for HIV and syphilis [and 
gonorrhea and chlamydia] . . . [and] [e]very week thereafter while working in a brothel” must 
undergo additional testing). 
140  See Alexa Albert, Lesson in Condom Use from Women of Mustang Ranch, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2001), 
https://perma.cc/AD7V-BTCL?type=image (advocating for the safe use of condoms after 
conducting studies among Nevada’s sex workers). 
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pandering, is guilty of a felony as well.141 Thus, while sex workers in Nevada are 
independent contractors142 who can purchase their own insurance policies and 
openly and safely negotiate their own contracts with both brothel owners and 
clients,143 they are protected by the law—including through the restriction of sex 
work to licensed houses of prostitution where “in-house and regulatory safety 
mechanisms,” as well as “good relations with police,” foster security.144 
Beyond regulating the activities of sex workers, Nevada places limitations on 
where houses of prostitution can operate. State law both criminalizes those who 
own or operate property on which “illegal prostitution”145—meaning that which 
occurs outside of a licensed brothel and/or by an unlicensed worker—occurs and 
contains specific mandates on where a licensed brothel can be located.146 These 
location-based restrictions include requirements that houses of prostitution be 
kept away from schools, churches, and other locales thought important for 
community-building.147 In addition, no houses of prostitution can operate in 
counties “with populations of 700,000 or more,” and even then, it is up to each 
individual county to determine whether or not to license such institutions.148 Thus, 
it is clear that while Nevada legalizes sex work, the state’s laws are more 
prohibitive than those present elsewhere. In Germany, for instance, although “the 
regulation of prostitution is under the competences of the Länder” in practice, 
both indoor and outdoor prostitution are generally permitted.149 Further, until 
2017, there were no permitting or medical consultation requirements for sex 
workers at the national level in Germany.150 On the spectrum from Sweden to 
 
141  NRS 201.360.  
142  See NRS 244.345(1)(b) (explaining the procedure to get a license).  
143  Anna Turner, I Applied for a Job at Nevada’s Most Famous Brothel, THRILLIST (July 21, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/8YWT-CD7J (outlining the application process, including mandatory STD and 
HIV testing, applying for a Nevada business license, and obtaining a background check/card from 
the local sheriff’s office). 
144  Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 277.  
145  NRS. 201.395. 
146  NRS 201.380–.390 (mandating that brothels can neither be located within 400 yards of a school or 
place of worship nor on any street “fronting the principal business street” of a town).  
147  Id. While this regulation might appear to increase the stigma surrounding sex work, similar zoning 
laws pertaining to the location of firearms dealers, gun ranges, and adult stores in many states 
suggest this prohibition is not meant to target sex work or suggest that the practice is inherently 
immoral. 
148  Rindels, supra note 95.  
149  TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at 25. 
150  See Germany Introduces Unpopular Prostitution Law, DEUTSCHE WELLE (2017), 
https://perma.cc/48ZK-NYX7 [hereinafter DEUTSCHE WELLE] (explaining that the new law 
requires sex workers to register and “seek a medical consultation,” requires condoms, restricts 
instances in which “a sex worker must service several men concurrently,” penalizes those who 
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New Zealand, then, Germany falls somewhere in the middle, while Nevada—at 
present—sits a bit closer to Sweden in order to both preserve the “live-and-let-
live” legacy of the state and protect those involved in the industry.151 
2. Nevada law promotes human rights as guaranteed by international 
human rights law 
While other systems for regulating and outlawing prostitution have some 
merit,152 Nevada’s current system—especially as modified in Section V of this 
Comment—strikes a better balance between protecting human rights and 
complying with international law.153 
To begin, Nevada law promotes the universal human right to work and to 
employment as protected by Article 23 of the UDHR.154 While any involuntary 
labor, including slavery and forced prostitution, does not comport with the “free 
choice of employment” promoted by Article 23, the ability to voluntarily become 
a sex worker and otherwise freely enter the sex industry is protected therein. 
Indeed, the legislative history of Article 23 suggests that its purpose was to 
 
accept services from individuals forced into prostitution, and mandates that new brothels apply for 
permits, among other regulations).  
151  Rindels, supra note 95. Unlike Nordic Model states, which, as explained in Section IV(A), tend to 
ineffectively attempt to suppress the demand for sex work, Nevada does not try to do so. Rather, 
the state allows demand to fluctuate naturally and instead focuses on ensuring the industry is safe 
for both buyers and sellers.   
152  See, e.g., Kline, supra note 84, at 688–89 (citing Heather Monasky, Note, On Comprehensive Prostitution 
Reform: Criminalizing the Trafficker and the Trick, but Not the Victim—Sweden’s Sexkopslagen in America, 
37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1989, 2028 (2011)) (explaining that a 2010 study by the Swedish 
government indicates that Sweden has less prostitution and trafficking than neighboring countries); 
see also Max Waltman, Sweden’s Prohibition of Purchase of Sex: The Law’s Reasons, Impact and Potential, 34 
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 449, 459–60 (stating that Sweden’s criminalization of the purchase of sex 
appears to have drastically cut down on the number of prostitutes in the country, as well as the 
number of men purchasing sex). 
153  See Skillbrei & Holmström, supra note 89 (“[T]he Swedish Sex Purchase Act is often said to be an 
effective tool against human trafficking. The evidence for this claim is weak.”); Daria Snadowsky, 
Note, The Best Little Whorehouse Is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s Prostitution Laws Serve Public Policy, and 
How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J. 217, 233 (2005) (describing the fear sex workers have—
when prostitution is illegal—of filing complaints to report abuse). 
154  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 23. As noted in Section IV(B)(1), individuals who test positive for HIV 
are prohibited from engaging in legal sex work in Nevada. As a result, the Nevada Model is not in 
complete compliance with Article 23. While this is potentially problematic from a human rights 
perspective, it is the result of a cost-benefit analysis—like many health codes and OSHA 
regulations—that imposes restrictions on who can conduct work and in what manner in order to 
protect the health and safety of the broader public. This Comment does not attempt to discern 
whether or not this balancing is correct. For a discussion of why it might not be, see Carrie 
Weisman, Should HIV-Positive Workers Be Allowed in the Sex Industry? Some Advocates Say Yes., IN THESE 
TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/L7GW-ZJY5. For a discussion of the impact this 
restriction has had on the continuity of work of registered sex workers in Nevada, see Jen Lawson, 
Police Say HIV Growing Threat Among Call Girls, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/ZD5V-9TJR (“[N]o licensed prostitute has tested positive for HIV.”).  
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promote “economic empowerment” among all individuals, with particular 
attention paid to women.155 Article 23 does not favor some forms of employment 
over others but rather aims to ensure all individuals are protected in their 
employment and are paid adequately for their services, whatever they may be.156 
In addition, although CEDAW is not part of the UDHR and will be discussed 
more below, the contention that sex work is protected by the UDHR is bolstered 
by CEDAW’s acknowledgement that “[t]he right to work is an inalienable right of 
all human beings.”157 Finally, paying particular attention to how Nevada law 
functions, both Article 23 of the UDHR’s guarantee that “[e]veryone has the right 
to form and to join trade unions” and Article 20’s protection of “the right to . . . 
peaceful assembly and association” arguably protect the formation and existence 
of brothels as well.158 
Beyond Article 23’s right to work, that provision also guarantees the right to 
“just and favourable conditions of work.”159 Nevada law promotes this right at 
present. With respect to favorable work conditions, for instance, there is evidence 
that—when sex work is outlawed—those who engage in the practice are 
marginalized and are therefore faced with inadequate work conditions.160 Such 
conditions include “limited bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with 
clients,” as well as harassment by both police and clients as “sex workers are 
pushed to more dangerous working environments, such as clandestine 
street[s].”161 In contrast, in Nevada’s brothels, although there are occasional 
issues,162 the state’s laws “were established . . . out of a concern with [ ] three 
frames of violence (interpersonal violence against prostitutes, violence against 
community order, and the violence of disease).”163 Keeping these concerns in 
mind, the law was crafted to guide brothels toward valuing both their own 
economic viability and the health and safety of their employees.164 As a result, 
 
155  Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 70: 30 Articles on 30 Articles- Article 23, OHCHR, 
https://perma.cc/L5WL-F7SA. 
156  Id. 
157  CEDAW, supra note 48, art. 11 (emphasis added). 
158  UDHR, supra note 16, arts. 20, 23.  
159  Id. art. 23.  
160  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 54–55 (explaining that the criminalization or marginalization of sex 
work leads to worsening work conditions for sex workers). 
161  Twenty Years of Failing Sex Workers: A Community Report on the Impact of the 1999 Swedish Sex Purchase 
Act, FUCKFÖRBUNDET (2019), https://perma.cc/G4GY-PHZD (reporting on the impacts of 
the Nordic Model in Sweden in its first 20 years in force).  
162  Rogers, supra note 99, at 29 (“[I]t is inevitable that not all prostitutes and customers will follow 
regulations.”); see also Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 277 (acknowledging that some “brothel 
owners . . . [do not care] about safety mechanisms” as much as others).  
163  Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 277. 
164  Id.  
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Nevada brothels protect sex workers from the very start, including during the 
negotiation process, in which house managers are able to listen to the “private” 
interactions between workers and clients in order to ensure adequate payment and 
safe negotiations.165 Furthermore, sex workers typically deposit their payment with 
the house manager after negotiations but before engaging in any sexual activity, at 
which point they can bring up “any strange feelings or problems.”166 In addition 
to the safety measures that are in place during negotiation and payment, houses 
typically provide panic buttons for their workers and maintain good relationships 
with local law enforcement to deal with any issues that do arise.167 Thus, Nevada 
law does well to ensure that sex workers experience adequate work conditions. 
Treated as workers rather than criminals or something in between, Nevada’s sex 
workers experience the benefits of organization, regulation, and law 
enforcement.168 
Similarly, the UDHR’s guarantee of a “right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of [oneself and one’s] . . . family, including . . . 
housing and medical care,” is promoted by Nevada law.169 In addition to the 
mandate that condoms be worn in brothels to prevent pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted infections, and other diseases, all sex workers undergo preliminary 
health screenings before being licensed.170 Further, as noted above, they must 
undergo additional testing on a weekly and monthly basis in order to continue 
selling their services.171 Indeed, research suggests that—because of the financial 
and legal liability brothel owners face in the event of a sex worker contracting or 
spreading an illness—Nevada’s legal system incentivizes safe behavior from the 
top down at these institutions.172 These sorts of health benefits are common in 
systems of legalization beyond Nevada, however, and are one factor that suggest 
that legalization is a healthier approach than abolition. While Germany’s medical 
testing requirements are more relaxed than those in Nevada, for example, sex 
 
165  Id. at 278 (acknowledging that, while these measures are in place to protect employees, they also 
help managers stop employees from stealing from the brothel). 
166  Id. at 279. 
167  Id. at 280–81. 
168  Abel, Fitzgerald & Brunton, supra note 106, at 119 (“Street-based workers were significantly more 
likely than managed and private participants to report [refusal by a client to pay, theft by a client, 
physical abuse/violence, and/or rape by a client] in the last 12 months.”).  
169  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 25. 
170  Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 276. 
171  Id. 
172  See Snadowsky, supra note 153, at 228 (describing the liability owners face if a customer contracts 
an STI from a sex worker who has tested positive).  
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workers there “have full access to social security measures,” including health 
insurance.173 This is typically not the case in those states that outlaw the practice. 
While most forms of legalization help to promote the UDHR’s right to an 
adequate standard of living in terms of healthcare, Nevada’s brothel system 
specifically helps to ensure a standard of living that includes housing. Indeed, 
while not all sex workers in Nevada reside in their places of work, they “usually 
live in the brothel[s].”174 While the sex workers “pay taxes, work card fees, ‘house’ 
fees, and room and board,” the guarantee of housing and of a “confined 
community space” typically leads to less violence and a more secure 
environment.175 This is quite different from countries like Sweden where, as noted 
above, reports indicate that sex workers struggle to find any housing at all.176 
Finally, Nevada law—for all of its intrusiveness with respect to licensing and 
health checks—promotes the right to privacy protected by the UDHR’s Article 
12.177 The ability to work in a private business under the protection of the law 
rather than in fear of it ensures that sex workers can live their lives free of police 
violence and other abuses at the hands of the state. The ability to choose one’s 
profession and go about one’s business freely is fundamental to the right to 
privacy, and Nevada law does well to protect it. 
Viewing Nevada’s prostitution law through the lens of the UDHR, it is clear 
that the state’s regulations are successful in protecting sex workers’ fundamental 
rights to housing, healthcare, safety, employment, and privacy. There are, 
however, places where Nevada law could do better in promoting human rights. 
Indeed, there remain unnecessary barriers to entry, such as the costs associated 
with licensing and medical examinations, that inhibit the ability of some who are 
interested in becoming sex workers from doing so. Further, Nevada’s limitation 
on which counties may license brothels limits certain universal human rights as 
well, including the right to “freedom of movement.”178 Thus, in Section V, this 
Comment proposes modifications that can be made to Nevada law that—if 
applied by other states that choose to implement such a system—will help to 
better promote human rights. Before explaining these proposed changes, 
however, it is first necessary to explore how Nevada law fares in relation to 
international prostitution and human trafficking law. 
 
173  TRANSCRIME, supra note 8, at 110; cf. Chu & Glass, supra note 134, at 107–08 (describing the 
health and healthcare issues sex workers face under the Nordic Model).   
174  Heineman, MacFarlane & Brents, supra note 96, at 9. 
175  Id. 
176  Goldberg, supra note 124. 
177  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 12. 
178  Id. art 13. 
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3. Nevada law comports with international prostitution law 
Although Nevada law legalizes sex work in a limited fashion, it complies with 
current international law as set out in DEVAW and the Palermo Protocol. Article 
2 of DEVAW, for instance, defines “violence against women,” in part, as 
“trafficking in women and forced prostitution.”179 All states, including Nevada, 
New Zealand, Germany, and Sweden, make clear that their goal is to comport 
with this provision and end these harmful practices. The only difference is their 
methodologies for doing so.180 
With respect to Nevada, the state’s mandate that sex work be confined to 
brothels has assisted in ending trafficking and forced prostitution. In fact, 
Nevada’s crime statistics indicate that those counties without legal brothels have 
substantially higher arrest rates for extra-legal prostitution than those with legal 
sex work.181 As noted above, prostitution outside of regulated and monitored 
brothels often leads to exploitation and violence, so these statistics indicate that 
perhaps legalized brothel sex work helps alleviate some of the issues outlawed by 
Article 2 of DEVAW. Although there are salient counterarguments to relying on 
this data, including that arrest rates may simply be higher in counties without legal 
sex work because those are typically the state’s larger and more urban counties, it 
is notable that when those counties without legal sex work are removed from 
Nevada’s crime statistics, the state has among the lowest instances of prostitution 
arrests in the U.S., even when compared to states with similarly rural 
populations.182 It is therefore not at all clear that it is the urban/rural divide leading 
to these different crime rates. Rather, legal sex work in those Nevada counties may 
genuinely contribute to both lower arrest rates and incidences of extra-legal sex 
work, as well as the adverse impacts that come along with it. Indeed, that is among 
the reasons that Section V of this Comment suggests eliminating the population-
based restrictions on where brothels can open. 
In addition, other studies suggest that Nevada’s system complies with Article 
2 of DEVAW’s call to end forced prostitution and trafficking as well. A largely 
qualitative review of Nevada’s brothels, for instance, concluded that while “an 
answer to the question of whether or not violence is inherent in the sale of adult 
 
179  DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 2. 
180  See, e.g., Alexa Bejinariu, Human Trafficking: A Comparison of National and Nevada Trends, UNLV CTR. 
FOR CRIME & JUST. POL’Y (2019), https://perma.cc/B99S-HSXD (explaining some of Nevada’s 
trafficking prevention policies and programs); see also 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sweden, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (2019), https://perma.cc/JG98-AXP4 (highlighting Sweden’s campaign to end 
human trafficking). 
181  See Rogers, supra note 99, at 20–21 (citing Crime in the United States Table 69: Arrest Data by State, FBI 
(2008)) (comparing arrest rates for prostitution in Nevada counties with and without legal brothels 
and finding substantially higher rates in those without legalized sex work). 
182  See id. at 22 (explaining that “[o]nly North Dakota had a lower rate” of prostitution and criminal 
vice than the counties in Nevada where sex work is legal). 
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consensual sex remains elusive . . . [t]here is a strong indication . . . that legal 
brothels generally offer a safer working environment than their illegal 
counterparts.”183 This study suggested that not only is this true with respect to 
physical safety, but also with respect to “contagion,” meaning illness.184 If, as 
history indicates, prostitution is a constant despite what the law says, then 
Nevada’s system for regulating it does well to comply with international law 
criminalizing forced prostitution, violence against women, and human trafficking. 
As stated above in terms of promoting human rights, however, there are areas 
where Nevada can improve,185 and those are discussed in Section V. 
Further, the Palermo Protocol, although less explicit regarding the legality of 
voluntary sex work, appears to allow the sort of system present in Nevada. To 
begin, the Palermo Protocol outlaws the “exploitation of prostitution.”186 Given 
the background against which this protocol was adopted, including CEDAW, 
which “shift[ed] from an abolitionist mindset to one that recognize[d] the human 
rights of sex workers,”187 it is unlikely the Palermo Protocol intended to abolish 
all forms of sex work. Lending credence to this interpretation of Article 3 of the 
Palermo Protocol is its discussion of consent.188 Article 3 makes the consent of 
the “victim” irrelevant if the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, 
deception, abuse of power, or payment is used to achieve it, but Article 3 does not 
say that freely given consent renders sex work exploitation.189 Nevada law, which 
allows sex work if it is voluntary and creates protocols to ensure such is the case, 
therefore complies with the Palermo Protocol. 
In contrast to the Nevada Model, other systems in which sex work is less 
regulated (such as those in Sweden and Germany) tend to foster more hostile and 
exploitative environments than that present in Nevada’s brothels. Thus, they may 
violate the Palermo Protocol. In fact, evidence suggests that a system such as 
Nevada’s not only allows for safer policing,190 but perhaps even fosters increased 
 
183  Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 293; see also Heineman, MacFarlane & Brents, supra note 96 
(“Legal sex workers report less violence and a heightened sense of security working in the brothel 
industry than plying their trade illegally in other venues.”). 
184  Id. 
185  See, e.g., Charleston v. State of Nevada, 423 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (D. Nev. 2019) (dismissing claims that 
Nevada’s legalized sex work violates federal sex trafficking law for lack of standing).  
186  The Palermo Protocol, supra note 24, art. 3. 
187  Marshall, supra note 6, at 53. 
188  See The Palermo Protocol, supra note 24, art. 3(a)–(b). 
189  Id. 
190  See Rogers, supra note 99, at 13. 
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policing for other illegal activity, such as trafficking.191 This is certainly in the spirit, 
if not the letter, of international agreements such as the Palermo Protocol and 
DEVAW, which indicate that women are “entitled to equal enjoyment and 
protection of all human rights.”192 Nevada’s sex work laws therefore both comport 
with international prostitution law and promote human rights. As stated above, 
however, there is much room for improvement. Section V suggests modifications 
to Nevada’s sex work law that the International Court of Justice might consider 
in issuing an advisory opinion pertaining to sex work and human trafficking. 
V.  A  MODIFIED NEVADA SYSTEM WOULD BEST PROTECT 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The legalization of sex work, particularly as Nevada has approached it, has 
many benefits. Unfortunately, it also has several drawbacks. While there is a 
“substitution effect” in those states that legalize prostitution, in which the demand 
for illicit prostitution declines in favor of legal sex work, for instance, 
countervailing evidence suggests states with legal prostitution “experience a larger 
reported incidence of trafficking in flows.”193 Beyond this issue, there are others 
that need to be considered before legalizing sex work. Indeed, there are also 
concerns that any regulation beyond abolition might lead to police harassment, 
even when an individual is in full compliance with the law.194 This is exacerbated 
by burdensome bureaucratic policies, such as expensive licensing requirements.195 
Finally, and somewhat relatedly, sex work carries a stigma, and often this leads 
those engaged in the practice to have difficulty “reintegrat[ing] into the 
 
191  See Snadowsky, supra note 153, at 233–34 (citing Jeremy Hay, You’re Under Arrest, Spread Your Legs, 
7 GAUNTLET MAGAZINE (1994), https://perma.cc/XXA6-PBC6 (online version printed under the 
title Police Abuse of Prostitutes in San Francisco)) (arguing that policing for illicit prostitution is wasteful); 
see also Andrew Breiner, These 3 Graphs Could Change Your Mind About Legalizing Sex Work, THINK 
PROGRESS (July 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/8Q32-R2YS (showing how, after decriminalization, 
New Zealand’s sex work industry shrank, while the willingness of sex workers to report violence to 
police increased). 
192  DEVAW, supra note 24, arts. 1, 3.  
193  See Seo-Young Cho, Axel Dreher & Eric Neumayer, Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human 
Trafficking?, 41 WORLD DEV. 67, 82 (2013) (suggesting that the available data indicates that countries 
with legalized prostitution “experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows” than those 
countries that criminalize sex work but also see a “substitution effect” in which the demand for 
illicit prostitutes declines in favor of legal sex work).   
194  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 62 (arguing that Germany’s legalization system is less effective at 
stopping police abuse than New Zealand’s full decriminalization regime). 
195  See id. at 62 (citing Molly Smith, The Problem with the “Swedish Model” for Sex Work Laws, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (June 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/GPW6-P8BK) (explaining the argument that “legalized 
model[s] still criminalize” those sex workers who cannot or do not fulfill the requirements necessary 
to comply with regulation). 
International Law After Dark Fox  
Summer 2021 215 
community on equal terms” after retirement.196 In order to safely legalize sex work, 
these issues must be addressed. This Section proposes ways that Nevada law can 
be modified to do so. 
A.  Modification One: Eliminate All Population-Related 
Requirements 
The Nevada Model is “not an ideal model in that many of its regulations are 
unofficial, outdated, and inefficient. But it succeeds because it recognizes 
prostitution as a reality and therefore functions to protect all the affected 
parties.”197 Therefore, this Comment proposes two key modifications to the 
Nevada system to help make it more up-to-date and efficient without constraining 
its ability to protect those involved in the industry. The first of these proposed 
modifications is the elimination of population-based restrictions on legalized sex 
work. This change will help curb illegal prostitution and, in doing so, continue to 
cut down on violence and human trafficking. 
Nevada outlaws sex work in counties with populations greater than 700,000. 
In order to lessen the adverse effects of illegal prostitution, as well as comport 
with international law and promote human rights, this restriction must be 
abolished. Indeed, it is often noted that “any public policy aimed at alleviating the 
worst effects of illegal prostitution in metropolitan areas with legal, regulated 
prostitution will have to go beyond legalizing brothels in exclusively rural” areas.198 
This is the case because, at least in Nevada, consumers of sex work in areas where 
it is illegal “are not content to drive to legal brothels in neighboring counties.”199 
Instead, they indulge in illegal prostitution, which—as noted above—is far less 
safe for all parties involved. In addition, beyond the basic policy argument that 
legalizing brothel prostitution broadly will improve the work conditions of sex 
workers, this change has major human rights and legal implications as well. 
With respect to human rights, legalizing brothel prostitution in all areas, 
regardless of population, ensures that states uphold Articles 13 and 23 of the 
UDHR. In terms of the former, which protects the “right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state,” outlawing sex work in 
some regions but not others restricts sex workers’ ability to move freely while still 
pursuing safe and legal job opportunities.200 The same is true with respect to 
Article 23, which guarantees “the right to work, to free choice of employment . . . 
 
196  See Waltman, supra note 152, at 454–57 (citing concerns regarding the stigmatization and 
reintegration of prostitutes). 
197  Bejinariu, supra note 106. 
198  See Rogers, supra note 99, at 19–21 (citing Crime in the United States Table 69: Arrest Data by State, FBI 
(2008)). 
199  Id. 
200  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 13.  
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and to protection against unemployment.”201 Without universally legal sex work,202 
a sex worker who is forced to move from one area (such as a state within a larger 
country, a county within a state, etc.) to another might find herself out of work 
and/or a criminal for continuing to pursue her career. This is in violation of 
UDHR Articles 13 and 23. 
Further, the general guarantee that all people are entitled to a life free of 
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” is violated when sex workers are forced 
to choose between remaining in one locale (perhaps in which they face abuse, 
violence, or other poor conditions) in order to continue working and moving to a 
desired location where they face unemployment.203 Similarly, since sex workers 
who engage in the trade in areas where it is illegal often face dangerous work 
conditions, violence, and/or abuse, those jurisdictions that continue to outlaw 
prostitution based on a characteristic as arbitrary as population204 risk violating 
UDHR Article 5’s protection against cruel treatment as well.205 Finally, it is also 
noteworthy that, in states like Germany that provide access to welfare, 
unemployment, and health benefits to individuals engaged in legally recognized 
“work,” the universal legalization of sex work will provide these benefits to sex 
workers in a manner that promotes the right to an adequate standard of living as 
guaranteed by the UDHR. Thus, given these considerations and the 
aforementioned fact that Nevada’s counties with legal brothel prostitution report 
among the lowest levels of extra-legal prostitution in the U.S., it seems in the 
interest of human rights to eliminate the population restriction before expanding 
Nevada’s system to other states around the globe. 
In addition, the elimination of these population-based restrictions would 
help a modified Nevada system better comport with international sex work law. 
With sex work universally legalized, those who want to take part in the industry 
will be able to “actively seek out work themselves” rather than be “coerced into 
prostitution and kept subservient by [frequently abusive] pimps.”206 The 
 
201  Id. art 23. 
202  This call for “universally legal sex work” is limited by the authority of local governments. As is the 
case in Nevada, some local governments may choose not to license brothels despite having the 
ability to do so. For the purposes of this Comment, however, what is envisioned is a system in 
which the decision to license brothels is made at purely the local level and not mandated by the 
state or national government.  
203  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 5. 
204  Rogers, supra note 99, at 22 (citing RONALD WEITZER, Sex Work: Paradigms and Policies, in SEX FOR 
SALE (2009)) (explaining that “opposition from the gaming industry” is the primary reason for 
Nevada’s prostitution population restriction). 
205  See Marshall, supra note 6, at 54–55. 
206  See Snadowsky, supra note 153, at 228–33 (citing HIV statistics, the ability to contract with brothel 
owners, age restrictions, and other regulations that ensure the safety and health of voluntary sex 
workers in brothels). 
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proliferation of regulated brothels, particularly in urban environments in which 
sex work tends to be relatively common, will combat this form of coercion, which 
itself violates international agreements such as DEVAW.207 More competition in 
the sex industry might also further improve conditions for brothel workers, 
including through increased bargaining power and benefits, as brothel operators 
are forced to compete for employees.208 
The general reduction in violence that accompanies legalized brothel 
prostitution209 will also assist states in complying with Article 2 of DEVAW, which 
outlaws “[v]iolence against women, including “violence related to exploitation” 
and “violence perpetrated or condoned by the State” (such as police violence).210 
From the perspective of both human rights and international prostitution law, 
then, legalizing brothel prostitution in all regions regardless of population size and 
density will aid in both protecting those involved in the trade as required by the 
UDHR and in curbing all of the forms of coercion and violence specifically 
outlawed by documents like DEVAW. Thus, this modification builds on the 
sturdy foundations of Nevada’s current system and should be considered should 
the ICJ promulgate an advisory opinion pertaining to managing sex work. 
B.  Modification Two: Increased Screening Before Licensing  
At present, all that is required to become a sex worker in Nevada is a general 
contractor’s license and a card from the local sheriff’s department following a 
procedure that is “basically the same as a background test,” meaning the applicant 
must merely have a “clean record.”211 While these requirements are useful in 
protecting the broader industry and have, in fact, been emulated elsewhere in the 
world,212 if the legal framework proposed herein is to better promote human rights 
and comport with international law (particularly those laws criminalizing human 
trafficking), it must do more to ensure those involved in sex work are doing so 
freely. 
 
207  See, e.g., DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 1; see also CEDAW, supra note 48, art. 3(a). 
208  Nevada’s brothel owners are referred to as “legal pimps” by some due to the power they can wield 
over their employees. See, e.g., Michelle L. Price, Nevada is Weighing a Ban on Brothels as the State’s Most 
Famous Legal Pimp Runs for Office, BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/63WC-SV77. An 
increase in work opportunities coupled with a relatively stagnant employee base, however, should 
foster improved working conditions and lessen this power imbalance. See Abel, Fitzgerald & 
Brunton, supra note 106, at 7. 
209  See, e.g., Brents & Hausbeck, supra note 98, at 271. 
210  DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 2. 
211  Turner, supra note 143. Applicants must also undergo health screenings, but those are not at issue 
in this Subsection.  
212  See DEUTSCHE WELLE, supra note 150 (discussing the new licensing scheme for sex workers in 
Germany).  
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In order to better combat sex trafficking, then, states that implement a 
system akin to Nevada’s must expand their background check procedure to 
include in-person interviews and a preliminary waiting period, during which local 
authorities allow the applicant to work—assuming he/she is healthy and has 
passed the normal background check—while any “red flags” are assessed. 213 
Studies suggest that such protocols will assist in fighting trafficking.214 Indeed, in 
Lyon County, Nevada, for instance, recent prostitute work card applications 
included “a variety of red flags in the background checks that might suggest 
trafficking,” but these “red flags” often went uninvestigated.215 Instituting 
mandatory interviews that assess the applicant’s situation rather than just their 
criminal history, along with a more thorough review process complete with “more 
and better equipment to handle applications” will correct the “real weaknesses 
and gaps in the” current review process without compromising the ability of those 
interested in becoming sex workers to do so.216 This refined review process must 
include sufficient equipment to verify passport authenticity and other non-local 
identification cards.217 By expanding this preliminary review process, states that 
adopt the modified Nevada system (Nevada Model) will ensure compliance with 
international law and help promote human rights. 
With respect to international law, every document discussed in Section III 
above outlaws—in some manner—practices that harm women or deprive an 
individual of their liberty. Indeed, DEVAW includes the “arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty” in its definition of “violence against women,”218 while CEDAW mandates 
that states must combat “all forms of traffic in women,”219 and the Palermo 
Protocol states as its purpose the prevention of “trafficking in persons.”220 
Instituting an expanded system of background checks, complete with the 
proposed waiting period during which an applicant can work on a temporary basis 
 
213  In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, in-person background checks are less viable than they 
would otherwise be. The ability to meet with the applicant one-on-one is of great importance in 
ensuring they are willfully applying to be a sex worker, however, so—should such meetings be at 
all possible using social distancing and other precautionary measures—they are still encouraged.  
214  See Michelle Rindels, Lyon County: A Third of Prostitutes Registered in 2017 Had Red Flags of Possible 
Human Trafficking, THE NEV. INDEP. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/78GP-2UKM (calling for 
“more staff and better equipment to handle applications,” among other improved resources, after 
30% of sex worker card applicants in Lyon County, Nevada had “red flags” on their applications 
that went uninvestigated). 
215  Id. 
216  Id. 
217  See id. 
218  DEVAW, supra note 24, art. 1. 
219  CEDAW, supra note 48, art. 6. 
220  The Palermo Protocol, supra note 24, art. 2. 
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pending full approval, will help the Nevada Model better comport with these 
provisions of international law. 
Further, not only might these improvements assist governments in assessing 
“red flags” and curbing trafficking, they might have a deterrence effect as well.221 
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized that “police deter 
crimes when they do things that strengthen a criminal’s perception of the certainty 
of being caught.”222 Thus, an improved system of background checks that 
thoroughly investigates “red flags” that might indicate an applicant is being 
trafficked could itself deter trafficking and help the Nevada Model comport with 
the international law against trafficking. 
The same is true with respect to the UDHR. Combatting human trafficking 
strongly promotes Article 5’s guarantee that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”223 In fact, increased protection 
against human trafficking also promotes the UDHR’s assurance that all people 
have a right to privacy and to be protected from “arbitrary interference” with that 
of their family and home.224 Finally, given the horrors faced by victims of 
trafficking, an improved system of combatting it will better ensure that 
“[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family.”225 Therefore, the improved background check 
procedure proposed herein will better help the Nevada Model comport with 
international law and promote human rights. 
1. Expanded background check procedures will not increase barriers 
to entry 
Additionally, it is of note that the expanded background check procedures 
outlined above will not raise application costs and therefore will not increase 
barriers to entry in violation of UDHR Article 23. Although this is more of a 
policy discussion that needs to be carried out on a state-by-state basis, 
administrative costs created by implementing the expanded background check 
system (as well as the cost of the current system) should adequately be offset by 
the reduced cost of policing (including the cost of arrests) resulting from the 
legalization of sex work.226 
 
221  See NAT’L INST. OF JUST., Five Things About Deterrence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 2016), 
https://perma.cc/ZJ8X-GWDY. 
222  Id.  
223  UDHR, supra note 16, art. 5. 
224  Id. art. 12. 
225  Id. art 23. 
226  For statistics regarding much of the world’s criminal justice spending per capita, see Graham Farrell 
& Ken Clark, What Does the World Spend on Criminal Justice, HEUNI (European Inst. for Crime 
Prevention & Control Paper No. 20, 2004), https://perma.cc/AK8H-DXP5.  
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2. This modification, along with broader legalization, will reduce the 
stigma associated with sex work 
Should the ICJ issue an advisory opinion advocating for the adoption of a 
system that legalizes brothel prostitution, the two improvements discussed in this 
Section should be included so that the proposed system best complies with 
international law and promotes human rights. In addition, the broad legalization 
of sex work will help combat any stigma227 currently attached to the practice. In 
fact, despite the Nevada Model’s tendency to treat sex workers differently than 
other workers, including through required periodic health screenings, the broad 
legalization system proposed herein will help the public view sex workers as 
average healthy individuals employed in a legitimate line of work. Indeed, while 
some contend that it is only a “myth” that legalizing prostitution will reduce the 
stigma for those involved,228 others argue that it is actually “criminalization [that] 
fuels [the] stigma, by framing commercial sex as immoral, illicit, and unlawful, by 
declining sex worker’s (human and worker) rights[,] and by powering negative 
opinions.”229 This criminalization-fueled stigma leads to psychological stress on 
the part of sex workers, as well as to a decline in “sex workers’ social status and 
control over sexual and employment-related negotiations.”230 Thus, not only will 
the legalization regime proposed herein promote human rights and comport with 
international law to a greater extent than any other system surveyed, it will also 
fight the stigma that persists around sex work.231 
VI.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEVADA MODEL  
As any reasonable shopper knows, “one size fits all” typically means a little 
discomfort for everyone. The same is true of legal and policy proposals. Thus, this 
 
227  See generally Cecilia Benoit, S. Mikael Jansson, Michaela Smith & Jackson Flagg, Prostitution Stigma and 
Its Effect on the Working Conditions, Personal Lives, and Health of Sex Workers, 55 J. SEX RSCH. 457 (Nov. 
2017). 
228  Jacqueline Gwynne, MYTH: Legalizing Prostitution Reduces the Stigma, NORDIC MODEL NOW!, 
https://perma.cc/838G-YRV4. 
229  Vanwesenbeeck, supra note 26, at 1632; North, supra note 14; Ronald Weitzer, Resistance to Sex Work 
Stigma, 21 SEXUALITIES 717, 725 (Jan. 2017) (“If the national legal context is one where prostitution 
is criminalized, the legal order itself compounds stigmatization and the authorities have a vested 
interested in treating sex work as deviant.”). These studies suggest that, even when treated 
differently than other workers, sex workers fare much better in the public’s opinion when their 
trade is legalized in even a limited manner. 
230  Vanwesenbeeck, supra note 26, at 1632. 
231  The history of marijuana in the U.S. provides an interesting case study on the relationship between 
illegality and stigmatization. For a discussion of part of the complex origins of the U.S.’ 
criminalization of the drug, see Becky Little, Why the US Made Marijuana Illegal, HISTORY (Aug. 31, 
2018), https://perma.cc/WFG2-52DG. Despite its relatively recent outlawing, marijuana is often 
highly stigmatized, see, for example, Travis D. Satterlund, Juliet P. Lee & Roland S. Moore, Stigma 
Among California’s Medical Marijuana Patients, 47 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 10 (2015). 
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Comment does not call for sweeping new international agreements or the 
imposition of sanctions on those states that do not undertake to implement the 
Nevada Model or a variation thereof. Rather, it merely encourages interested 
parties with the proper authorization to request an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice pertaining to the legalization of sex work.232 In doing 
so, authorized agencies in favor of the legalization and/or decriminalization of sex 
work, such as the WHO, can encourage the ICJ to offer its advice regarding the 
“legal questions” surrounding the practice’s legalization.233 In its opinion, the ICJ 
likely will find that, given the current legal landscape, the proposals herein, and 
the recent qualitative and quantitative studies pertaining to the prevalence of 
trafficking and the conditions faced by sex workers in Nevada, Sweden, and 
elsewhere, the Nevada Model is a sensible approach that promotes human rights 
and comports with international law better than any other system. 
Further, it is clear that beyond the legal ramifications associated with 
changing laws pertaining to sex work, there are also moral, philosophical, and 
perhaps even religious implications. As a result, it is important to reiterate that this 
Comment opposes the placing of sanctions on those states that decline to 
implement the Nevada Model. The broader international community has itself 
only recently come to recognize voluntary sex work as a valid practice. Thus, it is 
wholly unreasonable to penalize those states that do not agree with this rather new 
sentiment. Indeed, with time, it is likely that those states that initially hold out will 
adopt this more modern point of view on their own. The international community 
can only do so much to influence the people and governments who consent to be 
a part of it, and there is no reason to hope for spontaneous universal agreement 
on any issue, especially one as contentious and personal as the sale of sex. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment argues that the legalization of sex work is both permitted by 
current international law and is the best method for ensuring those who engage in 
the practice are safe, healthy, and secure in their human rights. Indeed, while the 
Nordic Model and other criminalization schemes seem to make progress in the 
fight to end human trafficking, they do so in a manner that abrogates numerous 
human rights and limits free choice. Similarly, other systems—such as the 
decriminalization model employed in New Zealand—are effective in promoting 
 
232  Organs and Agencies Authorized to Request Advisory Opinions, INT’L CT. OF JUST., 
https://perma.cc/9STW-9L4A. 
233  U.N. Charter art. 96, ¶ I–II. For more information on ICJ advisory opinions, see What Is an Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, 
https://perma.cc/C2XV-V473 (citing Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., 
https://perma.cc/4YWG-PHHT) (“In general, advisory opinions are not binding, but may inform 
the development of international law.”). 
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human rights but might be ineffective at combatting human trafficking, especially 
if attempted elsewhere in the world. The Nevada Model proposed herein, on the 
other hand, has the potential to be the most effective means of regulating sex 
work while both protecting human rights and combatting human trafficking. By 
upholding the UDHR while also fighting human trafficking and curbing violence, 
coercion, and abuse, the Nevada Model is a sort of compromise between the sex 
workers’ rights movement, which promotes decriminalization to protect human 
rights, and those who advocate for abolition in order to achieve that same goal. 
As with any untested proposition, there are bound to be surprises in 
implementing the Nevada Model should the ICJ recommend states begin doing 
so. The novel solution proposed herein is reliant upon data and research that is 
difficult to obtain (such as rates of human trafficking and extra-legal prostitution), 
and so there are bound to be unexpected discoveries as states proceed in 
employing it. Thus, at the very least, the Nevada Model will be a framework on 
which states that choose to legalize prostitution can build. 
223 
 
Cured: Proposing a Solution to the Hague Convention’s 




Each year, thousands of children are taken from their homes to foreign countries by one 
of their parents (the “taking parent”) without the consent of their other parent (the “left-behind 
parent”). This phenomenon is frequently referred to as international child abduction. If both the 
country from which the child was taken and the country to which the child was taken are 
signatories to the Hague Convention, the left-behind parent can file a petition for return of the 
child under the treaty. Recently, in a number of courts around the world, taking parents facing 
Hague Convention litigation have argued that, because of the risks of international travel during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, their children should not be returned. These taking parents invoke 
Article 13(b) of the Convention, which provides a defense against a child’s return if there is “a 
grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Taking parents contend that if children are 
obligated to travel internationally to satisfy return orders pursuant to the Convention, the children 
will be exposed to the virus and thus face a “grave risk” under Article 13(b).  
This Comment argues that courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption against Article 
13(b) defenses predicated on the risks of an infectious disease, or “zone of disease” defenses. This 
construction of the defense does not comport with existing precedent or the goals of the Hague 
Convention, and refusing to return abducted children on these grounds could lead to serious, long-
term harm for the children. Instead, courts should only find a “grave risk” in cases where the 
child faces a particularized, demonstrable risk of serious complications incident to infection. This 
Comment encourages courts to fashion responsible and pragmatic protective measures to attach to 
Hague Convention return orders, ensuring both the safety and the prompt return of children who 
have been abducted. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2020, the same month that the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) 
first appeared in Europe,1 an eleven-year-old girl, PT, arrived in England with her 
mother.2 PT, a “polite, calm, and confident girl,” was likely surprised to find 
herself in England.3 She had lived in Spain her entire young life, and her mother 
had not told her that they were traveling to England.4 Actually, PT’s mother had 
told her that they were moving to another town in Spain.5 Instead, the mother and 
daughter arrived in England and immediately moved in with the mother’s new 
partner in the southeastern region of the country.6 PT later reported that she was 
“a bit scared” of her mother’s new partner and that he shouted at her.7  
Back in Spain, PT’s father, who shared parental responsibility of PT with 
PT’s mother under a judgement issued by the Spanish courts, alleged the child’s 
move to England took place without his knowledge or consent.8 Initially, PT was 
told to lie to her father about their whereabouts.9 When PT’s father did eventually 
learn that PT was living in England with her mother, he demanded that the child 
be returned to Spain.10 PT’s mother refused, so the father traveled to England, 
hoping to retrieve PT.11 The mother met the father at a shopping mall in England 
and allowed him to see PT, but she again refused to permit him to take the child 
back to Spain.12 
Because the mother had unilaterally moved PT from Spain to England in 
breach of the father’s custody rights and without his consent or knowledge, the 
father had a strong case for international child abduction. On March 10, 2020, 
PT’s father filed a petition in the English courts for the child’s return to Spain13 
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
 
1  Gianfranco Spiteri et al., First Cases of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-10) in the WHO European 
Region, 25(9) EUROSURVEILLANCE (2020), https://perma.cc/GK3K-XKQU. Please be advised that 
the COVID-19 pandemic is still ongoing at the time of writing and publication. Any 
characterizations and discussions of COVID-19 in this Comment reflect only the understanding 
and research of the author and should not be relied on for any medical or scientific purposes. 
2  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [3] (Eng.). 
 3  Id. at [31]. 
4  Id. at [36], [31]. 
5  Id. at [31]. 
6  Id. at [6]. 
7  Id. at [32]. 
8  Id. at [37]–[38]. 
9  Id. at [38]. 
10  Id. at [7]. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at [8]. 
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Abduction (the Hague Convention or the Convention).14 The Hague Convention 
provides a shared civil remedy among States Party—a return of child order—for 
left-behind parents in international child abduction cases.15 The return of child 
remedy is available to left-behind parents who can establish a prima facie case 
under the Convention. Left-behind parents establish a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that their child was wrongfully removed or retained outside the 
child’s habitual residence and in violation of custody rights that the left-behind 
parent was actively exercising.16 If the court finds that the left-behind parent has 
established a prima facie case, it must then determine whether any affirmative 
defenses apply that would permit the abductor to keep the child in the country 
that the child was abducted to.  
After PT’s father filed a return of child petition in the English courts, a 
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) officer 
interviewed PT.17 The social worker told England’s High Court, Family Division 
in London, that PT was “very angry with her mother for taking her to England 
against her wishes” and that the child’s emotional state was one of “desperation” 
at having been removed from Spain.18 The judge noted that the social worker, 
“who is an extremely experienced CAFCASS Officer,” told him that that “this 
was only the second time in her long experience that she had encountered a child 
expressing such strong views in favour of return, despite remaining throughout in 
the care of their primary carer.”19  
The High Court judge found that PT’s father had established a prima facie 
case for return and that PT had, in fact, been abducted from Spain by her 
mother.20 In response, PT’s mother argued that the COVID-19 pandemic posed 
a “grave risk of harm” to PT and that, because traveling to Spain would put the 
child at risk of infection, PT should remain in England with her.21 Thus, the judge 
was asked to consider one of the Hague Convention’s limited affirmative 
defenses. Under Article 13(b) of the Convention, a court is not bound to return a 
child if “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”22 A grave risk exists, inter alia, where the return of the child would put 
 
14  Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter The Hague Convention]. 
15  See id. 
16  Id. art. 3. 
17  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [10] (Eng.). 
18  Id. at [34]. 
19  Id. at [33]. 
20  Id. at [39]. 
21  Id. at [46]–[47]. 
22  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
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him or her “in imminent danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—
e.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine, or disease.”23 In this case, PT’s 
mother argued that the child faced a heightened risk of infection by traveling 
during a pandemic and returning to Spain, where COVID-19 infections were high. 
In essence, the mother raised a “zone of disease” defense.  
The High Court examined the mother’s “zone of disease” defense in two 
parts. First, the judge considered that, on the date the judgment was prepared, 
March 29, 2020, the pandemic was more advanced in Spain than in the England—
the official death toll stood at 6,528 in Spain and 1,228 in England.24 However, 
the judge also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “serious public health 
emergency” in both countries and predicted that infection numbers would 
continue to rise in England and in Spain in the coming weeks.25 Thus, he observed, 
“there is a genuine risk that PT could contract the virus whether she remains in 
England or returns to Spain.”26 The High Court also noted that “those who are 
considered most at risk of serious complications from coronavirus are the elderly 
and those with underlying health conditions. Neither PT, nor her parents, fall 
within this category.”27  
Second, the judge considered the increased risk of infection that PT would 
face by traveling internationally to return to her father in Spain. “I accept that 
international travel at this time potentially carries with it a higher prospect of 
infection than remaining in self-isolation,” wrote the judge.28 “[T]he risk of 
infection posed by air travel, whilst no doubt significantly greater than normal, is 
not so high that either government [ ] felt [it] necessary to end flights altogether.”29 
Ultimately, the judge concluded that while flying from England to Spain during 
the pandemic would increase the child’s risk of contracting the virus, “such a risk, 
when considered in the context of the likely harm that would be suffered by PT 
should she contract the virus, [ ] sufficient to amount to the ‘grave risk’ of physical 
harm required by Art[icle] 13(b).”30  
In light of this finding, the High Court ordered PT’s immediate return. The 
High Court noted that, because there was no guarantee that flights would continue 
to operate between England and Spain much longer, any delay in travel could 
 
23  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).  
24  KR v. HH [2020] EWHC (Fam) 834, [46] (Eng.) 
25  Id. at [47].  
26  Id. 
27  Id.  
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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make the child’s return to Spain “practically impossible” and leave her stranded in 
England with her abductor until the resolution of the pandemic.31  
PT’s case was among the first of its kind. It illustrates the challenges a court 
faces when navigating the uncharted territory of the “zone of disease” defense. 
From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic until January 2021, at least eight 
Hague Convention cases explicitly addressed the risks of infection in the context 
of the grave risk of harm defense.32 Although the COVID-19 pandemic is an 
unprecedented public health crisis, it is not the last time judicial and administrative 
authorities will be asked to adjudicate Hague Convention cases against the 
backdrop of an infectious disease outbreak. The impact of COVID-19 on 
international child abduction litigation has exposed serious gaps in Article 13(b) 
caselaw and guidelines. To this author’s knowledge, no legal scholarship has 
directly examined the “zone of disease” formulation of the grave risk of harm 
defense, even though it bears a resemblance to other well-established forms of the 
defense, like the zone of war formulation. Now that courts are beginning to 
observe defendants in Hague Convention cases harness the global pandemic for 
their benefit, it is crucial to develop a robust and operable framework for 
evaluating Article 13(b) defenses predicated on the risks of an infectious disease. 
This Comment is the first step in helping fill that void.  
First and foremost, this Comment relies on the text of the Convention and 
on its accompanying explanatory report, which is instructive regarding the 
intentions of the Convention drafters. To flesh out provisions of the Convention, 
this Comment will often rely on interpretations put forward by U.S. courts, which 
provide a robust and coherent body of caselaw. This Comment will also discuss a 
number of foreign judgments that interpret the Convention, including several 
recent cases dealing with the “zone of disease” defense in the COVID-19 context. 
Sections II and III discuss the Hague Convention’s purpose, its exceptions, 
and the prima facie case for return under the Convention. The Convention rests 
upon a conviction that the best way to combat international child abduction is to 
refuse to grant it legal recognition. Thus, the treaty is designed to restore the legal 
status quo between the parties by returning the child to his or her habitual 
residence. Section IV explores alternatives to the immediate return of an abducted 
child and discusses the potential long-term consequences for a child if a “zone of 
 
31  Id. at [50].  
32  See, e.g., id.; FamC (MC TA) 52595-02-20 The Father v. The Mother (2020) (Isr.), 
https://perma.cc/E8NN-HEZS; C v. G [2020] IECA 233 (Ir.); Re N (a child) [2020] EWFC 35 
(Eng.); Chambers v. Russell, No. 1:20CV498, 2020 WL 5044036, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2020); 
Thüringer Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court of Thuringia] Mar. 17, 2020, 1 UF 
11/20 (Ger.); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhue [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe] June 
25, 2020, 2 UF 200/19 (Ger.) https://perma.cc/ZU2P-Z5KG; Amtsgericht Hamm 
Familiengericht Beschluss [Hamm Local Court], Apr. 23, 2020, 32 F 14/20, (Ger.) 
https://perma.cc/9EQ6-5SS9.  
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disease” defense is successful. Section V explains COVID-19’s impact on Hague 
Convention cases. Section VI analogizes the risks of infectious diseases to existing 
categories of risk found in Article 13(b) caselaw in order to evaluate the viability 
of “zone of disease” defenses under current precedent. Section VII proposes a 
framework for evaluating grave risk of harm defenses predicated on the risks of 
an infectious disease.  
This Comment’s proposal upholds the goals of the Hague Convention in 
restoring the legal status quo between parties and disincentivizing forum shopping 
by securing the prompt and safe return of the child. Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that, absent a showing of particularized risk to the child, courts should 
reject grave risk of harm defenses where the underlying risk alleged is exposure to 
an infectious disease. Judicial and administrative authorities charged with 
adjudicating the Hague Convention are empowered to exercise judicial discretion 
and to fashion protective measures, often referred to as undertakings, to ensure 
that a child’s return is safe. This Comment recommends that in lieu of granting 
grave risk of harm exceptions—which would flatly deny left-behind parents’ 
petitions for return—courts should exercise their powers to deliver common-
sense solutions to the logistical and safety obstacles posed by infectious diseases.  
II. THE RETURN OF CHILD PETITION 
Each year, thousands of children are taken from their homes to foreign 
countries by one of their parents (the “taking parent”) without the consent of their 
other parent (the “left-behind parent”).33 This phenomenon is frequently referred 
to as international child abduction. If both the country that the child was taken 
from (the child’s “habitual residence”) and the country the child was taken to (“the 
State of refuge”) are signatories to the Hague Convention, the left-behind parent 
can file a petition for return of the child under the treaty.34 As long as the child is 
under sixteen years old, the Convention allows the left-behind parent to civilly 
enforce the child’s return from one State Party to another.35 A decision under the 
Convention does not purport to resolve the underlying custody issues on their 
merits; a return of child order simply seeks to restore the parties’ legal and 
geographical status quos.36 
To enforce the child’s return, the left-behind parent must establish a prima 
facie case for return of the child. A successful prima facie case under the 
Convention creates a presumption that the child should be returned and 
 
33  For a statistical analysis of applications made in 2015 under the Hague Convention, see HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., GLOB. REP. 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/HA27-L9DV.  
34  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13. 
35  Id. art. 4.  
36  Id. art. 19. 
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establishes that the taking parent is, in fact, an abductor. Then, the abductor has 
the opportunity to raise one or more defenses opposing return. The United States 
and over 100 other countries37 have ratified the Hague Convention, which is “the 
most important international treaty on the subject of international child abduction 
and probably in all of international family law.”38 This Section examines the 
purpose of the Hague Convention, the factual circumstances of international child 
abduction, the procedural obligations of States Party, and the prima facie case for 
return of a child under the Convention. 
A. The Purpose of the Hague Convention: Restoring the Status Quo  
The Convention provides a civil remedy—a return of child order—to left-
behind parents who demonstrate that their custody rights may have been violated 
by their child’s “wrongful[ ] remov[al] or ret[ention]” outside the child’s country 
of “habitual residence.”39 The left-behind parent, with the assistance of his or her 
government’s foreign service department, brings suit against the taking parent in 
the State of refuge. If the left-behind parent is successful in obtaining a return of 
child order, this order does not necessitate the left-behind parent will gain custody; 
it only assures that the child will be returned to his or her country of habitual 
residence.40  
The Convention serves a crucial procedural and administrative role in 
combating international child abduction and includes important “safety valves” 
like Article 13(b) to protect the wellbeing and wishes of the child. However, the 
goal of the Hague Convention is easily misunderstood given “the drama implicit 
in the fact that it is concerned with the protection of children in international 
relations.”41 Accordingly, it may surprise some to learn that cases litigated under 
the Convention do not decide the merits of the underlying custody dispute.42 
“[T]he Convention’s stated object . . . is to secure the prompt return of children 
who have been wrongfully removed or retained.”43 By securing the prompt return 
of the child but declining to reach the underlying custody dispute, the Convention 
 
37  Ratifying nations include: the U.S., Brazil, Hong Kong and Macau, Australia, Canada, Iraq, Japan, 
France, Italy, South Korea, Mexico, the U.K., South Africa, Morocco, Russia, and Thailand. 
Notable exclusions include: China, India, the Philippines, Iran, and Vietnam. Status Table: 28: 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. 
INT’L L., https://perma.cc/3E7T-N6EQ.  
38  JEREMY D. MORLEY, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 9:1 (updated July 2020). 
39  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 3.  
40  Id. art. 19. 
41  Rinau v. Lithuania, App. No. 10926/09, ¶ 15 (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/92MX-UHR9. 
42  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 19. 
43  Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Convention on Private International Law, in ACTS AND 
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION 426, 431 (1982) https://perma.cc/T5X5-U2VL 
[hereinafter The Pérez-Vera Report]. 
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combats and deters the practice of international child abduction by neutralizing 
the potential benefits of forum shopping.44  
International child abduction creates unfair legal and logistical advantages for 
the abductor. It is these artificially-created advantages that often lead parents to 
abduct their children internationally in the first place.45 First, abductors use 
international child abduction to impermissibly forum shop for favorable custody 
laws in other countries.46 A parent may abduct a child to a country with more 
favorable custody laws intending to exploit those laws to the left-behind parent’s 
disadvantage. 47 Alternatively, the taking parent may seek an opportunity to 
relitigate—or simply escape—a custody judgment that was decided unfavorably 
against them in the child’s habitual residence.48 Even if the custody consequences 
of abduction are secondary in the taking parent’s mind to his or her primary 
motivation for removing the child, the taking parent will still stand to benefit from 
“the consolidation through lapse of time of the situation brought about by the 
removal of the child.”49 Second, by abducting a child internationally, the taking 
parent erects a sizeable logistical and financial hurdle for the left-behind parent 
who must pursue cross-border litigation to retrieve his or her abducted child.50  
Recognizing the unfair legal and logistical advantages international child 
abduction confers on taking parents, the Hague Convention’s official explanatory 
report, the Pérez-Vera Report, firmly states that “the Convention as a whole rests 
upon . . . the conviction that the best way to combat [illegal child removals] at an 
international level is to refuse to grant them legal recognition.”51 Because the Convention 
drafters saw forum shopping as a loophole that incentivized and enabled 
international child abduction, they placed considerable weight on the “restoration 
of the status quo” via the “prompt return” of the abducted child.52 Once the child 
is returned to his or her habitual residence, the parents are to litigate any 
outstanding custody disputes according the laws of that country, which is “in 
principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access.” 53 
 
 
44  Id. at 429.  
45  Id.   
46  Id. 
47  See generally id. 
48  See generally id. 
49  Id. at 429. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
52  Id. (quoting The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 1). 
53  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 19; the Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434–435. 
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B. Factual Circumstances of Abduction  
The circumstances of international child abduction vary considerably. 
Sometimes, the taking parent ostensibly takes the child on vacation but never 
returns. In a prototypical case handled by the State Department in 2004, a 
mother took her child to Rio de Janeiro for a vacation; the father planned to join 
them there later.54 Three days after arriving in Rio, the mother initiated divorce 
proceedings in Brazil and demanded that the father travel to Brazil to sign papers 
ceding full custody of their child to her.55  
In other cases, the taking parent disappears with the child unexpectedly, 
and the left-behind parent has no indication of where they have gone—or if the 
child has even left the country. A recent case heard in the U.K.’s Family Division 
of the High Court is illustrative of this type of “ghosting.” In AX v. CY,56 the 
father and mother, who both lived in Spain, had what appeared to be an amiable 
custody agreement, which had been incorporated into a written document in 
March 2018 with the assistance of lawyers.57 There was no indication to the 
father that there were any issues with the agreement, so “it came as a 
considerable surprise to him, and no doubt great dismay as well,” to learn that 
neither the mother nor the child were living in their home in Barcelona and that 
the child was no longer attending her school.58 In December 2018, the mother 
sent the father a picture of the child in London, and the father learned the 
potential whereabouts of his daughter for the first time.59 The father provided 
the court with telephone transcripts in which the mother told him that there was 
nothing he could do:  
Do you think you’re going to win by searching the whole world or what[?] . . . 
[A]nd when you come to look for your daughter, wherever you think she is, 
look, come with a lot of money in your pocket . . .[Y]ou won’t have anywhere 
to look to find me . . .. Nobody knows where I live.60 
Sometimes, taking parents flee with children after an unfavorable custody 
decision is handed down by the child’s habitual residence.61 Unlike “ghosting,” 
which intentionally catches the left-behind parent off guard, this type of abduction 
may be responsive to preventative measures advocated for by the Permanent 
 
54  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ABDUCTION 26 (2010), https://perma.cc/7XV8-MV5Y [hereinafter 
STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE]. 
55  Id.  
56  [2020] EWHC (Fam) 1599 (UK). 
57  Id. at [7]–[8]. 
58  Id. at [8].  
59  Id. at [10]. 
60  Id.  
61  See STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 54, at 30. 
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Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH).62 
Preventative measures are proactive steps taken by the government to intervene 
in a hostile custody situation before an abduction takes place.63 
In contrast, some taking parents may be fleeing an abusive relationship. The 
issue of domestic violence generally, and specifically instances where victims of 
domestic violence employ international child abduction to escape the abuse of 
themselves and their families, has recently become more visible in the public 
consciousness.64 One particularly harrowing case, Van De Sande v. Van De Sande,65 
describes escalating physical and verbal abuse directed by the father, Davy, at the 
mother, Jennifer, and their children.66 Jennifer and the children finally escaped 
their abuser in 2004, during a visit to Jennifer’s parents in the U.S., when Jennifer 
told Davy that she and the children would not return to Belgium.67 Davy 
“threatened to kill the children. He had earlier threatened to kill Jennifer. And the 
next day, in a conversation with Jennifer's brother, he threatened to kill 
‘everybody.’”68 Eventually, Jennifer informed her father about Davy's threats.69 
Jennifer’s father called law enforcement and a police officer escorted Davy from 
the house.70 Later, the court found that Davy’s abuse amounted to a grave risk of 
harm under Article 13(b) and accordingly denied his petition for return of the 
children to Belgium.71 There are a number of legal scholars whose work sheds 
light on this intersection between domestic violence and international child 
abduction.72 As Van De Sande illustrates, Article 13(b) acts as an important 
safeguard in this context.   
 
62  See generally HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., Part III—Preventative Measures, in GUIDE TO GOOD 
PRACTICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (2005) https://perma.cc/3M9E-GKNQ. 
63  See generally id.  
64  See, e.g., Brian Quillen, The New Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic-Violence Victims and Their 
Treatment Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 49 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 621 (2014). 
65  431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005). 
66  Id. at 529, 569–70. 
67  Id. at 569. 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at 570. 
70  Id.  
71  Id. at 572. 
72  See, e.g., Kyle Simpson, What Constitutes A “Grave Risk of Harm?”: Lowering the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’s Article 13(b) Evidentiary Burden to Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
841, 846 (2017); Shani M. King, The Hague Convention and Domestic Violence: Proposals for Balancing the 
Policies of Discouraging Child Abduction and Protecting Children from Domestic Violence, 47 FAM. L.Q. 299, 
300 (2013); Karen Brown Williams, Fleeing Domestic Violence: A Proposal to Change the Inadequacies of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in Domestic Violence Cases, 4 J. 
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C. Procedural Matters & Central Authorities  
While the circumstances of the abduction—and the culpability of the 
parties—are case-specific, the procedural path for filing a Hague Convention case 
is standardized across States Party.73 Under Article 6 of the Convention, each 
country that has ratified or acceded to the Convention is required to have a Central 
Authority (in the U.S., the State Department), which is the main point of contact 
for parents and other governments involved in abduction cases.74 Once the left-
behind parent realizes that the child is missing, he or she will inform the Central 
Authority in his or her country that an abduction has occurred. The Central 
Authority works with the left-behind parent to complete an application, required 
under Article 8 of the Convention, in order to initiate the process.75 Then, the 
Central Authority forwards the competed application to the corresponding 
Central Authority in the State of refuge and monitors the case throughout the 
foreign administrative and legal processes.76 Documents submitted as part of a 
Hague Convention application to the Central Authority are “admissible in courts 
in partner countries without the formalities often required by courts for admitting 
documents from foreign countries.”77 
Cooperation between Central Authorities is a cornerstone of the Convention 
and absolutely essential to the Convention’s efficacy in addressing the scourge of 
international child abductions. Article 7 of the Convention requires Central 
Authorities “to secure the prompt return of children” “either directly or through 
an intermediary” and to “take all appropriate measures”: 
a) to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed 
or retained;  
b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by 
taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;  
c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable 
resolution of the issues;  
 
MARSHALL L. J. 39, 41–42 (2011); Noah L. Browne, Relevance and Fairness: Protecting the Rights of 
Domestic-Violence Victims and Left-Behind Fathers Under the Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction, 60 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1194 (2011); see also Quillen, supra note 64, at 622; Julia Alanen, When 
Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence 
Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49, 51 (2008) 
73  NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
CASES UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION 3 (2012) https://perma.cc/PND3-AFQQ [hereinafter 
NCMEC, HAGUE CONVENTION MANUAL]. 
74  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 6. 
75  Id. arts. 6, 8.  
76  Id. art. 9. 
77  Important Features of the Hague Abduction Convention—Why the Hague Convention Matters, BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/7ZHB-2UU7. 
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d) to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background 
of the child;  
e) to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in 
connection with the application of the Convention;  
f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative 
proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper 
case, to make arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise 
of rights of access;  
g) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision 
of legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and 
advisers;  
h) to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and 
appropriate to secure the safe return of the child;  
i) to keep each other informed with respect to the operation of this 
Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its 
application.78  
As discussed later in Sections V, VI, and VII, in the infectious disease context, the 
Central Authorities’ duty to secure the “prompt return of children” may be in 
tension with their obligation to do so “[safe]ly.”79  
If the child is abducted to the U.S., for example, the State Department (the 
U.S.’s Central Authority) will begin the process of locating the child after receiving 
from the Central Authority of the child’s habitual residence a completed 
application filed by the left-behind parent.80 The State Department partners with 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies, including the International 
Social Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL), individual states’ missing-child 
clearinghouses, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC), to locate the child “using school, employment, financial, social 
security, police, postal, internet or other public records.”81 The investigative 
process may be particularly arduous if the taking parent has transitory living 
accommodations, difficulty enrolling the child in school, illegal immigration 
status, or a fear of detection by law enforcement.82  
Once the child is located, the U.S. State Department will try to negotiate 
with the taking parent to voluntarily return the child.83 If those efforts are 
unsuccessful, the State Department will attempt to secure an affordable or pro bono 
attorney for the left-behind parent by sending outreach letters to attorneys who 
 
78  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 7.  
79  Id. 
80  NCMEC, HAGUE CONVENTION MANUAL, supra note 73, at 3. 
81  Id. at 92.  
82  Id.  
83  Id. at 93. 
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have agreed to consider representation.84 Once the left-behind parent has retained 
an attorney, that attorney will aid the left-behind parent in filing a Hague petition 
for the return of the child in the appropriate court. Impediments to smooth 
litigation may include language barriers to effective attorney-client communication 
and financial barriers that prevent the left-behind parent from traveling to the 
State of refuge for hearings.85  
Not all U.S. courts are equally prepared to handle Hague Convention cases, 
which are “unusual” under the most straightforward circumstances.86 To alleviate 
confusion, the State Department will send a letter to the judge presiding over the 
case that “explains the State Department’s role as U.S. Central Authority for the 
Hague Convention and refers to key provisions of the Hague Petition and 
documents regarding the history of the Hague Convention (i.e., the Pérez-Vera 
Report).”87 The State Department will also provide the judge with a list of other 
judges in the same (or nearby) jurisdiction(s) who may be able to provide their 
own experience as a guide.88  
The State Department’s Hague Convention procedures are an example of 
how one Central Authority—albeit one in a demonstrably compliant State 
Party89—has decided to fulfill its requirements under Article 7. But this illustration 
also demonstrates how, even in compliant countries and under the best of 
circumstances, international child abduction cases are far from smooth sailing for 
the left-behind parent. In countries that have a demonstrated pattern of 
noncompliance with the Convention, judicial authorities fail to implement and 
comply with the provisions of the Convention and authorities fail to take 
appropriate steps to locate children or enforce return orders, leaving petitions 
unresolved—sometimes for years.90 Thus, although the Hague Convention, and 
the cross-border cooperation the Convention mandates, has undoubtedly eased 
the otherwise-unmanageable burden on left-behind parents attempting to retrieve 
their abducted children, these cases remain extremely burdensome for the left-
behind parent. This holds true even in complaint countries—but especially in 
those countries exhibiting a pattern of noncompliance.  
 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 94–95.  
86  Id. at 98. 
87  Id. at 99. 
88  Id. 
89  U.S. STATE DEP’T, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 8 (2020) https://perma.cc/3W7C-HV5C. 
90  Each year the U.S. State Department issues an annual report on compliance with the Hague 
Convention. In 2020, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Jordan, Peru, Romania 
and the U.A.E. where all flagged as States Party demonstrating a pattern of noncompliance. Id. 
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D. Prima Facie Case and Defenses 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention provides that:  
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –  
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and  
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, 
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal 
or retention.91  
It is typical for courts in the U.S. and in other States Party to condense and 
reframe these Article 3 elements into a threshold determination of habitual 
residence, followed by a two-step inquiry to determine whether the removal or 
retention was “wrongful.”92 Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
prima facie case for wrongful removal under the Convention: the left-behind 
parent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence93 that (1) the child was 
habitually resident in a foreign country immediately before his or her removal to 
or retention in the U.S., (2) the removal or retention is in breach of the petitioner’s 
custody rights under the law of the foreign country, and (3) the petitioner was 
exercising his or her custody rights at the time of removal or retention.94  
There are five potential defenses95 to a prima facie case of wrongful removal 
or retention, which, according to the Pérez-Vera Report, must be strictly 
construed—“applied only as far as they go and no further”—to prevent the 
Convention from becoming a “dead letter.”96 These defenses include: the “age 
and maturity” exception (Article 13), the consent exception (Article 13(a)), the 
“now-settled” exception (Article 12), the human rights exception (Article 20), and 
the “grave risk of harm” exception (Article 13(b)).97 The most common of these 




91  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 3. 
92  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 444.  
93  International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1) (implementing the Hague 
Convention in the U.S.). 
94  See, e.g., Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 168 (2013). 
95  MELISSA L. BREGER ET AL., New York Law of Domestic Violence § 4.6 (3d ed. 2020). 
96  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434.  
97  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, arts. 12, 13 & 20. 
98  Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague 
Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 676 (2001). 
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III. ARTICLE 13(B): THE FRIEDRICH FRAMEWORK 
Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention states that  
the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to 
order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which 
opposes its return establishes that . . .there is a grave risk that his or her return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.99  
Friedrich v. Friedrich is the preeminent case on the Article 13(b) grave risk defense. 
Not only does it define the grave risk exception for U.S. courts, it is also frequently 
cited in Hague Convention decisions abroad.100 In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit held 
that an Article 13(b) grave risk exists in two circumstances. The first is where 
“there is a grave risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent 
danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—e.g., returning the child to 
a zone of war, famine, or disease.”101 The second is “in cases of serious abuse or 
neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of 
habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the 
child adequate protection.”102 As previously noted, in conducting an Article 13(b) 
analysis, “courts cannot consider information that would be proper in a plenary 
custody hearing, engage in a custody determination, or address who would be the 
better parent” because judges adjudicating Hague Convention cases are not 
authorized to pass judgment on the underlying custody dispute.103  
Historically, American courts have construed the Article 13(b) defense 
narrowly, rarely finding a grave risk of harm to the child. This approach aligns 
with the drafters’ intention that all of the Convention’s defenses “be interpreted 
in a restrictive fashion.”104 Applying the Friedrich framework, “U.S. courts have 
held that the defense is not satisfied in cases [where, upon return, the child will 
face] poverty, unfavorable living conditions, or limited educational 
opportunities.”105 Additionally, pursuant to the Convention’s objective of 
deterring forum shopping by abductors, U.S. courts have found arguments 
predicated on psychological harm created by the child’s future separation from 
their abductor unconvincing, holding that “[t]he harm to the child must be greater 
 
99  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
100  See, e.g., C v. G [2020] IECA 223 (Ir.).   
101  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
102  Id.  
103  Lauren Cleary, Disaggregating the Two Prongs of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention to Cover Unsafe and 
Unstable Situations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2619, 2632 (2020).  
104  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 434. 
105  Cleary, supra note 103, at 2633.  
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than what is normally to be expected when a child is taken away from one parent 
and passed to another parent.”106  
Foreign courts differ from those in the U.S. and each other in their treatment 
of the grave risk of harm exception in many of the exception’s applications. For 
example, the treatment of grave risk of harm defenses concerning allegations of 
domestic violence tends to vary considerably between courts.107 In contrast, the 
treatment of Article 13(b) exceptions predicated on “the unsuitability of 
conditions in the child’s habitual residence writ large” is relatively uniform 
internationally.108 That is because Friedrich is “well-known” throughout the global 
judiciary, and many courts employ it as a guide when adjudicating this type of 
defense, leading to more consistent results.109 In most countries, however, there is 
a dearth of cases dealing with a grave risk of harm defense predicated on 
conditions in the child’s habitual residence. In the courts that have seen this 
construction of the exception raised, it has been “raised most frequently with 
regard to Israel.”110 The vast majority of courts concluded that the war-zone 
conditions in Israel did not constitute a grave risk of harm to the child.111 An 
Argentinian court of first instance reasoned that “[u]nfortunately, acts of terrorism 
due to political, racial and religious intolerance occur all over the world. As the 
Prosecutor for Minors points out in his judgment . . . in the city of Buenos Aires, 
where [the child currently lives], terrorist acts were perpetrated . . . which . . . 
caused outrage around the world.”112 The court’s judgment rests on the distinction 
between a particularized risk and a general, or universal, one.  
Because Article 13(b) is so often litigated and so often fraught with 
confusion relative to the Convention’s other defenses, it is the only Convention 
defense about which the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (HCCH) has seen necessary to publish a guide. The HCCH’s 
Guide to Good Practice (the Guide) provides guidance on the operation of Article 
13(b) defenses under the Hague Convention to all States Party.113 The Guide to 
 
106  Id. at 2634.  
107  Peter McEleavy, Case Law Analysis: Risks Associated with the Child’s State of Habitual Residence, HAGUE 
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112  Buenos Aires Court of First Instance, 05/10/2001, “A v. A.” (2001) (Arg), 
https://perma.cc/GAY7-3EMF.  
113  HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., Part V—Article 13(1)(b), in [DRAFT] GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE 
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
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Good Practice outlines three types of “grave risk.114 These types of risk are: a grave 
risk that the return would expose the child to physical harm, a grave risk that the 
return would expose the child to psychological harm, and a grave risk that the 
return would otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The Guide 
explains that these three types of risk must be (1) evaluated for the gravity of the 
risk and (2) assessed through a “forward-looking” lens.115 First, the level of risk 
must be “grave”—“the risk must be real and reach such a level of seriousness to 
be characterized as ‘grave.’”116 The Guide explains that the Convention drafters 
replaced “substantial risk” with “grave risk” because “‘grave’ was considered a 
more intensive qualifier.”117 Second, the exception should focus on the situation 
the child will face once returned.118 Although past experiences in their country of 
habitual residence may bear on this analysis, courts should be sure to factor in any 
changes that may have taken place since the child was last in the county that may 
affect his or her future experiences.119  
There is some evidence that the Guide has proven a useful resource for 
courts struggling with conflicting interpretations of Article 13(b). In 2011, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Article 13(b) defense 
in its seminal case Re E (Children). The decision echoed a number of the principles 
set forth in the Guide and added that “[t]here is no need for Art[icle] 13(b) to be 
narrowly construed. By its very terms it is of restricted application. The words of 
Art[icle] 13 are quite plain and need no further elaboration or gloss.”120 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE CHILD 
If a court finds that the abductor has failed to establish a grave risk of harm 
defense, the child must be returned to his or her country of habitual residence. 
However, the judge is empowered to temporarily stay the return order. This 
option is useful in the context of infectious disease outbreaks—the court can 
reject the Article 13(b) exception but keep the child in the State of refuge until it 
is safe for him or her to travel. 121  
 
114  Id. at 15. 
115  Id. at 15–16. 
116  Id. at 15.  
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120 BK v. NK [2016] EWHC (Fam) 2496, [45] (explaining the holding in Re E (Children) (Abduction: 
Custody Appeal) [2011] 2 FLR 758), https://perma.cc/B9XL-FTSX. 
121  See, e.g., Gallegos v. Garcia Soto, No. 1:20-CV-92-RP, 2020 WL 2086554, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 
2020) (“However, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the effective date of this Order is stayed, 
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If a court finds that the abductor has successfully established a grave risk of 
harm defense, the judge is faced with a decision. Article 13(b) provides that even 
if the court does find that the exception applies, the judge still has the ability to 
exercise his or her discretion to return the child notwithstanding the fact that the 
abductor has met his or her burden to show a grave risk of harm.122 A judge in the 
High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Appeal 
explained under what circumstances judges should exercise their discretion: 
It may be that highly unusual or exceptional circumstances might justify the 
exercise of the discretion to return the child notwithstanding the grave risk 
shown to exist although it is difficult to conceive of such situations. Even so, 
this could not and should not be done without the judge being fully satisfied 
that adequate and sufficient practical measures are in place to ensure that the 
child would not be exposed to any risk of harm.123 
In some States Party, courts are required to exercise their judicial discretion 
by considering protective measures that would, notwithstanding a grave risk of 
harm, allow the child to be returned to his or her habitual residence. Some U.S. 
courts are also required to consider such measures. The Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that before denying return based on the 
grave risk of harm exception, courts should consider protective measures that 
would allow the child’s return while still providing for the child’s protection.124  
In most countries, protective measures take the form of voluntary 
undertakings, which are promises made by the left-behind parent to the court to 
do (or not do) certain things in conjuncture with the child’s return order. 
According to the Guide, 
[a]n undertaking is a voluntary promise, commitment or assurance given by a 
natural person – in general, the left-behind parent – to a court to do, or not 
to do, certain things. Courts in certain jurisdictions will accept, or even 
require, undertakings from the left-behind parent in relation to the return of 
a child. An undertaking formally given to a court in the requested jurisdiction 
in the context of return proceedings may or may not be enforceable in the 
State to which the child will be returned.125 
 
COVID-19 pandemic no longer renders international travel unsafe and widespread social 
distancing practices are no longer necessary . . . The Court will schedule status conferences as 
necessary to determine the precise date and the logistics of Y.E.G.'s return, involving the Mexican 
Consulate when appropriate and keeping in mind the need to ensure Y.E.G.'s return is both 
‘prompt’ and ‘safe.’”).  
122  The Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 13.  
123  D. v. G. [2001] 1179 H.K.C. 1, 5 (C.F.A.)  (H.K.), https://perma.cc/QSH8-DPB2 (emphasis 
added).  
124  See generally Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Grave Risk of Harm 
Exception in Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as Implemented in 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A), 56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 163 (2011).  
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The Guide adds that such voluntary undertakings are not easily enforceable and 
therefore “should be used with caution, especially in cases [where the grave risk 
involves] domestic violence.”126 The court may also be able to give legal effect to 
a protective measure via a mirror order in the state of habitual residence if possible 
and available.127 However, the court “cannot make orders that would exceed its 
jurisdiction or that are not required to mitigate an established grave risk.”128 
If a “grave risk” is found—and if the judge declines to exercise his or her 
discretion to return the child notwithstanding the successfully mounted defense—
the consequences for the abducted child are fairly permanent: the left-behind 
parent’s petition will be denied, and the court will order the child to remain in the 
physical custody of the abductor. The left-behind parent can appeal the decision 
according the civil procedure rules of the court. After the left-behind parent 
exhausts the appeals process, however, the child’s custody status can only change 
if other forms of adjudication intercede—if, for example, a family court resolved 
the underlying custody dispute in a way that is averse to the abductor. The odds, 
however, of a favorable custody outcome for the left-behind parent in this 
situation are miserably low. The Pérez-Vera Report, explains why:  
It frequently happens that the person retaining the child tries to obtain a 
judicial or administrative decision in the State of refuge, which would legalize 
the factual situation which he has just brought about. However, if he is 
uncertain about the way in which the decision will go, he is just as likely to 
opt for inaction, leaving it up to the dispossessed party to take the initiative. 
Now, even if the latter acts quickly, that is to say manages to avoid the 
consolidation through lapse of time of the situation brought about by the 
removal of the child, the abductor will hold the advantage, since it is he who 
has chosen the forum in which the case is to be decided, a forum which, in 
principle, he regards as more favourable to his own claims. . . . In fact, 
resorting to this expedient, an individual can change the applicable law and 
obtain a judicial decision favourable to him. Admittedly, such a decision . . . 
will enjoy only a limited geographical validity, but in any event it bears a legal 
title sufficient to 'legalize' a factual situation which none of the legal systems 
involved wished to see brought about.129 
As discussed in Section II(A), the Hague Convention’s raison d'être is to 
ensure that the left-behind parent does not face the forum and logistical 
disadvantages inherent in being forced to litigate the underlying custody dispute 
in a foreign country chosen by the abductor. If the left-behind parent’s petition is 
denied because of a successful grave risk of harm defense, the left-behind parent, 
after exhausting the appeals process, is essentially left to fend for his or herself. 
When a left-behind parent emerges from the Hague Convention process empty-
 
126  Id. at 21. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 429. 
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handed like this, it is more likely than not that the abductor will prevail in retaining 
the abducted child long-term. 
V. COVID-19’S IMPACT ON HAGUE CONVENTION CASES 
COVID-19 originated in China in 2019 but quickly spread around the globe, 
dramatically altering daily life everywhere.130 The virus is highly contagious and 
spreads from person to person among those in close contact through respiratory 
droplets.131 When an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, they release 
droplets which are in turn inhaled by people within about six feet, or two meters, 
of the contagious person.132 Common symptoms include fever, cough, and 
tiredness, and the severity of symptoms range from mild to severe.133 In the early 
days of the outbreak, several hotspots emerged, including Wuhan, China; Iran; 
northern Italy; Spain; and New York.134 As the global outbreak unfolded, the 
geographical concentrations of COVID shifted. Even a year after the outbreak, 
the number of new cases was growing faster than ever.135 By January 1, 2021, the 
virus had infected at least 84.2 million people, claiming 1.8 million lives 
worldwide.136 Eleven months after the outbreak started, more than 500,000 new 
cases of COVID-19 were reported globally per day.137 COVID-19 prompted 
worldwide school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans. This Section 
discusses how the global pandemic impacted Hague Convention litigation both 
logistically and substantively.  
A. Logistical Obstacles to the Administration of Proceedings  
It goes without saying that the administration of international child 
abduction cases—like the administration of all judicial proceedings, particularly 
those with an international dimension—was complicated by the COVID-19 
pandemic. When lockdowns began in March 2020, a member of the International 
Secretariat of the Association of Judges of Brazil began compiling information 
from colleagues in different countries to draft a global survey of measures taken 
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to suspend judicial activity.138 The informal report showed that, over the course 
of just ten days in March, the suspension of judicial activity spread at an 
unprecedented rate across the globe. On March 22, 2020, the member wrote:  
The world faces an invisible army that carries death and disease wherever it 
goes. Scientists struggle against time in search of a vaccine against the virus 
or a cure for the disease. Governments adopt extreme contact restriction 
measures, with unpredictable economic consequences. . . . In this extreme 
scenario, the Judiciary in the world is forced to adapt. Presential activities are 
severely restricted in the most affected countries, but not only there. Remote 
work is widely adopted. Virtual audiences are encouraged.139  
And yet, despite the challenges presented by COVID-19, the wheels of justice 
continued turning—“[t]he Judiciary adapts, but does not stop.”140 
B. Guidance from the HCCH 
The year that the Hague Convention was signed, 1980, was a triumphant 
year for global health: it was the year that the World Health Organization (WHO) 
formally declared the global eradication of smallpox.141 Smallpox had plagued 
humans for millennia and killed one third of infected patients.142 The WHO’s 
formal declaration followed a nearly two-decade-long global vaccination 
campaign, which was seen as a culmination of advances in the science of 
vaccinations. “Polio vaccines, which were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s lead 
to similar success globally.”143 In the decades leading up to the signing of the 
Hague Convention, several epidemics impacted the global community. The Asian 
Flu pandemic killed more than one million people worldwide between 1957 and 
1958.144 In 1961, “a cholera pandemic originating in Indonesia spread[ ] to other 
parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.”145 In 1968, the Hong Kong Flu 
pandemic killed an estimated one million people, about half of them residents of 
Hong Kong.146 The Hague Convention was signed a year before the Centers for 
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) first reported “a rare form of pneumonia 
later identified as Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or AIDS.”147   
Although the signing of the Hague Convention coincided with a 
revolutionary achievement in the realm of global health—and although it can 
safely be assumed that most, if not all, of the drafters were savvy to the existence 
of recent outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, and Hong Kong Flu—there is no 
evidence that the drafters discussed the potential impact of infectious disease 
outbreaks on international child abduction cases. 148 The Hague Convention was 
intended to address a very specific type of cross-border, peacetime cooperation; 
it was not designed with a global health crisis or accompanying lockdowns and 
judicial suspensions in mind. 
In July 2020, the HCCH released an emergency toolkit to help guide courts 
amidst the pandemic.149 The toolkit advises that cases should be considered on an 
ad hoc basis and assures courts that “[t]he Convention continues to be effectively 
applied in times of COVID-19 through contact and cooperation with, and the 
sharing of resources between, Central Authorities.”150 The toolkit encourages 
courts to “[f]ocus on the child” by “[s]ecuring the safe and prompt return of the 
child to the State of habitual residence” and “[e]nsuring continuing and suitable 
contact between [the left-behind] parent and child.”151 The Permanent Bureau 
urges States Party to employ mediation, embrace technology, safeguard equality 
in access to the courts, and communicate “among members of the judiciary across 
borders through direct judicial communications or the International Hague 
Network of Judges.”152 The toolkit acknowledges that “[t]he current restrictions 
on international travel pose challenges to the enforcement of return orders under 
the Convention.”153  
In courts around the world, judges responded to the new practical obstacles 
facing Hague Convention proceedings. These proceedings are voluminous; in 
2015, at least 2,997 children were involved in 2,270 return of child petitions.154 
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Many judges held their Hague Convention proceedings remotely.155 In Hague 
Convention cases where the left-behind parent prevailed, courts have been faced 
with the realities of enforcing return orders in the middle of a global pandemic. 
Citing the Convention’s requirement that the return of the child be “prompt,”156 
many courts have chosen to enforce return orders without delay, despite the risks 
of travel.157 Other courts have temporarily stayed the return of the child,158 citing 
travel bans, the risks associated with travel during the pandemic, and the 
Convention’s requirement that children’s returns be “safe.”159  
C. Article 13(b) Issues 
As more Hague Convention cases grapple with infectious disease as the basis 
for Article 13(b) defenses, three major questions will likely emerge. First, does 
international travel generally—and air travel specifically—pose a “grave risk of 
harm” during an infectious disease outbreak? Since the start of the pandemic, the 
vast majority of governments have issued stay-at-home requirements or 
household lockdowns.160 In January 2021, the majority of governments had either 
1) an active stay-at-home order, recommending citizens refrain from leaving their 
homes or 2) an active stay-at-home order with exceptions for daily exercise, 
grocery shopping, and other essential errands.161 Additionally, many countries had 
active travel bans.162 Both of these types of government responses were designed 
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to slow the spread of the virus. Most governments strongly discouraged 
international travel and air travel. In the case outlined in the Introduction, KR v. 
HH, the judge acknowledged that “international travel at this time potentially 
carries with it a higher prospect of infection than remaining in self-isolation.”163 
Second, can one country’s infectious disease outbreak pose a “grave risk of 
harm” relative to another country’s outbreak? This line of inquiry acknowledges 
the ubiquity of the pandemic but also pits the infection rates of the child’s habitual 
residence against those in the State of refuge. It may also compare the prudence 
and efficacy of different government responses and public health policies or assert 
predictions about how a certain government’s responses and policies will impact 
future infection rates in that country. Judges typically appear reluctant to engage 
in this type of comparative analysis. The judge in KR v. HH refused to make a 
finding as to relative risk between England and Spain and simply concluded that 
there was “a genuine risk that PT could contract the virus whether she remains in 
England or returns to Spain.”164 
Third, does a child—or do children in general—face a grave risk of illness 
after being infected by the infectious disease? Instead of evaluating the risk of 
exposure that a child’s return will entail and the likelihood that a child will contract 
the virus, this line of inquiry assesses the relative risk of the symptoms the child 
would experience should he or she contract the virus. Although many people only 
experience mild symptoms once they become infected with COVID, others face 
serious illness and complications like pneumonia, organ failure, blot clots, and/or 
death.165 Data shows that older adults have a higher risk of serious illness and 
complications from COVID-19;166 when compared to this vulnerable age group, 
children may not face a grave risk of illness. Similarly, if a child has an existing 
chronic medical condition known to put people at greater risk of becoming 
seriously ill with COVID-19, such as sickle cell disease, severe obesity, or serious 
heart disease, he or she may face a grave risk of illness.167 In KR v. HH, the judge 
made a point of noting that neither PT nor her parents were elderly or had 
preexisting health concerns.168 Ultimately, the judge incorporated this fact into his 
ultimate finding by reasoning that although “the travel associated with a return is 
likely to increase the risk that PT could contract coronavirus . . . I do not consider 
such a risk, when considered in the context of the likely harm that would be suffered by PT 
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should she contract the virus, is sufficient to amount to the ‘grave risk’ of physical harm 
required by Art[icle] 13(b).”169 
Recently, a number of these issues were raised in The Father v. The Mother,170 
a Hague Convention case in a family court in Tel Aviv. In that case, the mother 
(abductor) opposed her daughter’s return to the U.S. from Israel, arguing that 
“[t]here is a real health danger to the Minor, and each day worsens and increases 
the risk of damage should she fly. According to the experts, the epidemic in the 
United States is not under control at this point.”171 The mother pointed to news 
articles to bolster her position, including one entitled “More than China: The 
United States is first in the number of corona patients.”172 When asked to respond, 
the father wrote, “[t]he corona situation as you know is a problematic situation 
worldwide,” adding that “the situation in Israel is worse than the situation in 
California.”173 Additionally, he argued that his daughter had health insurance in 
the U.S. but not in Israel—“If, God forbid, something happens to her, then 
[California] is the place where she should be.”174 The father noted that “children 
are hardly at risk, the risk is marginal or non-existent.”175  
The court concluded that the child would be safer in the U.S. “in light of the 
insurance coverage there” and held that because COVID-19 was not related to 
the child’s health condition, the mother had not demonstrated that the child would 
face a grave risk of harm.176 In its opinion, the court highlighted the mother’s 
COVID-19 Article 13(b) defense, writing:  
There is extreme importance that precisely in times of great uncertainty it is 
heard loud and clear that Minors’ rights are not an anarchy and the emergency 
situation cannot be exploited for change status de-facto [sic] disregarding the 
Minor’s right, her Father’s rights and ignore [sic] the provisions under 
International Conventions designed for ensuring minors’ rights and intended 
to settle complex legal and urgent situations between countries. 177  
The court also rejected the mother’s requests to delay the ruling in the case and 
prohibit the return of the child until the travel restrictions put in place by Israel’s 
Ministry of Health and the WHO had been lifted.178 
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VI. ANALOGIZING INFECTIOUS DISEASE TO EXISTING PRECEDENT 
Surprisingly, legal scholars have never evaluated the propriety of an Article 
13(b) defense predicated on the risks of an infectious disease, even though 
“disease” is one of the three zones enumerated by the Friedrich framework. Despite 
outbreaks of Ebola, cholera, SARS, and Zika over the last decade,179 COVID-19-
era litigation is the first to bring to light the potential applicability of the Article 
13(b) exception to instances of infectious disease outbreaks. First, this Section will 
establish the dearth of “zone of disease” caselaw. Next, it will turn to the most 
robust category of “zone of” caselaw—“zone of war” cases—and reflect again on 
the narrow parameters of Article 13(b) and courts’ preferences for showings of 
particularized risk. Throughout this Section, the COVID-19 fact patterns serve as 
a touchstone to discuss the broader issue of Article 13(b) exceptions predicated 
on the risks of infectious diseases.  
A. The Illusive “Zone of Disease” 
The “zone of disease” construction of the Article 13(b) defense is rarely 
raised by abductors and, when it is, it is typically raised halfheartedly and as part 
of a broader argument about conditions in the child’s habitual residence. In 
Tavarez v. Jarrett,180 for example, the abductor argued that Mexico posed a grave 
risk of harm to the child “due to inadequate medical care, risk of disease, high 
rates of criminal activity, and abuse.”181 The court found that there was no 
evidence offered to support the “zone of disease” defense other than the 
testimony of the abductor’s counsel that “there is no mosquito control [in 
Mexico].”182 
 Sometimes, courts characterize the defenses, that couch these weak “zone 
of disease” arguments, as poverty defenses. Typically, courts are unsympathetic to 
poverty defenses in the Hague Convention context, sensing the possibility of their 
abuse by abductors who are more affluent than their taking parent counterparts. 
For example, in Cuellar v. Joyce, the Ninth Circuit assessed a grave risk of harm 
defense brought by the father, claiming that the mother’s home in Panama lacked 
running water, air conditioning, or refrigeration and that the child was not given 
a proper diet, had reoccurring ear infections, and had unexplained burns behind 
her ears.183 The father also asserted that the child had suffered a head trauma in 
an accident that could have been prevented had the mother been attentive.184 The 
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court noted that “[b]illions of people live in circumstances similar to those 
described . . . . If that amounted to a grave risk of harm, parents in more 
developed countries would have unchecked power to abduct children from 
countries with a lower standard of living.”185 The Ninth Circuit held that the claims 
made by the father did not amount to a “grave risk of harm” and ordered the 
return of the child to Panama.186 
Unlike the concerns raised by the father in Cuellar, the risks associated with 
the global pandemic have much less to do with the wealth of a country or the 
financial stability of the left-behind parent. While there is evidence that poverty 
may heighten the risk of infection and complications from COVID-19, the 
pandemic clearly affects populations across socioeconomic lines.187 Thus, a court 
could not dismiss a COVID-19 “zone of disease” defense on the grounds that it 
constituted a poverty defense. However, it is possible that a future infectious 
disease outbreak could have a socioeconomic dimension that is not borne out by 
COVID-19. The Ninth Circuit’s statement that “[b]illions of people live in similar 
circumstances to those described” does apply to the current situation. Thus, the 
fact that the pandemic is ubiquitous may undermine its utility as the basis for an 
Article 13(b) defense. On the other hand, if a future infectious disease outbreak 
were less ubiquitous and more localized, this aspect of the inquiry might cut the 
other way.  
In C v. G188 the Republic of Ireland’s Court of Appeal tackled the “zone of 
disease” defense head on. The Court of Appeal overturned a High Court decision 
to refuse the return of a seven-year-old boy to Poland on the grounds that 
international travel during COVID-19 posed a grave risk to his physical safety.189 
The Court of Appeal held that the risks posed by COVID-19 were insufficient to 
establish an Article 13(b) defense alone.190 The court noted that Friedrich’s “zone 
of disease” formulation would be rendered moot by this application, since every 
country in the world had been affected by the pandemic.191 Allowing a “zone of 
disease” defense in this case would, “essentially, involve the suspension of the 
operation of the Convention.”192 The court went on to note that the “zone of 
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disease” formulation should be understood in the context of its inclusion with 
“war” and “famine”—suggesting that the “zone of disease” formulation should 
be limited as well.193 The application of the “zone of disease” defense in C v. G 
aligns with the trend in Friedrich caselaw towards narrow construction and with 
the general thrust of Cuellar. 
The HCCH’s Guide to Good Practice acknowledges that health risks could 
constitute an Article 13(b) exception. First, the Guide advises that “[i]n cases 
involving assertions associated with the child’s health, the grave risk analysis 
should focus on the availability of treatment in the State of habitual residence, and 
not on a comparison between the relative quality of care in each State.”194 In 
analogizing to the infectious disease outbreak fact pattern, this guidance suggests 
that, provided there are adequate government public health precautions and 
medical facilities available in the child’s country of habitual residence, courts 
should resist comparing the healthcare systems of the two countries. The Guide’s 
resistance to comparison may also suggest, more broadly, that courts should avoid 
comparing the relative risk of infection in the two countries. Second, the Guide 
advises that “[a] grave risk will typically be established only in situations where a 
treatment is or would be needed urgently and it is not available or accessible in 
the State of habitual residence, or where the child’s health does not allow for travel 
back to this State at all.”195  
In State Central Authority v. Maynard, the Family Court of Australia held that 
return to England would expose a child to an Article 13(b) grave risk where 
extensive medical records demonstrated that the child’s epileptic seizures meant 
that “travel could result in significant and serious damage to [the child] or her 
death.”196 On the other hand, the court rejected the abductor’s arguments 
comparing the English medical system to the Australian medical system.197  
Here, there is a clear parallel to the risk of international travel presented by 
an infectious disease outbreak and the arguments echo those raised by the 
abductor in The Father v. The Mother. However, in State Central Authority, the child 
had a specific, demonstrable, pre-existing medical condition that created a 
particularized serious health risk incident to travel. This distinction suggests that 
while the Guide and cases like State Central Authority may encourage courts to 
consider the risks of travel in terms of how an infectious disease may interact with 
a child’s pre-existing medical condition, these authorities would not necessarily 
extend that consideration to every child during an infectious disease outbreak. It 
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is likely that the generalized health risks associated with international travel during 
COVID-19 do not fall within the purview of this guidance.  
B. Zone of War  
Although, the zone of war caselaw is more fleshed out than other aspects of 
the Friedrich framework, the existing precedent mostly serves to confirm and 
reinforce the limitations of the Article 13(b) “zone of” exceptions. Commensurate 
with other areas of Friedrich caselaw, the zone of war formulation is construed 
“extremely narrow[ly]” by courts and rarely, if ever, succeeds.198 In Silverman v. 
Silverman, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that Israel did not constitute a zone 
of war, despite intense regional violence, including suicide bombings.199 As 
previously mentioned in Section III, the U.S. is not alone—courts in Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the U.K., France, and Germany have all 
found that the conditions in Israel did not constitute a grave risk of harm within 
the meaning of Article 13(b).200 In reaching its decision the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that the situation “threaten[ed] everyone in Israel,” bolstering the idea 
that a generalized risk may be insufficient to show a grave risk.201 This reasoning 
is awkward because, almost by definition, a zone of war creates a dangerous 
situation for the general public. If general regional violence that “threaten[s] 
everyone” is insufficient to demonstrate a grave risk of harm under Friedrich, is the 
zone of war framework obsolete? Likely, under Silverman’s logic, the risk of an 
infectious disease outbreak does not rise to the level of grave risk imagined by 
Article 13(b). Indisputably, the pandemic “threaten[s] everyone.” This 
generalization is even more true in the COVID-19 context because the threat of 
the pandemic cannot be conceptually severed from its global nature—whereas the 
violence in Silverman only extended to the broader Middle East/North Africa 
region. And, crucially, the risks are equally extreme: death is the worst-case 
scenario of living in a war zone or being infected by a disease.  
The Silverman opinion points to a district court case with more concrete zone 
of war criteria.202 Freier v. Freier evaluates another a grave risk of harm defense 
predicated on the 1996 violence in Israel, finding it similarly insufficient to the 
defense raised in Silverman.203 But unlike the Eighth Circuit in Silverman, in reaching 
its decision in Freier, the district court provided specific reasoning. The court held 
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that Israel did not qualify as a zone of war because schools and businesses were 
open and the petitioner was able to leave the country.204 Additionally, the court 
noted that “the fighting is limited to certain areas and does not directly involve 
the city where the child resides.”205  
Analogizing from this logic, COVID-19 would most likely have constituted 
a grave risk of harm in some countries at certain points during the course of the 
pandemic. First, school closures were widespread due to the pandemic. According 
to UNESCO, on April 2, 2020, 84.5% of total learners enrolled at pre-primary, 
primary, lower-secondary, upper-secondary, and tertiary education levels were 
impacted by COVID-19 school closures worldwide.206 Almost 1.5 billion learners 
were affected, and 172 countries had implemented nationwide school closures.207 
By September 2020, those numbers had fallen, but 49.6% of total learns were still 
impacted by closures worldwide.208 More than 850 million children were still 
affected, and there were 50 country-wide school closures still in effect.209  
Second, many countries had workplace closures as a result of the pandemic. 
In some countries, including China, Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia, workplace 
closures were still in effect in September 2020 for all but essential workplaces such 
as grocery stores and medical facilities.210 By contrast, in countries like Canada, 
Mexico, India, and Russia workplace closures were only in effect for select sectors 
or categories of workers as of fall 2020.211 Globally, workplace closures shifted 
with the tides of infection rates and public policy calculations as the markets 
reacted to the cost of forced closures and laborers reevaluated health risks against 
growing financial pressure to return to work.  
Third, many countries put in place travel bans to stem the flow of the 
pandemic. For example, in April 2020, more than 7.1 billion people worldwide 
lived in countries with travel bans.212 “Roughly 3 billion people . . . live[ed] in 
countries with borders completely closed to noncitizens and nonresidents.”213 On 
March 28, China closed its borders to foreigners with the exception of “some 
diplomatic and scientific personnel.”214 At the start of the pandemic India “closed 
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its borders by suspending visas and requiring a two-week quarantine for all arrivals 
regardless of citizenship.”215 Since the beginning of the outbreak, governments 
slowly lifted or amended travel bans, but many countries continued to enforce 
travel restrictions in some form or another, especially for noncitizens.216 In 
September 2020, 70 countries were completely closed and 55 countries had no 
travel restrictions.217  
Thus, according to the three metrics posited by Freier, COVID-19 may have 
presented a grave risk of harm to some children in certain countries at certain 
times during the pandemic. However, the analysis above highlights the fickle 
nature of Freier’s standards in this context, as the impacts of infectious diseases 
are constantly in flux. The Freier framework may be administrable in the context 
of a protracted war, but in terms of an infectious disease outbreak, where the 
landscape of risk and government responses change daily, these metrics would 
likely prove unmanageable. Additionally, Freier’s reasoning has a very limited 
sphere of influence. Not only does it lack appellate authority, the opinion also 
employs this criterion to reach an unfavorable decision for the abductor on the 
Article 13(b) defense. The likelihood that Freier could be used to successfully argue 
an Article 13(b) defense predicated on the risks posed by the pandemic or another 
infectious disease outbreak is slim. This likelihood is weakened by a stark fact 
raised in Silverman: “there does not appear to be [any] case that finds any country 
a ‘zone of war’ under the Convention.”218 
VII. SUGGESTIONS 
This Comment recommends that, generally, courts should reject Article 
13(b) defenses predicated on infectious disease outbreaks like COVID-19. 
Instead, courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the risk of exposure 
to an infectious disease does not constitute a grave risk of harm to the child within 
the meaning of the Hague Convention. If States Party decline to adopt such a 
rebuttable presumption, they should, at the very least, provide left-behind parents 
with an equitable relief doctrine in cases where the abductor has already put the 
child at risk of infection.  
A. The Rebuttable Presumption  
This Comment advocates for a rebuttable presumption against “zone of 
disease” defenses. Under this rule, the abductor would be able to rebut the 
presumption against the “zone of disease” defense by demonstrating that the child 
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faces a particularized risk of serious complications incident to infection. As 
demonstrated in Sections III and VI, States Party have generally understood the 
Article 13(b) exception to be applicable in situations of particularized, rather than 
generalized, risk. A particularized risk of serious complications would require a 
showing that the child is more at risk of serious complications like serious injury 
or death than the general population. Evidence such as the extensive medical 
records presented by the abductor in State Central Authority219 demonstrating her 
child’s epileptic seizure condition, would be persuasive. Courts should weigh 
heavily medical records and reports from credible health institutions (such as the 
WHO or the CDC) showing that the child is part of a particularly vulnerable 
population. Testimony from the child’s medical provider would also be cogent. In 
rare cases, a showing of generalized risk may be sufficient if the abductor could 
show that the child still faced a substantial risk of serious injury or death even 
absent a particular vulnerability. For example, such an exception would have 
applied to a disease like smallpox, which had a mortality rate of over thirty 
percent.220 
In situations where a particularized risk is found, the court should hold that 
the child faces a “grave risk of harm” within the meaning of the Hague 
Convention. However, if there are reasonable voluntary undertakings the court 
could impose to neutralize the particularized risk, the court should exercise its 
discretion to return the child despite the finding that the abductor had met his or 
her burden under the Article 13(b) exception. Courts should elicit voluntary 
undertakings from left-behind parents to place customized safety precautions on 
return orders. These voluntary undertakings could include promises to help the 
child practice social distancing, mask-wearing, and quarantine and promises to 
comply with certain travel recommendations, including recommendations 
regarding the timing of travel plans and modes of transportation. Similarly, the 
court should consider issuing a return order, but staying the order until the 
particularized threat to the child is neutralized. 
In cases where no particularized risk to the child is found and the taking 
parent has failed to meet his or her Article 13(b) burden, the judge must return 
the child to his or her habitual residence. However, even absent a showing of 
particularized harm, the court should take precautions to protect the safety of the 
child. If the infectious disease poses a serious public health risk, the court should 
adopt reasonable protective measures and consider temporarily staying the order 
for the child’s return.   
A rebuttable presumption against the “zone of disease” defense is an 
appropriate solution to the risks posed by infectious diseases for several reasons. 
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First, as discussed in Section IV, while an infectious disease outbreak is, by 
definition, a temporary occurrence, the consequences of a court finding a grave 
risk to the child can effectively finalize the child’s custody arrangement by making 
it nearly impossible for a left-behind parent to retrieve their child if they are 
unsuccessful in appealing the trail court’s judgment. If the court finds a grave risk 
of harm to the child, the judge must deny the Hague petition and refuse the return 
of the child unless the judge decides to exercise his or her discretion to grant the 
return the child notwithstanding the established grave risk. While this judicial 
discretion exists in theory, some judges feel that such measures are only justified 
in “highly unusual or exceptional circumstances” and remark that “it is difficult to 
conceive of such situations.” 221 Instead of relying on judges to exercise their 
discretion when erroneous “zone of disease” defenses are successfully raised, 
States Party should build the preferred outcome into their reading of the law itself 
by creating a rebuttable presumption against such defenses.  
Moreover, the Convention drafters intended that the exceptions to return to 
be narrowly drawn, and thus a rebuttable presumption effectuates the original 
understanding of the grave risk of harm defense. As discussed in Sections II(A) 
and IV, the purpose of the Convention is to neutralize the artificial legal and 
logistical advantages enjoyed by the taking parent as a result of international child 
abduction. The drafters feared that “a systemic invocation of the [Convention’s] 
exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductors for that of the child’s 
[habitual] residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the 
Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its 
inspiration.”222 A rebuttable presumption bolsters a narrow construction of this 
defense, avoiding a “systemic invocation” of the Article 13(b) exception, while 
providing for the safety of the child via protective measures and stays.  
Finally, a rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” defenses upholds 
the foundational principle of the Convention. “[T]he Convention as a whole,” 
wrote Pérez-Vera, “rests upon the unanimous rejection of this phenomenon of 
illegal child removals and upon the conviction that the best way to combat them 
at an international level is to refuse to grant them legal recognition.”223 A 
rebuttable presumption ensures that all children who can be safely returned to 
their habitual residence are returned as soon as possible. A child victim of 
international child abduction “suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, 
the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his 
upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt 
to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teaches and 
 
221  D. v. G. [2001] 1179 H.K.C. 1, 5 (C.F.A.) (H.K.), https://perma.cc/QSH8-DPB2. 
222 The Pérez-Vera Report, supra note 43, at 435. 
223  Id. at 434. 
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relatives.”224 In addition to these uncomfortable and frightening experiences of 
destabilization, children may face long-term mental health struggles as a result of 
their abduction. Studies have shown that “[c]hildren who have been 
psychologically violated and maltreated through the act of abduction, are more 
likely to exhibit a variety of psychological and social handicaps.”225 Abducted 
children suffer from depression, excessive fearfulness, helplessness, anger, 
disruption in identity formation, and fear of abandonment—conditions which 
may persist lifelong.226 Overall, a rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” 
defenses increases the likelihood that a child will be returned to his or her habitual 
residence and lessens the length of time a child spends away from home as a victim 
of international child abduction. 
B. The Unclean Hands Doctrine  
Lastly, if States Party decline to adopt such a rebuttable presumption, they 
should, at the very least, provide left-behind parents with an equitable relief 
doctrine in cases where the abductor has already put the child at risk of infection. 
If an abductor has abducted a child during an infectious disease outbreak and is 
now insisting that the child cannot be returned because of that outbreak, the 
abductor has “unclean hands.”  
Traditionally, the doctrine of unclean hands is understood for the equitable 
maxim that “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”227 It is a 
“self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted 
with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the mater in which he seeks relief, 
however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.”228 Historically, 
U.S. courts have declined to apply the doctrine in Hague Convention cases. In 
Karpenko v. Leendertz, for example, the Third Circuit held that the mother’s 
interference with the father’s custody rights did not bar return after the father’s 
wrongful removal of the child and concluded that the “application of the unclean 
hands doctrine would undermine the Hague Convention’s goal of protecting the 
well-being of the child.”229 However, this rejection of the unclean hands doctrine 
should be reconsidered in light of the peculiar fact dynamics at play in a “zone of 
disease” defense.  
 
224  Id. at 432 (quoting M. Adair Dyer, Questionnaire and Report on International Child abduction by One Parent, 
Preliminary Doc. No. 1 (Aug. 1978)).  
225  Nancy Faulkner, Report Presented to U.N. Convention on Child Rights in Special Session, Parental 
Child Abductio is Child Abuse (June 9, 1999), https://perma.cc/XQ83-CX2U. 
226  Id. 
227  Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  
228  Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). 
229  Id. at 265.  
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In the context of the “zone of disease” defense, the unclean hands doctrine 
would preclude the use of the Article 13(b) exception by abductors who had 
already exposed their children to the infectious disease at issue. A family court in 
London recently heard a case in which such a doctrine could be applied. In Re N 
(a child),230 the mother took her child to the Greek island of Paros on March 20, 
2020, three days before the Prime Minister announced a national lockdown in the 
U.K.231 The mother claimed that her intention in traveling to Paros was to escape 
the dangers of the pandemic:  
[T]he main reason that I have come to Greece is that I am very afraid of the 
coronavirus and I want to do whatever I can to keep N (and me) safe from 
it. The small Greek island where my mother lives, where N and I are now 
staying with her, is naturally isolated from the mainland and has its own 
medical facilities. It is absolutely safe for until now there were zero (0) 
incidents of corona virus contamination. I believe that it is a much safer place 
to be for us than the much more densely populated area of Barking / outskirts 
of London.232  
The court held that while the mother may be correct that the COVID-19 infection 
rate was lower in Greece at the time, “that does not justify, in the slightest, what 
was a wrongful removal of N from the place of his habitual residence.”233 
Ultimately the court did not reach the merits of the petition,234 but the facts of Re 
N (a child) nevertheless raise a thought-provoking hypothetical: what if the 
abductor in Re N (a child) had levied a “zone of disease” defense to the child’s 
return to Barking? 
Common sense dictates that an abductor who traveled with her child during 
the pandemic—albeit early in the outbreak (March 20)—should be precluded 
from arguing that her child would face a “grave risk of harm” were the child 
ordered to return to the U.K. Essentially, the abductor has already exposed the 
child to the same “grave risk.” Recently, a U.S. district court agreed, quickly 
disposing of the abductor’s Article 13(b) defense. Without specifically naming the 
unclean hands doctrine, the judge reasoned with similar logic: 
Finally, Respondent argues that the risk from COVID-19 is so great that he 
should not be required to return Z.R. to Jamaica. The court does not find this 
testimony persuasive. Respondent testified that he recently brought his six-
year-old daughter from Jamaica to stay with him in the U.S.; he will be taking 
her back later this month.235 
 
230  Re N (a child) [2020] EWFC (Fam) 35, [16] (Eng.). 
231  Id.  
232  Id. at [25]. 
233  Id. at [16].  
234  Id. at [26]–[27]. 
235  Chambers v. Russell, No. 1:20CV498, 2020 WL 5044036, at *14 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2020). 
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An equitable relief doctrine akin to the unclean hands doctrine would provide left-
behind parents a necessary safety net in jurisdictions that decline to adopt a 
rebuttable presumption against “zone of disease” defenses. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed troubling gaps in Article 13(b) 
caselaw and guidelines. During the global health crisis, abductors have carved out 
a new iteration of the grave risk of harm defense predicated on the risks posed by 
an infectious disease outbreak. It is essential that States Party put forward a united 
response to this “zone of disease” defense. A rebuttable presumption against the 
“zone of disease” defense would correctly balance the Hague Convention’s goal 
of restoring the legal status quo between parties while preserving the important 
“safety valve” function Article 13(b) is meant to provide. Doubtless, these cases 
present courts with an unenviable task. Future scholarship may speculate on the 
ethical pitfalls of entrusting judges with risk assessments that necessarily draw on 
an emerging and ever-evolving body of public health news and medical research. 
In the meantime, courts should continue to combat the scourge of international 
child abduction by securing the prompt and safe return of abducted children, 
reminding abductors “that Minors’ rights are not an anarchy and the emergency 
situation cannot be exploited.”236 
 




How Hackers of Submarine Cables May Be Held Liable 




Submarine internet cables play a vital role in the modern economy and transmit almost all 
global internet connections between countries. These cables, however, are vulnerable to interference 
or hacking by foreign states who seek to obtain the valuable data that passes through them. 
Because these cables are located on the high seas, however, no country has legal jurisdiction over 
large portions of them allowing for any number of states or private actors to hack into them and 
steal valuable information. This Comment evaluates whether states have any legal recourse under 
public international law against entities that hack into submarine cables. To answer this 
question, this Comment explores the development of public international law with respect to the 
high seas and evaluates public international norms for hacking and cyber operations. This 
Comment then argues, given the weakness of current domestic regimes with respect to submarine 
cable protections, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea can assert jurisdiction over 
disputes related to submarine hacking. This Comment further makes the novel argument that 
states can assert damage done to cables through hacking or violations of citizens’ rights to privacy 
through hacking present potential legal avenues to pursue liability against submarine hacking.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Contrary to popular belief, the global internet is largely comprised of a 
network of data cables linking states and continents and not satellite links 
propelling data through the air.1 In communications between continents, 
approximately 99% of all telecommunications is transmitted via a network of 
around 400 underwater, submarine cables. 2 For example, to send an email from 
Boston to Dublin, the GTT Atlantic Cable would route your message under the 
Atlantic Ocean through Nova Scotia, Northern Ireland, and London before 
arriving in Dublin. 3 This process would take place nearly instantaneously but 
traverse hundreds of miles of fiber optic cable under the Atlantic Ocean. 
These undersea cables are only about the size of a garden hose but represent 
billions of dollars of productivity and information. If a ship were to drop anchor 
in the wrong location and sever a cable, internet service could be cut to an entire 
country.4 If a rogue agent elected to cut the cables to the United States, an 
estimated $10 trillion in daily financial transfers and vast amounts of data would 
be clogged up.5 Because damage to submarine cables is so devastating, the 
international community has devised a number of conventions and domestic 
protections to protect against cable damage. 
More insidiously, however, these cables are also at risk of hacking and 
intelligence gathering because so much data flows through them. States can use 
submarines to make small slits in submarine cables and insert listening and data 
collection devices.6 These spying states then collect all the information that flows 
through the cables: every overseas telephone call, email, financial transfer, or data 
upload that passes through the internet from one country to another is collected.7 
Encryption of information that passes through these cables somewhat protects 
against intelligence gathering, but sophisticated operators can often break 
encryption and can nevertheless obtain useful information through the metadata 
 
1  See, generally Edward Malecki & Hu Wei, A Wired World: The Evolving Geography of Submarine Cables 
and the Shift to Asia, 99 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 360 (2009). 
2  Greg Miller, Undersea Internet Cables are Surprisingly Vulnerable, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/X53J-XMHA. 
3  Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://perma.cc/S2SR-FL66 (2021). 
4  Chris Baynes, Entire Country Taken Offline for Two Days After Undersea Internet Cable Cut, INDEP. (Apr 
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/26LE-P6QD. 
5  Tim Johnson McClatchy, Undersea Cables: Too Valuable to Leave Vulnerable, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 12, 
2017), https://perma.cc/AH3X-TPMX.  
6  Christopher Drew, Divers Say Net Tied Submarine to Listening Device, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/YXS8-ACXT. 
7  Sophia Ankel, Russian Intelligence Agents Reportedly Went to Ireland to Inspect Undersea Cables, and It’s 
Reigniting Fears They Could Cut Them and Take Entire Countries Offline, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/8CE7-V38L. 
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embedded in encrypted transmissions.8 This massive amount of information 
provides valuable military, economic, and personal information to the hacking 
country. This hacking, however, is also a violation of citizens’ privacy and a 
violation of the hacked states’ economic and military interests. 
Out of concern for this sort of hacking, in 2020 the U.S. blocked Google 
and Facebook from turning on a submarine cable linking the U.S. and Hong 
Kong.9 Although the 8,000 mile cable had already been laid and hundreds of 
millions of dollars were spent on its development, the U.S. was too concerned 
about potential Chinese intelligence pilfering to let the cable go live.10  The 
decision dramatically demonstrates the U.S.’s fears around submarine cable 
hacking have grown to exceptional new heights. And the U.S. government’s fears 
are not misplaced. In 2013, the British spy agency the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was found to secretly have tapped into 
undersea cables to gather information.11 In 2015, U.S. sensors detected Russian 
submarines near undersea cables raising concerns.12 And during the Cold War, the 
U.S. tapped into Soviet undersea cables and gathered critical intelligence as part 
of Operation Ivy Bells.13 
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and states increasingly 
rely on the internet economically, hacking into internet infrastructure becomes a 
greater threat. The U.S., for example, has undertaken expensive and extensive 
efforts to remove Huawei from its domestic telecommunication infrastructure to 
prevent the Chinese government from spying domestically.14 Undersea cables, 
however, are not so easily protected. Undersea cables are expensive to lay,15 
 
8  DOUG BRAKE, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., SUBMARINE CABLES: CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (2019), https://perma.cc/8YQ8-T9TL. 
9  Anthony Spadafora, Google, Facebook Undersea Web Cable Will No Longer Connect US and Hong Kong, 
TECHRADAR (Aug. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/U8YZ-FXXS. 
10  Justin Sherman, The US-China Battle over the Internet Goes Under the Sea, WIRED (June 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/5X8K-8FY4. 
11  Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davis & James Ball, GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic 
Cables for Secret Access to the World’s Telecommunciations, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/4DGD-HRN5.  
12  Barbara Starr, U.S. Sensors Detect Russian Submarines Near Underwater Cables, CNN (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/RL96-QV9L.  
13  Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 
2013), https://perma.cc/W8GY-F5R2. 
14  David McCabe, F.C.C. Designates Huawei and ZTE as National Security Threats, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2020), https://perma.cc/PW37-6Z2Y. 
15  Tim Hornyak, Here’s What It Takes to Lay Google’s 9,000km Undersea Cable, COMPUTERWORLD (July 
13, 2015), https://perma.cc/EHL6-GSMX (approximately $300 million for a cable between the 
U.S. and Japan). 
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difficult to replace, and often traverse international waters over which states do 
not have exclusive domain.16 
Even with such a large threat, there is an open question as to whether states 
can protect against submarine cable hacking. The fundamental question this 
Comment seeks to answer is whether states have any recourse or protections 
against submarine cable hacking by foreign states under public international law. 
This Comment argues the increasingly recognized international right to privacy 
can provide grounds for protecting against submarine cable hacking and that 
states can enforce this right through dispute resolution mechanisms for the high 
seas. 
This Comment proceeds in five sections to develop this answer. Section II 
provides a brief overview of the technology behind submarine cables and the 
methods used in hacking these cables. Section III evaluates current attitudes in 
the international community with respect to submarine cable hacking and explains 
why norms around privacy, combined with the incredible resources required to 
protect cables from hacking, may lead to a shift in states’ treatment of submarine 
cable hacking. 
Section IV explores the history of international treaties and conventions 
surrounding submarine cables and the high seas. Section V summarizes current 
public international law related to cyber operations and hacking and discusses the 
emergence of a newly recognized international right to privacy with respect to 
telecommunications and personal data. Section VI discusses current scholarly 
responses to submarine cable hacking to situate this Comment’s solution in 
present scholarship. And in Section VII, I propose a novel solution addressing the 
problem of submarine cable hacking using the international right to privacy 
adjudicated through dispute resolution mechanisms developed for the high seas. 
The use of the international right to privacy and this dispute resolution body is 
presently underdiscussed by scholars. This solution further advances the right to 
privacy as integral to protect against submarine cable hacking and describes how 
shifts in attitudes toward privacy may contribute to the creation of norms against 
surveillance hacking. 
II.  TECHNICAL PRIMER ON HACKING AND SUBMARINE 
CABLES  
This Section describes the network of submarine cables that makes up the 
modern internet, the technical elements of modern submarine cable hacking 
techniques, and the possibility of damage by submarine cable hacking. This 
information is relevant to subsequent possible solutions around submarine cable 
 
16  James Griffiths, The Global Internet Is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable, CNN 
(July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/3VJM-LQQD.  
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hacking because international treaties require some protections against incidental 
or intentional damage to submarine cables, as discussed in Section IV. 
Most of the internet is formed through a network of undersea submarine 
cables.17 About the size of a garden hose, these cables are buried just under the 
ocean floor by submarine-cable laying ships and transmit internet data between 
countries.18 While there are some legacy cables that transmit primarily telephone 
or telegraph information, the majority of modern cables are fiber optic cables that 
can transmit dozens of Terabytes of data per second.19 While some cables are 
specially created for military and intelligence transmission purposes, the majority 
of cables are general in use and transmit commercial, government, and private 
commercial correspondence simultaneously.20 
Because laying and operating a cable across large bodies of water is so costly, 
most cables were historically financed, laid, and operated by a consortium of 
multiple owners. For example, the U.S., Japan, and Australia agreed in 2020 to 
jointly finance a cable link to the Pacific island nation of Palau at a cost of $30 
billion.21  Despite this history, individual companies or governments increasingly 
financed and laid submarine cables.22 For example, in 2020 Google announced it 
was financing and constructing its own cable linking the U.S., the United 
Kingdom, and Spain.23 
Once laid, cables are maintained and operated by the financing consortium 
or the private company financing the cable project. These cable operators are 
responsible for maintenance and repairs for any damage to the cable. Due to their 
length, most modern cables are outfitted with fault monitoring systems that can 
detect cable breaks or points of damage for repair.24 
States are capable of spying on submarine cables. As discussed below, 
because the hacking of cables requires specialized equipment including 
submarines, most experts are concerned with government-sponsored hacking 
 
17 Id. 
18  Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLICY 19 (Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara C. Davenport eds., 2014). 
19  Klint Finley, How Google Is Cramming More Data into Its New Atlantic Cable, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/D49P-23GW.  
20  H.I. Sutton, How Russian Spy Submarines Can Interfere with Undersea Internet Cables, FORBES (Aug. 19, 
2020), https://perma.cc/5BXR-4CWT.  
21  Yohei Hirose, Japan, US and Australia to Finance Undersea Cable for Palau, NIKKEI ASIA (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2WXP-FH9D. 
22  Marissa Alcala et al., Financing Subsea Cables in Latin America, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 16, 
2020), https://perma.cc/QPG9-QKZW. 
23  Sam Shead, Google Is Building a Huge Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable to Connect the U.S. to Britain and Spain, 
CNBC (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/T3GE-N363. 
24  See generally ISAAC GEISLER ET AL., DEP’T OF SYS. ENG’G & OPERATIONS RES., GEO. MASON UNIV., 
DESIGN OF A TRANSOCEANIC CABLE SYSTEM (2015), https://perma.cc/7WPB-HRPE. 
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attempts.25 Third-party and private actors, however, are still considered a risk to 
submarine cables. When four cables linking Europe and the Middle East were 
simultaneously damaged, many officials and commercial operators alleged private 
actors had cut the cables.26 Although more sophisticated technology is required to 
hack a cable compared to destroying one, the threat of terrorists hacking a 
submarine cable remains even if not manifest to date.27 
In general, the process by which intelligence agencies tap into cables is highly 
secretive. There are some indications, however, as to how it is done. Some reports 
indicate states use specially designed submarines equipped with devices to splice 
into cables. In this “splicing method,” the submarine, having broken through the 
protective coating, installs listening devices within the fiber optic cable to collect 
transmitted data.28 Some commentators, however, cast doubt on this method due 
to the possibility of a cable operator detecting a break in data transmission through 
the cable.29 Some reports nevertheless indicate the techniques are sophisticated 
enough to not alert cable operators even when external damage to the cable is 
already done.30 The possibility of damage to the cable or service interruption 
through splicing is important in the global regulatory regime for cable protections, 
as will be discussed at length in Section VI. 
Other hacking methods appear less obtrusive. Some intelligence analysts 
have speculated operators gain access to a cable at landing stations—stations fitted 
with signal boosting equipment and cable access features—in order to install 
intercept probes that capture the fiber optic light signal and make a copy of it.31 
This method, and a similar one involving creating a slight curvature within the 
cable to siphon off data as it passes through the curve, may not alert an operator 
that hacking has occurred because the cable does not witness a service interruption 
 
25  Griffiths, supra note 16. 
26  Investigators ultimately determined a ship’s anchor was to blame for at least one of four 
simultaneously damaged cables connecting the Middle East and Europe, but many at the time 
alleged the cables were damaged by private actors and conspiracy theories still abound. Lily Hay 
Newman, Cut Undersea Cable Plunges Yemen Into Days-Long Internet Outage, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/C4AF-CLBG; Kim Zetter, Undersea Cables Cut; 14 Countries Lose Web – Updated, 
WIRED (Dec. 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/3TGK-EUHH. 
27  MICHAEL SECHRIST, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR., NEW THREATS, OLD TECHNOLOGY: 
VULNERABILITIES IN UNDERSEA COMMUNICATIONS CABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
(2012), https://perma.cc/953R-MSKW. 
28  New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/KDM9-683P. 
29  See Tara M. Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity & International Law: An Intersectional Analysis, 
24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 57, 103–5 (2015). 
30  Meghan Neal, How to Hack the Backbone of the Internet, VICE (Oct. 31, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/6MWG-CF3E.  
31  See Khazan, supra note 13. 
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seen in splicing.32 While these methods involve some damage to the cable, they 
may not be easily identified or protected against even by wary states. Generally, 
while the method used may differ, most methods involve some degree of damage 
to the submarine cable and some degree of interference with a cable’s data 
transmission. 
III.  THE SHIFTING DIALOGUE AROUND SUBMARINE CABLE 
HACKING  
This Section discusses why submarine cable hacking is a pressing and ripe 
area for solutions within public international law. As noted above, most of the 
world’s global powers, particularly the U.S., China, and Russia, enjoy the ability to 
hack into one another’s cables and may want to reserve that ability. This may 
indicate few states would be interested in developing norms or international public 
law against submarine cable hacking. Indeed, the lack of a global convention 
against peacetime hacking may signal a lack of state interest in curbing this 
behavior. The ground, however, may be shifting. 
First, the volume of information, and in turn sensitive information, that 
passes through submarine cables is growing. Presently, submarine cables carry 
95% of all international communications.33 As countries continue to develop and 
as crises like COVID-19 require more work and entertainment to be done 
remotely, global demand for internet bandwidth rises.34 In turn, submarine cable 
use will only increase. Global consumer IP traffic is expected to rise from 212 
Exabytes per month in 2020 to 333 Exabytes per month in 2022.35 Submarine 
cable bandwidth and traffic are expected to rise by 40% by 2022.36 In 2020 alone, 
global submarine cable bandwidth rose by 35%.37 Correspondingly, the submarine 
cable market is expected to grow at approximately 11% by year from 2020 to 2025 
increasing the market’s total value from $10.3 billion to $22 billion.38 The need for 
cable protection then increases as the value and flow of data increases through 
submarine cables. 
 
32  Id. 
33  Submarine Cables, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (NOAA), https://perma.cc/2YKK-
DTS3. 
34  Paul Brodsky, Let’s Just Say Demand Is Thriving in the Global Bandwidth Market, TELEGEOGRAPHY DIG. 
(May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/B245-M8FE.  
35  Data Volume of Global Consumer IP Traffic From 2017 to 2022, STATISTA (Feb. 2019), 
https://perma.cc/FY6S-NVT6. 
36  Alex Vaxmonsky, New Subsea Cable Architectures Are Carrying the World’s Traffic, EQUINIX (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://perma.cc/9GHL-WD9A.  
37  Geoff Bennett, Subsea Cable Capacity: Where Do We Go Next?, SUBMARINE TELECOMS F. (Sept. 21, 
2020), https://perma.cc/8P7K-NKJ3. 
38  Submarine Cable System Market Worth $22.0 Billion by 2025, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/7QTT-LM33.   
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Second, while covert and secretive, state hacking and cyber operations only 
appear to be increasing in scope and frequency. In 2013, leaks revealed the British 
intelligence service the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
was tapping dozens of fiber optic cables processing over 600 million telephone 
events and 21 Petabytes of data each day.39 In 2015, American and NATO security 
forces became concerned with Russian submarines and spy ships increasingly 
patrolling areas near American submarine cables.40 And the threat of Russian 
activity has only increased. Russia has built out its submarine fleet,41 and a number 
of these submarines are claimed to be equipped with cable hacking capabilities.42 
This buildout of state capabilities to hack submarine cables has shifted states’ 
behavior with respect to submarine cables and hacking generally. Out of concern 
of Chinese hacking attempts, as mentioned above, U.S. regulators prevented the 
Pacific Light Cable Network connecting the U.S. and Hong Kong from going 
live.43 This was seen as a dramatic move because Google and Facebook had 
already spent over $300 million to construct the cable.44 In the commercial 
context, the U.S. and China agreed in 2015 to halt government support for cyber 
theft of corporate secrets or business information.45 In crafting the treaty, the U.S. 
asserted the two countries would together seek “international rules of the road for 
appropriate conduct in cyberspace” out of a growing concern around an arms race 
in cyber operations and hacking.46 While not the same as submarine cable hacking, 
the commercial hacking détente between China and the U.S. indicates some shift 
in behavior around state-sponsored hacking. The international community may 
be heading toward a similar watershed moment for crafting treaties around 
submarine cable hacking given the buildout of state hacking capabilities. 
Third, citizens and states are increasingly aware of hacking and intelligence 
gathering conducted through submarine cables. Expressions of outrage against 
these methods have increased accordingly. After Edward Snowden revealed the 
extent of spying on U.S. citizens, thousands took to the streets to protest against 
 
39  MacAskill et al., supra note 11. 
40  David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/WM9H-G9C6.  
41  Xavier Vavasseur, Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Get 15 New Vessels in 2020, NAVAL NEWS (May 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/39VS-4HZD.  
42  Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/5RRD-PSX2.  
43  Agence-France Presse, Pacific Data Cable Not Safe from China if Hong Kong Included, Says US, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/HWY2-BLAB.  
44  Mark Harris, Google and Facebook Turn Their Backs on Undersea Cable to China, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 
2020), https://perma.cc/D3YQ-55H8.  
45  David E. Sanger & Steven Lee Myers, After a Hiatus, China Accelerates Cyberspying Efforts to Obtain 
U.S. Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/KB46-K7SG.  
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government surveillance.47 Human rights watch groups and the media continue to 
monitor and critique civilian surveillance and spying efforts, and those criticisms 
have only increased in recent years. The U.N. Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner has produced annual reports related to the right to privacy in the 
digital age and has advocated for greater recognition of the right to privacy against 
broad surveillance.48 As citizens, NGOs, and political bodies increasingly advocate 
for protections for the right to privacy, states will increasingly shift their behavior 
to cooperating around greater privacy protections out of fear of losing the favor 
of the electorate. 
Fourth, cables are not capable of being monitored like other military or 
commercial assets. Due to their length stretching hundreds of miles in the open 
ocean and the number of cables traversing the sea, states would need to expend 
unconscionable resources to patrol for surface ships and submarines that threaten 
cables. While cable operators are able to observe real-time widespread disruptions 
in data service, sophisticated hacking agents are supposedly able to splice into 
submarine cables without alerting cable operators.49 To intercept cable hacking 
operators, a state would then need a nearby ship, or perhaps even submarine, 
capable of detecting and intercepting a hacking submarine. Indeed, it is difficult 
to fathom the resources required to patrol the 5,000 or so miles from Los Angeles 
to Tokyo across the Pacific for one cable let alone dozens of cables. Accordingly, 
spying attempts on cables are likely to succeed. NATO and British intelligence 
officers have acknowledged fears of Russian cable hacking in the Atlantic have 
grown because states cannot constantly patrol for hacking attempts.50 
Because states are unable to fully patrol against submarine hacking attempts, 
states may want additional tools in their foreign policy toolbox to address possible 
hacking attempts. As the danger posed by hacking grows and because the 
resources required to patrol against hacking are so immense, states will need to 
explore alternative means to protect cables and their sensitive data, which may 
include recognizing liability for hacking. By recognizing grounds for liability 
against submarine cable hacking, states can obtain a tool for enforcement against 
rogue actors when the costs and benefits are in their favor. 
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KGJY.  
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Fifth, while the U.S., China, and Russia, among others, may want to continue 
participating in hacking operations, not all states participate in hacking and not all 
states will want to continue to allow hacking to persist on the global stage. 
Landlocked states and states with less robust submarine military presences do not 
have the same incentives to allow submarine hacking to continue because they 
cannot as easily participate. Further, these states may be incidentally damaged by 
hacking attempts against U.S. or Russian submarine cables because their 
information flows through those same cables to other states.51 These states may 
then want protections against submarine hacking regardless of whether global 
powers, like the U.S. and China, want the practice to continue. 
The geopolitical landscape and incentives around protections against cable 
hacking thus appear to be shifting. Accordingly, this Comment turns to 
international public law as a potential way to curb hacking behavior. In the 
following Section, this Comment examines the protections currently afforded to 
cables under public international law. Subsequently, this Comment evaluates 
current scholarly thought on solutions within the public international legal system 
before proposing a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAWS REGULATING SUBMARINE CABLES  
This Section offers an overview of the history of submarine cable 
protections and an overview of current submarine cable protections in public 
international law. The history of submarine cable protection offers strong insight 
into how current protections were developed. By understanding how cable 
protections changed over time, this Comment helps better understand the norms 
around cables outside of the language of international conventions. Further, the 
history of submarine cables can inform our understanding of the protections 
dispute resolution bodies are willing to extend to cables when evaluating 
international law. 
A.  The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine 
Telegraph Cables  
International protections for submarine cables began, surprisingly enough, 
in the 1880s with the dawn of undersea telegraph wires. Due to threats from 
fishermen and pirates who accidentally or intentionally severed telegraph cables,52 
27 states joined together to create the 1884 Convention for the Protection of 
 
51  Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across Oceans¸ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), 
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Submarine Telegraph Cables.53 Principally, the 1884 Convention was designed to 
protect cables against willful or negligent damage to cables that may interrupt or 
obstruct telegraph signals.54 
The 1884 Convention, however, was limited in scope and application. Rather 
than develop a comprehensive international court to handle submarine cable 
disputes or violations of the convention, the 1884 Convention required states to 
create their own national regulations to protect submarine cables.55 Many 
signatory states, such as Canada, never implemented national laws in accordance 
with the Convention. Other participating states, like China, never signed the 
Convention and similarly have not developed comprehensive domestic laws in 
accordance with the Convention’s requirements.56 Where states did implement 
domestic laws under their Convention obligations, those protections were 
generally piecemeal and weak. For example, the U.S. enacted the 1888 Submarine 
Cable Act57 in response to the 1884 Convention, but fines under the statute are so 
small the U.S. Coast Guard does not pursue violators. There is not a single record 
of a criminal charge under the statute and civil fines are capped at $5,000.58 
The signing countries in 1884 could not have anticipated the emergence of 
internet submarine cables or hacking into these cables to pilfer vital information. 
The 1884 Convention, however, may offer some recourse for this sort of 
misbehavior. Article II provides it is a punishable offense to “break or injure a 
submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence, in such manner as might 
interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication.”59 Splicing or tapping into 
submarine cables requires some damage to the cable and some degree of service 
interruption to intercept transmitted data. Article II may then apply to submarine 
cable hacking. 
Nevertheless, the 1884 Convention may be limited in its protective ability. 
First, the Convention requires states to implement domestic regimes protecting 
cables. Because domestic jurisdiction over foreign nationals is limited, especially 
on the high seas as will be discussed, these protections are limited in reach. 
 
53  Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884 [hereinafter 1884 
Convention]. 
54  Id. art. II (“It is a punishable offence to break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable 
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or partially, such punishment being without prejudice to any civil action for damages.”). 
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legislatures the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present Convention, and 
especially for punishing, by either fine or imprisonment, or both, those who contravene the 
provisions of Articles II, V and VI.”). 
56  Id. art. 17. 
57  47 USC § 21 et seq. 
58  Wagner, supra note 52, at 135. 
59  1884 Convention, supra note 53, art. II. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 272 Vol. 22 No. 1 
Further, because Article II is limited solely to “telegraphic wires,” it is not clear 
whether damage to submarine internet cables portends liability under the 
Convention. While many modern cables have the ability to transmit telegraphs, 
most are fiber optic cables and therefore may be outside the convention’s scope. 
And unlike subsequent conventions, the 1884 Convention did not create a tribunal 
or dispute resolution body to handle these issues. States then are reliant on other 
states’ domestic regulations for protecting submarine cables. Regardless of its 
limited applicability to hacking, however, the 1884 Convention pioneered 
protections for submarine cables, the spirt of which have since been largely 
incorporated in modern treaties dealing with the high seas. 
B.  Intermediary Treaties and the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 
Following the 1884 Convention, the international community incorporated 
further protections for submarine cables in broader treaties related to the high 
seas. In 1958, the Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf and the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas incorporated portions of the 1884 Convention. 
Namely, protections of cables from willful or culpably negligent damage and 
indemnification obligations for other cable owners were incorporated in these 
later conventions from the 1884 Convention.60 
Notably, the 1958 High Seas Convention additionally codified the freedom 
to lay cables as a high seas freedom, expanding the protections offered by the 1884 
Convention.61 Specifically, Article II holds “the high seas being open to all nations, 
no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty”  and 
the “freedom to lay submarine cables” is one such recognized right.62 Article 
XXVI further affirms “States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and 
pipelines on the bed of the high seas.”63 This Convention also introduced more 
limited rights on the continental shelf and territorial waters, a distinction to be 
discussed at length.64 This Convention was the first to establish a general freedom 
to lay submarine cables which has become central to modern treaty obligations 
with respect to submarine cables. 
Following these intermediary conventions, in 1982 the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the contemporary convention for the law of the 
 
60  See id. arts. II, IV, VII; see also Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport & Robert Beckman, Overview of the 
International Legal Regime, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 63, 71–72 
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sea, was created.65 UNCLOS was devised over extensive negotiations to replace 
the 1958 conventions with a more comprehensive framework of laws and 
obligations.66 Generally speaking, UNCLOS divides the seas into three sections, 
each corresponding to distinct rights and duties of states: territorial seas, the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves, and the high seas. 
UNCLOS incorporated many of the same rights and duties with respect to 
submarine cables as the 1884 Convention and the 1958 conventions. To 
understand the rights of states under UNCLOS, this Comment will review states’ 
rights with respect to submarine cables in each of these three territorial zones. 
A state’s territorial seas are the sea, including its bed and subsoil, for the area 
up to 12 miles from a state’s shores.67 States maintain sovereignty over the 
territorial sea and can impose their own laws over this area, including with respect 
to submarine cables.68 If foreign actors break the coastal state’s laws in its 
territorial waters, those actors would be subject to the coastal state’s jurisdiction 
under UNCLOS. If a foreign state hacked into or damaged the coastal state’s 
submarine cables within its territorial waters, those foreign hackers would be 
subject to the coastal state’s laws against submarine cable hacking or damage to 
submarine cables. For this reason, among others, states do not engage in hacking 
in other states’ territorial waters. Even if they did, however, most states have not 
crafted any protections or regulations on submarine cables within their territorial 
waters.69 Where states have crafted protections for intentional or negligent damage 
to cables, those protections are rarely enforced and are often quite weak.70 
In the second zone, coastal states can claim the EEZ and continental shelf 
up to 200 nautical miles past the borders of the state’s territorial seas.71 The 
delimiting of the precise boundaries of this zone is somewhat complicated 
however.72 Within this area, states enjoy certain rights to exploit natural resources 
or explore.73 Regardless of these rights, other states maintain general rights to 
 
65  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
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“other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms” which can 
extend to submarine cables.74 UNCLOS also extends particular freedoms around 
submarine cables including the ability to lay submarine cables and pipelines.75 
While not explicitly mentioned, this freedom likely also includes the ability to 
operate, repair, and inspect previously laid submarine cables.76 
States, however, do not have unfettered access to the EEZ and the 
continental shelf in the name of cable installation or repair. UNCLOS requires 
states exercising these rights to “comply with the laws and regulations adopted by 
the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other 
rules of international law.”77 While this language is broad, this allowance permits 
coastal states to restrict foreign states’ activities in furtherance of their right to 
exploit natural resources in the EEZ or continental shelf or their right to explore 
the area. In practice, however, this allowance is largely curtailed, and states broadly 
enjoy States therefore broadly enjoy the freedom to lay submarine cables in the 
EEZ. 
UNCLOS provides similar protections for submarine cables in the EEZ as 
in territorial waters, though jurisdiction is less clear. Again, similar to territorial 
waters, while states are required to “adopt the laws and regulations necessary to 
provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject 
to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or 
through culpable negligence… be a punishable offense,”78 most states have not 
done so.79 Unlike territorial waters, however, coastal states’ regulations in the EEZ 
or the continental shelf do not apply to foreign nationals who intentionally break 
or damage cables.80 This means states in the EEZ and the continental shelf can 
only hold their own citizens that injure cables liable under their domestic laws. 
While some states have made novel legal arguments about submarine cables as 
being in a protected zone of exploitation,81 the majority of states accept domestic 
jurisdiction does not extend to cables in the EEZ.82 In the instance of hacking, 
this would mean coastal states could only address domestic hackers, which, while 
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potentially useful for private actors, does not likely apply to the majority of 
hacking incidents, which are largely committed by foreign governments. 
The high seas are the third zone described by UNCLOS. The high seas are 
defined as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic 
waters of an archipelagic State.”83 The high seas are canonically regarded as 
beyond the reach of states’ national jurisdiction.84 Accordingly, the high seas are 
the largest sea area and do not offer any domestic protections against hacking 
attempts. 
The high seas, although beyond the reach of any state, are subject to 
applicable international treaties including UNCLOS. Broadly, the high seas are 
reserved for “peaceful purposes.”85 If hacking was considered an act of aggression, 
states would not enjoy that freedom on the high seas. Similarly, acts considered 
illegal under international treaties or conventions, like slave trading for example, 
would not be a permissible use of the high seas. Presently, as discussed in Section 
V, submarine cable hacking is considered a peaceful activity and not illegal under 
any international convention. 
UNCLOS does not offer many protections for submarine cables on the high 
seas. Under UNCLOS, states maintain the freedom to lay submarine cables86 but 
must exercise this freedom in recognition of other states’ exercise of high seas 
freedoms.87 Similar to requirements for the EEZ, states are obligated under 
UNCLOS to craft laws and regulations that require their citizens to compensate 
cable owners for damage they caused to cables or pipelines.88 Many states have 
not designed laws to meet this obligation and those that have generally involve 
paltry compensatory payments.89 Again, like the EEZ, these regulations would not 
extend to foreign nationals on the high seas under UNCLOS. 
Unlike the 1884 Convention, UNCLOS included a dispute resolution 
framework for conflicts between states. The International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) serves as a binding dispute resolution mechanism where states 
are unable to reach a peaceful settlement. ITLOS has jurisdiction over “any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is 
submitted to it in accordance with this Part” including failing to comply with 
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convention obligations.90 Where states have not implemented their treaty 
obligations, ITLOS can compel states to specifically perform or craft regulations 
under their UNCLOS requirements. 
States are able to select ITLOS for the settlement of disputes at any time 
through means of written declaration;91 however, states must fully exhaust 
domestic remedies before applying for resolution through ITLOS.92 Therefore, if 
a foreign state hacks into a state’s submarine cable in its territorial waters, the 
injured state must seek liability under its domestic laws first where available. 
ITLOS can apply the international law under UNCLOS or “other rules of 
international law not incompatible with this Convention.”93 This extends to other 
human rights treaties or accepted international conventions. Generally, ITLOS 
handles cases involving foreign sailors held without cause,94 but the Tribunal has 
exerted its jurisdiction over any number of maritime issues.95 As discussed in 
Section VII, ITLOS may be a useful vehicle for arbitrating disputes between states 
around submarine cable hacking and the international right to privacy. 
Because UNCLOS does not offer explicit protections for cables from 
hacking on the high seas, the puzzle then is how to create enforcement 
mechanisms and norms against hacking. Because domestic jurisdiction can only 
be asserted in territorial waters and most states do not have robust domestic laws, 
trying to enforce cable protections through national laws seems impractical. 
Indeed, as will be discussed, scholars have consistently decried the absence of 
domestic protections for submarine cables. In the following Section, this 
Comment will explore whether other conventions in international law, rather than 
solely the laws of the sea, protect against submarine cable hacking. This Comment 
then explores possible solutions to this problem of liability using ITLOS as a 
possible avenue for liability. 
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V.  INTERNATIONAL NORMS WITH RESPECT TO HACKING  
This Section describes the international conventions and framework with 
respect to cyber operations and hacking. Generally, hacking and cyber surveillance 
are regarded as peacetime activities and are not limited by any international treaties 
or conventions. The methods employed in pursuit of these goals, however, may 
be deemed problematic by various conventions. This Section explores the limits 
of hacking techniques and cyber surveillance and discusses how shifting norms 
around the right to privacy may change international consensus on the viability of 
some surveillance tactics. 
At present, there is no international framework for hacking offenses or cyber 
operations. While previous conventions like the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime96 tried to harmonize national laws with respect to cyber operations 
and provide for mutual assistance in investigating and prosecuting cyber 
operations,97 there is no international legal framework for cyber offenses or 
hacking.98 
In response to lacking a global framework, a group of preeminent 
international law scholars and practitioners created the Tallinn Manual99 to 
describe the legal norms and regulations around cyber operations and hacking.100 
The Tallinn Manual is not an international convention and is not binding. Rather, 
the document serves as an expression of opinion of various experts versed in these 
topics. Accordingly, it should be considered a reflection of the law at the time of 
writing and not a limiting or normative statement of the law. The Tallinn Manual 
is also limited in scope and incorporates public, but not private or domestic, 
international law.101 The document, however, can provide a general insight into 
how the international community views current restrictions on cyber operations 
on the high seas and whether hacking is indeed a “peaceful use” of international 
waters. 
A.  General Cyber Operations on the High Seas  
According to the Tallinn Manual, the primary basis for liability for cyber 
activities is territorial. Much like a state has jurisdiction over damage to cables in 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) 
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its territorial seas, states have jurisdiction over cyber activities or hacking that 
occur within their territory or their territorial waters.102 The experts note tapping 
a state’s submarine cables in its territorial waters violated its sovereignty.103 States 
then have jurisdiction over hacking attempts within their territorial waters. 
Tapping or hacking activities outside of a state’s territorial waters do not 
offer the same legal recourse. Like cable damage under UNCLOS, the EEZ and 
the continental shelf is subject to a complicated legal framework for cyber 
operations jurisdiction. Generally, if cyber operations are carried out for “peaceful 
purposes” and maintain “due regard to that State’s rights and duties in the zone,” 
they are permitted in the EEZ.104 And so long as these operations do not violate 
“other international legal norms… governing the circumstances,” they do not 
constitute a violation of state sovereignty in the EEZ.105 Hacking therefore in the 
EEZ, when it does not violate other international legal norms, is permissible. 
On the high seas, states have even fewer rights or protections against 
hacking. Cable hacking attempts on the high seas do not constitute a violation of 
the hacked state’s sovereignty.106 Indeed, background intelligence gathering on the 
high seas during peacetime has long been considered legal without much debate 
in the international community.107 While hacking or tapping constitute more 
invasive techniques than radio or sonar surveillance, which have both been long 
accepted, most scholars believe there is no difference by conducting more “active” 
intelligence gathering via hacking.108 As in the EEZ, however, human rights 
violations that occur during cyber operations on the high seas are not permissible 
according to the Tallinn Manual. 
As typified by the above, norms around cyber operations have either not 
solidified or are highly permissive of cyber operations on the high seas. Because 
these norms are absent, there is insufficient state practice and public international 
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law to conclude cyber espionage is per se banned.109 Experts, however, agree that 
cyber operations or hacking may be carried out in a manner that is unlawful.110 
Accordingly, this Comment turns to the consequences of hacking and review 
whether or not these effects may constitute some form of illegal or prohibited 
activity under public international law. 
B.  Incidental Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Cable 
Damage 
One incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is damage to the submarine 
cables as a result of splicing into the cable or damaging the cable in the installation 
of surveillance devices. As noted above, UNCLOS mandates states craft laws to 
hold their citizens liable for intentional or negligent damage to submarine cables. 
These laws, however, are limited in jurisdiction to territorial waters. Experts 
notably have split as to whether the mere act of tapping cables that results in 
damage renders it a violation of public international law regardless of location.111 
The majority of experts agreed states engage in these activities at their own risk 
and can incur liability for incidental damage. Separately, a handful of experts 
argued that unforeseeable damage from tapping operations would not incur 
liability. These experts note there is no settled case law as to whether incidental 
damage from cyber operations would be deemed foreseeable or intentional.112 
This question of liability for damage is nonetheless important. By being able 
to hold foreign states liable for damage incurred as a result of hacking, states can 
shift the cost-benefit calculus of hacking attempts by requesting damages. While 
this may not wholly eliminate submarine cable hacking, potential liability for 
damage may reduce overall hacking activity levels. It typically costs millions of 
dollars to repair damage to the actual cable.113 The economic costs associated with 
a down cable are hard to estimate but the losses can be extraordinary. Somalia lost 
internet access for three weeks due to cable damage at a cost of $130 million.114 
Even without a total internet outage, increased bandwidth demand and slower 
data speed as a result of cable interference can wreak huge productivity losses. If 
a state was held liable for repair costs, or lost productivity, the possible costs 
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associated with hacking would rise and overall hacking activity levels may fall in 
turn. 
C. Incidental  Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Violations 
of the International Right to Privacy  
A second incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is the violation of 
citizens’ privacy by harvesting electronic data. Because hacking operators cannot 
control what data they siphon off, hackers will inevitably intercept citizens’ private 
communications and data in their operations, unless the cable is a dedicated 
military cable. This violation of privacy is significant because, as the Tallinn 
Manual experts noted, cyber operations may not be conducted in an unlawful 
manner.115 While controversial, the international right to privacy would likely be 
violated by these operations. Accordingly, this Comment next reviews the 
international right to privacy, its implications for submarine hacking, and the 
debate around its scope. 
A number of conventions have enumerated an international right to 
privacy.116 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights introduced this principle 
in Article 12 that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”117 The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) enumerated this right in Article 17 that “no one shall 
be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.”118 At its core, this right protects a “private sphere” of 
autonomous liberty and development that cannot be intruded on without 
permission by state actors, individuals, or corporations.119 This right has been 
extended to include protection of personal communications and data.120 The 
scope of this right is clear for intelligence gathering or hacking within the territory 
of a state. Any arbitrary electronic interception that takes place within a nation’s 
borders or involves that nation’s citizens violates the international right to 
privacy.121 
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The scope of this right is less clear for intelligence gathering on foreign states 
or foreign nationals. The U.S. has presented the most limited interpretation of the 
right to privacy in this context. According to the U.S., the right only attaches to 
citizens within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction.122 Therefore, 
foreigners and citizens located abroad do not enjoy the right to privacy for U.S. 
surveillance activities. In the context of U.S. submarine cable hacking, this implies 
only U.S. citizens enjoy the right to privacy, and they only enjoy this right for 
submarine cable hacking conducted in the U.S.’s territorial waters. The majority 
of states in the international community hold the right is broader. According to 
the majority opinion, states “respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even 
if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”123 While the precise contours 
of the ICCPR are still debated, a number of international bodies have coalesced 
around the principle that a state’s obligations are maintained for foreigners and 
citizens alike.124 Under this interpretation, citizens enjoy the right to privacy for 
submarine cable hacking regardless of where the hacking takes place or what state 
conducts the hacking. 
The debate around the scope of this right centers on whether a state 
exercises “effective control” over a person or territory in determining jurisdiction. 
As discussed earlier, the high seas are beyond the territorial reach of any particular 
state. Therefore, questions of “effective control” become more pressing as 
scholars consider whether a state exercises effective control over cyberspace 
through cables located on the high seas. This question is hotly debated. Some 
scholars have noted limiting effective control to solely physical territory may result 
in illogical results as it is not clear where cyber communications are physically 
located when conducted over the internet.125 Other scholars have argued a “virtual 
control,” where states are liable for those citizens whose communications it has 
control over, is more appropriate.126 In the context of submarine cables, this may 
be a more appropriate approach as it would ensure the equal treatment of 
individuals regardless of physical location, which matches the traversing and 
multi-state nature of submarine cables. 
An international right to privacy nevertheless remains controversial. Some 
scholars insist an application of a universal right to privacy may undermine 
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domestic protections against surveillance currently in place.127 These scholars 
argue a more universal definition may reduce the obligations afforded domestic 
citizens under current cyber privacy laws.128 Other scholars have argued the right 
to privacy is socially defined and therefore changes from context to context or 
society to society.129 Accordingly, the scope of the right at issue may not extend 
to protections against state surveillance for defense purposes depending on the 
social definition and context. 
Regardless of the ongoing debate, the recognition and scope of the right to 
privacy appears to be shifting, as discussed in Section III, toward a greater 
recognition of the right to privacy. Scholars have noted international human rights 
cases increasingly find states’ human rights obligations follow them in acting 
abroad.130 As this recognition expands, mass surveillance is increasingly 
considered “arbitrary” and in contravention of the ICCPR.131 In a 2015 
groundbreaking case, ten U.K. NGOs filed an action with the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) arguing the U.K.’s mass surveillance system violated the 
right to privacy.132 The ECtHR agreed noting the surveillance scheme’s arbitrary 
intelligence collection violated the right to privacy under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.133 This case is significant because it specifically 
addressed bulk surveillance conducted through fiber optic cables.134 On appeal, 
the ECtHR dismissed the case for failing to seek appropriate domestic remedies.135 
Nevertheless, the court’s initial ruling reflects a concerted shift in behavior toward 
greater privacy rights recognition. Similarly, in 2020, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) held indiscriminate government mass surveillance 
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violated E.U. regulations for privacy and data protection.136 The CJEU held 
surveillance should be conducted only for what is strictly necessary for national 
security purposes.137 These shifts are representative of general shifts in recognition 
of the right to privacy. 
While cooperation for developing protections and harmonization of 
definitions for privacy in the internet age is ongoing,138 it is apparent that the right 
to privacy exists and is increasingly recognized in international public law. While 
this Comment cannot cure all the debates around the right to privacy, the solution 
described in Section VII provides a novel exploration of the right to privacy in 
cyber space that may help advance discussions elsewhere. 
VI.  THE LAY OF THE LAND OF CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP  
This Section explores current scholarship on submarine cable protections 
and submarine cable hacking. This Section serves to provide context for the 
novelty of the solution offered in Section VII and discuss how scholars interpret 
currently proposed avenues for liability for submarine hacking. Scholars currently 
focus on protections for incidental or intentional damage to cables in order to 
raise the relative costs associated with hacking. Scholars, however, are pessimistic 
about current domestic protections toward submarine cables and generally accept 
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape. Notably, scholars 
have previously not used the right to privacy to frame the debate around 
submarine cable hacking and have not used dispute resolution mechanisms, like 
ITLOS, for resolving these issues. 
As a summary of prior Sections, UNCLOS does not explicitly place 
restrictions on peacetime intelligence gathering or cyber operations on the high 
seas or in the EEZ. Because the high seas are not subject to any state’s domestic 
jurisdiction and the EEZ is subject to very limited jurisdiction, domestic laws 
against hacking or damage to submarine cables do not apply in these areas. 
Further, there is no international treaty or convention that restricts or bans cyber 
operations generally. Experts agree that “the bottom line is that there is no clear 
prohibition against the physical tapping of fiber optic cables in the EEZ [or the 
high seas] to be found in UNCLOS”139 or other international treaties.140 
While states generally have the freedom to conduct cyber operations on the 
high seas, if the method of those operations violates other international treaties or 
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laws, those methods are subject to liability.141 Scholars have therefore turned to 
UNCLOS Article 112 and Article 113, which describe the freedom to lay 
submarine cables and the obligation of states to create domestic protections for 
cables, as possible protections for cables.142 In their analyses, these scholars focus 
on incidental damage to submarine cables, the first indirect effect from cable 
hacking. 
Scholars, however, are pessimistic about using Article 112 or Article 113 to 
protect submarine cables. While UNCLOS requires states to have domestic laws 
to punish intentional or negligent damage of undersea cables, most states have not 
imposed these regulations. For example, Canada does not have any legal 
protections for cables once laid.143 While Canadian law requires permits to lay 
cables and conduct periodic environmental impact reports, cable companies do 
not have any legal recourse under Canadian law for cables damaged by other 
parties. The U.N. General Assembly has even called on states to implement 
protections under Article 113 due to the paucity of available domestic protections 
against damage to cables.144 
And where states do have regulations, those protections are generally weak 
and rarely enforced. For example, U.S. federal law states parties who intentionally 
damage cables are subject to a maximum fine of $5,000.145 Repair costs far exceed 
this figure.146 Other states similarly have weak enforcement regimes. In Australia, 
the penalty for intentional damage of submarine cables is AUS$2,000 or 
imprisonment for 12 months while the penalty for negligent damage is AUS$1,000 
or imprisonment for 3 months.147 With such insignificant protections, there are 
few incentives for cable owners or regulators to seek enforcement. Accordingly, 
there are no documented instances of prosecution under either the U.S. or 
Australian laws. 
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Scholars and advocates have argued strengthening these domestic 
protections may offer some relief against hacking. As discussed in the previous 
Section, by increasing the costs associated with a hacking operation, the associated 
cost-benefit analysis shifts. Scholars have focused on increasing these protections 
in the absence of a new international framework against hacking. Tara Davenport 
noted Article 113 of UNCLOS would apply to damage done through cable 
tapping but that domestic protections against submarine cable damage are 
“woefully inadequate” and “not commensurate with the damage resulting from 
intentional interference.”148 Zoe Scanlon likewise recognized despite the 
“assumption underpinning UNCLOS that coastal states would recognize their 
clear interest in protecting submarine cables,” most states have not enacted 
legislation protecting cables.149 This contributes to an ineffective legal regime 
against cable damage and hacking. 
While there is some appetite for bolstering domestic protections,150 doing so 
is an incomplete solution. First, the associated penalties would have to be severe 
in order to change the calculus of hacking states and compensate the injured cable 
owners. High penalties, however, may result in expensive liability for negligent, 
non-hacking agents like ship owners who incidentally drop anchor on a cable—
the most common cable injury.151 High penalties may also incentivize states to 
cheat by refusing to pay damages or prosecute their citizens. Further, these 
domestic regulations could only assert jurisdiction over the citizens and ships of 
the regulating state or in offenses committed in its territorial waters. While hacking 
is easiest closest to land,152 the activities at issue most often do not occur in 
territorial waters and most commonly involve foreign actors or states as discussed 
in Section II. 
Scholars, in recognition of these weaknesses, have generally accepted 
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape until further 
protections can be crafted or norms around cyber operations crystallize against 
mass surveillance.153 Scholars, however, have overlooked the second indirect 
effect of cyber operations on submarine cables: privacy violations. The following 
section offers a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking by 
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combining the dispute resolution framework under UNCLOS with other sources 
of public international law using privacy as grounds for liability. 
VII.  USING ITLOS  TO TRIGGER DISPUTE RESOLUTION :  
DAMAGE AND PRIVACY SOLUTIONS FOR HACKING  
This Section describes the novel solution offered by this Comment with 
respect to submarine cable hacking. The Section first describes how the binding 
dispute resolution system under the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) likely has jurisdiction over submarine hacking attempts. This Section 
further argues, contrary to prior scholarly work, the lack of domestic protections 
for submarine cable hacking benefits the creation of international norms and a 
regime against cable hacking. This Section then proposes two solutions using 
ITLOS. First, ITLOS can be used to create an international regime protecting 
against submarine cable damage. This in turn raises the costs of submarine cable 
hacking and may lower hacking activity levels. Second, ITLOS can serve as a 
forum to argue hacking violates the international right to privacy and therefore 
should not be permitted even on the high seas. This analysis of the right to privacy 
with respect to submarine cables is novel in current scholarship and contributes 
to the ongoing debate about the limits of bulk surveillance collection and 
surveillance protections generally. 
A.  Jurisdiction Under ITLOS 
As a preliminary matter, ITLOS likely has jurisdiction over alleged 
submarine hacking disputes. As referenced above, under UNCLOS, ITLOS 
serves as a dispute resolution mechanism between states. The jurisdiction of 
ITLOS is broad, encompassing “all disputes and all applications submitted to it in 
accordance with [UNCLOS].”154 To confer jurisdiction, therefore, states must 
have a viable link between hacking attempts and UNCLOS. 
Under UNCLOS Articles 112 and 113, states have two arguments as to why 
ITLOS has jurisdiction over submarine cable hacking. First, states can use ITLOS 
for dispute resolution where other states are not abiding by their obligations to 
UNCLOS. Article 113 provides states must adopt laws and regulations to punish 
“breaking or injury” of submarine cables on the high seas “in such a manner as to 
be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications.”155 
States therefore must create domestic liability schemes to hold its citizens liable 
for damage to or interruption of submarine cables on the high seas. If, for 
example, a state has not met its UNCLOS Article 113 obligations to have domestic 
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regulations and a foreign state’s cable is damaged, the foreign state can invoke 
ITLOS to determine the breaching state’s cable liability. Generally, disputes 
between states about how to handle cable damage would sufficiently link to 
UNCLOS to confer jurisdiction.156 
Second, states can present arguments that protections for cables under 
UNCLOS are broader than the right to merely lay cables. Article 112 codifies the 
right for all states “to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high 
seas beyond the continental shelf.”157 While not stated, it can be assumed states 
have the freedom to operate these cables on the high seas. If a foreign state were 
to violate this assumed right of operation, through hacking or cable signal 
disruption, an injured state may then have grounds for liability under UNCLOS. 
ITLOS would be a suitable body to address the violation of this right because the 
tribunal adjudicates the rights and responsibilities of states on the high seas. 
Even if Articles 112 and 113 are not compelling enough to justify 
jurisdiction, ITLOS also has jurisdiction over “any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes 
of [UNCLOS].”158 This broad language allows ITLOS to exert jurisdiction over 
any international treaty that affects or interacts with UNCLOS. While broad, 
ITLOS usually declines, however, jurisdiction absent some connection to the high 
seas or a subject matter of UNCLOS. Scholars have noted the specialized nature 
of ITLOS means the “subject matter of any agreement providing for jurisdiction 
of ITLOS would probably relate closely to the law of the sea, given the expertise 
of the judges of ITLOS.”159 
For example, in a case involving detained sailors, ITLOS asserted 
international human rights under other international conventions were at issue. 
Plaintiffs, however, had to first assert a jurisdictional link to these rights by noting 
that the detention that led to these violations was sanctioned under UNCLOS.160 
Similarly, Italy invoked the ICCPR in its complaint to ITLOS to free Italian sailors 
detained by the Indian government. Italy did not invoke a stand-alone argument 
for release under the ICCPR but rather paired it with UNCLOS provisions against 
“prejudice.”161 States can similarly invoke ITLOS to clarify the obligations of states 
to the international right to privacy, as articulated by a number of international 
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conventions, with respect to UNCLOS. States should then be able to obtain 
ITLOS jurisdiction under this more general human rights framework. 
Before reaching these questions of ITLOS jurisdiction, however, ITLOS 
may only resolve disputes under UNCLOS “after local remedies have been 
exhausted where this is required by international law.”162 Subsequently, states 
subject to hacking must have exhausted domestic remedies before looking to 
ITLOS. As mentioned above, scholars have frequently noted the paucity of 
domestic regulations against submarine cable hacking. Many states have not 
implemented any domestic regulations concerning submarine cable damage, let 
alone hacking.163 And where those domestic protections do exist, they are often 
weak relative to the potential damage done by hacking attempts to a cable’s 
constitution.164 Because domestic protections are not typically available or are 
insufficient where they are available, states have generally exhausted all domestic 
remedies.165 
And while scholars have criticized the weakness of these domestic 
protections and frequently recommended instituting stronger domestic 
regulations, the absence of these regulations actually strengthens the argument for 
jurisdiction under ITLOS. If domestic regulations were available, states would be 
obligated to pursue liability under those regulations. Because states have not 
implemented these regulations or have incredibly weak domestic protections, this 
domestic remedy is likely not available.166 Because states have therefore not 
complied with their requirements under UNCLOS, ITLOS has a strong case for 
jurisdiction as the appropriate body to handle disputes associated with these 
unfulfilled obligations. In this respect, the overwhelming weakness of domestic 
protections actually benefits states in arguing for jurisdiction before ITLOS. This 
observation is in contravention to scholars’ criticism of domestic cable 
protections.167 
Once jurisdiction has been established, states can then turn to the two 
indirect effects of hacking—cable damage and violations of the right to privacy— 
to seek liability against hacking states. 
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B.  Using ITLOS to Protect Against Cable Damage  
States can use ITLOS to protect against hacking by enforcing liability for 
damages incurred from hacking. Using Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS, injured 
states can argue the offending states are not abiding by their UNCLOS 
requirements to create a domestic regime to punish cable damagers. Injured states 
can further argue offending states violate the freedom to lay and operate 
submarine cables. In the first instance, an injured state may use ITLOS to force 
the offending state to punish its wrongdoers under its own domestic jurisdiction. 
ITLOS can bind states to craft and administer regimes protecting cables against 
damage by their citizens. This may in turn increase prospective economic costs of 
hacking and reduce overall hacking activity levels. While states may have an 
incentive to cheat, the political costs from breaking with its required enforcement 
regime will only increase under a binding dispute resolution order from ITLOS. 
States can further argue domestic protections as required under UNCLOS 
may not wholly protect this articulated right. If the cost of damage to cables is so 
expensive168 and the economic value of internet access is so great,169 states can 
argue the domestic regimes formulated and required under UNCLOS may not 
adequately protect their rights to be free from damage or interference. 
Accordingly, states may argue ITLOS should assert some damages or 
compensation requirement for intentional damage to cables from hacking. 
In the second instance, states may argue the freedom to lay and operate 
cables under UNCLOS extends to protections against interference by foreign 
states on the high seas. While UNCLOS only protects against “damage” to 
cables,170 states can reasonably argue the UNCLOS protections are an outgrowth 
of a history of protecting general use and operation of cables. Because the 1884 
Convention protected against interference of cable operation, which was 
subsequently codified in the intervening conventions, states can reasonably claim 
UNCLOS’s more general cable freedoms extend to freedom from arbitrary 
interference by foreign states. Because hacking interferes with a cable’s signal and 
likely requires repair by the operator, states can then argue hacking falls under this 
sphere of prohibited activities. 
ITLOS would likely be receptive to this argument. ITLOS has a history of 
extending greater protections to states than is precisely articulated in the language 
of UNCLOS. In MV/Saiga, ITLOS held Guinea violated the prohibition against 
the excessive use of force in detaining ships, although prohibitions against the 
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excessive use of force are not expressly articulated by UNCLOS.171 And in Guyana 
v. Suriname, ITLOS held Suriname used unlawful force against a Canadian vessel 
licensed by Guyana even without a prohibition on the use of force against foreign 
vessels under UNCLOS.172 These cases indicate ITLOS’s willingness to extend 
more general international law protections beyond UNCLOS. These cases further 
demonstrate ITLOS is willing to extend protections to states beyond the text of 
UNCLOS using the history and subtext of the treaty. Accordingly, ITLOS may 
be receptive to the argument that freedom from damage or interference has long 
been historically recognized. 
This solution is novel as it resolves the lack of enforcement mechanism 
scholars criticized by scholars with respect to domestic cable regimes. Because 
ITLOS can require states to abide by their treaty obligations, ITLOS can then 
mandate states create domestic regulations to protect cables. Further, this solution 
allows ITLOS to hear arguments about more general freedoms related to 
submarine cable use. Because ITLOS can hear arguments related to other binding 
treaties and agreements,173 states can argue the 1884 Convention or intervening 
law of the sea conventions established the freedom to lay and operate cables 
includes freedom from unnecessary cable interference. 
This solution carries with it a handful of potential caveats. First, ITLOS will 
most likely require the offending country to hold violators domestically liable. This 
follows because Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS only require a domestic cable 
protection scheme. The offending country is likely to impose minimal penalties 
or elect not to impose penalties. This strategy may then not raise costs associated 
with hacking to lower overall activity levels. This outcome, however, does not 
fully undermine the solution described above. If countries’ domestic regimes 
continue to be weak or weakly enforced, ITLOS is more likely to extend greater 
protections to cables than are required under UNCLOS. This would be similar to 
the extension of greater rights than necessary in Guyana v. Suriname.174 Further, 
continued refusal to hold violators domestically liable will cause ITLOS to hold 
contravening states accountable for failing to uphold their UNCLOS 
responsibilities. This may in turn increase the costs associated with hacking and 
lower activity levels. 
Second, arguments about more general rights to cable protections, such as 
the freedom of cable operation, may be weak because not many states signed onto 
the 1884 Convention or the intervening conventions of the laws of the sea. 
Without a convention to point to, ITLOS would then be relying on general norms 
 
171  M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Memorial of St. Vincent of June 19, 1998, 
2 ITLOS Rep. 13, ¶ 95. 
172  Guyana v. Suriname, 47 I.L.M. 166, ¶ 405 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007). 
173  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXXIII. 
174  Suriname, 47 I.L.M. 166.  
Submarine Cable Hacking and Law of the Sea Jason Petty 
Summer 2021 291 
of international law in creating a liability regime for cable damage. ITLOS may be 
reticent to do that for fear of overstepping its bounds and of countries not 
participating in dispute resolution. Once such refusal occurred in Arctic Sunrise 
when Russia refused to appear in front of ITLOS.175 
Third, not all hacking attempts end in damage to submarine cables. If a cable 
was not damaged during a hacking attempt, this regime may not apply. 
Accordingly, states must turn to other norms or rights to protect against 
submarine hacking. The following Section presents a solution to submarine cable 
hacking that centers on the right to privacy and does not rely on damage to the 
underlying cable to provide liability. 
C. Using ITLOS to Protect Against Violat ions of the Right to 
Privacy 
States can also use ITLOS to pursue violations to the international right to 
privacy committed by hacking. ITLOS is able to apply UNCLOS law and “other 
rules of international law not incompatible with” UNCLOS including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.176 States subject to 
hacking can use these conventions and other international human rights to argue 
against hacking once they have jurisdiction under ITLOS. 
States can argue hacking contravenes the right to privacy embedded in 
numerous human rights treaties. As discussed in Section V, citizens enjoy a right 
to privacy under many international conventions. ITLOS can enforce violations 
of the ICCPR and other treaties as they relate to the right to privacy. While 
submarine cable hackers may be attempting to access sensitive government 
information, the hacking of undersea cables almost inevitably includes access to 
private citizens’ internet traffic because states cannot pick and choose what 
information they obtain.177 Such a broad sweeping may therefore be considered 
“arbitrary” and in contravention of the international right to privacy. 
While litigation around the right to privacy is relatively new, there is a trend 
among international bodies toward recognizing a universal right to privacy. As 
discussed in Section V, the ECtHR previously held the U.K.’s bulk surveillance 
program through fiber optic cables violated the right to privacy but subsequently 
dismissed the case on appeal for failure to pursue all domestic remedies.178 In 
October 2020, the CJEU held indiscriminate mass surveillance violated E.U. 
 
175  Chao Zhang, Russian Absence at the Arctic Sunrise Case: A Comparison with the Chinese Position in the South 
China Sea Arbitration, 8 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 413, 414 (2015). 
176  UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXXIII; Noyes, supra note 159, at 124. 
177  Mark Harris, How US National Security Agencies Hold the Internet Hostage, TECHCRUNCH (July 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/J4UV-HNNM. 
178  10 Human Rights Organisations v. United Kingdom, supra note 132. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 292 Vol. 22 No. 1 
privacy and data protections.179 And the German Constitutional Court held 
Germany’s constitutional protections against indiscriminate surveillance and data 
collection extended to foreigners living abroad.180 Beyond these court rulings, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed the rights under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR apply globally.181 And while the ICJ 
has not affirmed a right to privacy against all indiscriminate surveillance, the Court 
did not denounce such an argument in two prior cases involving surveillance on 
private communications.182 This matches a trend in international bodies toward 
greater recognition of the right to privacy in recent years.183 
Rights under the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
have previously been protected by ITLOS. 184 While ITLOS has not taken on cases 
involving privacy, ITLOS precedent indicates a keen and demonstrated interest in 
protecting other human rights outside of those codified by UNCLOS. For 
example, ITLOS in its 1999 MV Saiga Nr. 2 judgment,185 for a case involving 
seized vessels, referred to “considerations of humanity” that “must apply to the 
Law of the Sea as they do in other areas of international law.”186 The ITLOS 
decisions in Arctic Sunrise and Enrica Lexie further indicate an increasing willingness 
by ITLOS to consider human rights concerns, either implicitly in the case of Enrica 
Lexie or explicitly as in Arctic Sunrise.187  
These cases demonstrate “a pattern of increased willingness on the part of 
States to invoke (universal) human rights instruments (i.e., the ICCPR)—and, in 
this case, even the views of human rights bodies (i.e., the Human Rights 
Committee) — in provisional measures proceedings before ITLOS.”188 Scholars 
have observed ITLOS increasingly incorporates “considerations of humanity” in 
 
179  Lomas, supra note 136. 
180  Melissa Eddy, Right to Privacy Extends to Foreign Internet Users, German Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 2020), https://perma.cc/GVU4-X7L5. 
181  Frederic Gilles Sourgens, The Privacy Principle, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 354 (2017); see also Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
182  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35 
(May 24) (finding expulsion of the spying diplomat was the proper remedy); Libananco Holdings 
Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Decision on Preliminary Issues, 1 
43 (June 23, 2008) (finding states can intercept communications as part of lawful criminal 
investigations). 
183  Van Schaack, supra note 130, at 32. 
184  See generally Petrig & Bo, supra note 160. 
185  M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Judgment of July 1, 1999, ITLOS Rep., 10. 
186  Id. ⁋ 15; see also Treves, supra note 90, at 5. 
187  Petrig & Bo, supra note 160, at 382–85, 386–91. 
188  Id. at 391. 
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its decision-making.189 And, as discussed in Section V, the international right to 
privacy would fall into such considerations. 
ITLOS is further likely to invoke the right to privacy under the ICCPR or 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because privacy is so closely linked to 
the subject of the proceeding on the merits. ITLOS requires “the relief sought 
(and the rights to be protected by the relief) must be closely related to the rights 
subject to the proceedings on the merits.”190 The freedom to lay cables under 
UNCLOS impugns some respect for those cables, their use, and their content. 
Because hacking violates the use and content of these cables, the right to privacy 
seems closely associated with hacking and capable of being invoked in 
proceedings. 
This solution is novel for a handful of reasons. First, this solution uses a 
supposed weakness in international protections for submarine cables—lack of 
domestic protections— as the jurisdictional hook for liability. Although scholars 
have critiqued the weakness of these regimes,191 the lack of an effective or a largely 
weak framework is actually a strength in creating a secondary method to pursue 
violators. Further, if domestic protections were stronger, ITLOS complaints may 
be superseded by domestic and local remedies. Because domestic remedies are 
limited in application and minimal at best, the dispute resolution system offered 
by ITLOS has broader application and ability to impose necessary penalties. 
Second, this solution avoids questions of the peacetime legitimacy of state 
intelligence gathering more generally. As discussed in the Tallinn Manual, cyber 
operations may not be conducted in an unlawful manner.192 If submarine cable 
hacking is considered a violation of the international right to privacy, this 
particular method of collecting surveillance would be deemed unlawful. States still 
preserve the ability to gather intelligence or surveillance through other, less 
arbitrary, means. This solution is therefore more tailored than other debates 
around peacetime intelligence gathering writ large. 
While a novel method of solution, the use of ITLOS to make claims against 
the international right to privacy is not without caveats. While the caveats 
discussed below are not fatal to the solution described, they do present questions 
about the potential scope of the solution asserted and how controversies around 
the international right to privacy and international legal obligations generally bleed 
into the conversation around submarine cables. 
 
189  See generally Francesca Delfino, ‘Considerations of Humanity’ in the Jurisprudence of ITLOS and UNCLOS 
Arbitral Tribunals, in INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 421 (Angela Del Vecchio & Roberto Virzo 
eds., 2019). 
190  Petrig & Bo, supra note 160, at 380. 
191  See Davenport, supra note 29, at 84; Scanlon, supra note 149, at 299–301. 
192  TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99, at 170. 
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First, not all states are signatories to UNCLOS or the human rights 
conventions that describe the international right to privacy. Prominently, for 
example, the U.S. has not ratified its participation in UNCLOS, although it is a 
signatory.193 While making some claims against other states under UNCLOS, it is 
not clear the U.S. can invoke UNCLOS or be subject to liability under UNCLOS 
for claims made by other states.194 Non-signatory parties could voluntarily agree 
to arbitration under ITLOS but doing so does not seem to be in their rational self-
interest. Because not all states are then bound to ITLOS as a dispute resolution 
mechanism, the solution offered above may not be universal in application. 
Second, even if a decision is binding, it is not clear how ITLOS would 
enforce its arbitration decisions if parties do not comply.195 For example, in the 
Arctic Sunrise arbitration, Russia refused to appear before ITLOS or abide by the 
tribunal’s ruling.196 ITLOS does not have a security force to implement rulings and 
does not have the ability to levy sanctions or restrict access to seaways if states do 
not comply with their rulings. States would therefore still need to consent to 
whatever ruling ITLOS makes, even if their rulings are technically “binding.” This 
critique, however, could likely be levied with any international legal enforcement 
mechanism as truly bad actors can continue to evade judgments. 
Third, if the injured state and the hacking state have reasonably robust 
domestic cable protection schemes, ITLOS may not have jurisdiction. As 
discussed above, ITLOS requires states to exercise local remedies before 
appealing to ITLOS for dispute resolution. If the offending state has domestic 
protections, the injured state can appeal to that state to subject the offenders to 
domestic protections. This would result in the offending state being responsible 
for enforcing a regime which its citizens, and quite probably state agents, have 
violated. The incentives for the offending state to do so are minimal. 
This possibility, however, is not fatal to the above solution mechanism. 
States can still appeal to UNCLOS for greater clarity for states’ responsibilities for 
cable protections on the high seas under Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS. States 
can further dispute the domestic proceedings as insufficient to compensate the 
injured party for potential cable damage or the stolen information. And states can 
likely still make claims related to the international right to privacy not addressed 
by domestic protections. While this last claim may raise issues around whether 
ITLOS is the proper body to hear these complaints, because the conduct occurs 
at sea, ITLOS still has a viable claim to jurisdiction. 
 
193  Will Schrepferman, Hypocri-Sea: The United States’ Failure to Join the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
HARV INT’L R. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/DG73-SR5A. 
194  Id. 
195  Noyes, supra note 159, at 154.  
196  Craig H. Allen, ITLOS Orders Russia to Release ARCTIC SUNRISE and Its Greenpeace Protestors, 
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Fourth, relatedly, the most probable avenue to obtain jurisdiction under 
ITLOS involves damage to submarine cables as a result of hacking. If hacking 
technologies are sufficiently sophisticated, they may cause no harm to submarine 
cables. Accordingly, states would need to develop alternative reasons to obtain 
ITLOS jurisdiction. As discussed above, states can argue for dispute resolution 
for interfering with cable operation under Articles 112 or 113. More generally, 
states can argue ITLOS’s broad jurisdiction gives them standing, but this also 
seems weak. 
Alternatively, states can make claims using the more general wording of the 
1884 Convention. The 1884 Convention prevents “interference” with telegraph 
cables. Because hacking necessarily involves some degree of signal interference of 
fiber optic cables, hacking would likely fall into this broader “interference” 
category. And because the 1884 Convention does not have a body for dispute 
resolution related to obligations under the Convention, states can reasonably 
argue ITLOS is the most proper forum to hear disputes. 
This argument does not guarantee jurisdiction either. Foremost, the 1884 
Convention addresses telegraph cables. While it seems reasonable to extend these 
protections to fiber optic or internet cables given the spirit of the Convention, the 
1884 Convention is then limited in scope. Further, “interference” is harder to 
prove as compared to external damage to cables in hacking attempts. It is more 
difficult for signal operators to observe momentary gaps in service as compared 
to external cable damage, and maintaining a record showing this interference is 
both costly and difficult. Additionally, not many states are parties to the 1884 
Convention as compared to UNCLOS. While many of the power players likely to 
engage in hacking are parties to both, including Russia and the U.K., some states 
are parties only to UNCLOS, like China, or party only to the 1884 Convention, 
like the U.S. Finally, the 1884 Convention, like UNCLOS, only presents 
obligations for states to create domestic protective schemes for submarine cables. 
The 1884 Convention does not have any enforcement mechanisms against this 
bad behavior which makes ITLOS’s jurisdiction more specious. And claims 
related to U.N. human rights obligations using the 1884 Convention to confer 
jurisdiction seem weak. 
Fifth, claims of the right to privacy are relatively novel for international 
courts and the limits of this right have not been clearly defined. ITLOS, in turn, 
may not make sweeping decisions related to hacking for these types of cases 
without further clarity on the scope of the right to privacy. ITLOS may instead 
resolve the dispute by requiring greater compensatory damages or greater 
domestic protections for damage to cables without resolving the issue of hacking. 
This result may incidentally reduce hacking by raising the possible costs associated 
with hacking attempts, but states may still find the possible damages as reasonable 
to the perceived intelligence gains from hacking. Accordingly, privacy suits may 
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need to wait for greater international consensus on the limits of the right to 
privacy. 
This solution, however, can build on changing norms around the right to 
privacy. As discussed in Section V, the international right to privacy is increasingly 
recognized on the global stage. This solution presents novel questions within this 
ongoing debate. The recognition of the right to privacy depends largely on 
“effective control” of the persons or territory involved in the surveillance.197 
Submarine cables present novel questions around this effective control as it is 
nearly certain that at least some of a state’s citizens’ communications will be 
obtained through a submarine cable hack. Is this incidental acquisition enough to 
violate standards against countries surveilling their own citizens arbitrarily? 
Further, submarine cables are simultaneously a protected and necessary state 
resource and located on the high seas. Cables may then be a useful framing to 
consider how much control and sovereignty states have over their cyber space. 
Are cables more like physical territory or more like ephemeral cyber space in 
considering sovereignty and does the distinction ultimately matter with respect to 
privacy rights? This Comment is unable to answer these questions fully, but the 
Comment’s solution opens novel avenues for argument around these themes and 
may help advance the dialogue with respect to privacy rights. 
Sixth, some states may not want to pursue creating a regime against 
submarine cable hacking. As discussed in Section II, many global powers, 
including the U.S., China, the U.K., and Russia, engage in submarine cable 
hacking. States, particularly those with robust submarine military presences, may 
want to preserve the ability to surveil other states using submarine cable hacking. 
These states would therefore not invoke ITLOS or the right to privacy against 
submarine cable hacking. This may be a particularly onerous challenge because 
these powerful states often develop and enforce global norms. 
As discussed in Section III, however, this criticism may not necessarily be 
fatal to the solution offered above. Norms with respect to submarine cables and 
hacking in general appear to be shifting. Smaller states or landlocked states that 
do not engage in submarine cable hacking have incentives to further develop these 
norms to protect their citizens’ privacy and governmental data without the 
counterincentive of preserving the right to hack other states. While this shift may 
take time to play out, the momentum is in favor of increased recognition of 
privacy rights as discussed in Section V. Regardless, as hacking increases and as 
the associated damage from hacking rises, international legal solutions may be 
more cost effective than patrolling the seas against hacking attempts. Accordingly, 
states may decide international norms are a more cost-effective way of reducing 
hacking activity levels. 
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Seventh, if states elect not to pursue a hacking complaint against another 
state for geopolitical reasons, the injured cable operator may not be able to use 
ITLOS to seek a suitable remedy. In most cases, the injured party is likely a 
corporation. Due to the terrific costs in laying submarine cables, the majority of 
modern-day cables are owned and laid by private companies and collectives. For 
example, Google has backed at least 14 cables globally and other tech firms have 
similarly pursued their own submarine cable systems.198 Accordingly, corporations 
often foot the bill for cable damage or privacy concerns.199 
ITLOS jurisdiction over corporations is somewhat ambiguous but appears 
limited. Article 20 of the ITLOS charter provides non-state entities can access to 
the Tribunal for cases where other agreements accepted by all parties in the case 
confer jurisdiction to ITLOS.200 It is highly unlikely the corporation and the 
hacking party will have agreed to dispute resolution by ITLOS in the case of 
hacking. Accordingly, when the corporation’s home country elects not to pursue 
dispute resolution, ITLOS may not be a viable solution. 
This, however, does not entirely eliminate the possibility of enforcing an 
anti-hacking regime through corporate action. Depending on the jurisdictional 
limits of the corporation’s home country, corporations can pursue private civil 
suits against foreign states.201 These actions are generally not taken due to 
geopolitical concerns, concerns about comity, and questions about where the 
alleged tort occurred.202 The possibility of these suits, however, raises the specter 
of private action against hacking malfeasors, which may be worth considering in 
subsequent analyses beyond the scope of this Comment. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment examined whether states had any recourse under public 
international law when foreign states hacked into submarine cables. In so doing, 
this Comment explored public international law around submarine cables (Section 
IV) and public international law with respect to hacking (Section V) to conclude 
states can use the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) invoke 
liability (Section VI). This Comment argued ITLOS would have proper 
 
198  Winston Qiu, Complete List of Google’s Subsea Cable Investments, SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORKS (July 
9, 2019), https://perma.cc/3KL8-T4PK. 
199  Many corporations form cable cooperatives to share repair and installation costs. See, for example, 
the Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement. About, ACMA, https://perma.cc/DXF6-
NPFM. 
200  Noyes, supra note 159, at 132. 
201  See, generally Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 565 (2018). 
202  See generally Samantha N. Sergent, Extinguishing the Firewall: Addressing the Jurisdictional Challenges to 
Bringing the Cyber Tort Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns, 72 VAND. L. REV. 391 (2019). 
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jurisdiction over submarine hacking claims and would be a suitable body to 
address these complaints due to the weakness of domestic cable protections. This 
Comment argued states have two avenues for establishing liability through 
ITLOS: damage to cables or violations of the international right to privacy. This 
Comment thus invokes broader discussion of how states can seek legal recourse 
against submarine cable hacking while norms and conventions addressing hacking 
and submarine cables continue to develop. 
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Climate change will increasingly lead to widespread environmental degradation which will 
in turn spur large-scale vulnerability, displacement, and migration. This phenomenon is now well 
recognized in the literature, although causal pathways continue to be debated. However, scholars 
and practitioners have so far largely neglected to examine the related ways in which climate change 
will significantly impact the scale and scope of global trafficking in persons. This Comment 
responds to a lack of scholarship on the climate change-human trafficking nexus by exploring the 
predicted impacts of climate change on human trafficking. In light of these forecasted developments, 
this Comment argues that the United Nations Trafficking Protocol contains a textual basis 
through which states may recognize people who have been made vulnerable to trafficking by climate 
change. Finally, this Comment asserts that any apparent or actual consent by those who are 
trafficked is irrelevant within the framework of the Protocol. 
  
 
  J.D. Candidate at the University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2022. The author would like to 
thank the entire editorial staff of the Chicago Journal of International Law for their excellent feedback, 
editor David Silberthau for his thoughtful guidance, and Professor Claudia Flores for her insightful 
advisement. The author is also grateful to her family, including Pasquale Toscano, Gemma Smith 
and Alexis Doyle, for their unwavering support in all endeavors. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 300 Vol. 22 No. 1 
Table of Contents 
 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 301 
II. The International Law of Human Trafficking .................................................. 306 
A. The Trafficking Protocol ................................................................................. 307 
1. The Role of Consent .................................................................................... 310 
B. The Smuggling-Trafficking Binary ................................................................. 313 
III. The Climate Change-Human Trafficking Nexus ............................................ 318 
A. Environmental Mechanisms Impacting Human Trafficking ..................... 320 
1. Sudden Onset Disasters ............................................................................... 320 
2. Slow Onset Disasters .................................................................................... 322 
3. Cycles of Causality ........................................................................................ 324 
B. Predicted Impacts ............................................................................................. 325 
1. Increased Number of People Impacted by Trafficking........................... 325 
2. Altered Methods of Trafficking .................................................................. 326 
IV. The Trafficking Protocol Applies to Victims of Climate Change ................ 327 
A. Victims of Climate Change are in a Position of Vulnerability ................... 328 
B. Consent is Not Dispositive ............................................................................. 330 
V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 333 
 
  
Applying the U.N. Trafficking Protocol Smith 
Summer 2021 301 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In a 2019 speech on World Day Against Trafficking in Persons, U.N. 
Secretary-General António Guteress recognized climate change as a phenomenon 
that “exacerbate[s] the vulnerabilities and desperation that enable [human] 
trafficking to flourish.”1 Human trafficking, also called trafficking in persons, 
occurs when a person (the trafficker) has a purpose of exploitation and recruits, 
transports, or harbors another person (the victim) through means such as force, 
coercion, fraud, or abuse of [the victim’s] position of vulnerability.2 Exploitation 
in trafficking may take a variety of forms; prevalent examples include forced labor, 
sexual exploitation, and organ removal.3 All forms of human trafficking have been 
prohibited under international law since 2003, when the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(Trafficking Protocol) entered into force.4 
This Comment addresses instances where a victim has been made vulnerable 
to trafficking through climate change-related processes of environmental 
degradation. This relationship is referred to as the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus, a term that describes the multicausal and multidirectional 
intersection between environmental phenomena spurred by global warming and 
developments in global and regional patterns of trafficking in persons. The nexus 
will be elaborated upon in Section III, but a brief overview may serve to indicate 
where the discussion is headed: in short, climate change will increase natural 
disasters and forced migration. Both of these factors will increasingly make it a 
daunting and complex task to prevent human trafficking and protect vulnerable 
people from exploitative and coercive situations. 
For example, a 2007 study conducted in Bangladesh after Cyclone Sidr found 
that: 
criminal networks began to operate in the disaster-affected region, preying on 
widows, men desperate to cross [an international border] to find employment 
and income, and sometimes entire families. Victims of trafficking were forced 
into prostitution and hard labour, some working in sweatshops. . . . Some 
disaster-affected families also began to collude with the traffickers in order to 
 
1  Conflict, Climate Change Among Factors that Increase ‘Desperation that Enables Human Trafficking to Flourish,’ 
Says UN Chief, U.N. NEWS (July 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/9QEN-U7EC. 
2  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), What is Human Trafficking, UNODC, 
https://perma.cc/QD7G-RCUG. 
3  Id. 
4  United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 15, 2000, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Trafficking 
Protocol]. 
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earn money. . . . Women-headed households were identified as especially 
vulnerable to human trafficking and the associated forms of exploitation.5 
Research performed in countries such as Bangladesh, the Philippines, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Cambodia has documented similar post-disaster patterns.6 Although 
much of the available research concentrates on post-disaster upticks in trafficking 
on the Asia-Pacific region,7 this phenomenon occurs all over the world, including 
in the U.S.8 
Many of the cases arising from the climate change-human trafficking nexus 
may lack the level of coercion or force traditionally associated with trafficking 
cases.9 Rather, the victims may have implicitly or explicitly consented to a 
trafficking situation as the least bad choice after a climate-related natural disaster.10 
The lack of full-scale coercion and potential presence of consent raise concerns 
of a protection gap: victims of climate change will remain in exploitative situations 
without the possibility of gaining a protective legal status as a victim of trafficking. 
To address this protection gap, this Comment sets forth a textual argument for 
the inclusion of victims of the climate change-human trafficking nexus under the 
Trafficking Protocol. 
The goal of this argument is to prevent the harm caused by human 
trafficking without vitiating the definition contained within the Trafficking 
Protocol. This is the central tension underpinning this Comment: extending legal 
protection to people who are trafficked as a result of climate change while 
maintaining some limiting factor to reassure administrative agents that this 
solution is, at least in theory, feasible. 
Human trafficking is a massive industry that impacts a significant number of 
people and carries tangible financial repercussions. According to 2017 estimates, 
at any given time, 24.9 million victims of human trafficking are enduring modern 
slavery.11 Sixty-four percent of trafficking victims are in forced labor situations, 
 
5  Sabira Coelho et al., The Climate Change–Human Trafficking Nexus (citing Alice Poncelet et al., A 
Country Made for Disasters: Environmental Vulnerability and Forced Migration in Bangladesh, in ENV’T, 
FORCED MIGRATION & SOC. VULNERABILITY 211–22 (Tamer Afifi & Jill Jäger, eds.)), at 6 INT’L 
ORG. FOR MIGRATION (2016). 
6  See generally id. 
7  For good reason, the Asia-Pacific region will be most impacted by the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus. The region already has a high rate of irregular migration and “extreme 
vulnerability to climate change” due to its “diverse topography.” Id. at 5. 
8  See, e.g., Jasmine Garsd, Human Trafficking is a Hidden Aftermath of Natural Disasters, PUB. RADIO INT’L 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/X97W-RH7D. 
9  See generally id. 
10  Id. 
11  This is likely a conservative estimate. See Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/274N-BJL8; Anna Stephens, Climate Change and Human Trafficking: 
An Investigation into how Climate Change and Natural Disasters Increase the Risk of Human Trafficking and 
How it Can be Intercepted in the Future, LUND UNIV. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABILITY STUD. 9 (2019). 
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spanning sectors such as construction and manufacturing, domestic care, and 
agriculture.12 Globally, human traffickers earn roughly 150 billion USD, per year.13 
Sexual exploitation is a disproportionate source of financial benefit, making up 
sixty-six percent of the industry’s financial earnings, although only nineteen 
percent of victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation.14 
Despite these staggering statistics, human trafficking is a growing problem, 
and there is little reason to think this will change anytime soon.15 The rate of 
successful prosecutions of human traffickers is extremely low,16 and very few 
victims of trafficking are ever detected, offered protection, or provided with the 
services they need to extricate themselves from coercive situations.17 
Climate change likely exacerbates these trends. The planet’s warming results 
in more numerous, severe, and unpredictable natural disasters.18 These disasters 
fall into two categories: sudden onset disasters, such as cyclones, and slow onset 
events, such as sea level rise.19 Both types of environmental disasters commonly 
result in loss of home and livelihood for people in the area.20 
Those with fewer resources initially are especially likely to be impacted and 
face severely limited options for survival post-disaster.21 As a result, they become 
easy targets for recruitment by traffickers.22 Recruitment can take a variety of 
forms, ranging from widespread online advertisements to targeted physical 
approaches.23 Such interactions generally involve promises of easy money, 
housing, or food, with few or no details about the work to be performed in 
exchange.24 This recruitment may occur almost immediately after a natural 
disaster,25 or it may be a more distant result as, for example, when people begin 
 
12  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 11. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, 41 (Dec. 2018). 
16 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 11. 
17  UNODC, supra note 15. 
18  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
19  Denise Chow, ‘Time is Fast Running Out’: World Meteorological Organization Warns Climate Efforts are 
Falling Short, NBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/W8ES-LJJ2. 
20  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
21  Id. 
22  KOKO WARNER ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON 
HUMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT,  iv, 2 (2009). 
23  Garsd, supra note 8.  
24  Id. 
25  As with the well-documented increase in trafficking that occurs after sudden onset disasters, see 
WARNER ET AL., supra note 22; see Part III.A.1. 
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migration journeys as a form of proactive climate change adaptation.26 In this way, 
climate change compounds existing vulnerabilities and will likely increase the 
situations in which people succumb to coercive situations due to a lack of 
intervening options or support. 
Human migration is another important facet of the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates 
that by 2050 the world will have over 200 million forced migrants, largely due to 
environmental degradation.27 The IOM acknowledges that this may be a 
conservative number. Yet, it is already more than twice the current number of 
displaced people worldwide (79.5 million).28 While estimates vary, top scholars in 
the field confidently assert that the “scope and scale [of migration] could vastly 
exceed anything that has occurred before.”29 
Of course, it is difficult to accurately estimate what number of these migrants 
might become trafficking victims.30 Data about the prevalence of trafficking 
among forced migrants is not yet available.31 But the predicted rise of forced 
migration means that even relatively low rates could have a big impact on global 
rates of human trafficking. For example, if one in four forced migrants became 
trafficked, this would more than double the current number of global human 
trafficking victims. Additionally, climate change may alter the means that 
traffickers use and the type of trafficking that people experience through, for 
example, the increased prevalence of debt bondage.32 Each of these impacts has 
enormous significance for advocates and practitioners. 
A great deal of this migration will be intrastate, with many people moving 
from rural agricultural areas to urban slums, where traffickers often recruit.33 
However, migration across international borders is also likely to increase 
significantly due to climate change.34 As the effects of climate change intensify and 
combine with pre-existing factors, such as violent conflict or a dearth of resources, 
people will travel greater and greater distances in search of safety and 
 
26  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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28  Figures at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (June 18, 
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and Factories, 0 NATURE AND SPACE 1, 6 (2019). 
33  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
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opportunity.35 In the face of global populist sentiment and lack of political will to 
support legal international migration, people will increasingly enlist the services of 
human smugglers to make these journeys, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
eventual trafficking.36 Whatever the relative proportions of differing types of 
migration, the effect is the same: increased vulnerability to human trafficking as a 
result of environmental displacement that has disrupted livelihoods and systems 
of support. 
Despite the urgency and significance of the climate crisis for efforts to 
eradicate sexual exploitation and forced labor, the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus has received relatively little attention from policymakers and 
academics.37 Secretary-General Guteress is one of just a handful of public figures 
who has sought to increase awareness of the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus. 38 The IOM is one of the few international organizations that has formally 
begun to publish on the nexus, and their work so far encompasses just one 
publication.39 
The climate change-human trafficking nexus also continues to be largely 
ignored by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the U.N. agency 
tasked with addressing human trafficking through research and policy 
development. For example, in 2018, the UNODC’s 88-page biannual report on 
global human trafficking contained no mention of or reference to climate change 
or the environment.40 
Agencies focused on responding to climate change and natural disasters have 
similarly neglected to address trafficking as a consequence of environmental 
events, despite substantial evidence that supports a positive correlation between 
natural disasters and increased rates of trafficking.41 A thorough review of the 
disaster response and emergency preparedness documents of various U.N. 
agencies, the American Red Cross, and Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
35  John Podesta, The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees, BROOKINGS (July 25, 2019), 
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yielded zero documents that mentioned human trafficking as a potential post-
disaster phenomenon.42 
This Comment proceeds in Section II by examining the current international 
legal regime governing human trafficking and interrogating the smuggling-
trafficking binary that currently exists in international law. Section III analyzes the 
mechanisms and predicted impacts that are central to the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus, with a focus on identifying the potential challenges for the 
existing legal regime. Section IV argues that the potential legal protection gap for 
populations impacted by the climate change-human trafficking nexus is in fact less 
prominent here, as the international legal regime on human trafficking already 
contains an existing textual basis to include these types of cases. This Comment 
concludes by centering this legal solution within broader discussions around the 
suitability of various political, legal, and social responses to environmental 
displacement, human trafficking, and modern-day slavery. 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING  
No existing international legal tool is explicitly aimed at the climate change-
human trafficking nexus. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) “is the principal international mechanism for dealing with climate 
change,” but its focus is almost exclusively on “reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.”43 The UNFCCC does not consider the impact of climate change on 
displacement and migration, much less on human trafficking. In 2015, at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 21, a formal committee agreed “to develop 
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”44 But this has not 
led to tangible impact on international or domestic legal frameworks to support 
migrants displaced by environmental degradation.45 There are several advisory, 
non-governmental groups (such as the Nansen Initiative) that have “propos[ed] 
procedures for the protection of people displaced by climate change,” but these 
proposals have not yet resulted in concrete mobilization or action, and none of 
them address trafficking directly.46 
Of course, climate change and human trafficking are each individually the 
subject of numerous legal and policy regimes and academic studies; it is only their 
nexus that remains widely under-examined. The U.N. has prioritized ending 
 
42  Id. 
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REV. 345, 360 (2018). 
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modern slavery and human trafficking through the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG), adopted in 2015.47 SDG Target 8.7 calls for states to take 
“immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery 
and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 
end child labour in all its forms.”48 SDG 13 emphasizes taking “urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts.”49 
This Comment argues that the Trafficking Protocol’s definition of 
trafficking in persons appropriately includes people who are trafficked as a result 
of climate-related vulnerability. This argument is rooted in a recognition of the 
significant and wide-ranging consequences of characterizing certain conduct as 
‘trafficking.’50 
First, states are obligated to respond to trafficking with a “range of 
criminalization and cooperation [efforts] both internally and in relation to other 
[s]tates.”51 Second, people whose actions are criminally prosecuted as trafficking 
are often subject to a different legal regime and face harsher sanctions than if they 
were determined to not be partaking in trafficking.52 Finally, and perhaps most 
critically, people who are victims of trafficking are “entitled to special measures of 
assistance and protection that [are] unavailable to those who are considered to 
have not been trafficked.”53 Importantly, the definition of trafficking contains 
both political and legal dimensions, such that “the parameters around what 
constitutes ‘trafficking’ are not yet firmly established.”54 
A.  The Trafficking Protocol  
The primary international legal instrument on human trafficking is the U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol, adopted by the General Assembly in 2000.55 The Protocol 
“is the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on 
trafficking in persons.”56 Crucially, the Trafficking Protocol is only binding on 
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ratifying states. As of January 2021, 178 states have ratified and are thus obligated 
to take steps to fulfill the core purposes of the Trafficking Protocol: the 
prevention of trafficking, the protection of trafficking victims, and the promotion 
of international cooperation to meet the first two objectives.57 
The exact scope and scale of required state action is not set forth in great 
detail.58 The Trafficking Protocol is a strong norm-setting instrument and model 
document, but it leaves implementing states with significant flexibility. Thus, 
jurisdictional approaches to anti-trafficking legislation and policies vary greatly.59 
This legal context highlights a significant challenge to the implementation of 
this Comment’s proposed solution. The Trafficking Protocol is a flexible 
instrument, a feature that simultaneously fuels this Comment’s argument and 
limits its impact. Although the Trafficking Protocol is binding on states, the extent 
of each state’s exact obligations is largely discretionary as a result of relatively non-
demanding language used. Thus, the willingness and ability of states to act in 
accordance with this Comment’s analysis and extend protection to victims hinges 
on the political will and available resources of each state. 
These challenges contextualize—rather than invalidate—this Comment’s 
argument, as well as the Trafficking Protocol’s role as “an international framework 
that has impelled a global anti-trafficking movement.”60 The Trafficking Protocol 
sought to formalize a global legal definition of “trafficking in persons” in order 
“to provide some degree of consensus-based standardization of concepts.” 61 This 
in turn could “support efficient international cooperation in investigating and 
prosecuting cases,” “giv[e] a clearer global picture of the problem,” and provide 
global standards for efforts to provide “support and assistance for victims.”62 
Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol directs signatories to criminalize the 
offense of trafficking in persons as defined below, as well as attempting or 
participating indirectly in trafficking.63 Under the Trafficking Protocol, the crime 
of “trafficking in persons” is defined as: 
 
57  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2. 
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the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs. . . .64 
The Trafficking Protocol thus sets forth three distinct elements for the crime of 
trafficking in persons: (1) an act, which can be fulfilled by the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, (2) a means by which the 
action occurs or is made possible, and (3) an intent, meaning the purpose behind 
the action, which is required to be one of exploitation.65 
Consider the application of these three elements to an example. The 
following is a description of a 2015 case in the U.S.: 
Andras Janos Vass and two others convinced gay Hungarian men, ages 20 to 
22, to come to the United States under false promises of jobs with good pay. 
The defendants then brought the young men to Miami, Florida, where they 
forced the victims to engage in commercial sex entirely for their own profit, 
working up to 20 hours a day. The traffickers isolated the victims from each 
other, confiscated their travel and identification documents, kept them 
confined to the apartment, and used financial manipulation to keep the 
victims from leaving or seeking help. The traffickers monitored their 
communications with family and with others.66 
The first element, the act, was present from the moment that the defendants 
recruited the victims. That element was further developed when the defendants, 
through financial support and encouragement, enabled the victims to come to the 
U.S. (transportation), and also when they harbored the victims in an apartment. 
Any of these actions on their own would likely have been enough to fulfill the act 
element. Similarly, the traffickers used a variety of means (coercion, threat, 
deception, and fraud), any one of which in isolation would likely have satisfied the 
second element. Finally, the presence of the intent element is extremely well-
supported here. The fact pattern evinces a premeditated and well-planned method 
of exploitation. As this example shows, analysis of individual cases under the 
Trafficking Protocol’s definition is highly fact specific. 
As far as victim protections, the Protocol emphasizes the participation of 
the victim in criminal proceedings against the trafficker by mandating that “[i]n 
appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law,” a party state 
 
64  Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3.  
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shall provide information on court proceedings and allow the victim’s “views and 
concerns to be presented.”67 Article 6 encourages, but does not mandate, states to 
“consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and 
social recovery of victims” through the provision of housing, counseling, legal 
assistance, medical and material assistance, and employment or educational 
opportunities.68 
1. The Role of Consent 
The Trafficking Protocol specifies that whenever the definition set forth in 
Article 3 has been fulfilled, then the consent of the person being trafficked “shall 
be irrelevant.”69 Although this language seems clear on its face, including terms 
like “abuse of authority” and “abuse of a position of vulnerability” in the means 
part of the definition of trafficking complicates matters.70 As a result, interpretive 
questions remain. In particular, stakeholders continue to debate whether the 
means must rise to the level of impairing or negating the consent of a particular 
alleged victim in order to satisfy the definition.71 
In the U.N. system, the travaux préparatoires are documents that represent 
the “negotiation, discussions, and drafting of a final treaty text.”72 They are 
sometimes used to shed light on ambiguous parts of a treaty. Unfortunately, the 
travaux préparatoires for the Trafficking Protocol are sparse and “do not provide 
clarity” on unresolved issues related to consent.73 This is likely because the 
Protocol’s ambiguous stance is the result of disagreement between non-
governmental organizations and states during the drafting process over “whether 
trafficking should be permitted to occur if an individual consents to the process, 
and, similarly, whether prostitution and sex work are activities to which individuals 
are (or should be) capable of freely consenting.”74 The language that the drafters 
settled on is likely intentionally vague so as to allow implementing states to align 
the Trafficking Protocol to their unique perspective on this issue.75 But it also 
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means that the Protocol itself “does little to answer the question of whether 
consent can be accommodated within the parameters of trafficking activity.”76 
The role of consent in domestic legislation varies from state to state. Some 
states emulate the language of the Trafficking Protocol and others implement their 
own explicit considerations of consent.77 In surveying states, the UNODC also 
found frequent differences between what the law says on paper and how law 
enforcement and judicial actors treat consent in practice.78 
For example, U.S. domestic trafficking law contains no explicit references to 
consent, which would seemingly indicate that consent is not meant to play a role 
in the adjudication of trafficking cases.79 But surveyed practitioners agreed that 
issues of consent frequently arise through investigatory and prosecutorial 
processes, including trials, when trying to determine the trafficker’s intent to 
coerce.80 Moreover, practitioners acknowledged that a victim’s clear consent “may 
present an obstacle to successful prosecution and such cases may not be pursued 
for that reason, particularly if the exploitation is at the less severe end of the 
scale.”81 
Academic studies, too, are suffused with disagreement and confusion on 
whether consent is relevant to determinations of when someone is trafficked. 
Depictions of the typical trafficking situation range widely. For some scholars, 
trafficking encompasses only the most extreme examples of coercive or abusive 
situations, such as when a child is directly sold into servitude.82 For others, 
trafficking is more aptly characterized as “an extended form of migration, spurred 
by the same economic and political factors that trigger people to seek the services 
of smugglers.”83 This faction of scholars tends to view people who are trafficked 
less as victims and more as “enterprising people who overcame a lack of options 
at home.”84 
Perhaps seeking to respond to these debates, in 2009 the UNODC issued a 
Model Law on Trafficking in Persons, which offers the following guidance on 
Article 3(b) of the Trafficking Protocol: 
[O]nce the elements of the crime of trafficking, including the use of one of 
the identified means (coercion, deception, etc.), are proven, any defence or 
allegation that the victim ‘consented’ is irrelevant. . . . While being aware of 
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the nature of the work, the person may have been misled as to the conditions 
of work, which have turned out to be exploitative or coercive. This provision 
restates existing international legal norms. It is logically and legally impossible 
to ‘consent’ when one of the means listed in the definition is used. Genuine 
consent is only possible and legally recognized when all the relevant facts are 
known and a person exercises free will.85 
Additionally, growing awareness of the confusion around the role of consent 
prompted the UNODC in 2014 to publish an issue paper on consent in the 
Trafficking Protocol.86 The issue paper’s findings come from surveys of domestic 
legislature and numerous interviews with practitioners and policymakers in 
signatory states to identify areas of confusion and promulgate guidance.87 The 
paper highlights a general consensus that the consent of an alleged victim “should 
not be permitted to trump fundamental human and social values such as dignity, 
freedom, and protection [of the vulnerable]” by preventing prosecution of their 
trafficker or a victim status determination.88 However, interviewees disagreed on 
“what those values are and how they should be understood and applied,” 
indicating that irrespective of the Trafficking Protocol’s text, the issue of consent 
is a live one in many jurisdictions.89 
These ongoing debates over the role of consent must be properly framed. 
Pragmatist actors arguing for strict exclusion of consenting victims are often 
concerned with issues of feasibility. The fear is that if the scope of the trafficking 
definition becomes overly broad, the utility of defining trafficking as a unique 
crime whose victims are entitled to certain legal protections is diminished. This 
broadening may lead to exponential growth in the number of cases and victims. 
This growth will detract from a state’s ability to take anti-trafficking measures and 
protect victims. 
In responding to these “floodgates” concerns about the role of consent, it is 
worth emphasizing the conceptual distinction between defining human trafficking 
and effectively responding to human trafficking. Temporal, financial, and political 
constraints necessarily mean that states have limited resources to prosecute 
traffickers and offer services to people who have experienced trafficking. But 
there “is no limit to how many cases may constitute human trafficking” and the 
applicability of the trafficking definition to one victim’s circumstances do not 
adversely or positively affect another individual’s case.90 This Comment is more 
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concerned with protecting the theoretical application of the Trafficking Protocol 
to all relevant cases. Questions of enforcement and feasibility are certainly 
important, but they are somewhat tangential to this Comment’s argument. 
Under the language of the current Trafficking Protocol, if an act is not 
carried out by way of one of the articulated means, “the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person,” even if the act is accompanied by 
exploitative intent, then the act is not trafficking.91 The most critical part of this 
Comment’s argument, then, is that victims of climate change are in a position of 
vulnerability as defined by the Protocol. The abuse of this position of vulnerability 
constitutes trafficking, irrespective of the victim’s consent. This argument will be 
elaborated upon in Section IV. 
B.  The Smuggling-Trafficking Binary  
The international legal system treats human trafficking and smuggling as 
completely distinct types of crimes, a framework referred to as the smuggling-
trafficking binary. This binary is already at odds with what practitioners see on the 
ground and acts as a legal concept that allows governments to get out of 
obligations they might otherwise owe to trafficked victims.92 This Comment’s 
discussion highlights how the binary is especially problematic within the context 
of the climate change-human trafficking nexus. 
As climate change progresses, rates of irregular migration across 
international borders will increase.93 In the face of greater border controls, many 
of these migrants will enlist the services of a human smuggler.94 A number of 
factors will cumulatively increase the risk that people who are smuggled ultimately 
become trafficked.95 Strict adherence to the binary thus presents an easy out for 
states. States may categorize many people who are in fact victims of trafficking as 
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people who have been smuggled and are thus deportable and not entitled to 
protection. 
The smuggling of migrants became a crime under international law in 2000 
with the adoption of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol).96 The Smuggling Protocol defines human 
smuggling as: 
the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident . . . .97 
The Smuggling Protocol prohibits states from criminally prosecuting 
migrants who have been smuggled but goes on to clarify that “[n]othing in this 
Protocol shall prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose 
conduct constitutes an offence under its domestic law.”98 
The Smuggling Protocol makes little provision for allowing people who are 
smuggled to stay in the destination country. Article 18 in fact anticipates automatic 
deportation by requiring states to “facilitate and accept, without undue or 
unreasonable delay, the return of a person [who has been smuggled].”99 The 
Smuggling Protocol makes clear that each state must “take all appropriate 
measures to carry out the return in an orderly manner with due regard for the 
safety and dignity of the person [who has been smuggled].” However, this 
ambiguous language is very different from the specific references to physical and 
psychiatric care for victims in the Trafficking Protocol.100 This difference in 
protections highlights the stakes of the smuggling-trafficking binary. 
In sum, under the current international law framework there are three 
primary distinctions between smuggling and trafficking. First, smuggling always 
involves crossing an international border, while human trafficking may consist 
only of intrastate movement (or, indeed, no movement at all). Second, the intent 
or purpose of the trafficker is to exploit the victim, while the absence of 
exploitative intent (or at least, the same degree of exploitative intent) characterizes 
a smuggler’s actions.101 Third, “people who have been trafficked are (or should 
be) treated as victims, [while] people who have been smuggled are regarded as 
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criminals.”102 This is key to this Comment’s discussion of the binary: the fact that 
“in the case of smuggling, the victim is the state rather than the person who is 
smuggled, whereas, in trafficking, the crime is against the victim of trafficking.”103 
The third distinction is especially problematic within the context of the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus. Increased rates of irregular migration 
and greater barriers to cross-border migration will lead to higher rates of 
smuggling.104 And data suggests that those who enlist the services of smugglers 
will be increasingly desperate and willing to exchange labor in the destination 
country as a way to pay the smuggling fee.105 This makes it especially likely that 
human trafficking will result from a smuggling situation.106 Where an individual 
falls on both sides of the smuggling-trafficking binary, states may focus on the 
fact that they were smuggled in—and are thus deportable—instead of the fact that 
the individual is a trafficking victim, and therefore entitled to protection under 
international law. 
As with so many other areas of international law,107 the disparate approaches 
presented in the trafficking-smuggling binary are also heavily influenced by 
gendered notions of vulnerability and choice. The prototypical trafficking victim 
is a vulnerable and desperate woman who is coerced into sexual servitude or 
forced labor, while the Smuggling Protocol generally envisions reaching “a male 
economic migrant who has weighed his options and chosen to migrate for better 
economic opportunities.”108 In reality, the line between trafficking and smuggling 
is often blurred, and people of all genders may fall under one or both definitions. 
Moreover, the smuggling-trafficking binary encourages states to engage in a 
securitized response towards human smuggling, which likely perpetuates and 
increases rates of violent and exploitative smuggling that more frequently lead to 
human trafficking—a counter-productive result.109 To understand this process, 
consider the different types of barriers that may compel people to seek the services 
of human smugglers: physical barriers, such as crossing a sea, desert, or border 
fence; political barriers, like navigating a violent conflict zone, a heavily militarized 
border, or an impenetrable visa regime; and cultural barriers, such as language 
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differences or ethnic differences that may give rise to suspicion of the irregular 
migrant.110 To overcome these barriers, migrants enlist the services of smugglers, 
who traditionally help migrants to reach their destination safely and often provide 
protection from bad actors.111 
But the harsh criminalization of human smuggling has “tipped [the power 
dynamic between smuggler and migrant] in favor of the smuggler, eroding the 
safeguards traditionally protecting migrants and making them increasingly 
vulnerable to abuse.”112 Whenever the state constructs a novel barrier for irregular 
migrants by, for example, militarizing a border section or initiating a law 
enforcement crackdown in a migration hub, demand for smuggling services 
increases. The smuggling market responds by offering new and increasingly risky 
routes and raising prices to compensate for the increased risk. As fees and demand 
simultaneously increase, the ability of migrants to pay upfront decreases. This 
means that migrants are more likely to exchange promises of free labor for a 
smuggling journey, which renders them more susceptible to exploitation and debt 
bondage.113 
For example, Thailand is one of the world’s largest fishery exporters and has 
repeatedly come under fire for failing to address the prevalence of forced labor 
and victims of trafficking in its fisheries.114 As the Thai government has “sought 
to balance negative public attitudes about migration…with strong economic 
demand for low-cost labor,” they have engaged in “contradictory and inconsistent 
migration policymaking.”115 Limited opportunity for legal migration of low-skilled 
workers has pushed migrants (predominantly from Burma and Cambodia) 
towards “more expensive and less safe border crossings, thereby increasing profits 
for smugglers and traffickers.” In short, “[t]he higher the barriers and the more 
complex the routes, the higher the demand for smugglers becomes, the more 
specialized they need to be and, consequently, the more they charge.”116 And the 
more they charge, the more likely it is that their clients will be unable to pay those 
charges without becoming exploited.117 Climate change will exacerbate these 
dynamics by increasing the demand for smuggling services and simultaneously 
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implementing new types of physical and political barriers, a point which will be 
further elaborated upon in the next Section. 
Treating smuggling and trafficking “as twin threats” in this way “allows 
partners to take [ ] relatively neutral and security-focused actions to combat 
‘trafficking,’ while overlooking the broader requirements for suppressing 
smuggling and better managing migration [and] at the same time claiming to have 
complied with the spirit of an international agreement [on trafficking].”118 This 
strategy contributes to the project of building a nation state by contributing to an 
“us” and “them” mentality drawn along sovereign borders. Antitrafficking 
discourse and policymaking has drawn upon and perpetuated “myths of migrant 
criminality”119 by depicting traffickers as noncitizen men, particularly noncitizen 
men of color, in a way that is completely detached from the complicity of citizen 
consumers of trafficked labor.120 This framing “fits comfortably within the larger 
narrative that has been constructed around unauthorized migration”121 and 
justifies extensive border control efforts “that may, ironically, give traffickers 
more business.”122 
In addition to being premised upon oversimplified conceptions of gender 
and shortsighted views of the consequences of a securitized response to human 
smuggling, the smuggling-trafficking binary presents state governments with 
misplaced incentives. The stark differences between what is owed to someone 
who is smuggled and someone who is trafficked mean that fighting human 
smuggling is more expedient and less resource intensive. States are incentivized to 
“see all trafficked people—non-consenting ‘victims’ and consenting adults—as 
people who have consented to enter [the country] illegally and therefore are not 
in need of protection.”123 
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As the impacts of climate change become more severe, such that deporting 
people to their place of origin becomes an increasingly inhumane option, it will 
be important to ensure that states are not (whether accidentally or intentionally) 
dismissing bona fide victims of trafficking as people who have willingly 
participated in smuggling. In addition, deportation will not address the cyclical 
nature of the climate change-human trafficking nexus: many people are likely to 
attempt the perilous journey to another country again after deportation, since the 
on-the-ground conditions in their place of origin will likely only have deteriorated. 
This Comment thus operates within the context of this smuggling-trafficking 
binary and seeks to illustrate how climate change will continue to disrupt the bases 
upon which the binary is built. 
III.  THE CLIMATE CHANGE-HUMAN TRAFFICKING NEXUS  
In 2019, natural disasters displaced 22 million people globally.124 This 
number is more than twice the yearly average number of people who are displaced 
due to violence, underscoring that environmental degradation—not human 
conflict—is one of the most significant drivers of instability on our planet.125 
Moreover, environmental degradation and human conflict will likely continue to 
intersect, with disastrous consequences. For example, one study on the Syrian war 
and refugee crisis concluded that persistent drought attributable to climate change 
led 1.5 million Syrian farmers to move from rural areas into overcrowded cities in 
search of work, “contributing to social turmoil and ultimately a civil war.”126 
Over the last few decades, anthropogenic climate change has more than 
doubled the frequency of natural disasters that lead to widespread displacement 
and insecurity.127 Legal and policy responses to climate-induced migration have 
been few and far between, in part because distinguishing “climate change 
migrants” from “economic migrants” is difficult, since “migration is never solely 
due to climate change, but rather a compounding result of vulnerabilities.”128 
However, this Comment subscribes to a relatively maximalist understanding 
of environmental migration by asserting that environmental migration does exist 
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and can be identified as a distinct phenomenon.129 Such an approach is already 
prevalent in the scholarship on climate change and migration. One notable 
example is the typology offered by Fabrice Renaud et al., which provides three 
categories of climate change-induced migrants: (1) environmental refugees, who 
flee immediately after sudden onset disasters, (2) environmentally forced migrants, 
who have to migrate to avoid destitution, and (3) environmentally motivated 
migrants, who proactively leave an area impacted by slow onset disasters “in order 
to preempt the worse.”130 Additionally, advancements in climate science will 
continue to offer solutions to problems of proof and causality. Through extreme 
event attribution, for example, scientists are now able to calculate with increasing 
levels of certainty the impact of anthropogenic climate change on the occurrence 
and severity of natural disasters.131 
Of course, climate change and environmental degradation never act in 
isolation. Climate change is a vulnerability multiplier, meaning that its impacts 
greatly exacerbate pre-existing conditions, such as water and food shortages, 
poverty, low educational attainment, and gender inequality, that make people 
vulnerable to the recruitment of human traffickers.132 The above discussion 
illustrates how climate change may be sufficiently isolated so as to identify a 
distinct group of people who are trafficked as a result of climate vulnerability. 
Despite ongoing issues of multicausality, empirical evidence makes clear that 
climate change is responsible for a growing number of natural disasters that lead 
to displacement and force people into desperate situations where they are more 
likely to be trafficked.133 Given this urgency, the multicausal nature of the climate 
change-human trafficking nexus “should not be an excuse to ignore the necessity 
of developing a protection framework for climate-induced displacement.”134 
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A.  Environmental Mechanisms Impacting Human Trafficking  
There are two primary environmental mechanisms through which climate 
change impacts human trafficking: sudden onset disasters and slow onset 
disasters.135 In general, sudden onset disasters “lead to mass amounts of displaced 
persons leaving quickly, while [slow onset disasters] steadily bring strife to natural 
resources, employment prospects, and agricultural accessibility, leading to a slow 
movement of people out of the area.”136 Disaster-related displacement is rarely 
driven by a sudden or slow onset event alone; instead, environmental factors work 
in tandem with socioeconomic and political factors that curtail or eliminate 
people’s ability to stay in their habitual land.137 Additionally, sudden and slow onset 
disasters may simultaneously impact certain regions, furthering the destructive 
effects. 
Importantly, the consequences of the displacement and migration spurred 
by sudden and slow onset disasters are not yet fully known.138 In the absence of 
comprehensive data, the ensuing discussion about the mechanisms underlying the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus provides a coherent narrative by utilizing 
disparate case studies and common-sense assumptions. 
1. Sudden Onset Disasters 
Sudden onset disasters are unexpected and rapidly developing 
environmental events such as flooding, mudslides, earthquakes, and tsunamis.139  
Climate change is expected to significantly increase the intensity, unpredictability, 
and number of sudden onset disasters.140 These disasters frequently “cause 
unexpected loss of land and lives, and destruction of means of livelihoods, 
instantly plunging those without safety nets into poverty.”141 Since 2004, the IOM 
has monitored trafficking trends after natural disasters and incorporated the issue 
of post-disaster trafficking into its crisis response frameworks.142 As a result, a 
substantial amount of research on post-disaster trafficking patterns has been 
conducted. Although this research has yet to incorporate explicit discussions of 
 
massive numbers of forced migrants. Instead, the current refugee framework, including UNHCR 
and other international organizations, treats a large number of people who flee their homes because 
of persecution, war, and famine as ‘persons of concern’ and extends protection and assistance.”). 
135  Coelho et al., supra note 5. 
136  Stephens, supra note 11, at 19. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. at 21. 
139 Platform on Disaster Displacement, Key Definitions, https://perma.cc/22Y4-3QXP. 
140  Elizabeth Ferris, Disasters and Displacement: What We Know, What We Don’t Know, BROOKINGS (June 
9, 2014), https://perma.cc/A9SV-LNUU. 
141  Coelho et al., supra note 5, at 3.  
142  Id. at 6.  
Applying the U.N. Trafficking Protocol Smith 
Summer 2021 321 
the impact of climate change, the data establishes a strong positive correlation 
between the severity of natural disasters and increased rates in human 
trafficking.143 
For example, after Hurricane Harvey wreaked havoc in 2017 in the American 
South, law enforcement agents, policymakers, and journalists documented 
increases in trafficking, especially sex trafficking.144 Former Congresswoman 
Linda Smith analyzes human trafficking through fundamental market principles, 
noting that “if someone is going to pay good money, lots of money, somebody 
else is going to bring a product to that market.”145 Sudden onset disasters 
frequently have an impact on both the supply and demand side of the trafficking 
market. For example, after Hurricane Harvey, women were more likely to lose 
their jobs and homes and thus become ready targets for traffickers, and hundreds 
or thousands of male aid workers arrived in the area as potential ‘customers.’146 
These patterns are facilitated by the widespread prevalence of smartphones, as the 
internet provides an easy and relatively discrete way for traffickers to recruit both 
customers and victims. Smartphone usage is increasing rapidly across the globe, 
such that people who lose their homes and livelihoods in a disaster are likely to 
retain their mobile phone and internet connection.147 
In addition to sex trafficking, sudden onset disasters are also likely to lead to 
trafficking for forced labor. As the number of natural disasters increases, the 
capacity of the international humanitarian aid system to adequately respond will 
continue to decrease. This will lead to more and more victims of natural disasters 
undertaking migration journeys. When these journeys stay within the borders of 
the individual’s state of origin, they are likely to involve moving from rural 
agricultural areas to urban slums, and research indicates that people in this 
situation are highly vulnerable to trafficking recruitment efforts.148 
If an individual’s migration journey involves crossing an international 
border, they are likely to “seek assistance from human smugglers, [which 
subsequently] plac[es] them[] at risk of many of the forms of exploitation that are 
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commonly associated with trafficking, such as sexual exploitation, forced labour, 
forced marriage, as well as organ removal.”149 Global responses to the refugee 
crises of the last few decades—in particular, the hostility of receiving countries to 
forced migrants and lack of political will to facilitate legal migration—indicate that 
use of smugglers will only continue to increase.150 As a result of climate change, 
people have fewer viable options for livelihoods and simultaneously experience 
displacement more frequently. Thus, disaster-induced migration, regardless of the 
immediacy with which migration begins or the duration and extent of the 
migration, places people in positions of vulnerability to trafficking. Climate change 
will significantly impact rates of disaster-induced migration and, by extension, 
trafficking. 
2. Slow Onset Disasters 
Slow onset disasters include drought, coastal erosion, desertification, 
salinization, sea level rise, and glacial retreat.151 Because slow onset disasters occur 
over time, there may be more opportunity for the development of mitigation and 
adaptation systems and infrastructure to offset their negative impacts, but these 
measures require access to resources. This means that communities with fewer 
resources (who were already more vulnerable to trafficking) are less likely to be 
insulated from the impacts of slow onset disasters and more likely to resort to 
migration as a “necessary tool for survival.”152 
In addition to being a last-resort survival mechanism, migration is a key 
proactive strategy to diversify income in the face of environmental degradation 
that challenges the sustainability of traditional agricultural livelihoods.153 As with 
sudden onset disasters, migration may be intrastate or involve crossing an 
international border, but in either scenario, increased vulnerability to trafficking is 
a likely result.154 Moreover, “households with extremely limited resources may not 
be able to migrate at all,” and “[a]s these households remain in inhospitable 
environments associated with intensifying deprivation, [their] members are also 
made [increasingly] vulnerable to trafficking.”155 There is a particular concern 
about inhabitants of very rural areas, who may not have the ability to migrate and 
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may receive delayed or limited assistance by governments and humanitarian 
organizations after a disaster.156 
A case study from the Sundarbans region of West Bengal, India, may serve 
to further illustrate how these mechanisms will operate within the climate change-
human trafficking nexus. The Sundarbans is a region of low-lying islands with a 
population of 4.4 million people, the vast majority of whom experience “severe 
impoverishment and insecurity.”157 Gender inequities are prevalent, particularly in 
regards to educational attainment, workforce participation, and gender-based 
violence.158 In addition, the region is home to a number of particularly vulnerable 
populations, including a high number of “undocumented Bangladeshi migrants 
and landless households that have historically and contemporaneously faced 
discrimination, marginalization, and poverty.”159 The Sundarbans contain one of 
the world’s largest and most biodiverse mangrove ecosystems on earth, and the 
region’s peoples have long relied on the soil and water of this ecosystem.160 But in 
recent years, “[s]tronger and more recurrent floods and cyclones, erratic rainfall, 
increased temperatures, and encroaching sea-level rise have contributed to soil 
and water salinization, crop losses, soil infertility, and significant long-term 
reductions in agricultural yields, adversely impacting local livelihoods.”161 
In the face of converging environmental challenges, many of those who are 
able to do so have chosen to migrate in search of better prospects and greater 
security.162 This migration occurs steadily as slow onset disasters progress and 
spikes as a result of sudden onset disasters. For example, in 2009, after Cyclone 
Aila swept through the region, seventy-five percent of households in the 
Sundarbans reported that at least one family member had migrated out of the 
region in search of labor, and children comprised twenty percent of those 
migrating.163 
This type of irregular and insecure labor migration—often, as in this case, 
undertaken in the context of “degraded environments, unviable livelihoods, 
destitute, and survival need”164—is highly likely to amplify vulnerability to 
trafficking for forced labor and sexual exploitation. But there may be little 
alternative; the same unsustainable conditions that compel people to undertake 
perilous journeys in search of survival simultaneously impede their ability to return 
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home if they do become the subject of trafficking and exploitation.165 This is a 
unique aspect of people who are trafficked due to climate change-induced 
vulnerability: once freed from a trafficking situation, there may be no safe home 
to which they can return. 
3. Cycles of Causality 
Human trafficking is not only an effect of climate change but also undergirds 
the structural systems that cause climate change and worsen its impacts. Many of 
the industries that contribute to environmental degradation are “underpinned by 
large numbers of migrant workers in forced labor situations” who often enter 
these situations as a result of being trafficked.166 For example, the lucrative palm 
oil industry in South East Asia is responsible for widespread rainforest destruction 
and is “heavily dependent on less-than-ethical recruitment of foreign labour, as 
well as coercive labour practices.”167 In fact, data suggests that “up to half of illegal 
deforestation globally is dependent on slave labour” and these practices are 
estimated to be responsible for emitting an estimated 2.54 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide each year—more than any nation in the world except for China and the 
U.S.168 
Fishing is another global industry that simultaneously worsens the impact of 
climate change169 and relies on modern slavery to make up its workforce and 
supply chains.170 The IOM seeks to highlight the prevalence of forced labor in 
fishing and provide assistance to victims of trafficking on fishing boats and within 
onshore seafood processing facilities.171 In 2017, the IOM’s Global Assistance 
Fund, which serves trafficking victims and other vulnerable migrants, took part in 
efforts to assist 600 men who were found in forced labor situations on fishing 
boats (from various nations) in Indonesian waters: 
Some had not been on dry land for years. One of the victims had been 
separated from his family, without any contact, for 22 years. . . . Many migrant 
fishers enter the destination country through networks of recruitment agents, 
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often incurring high brokerage fees, even when they are engaged through 
legally recognised recruitment agencies, leading to personal debts that must 
be repaid through deductions from wages. And when the labour brokerage is 
informal and the workers have no contracts of employment, there is 
considerable risk of further abuse. Debt bondage in the context of labour 
migration and trafficking is a trend that can be seen across a number of 
countries and sectors.172 
There is a third layer of causality, too: as the impacts of climate change are 
more keenly felt, such as ocean acidification, increased prevalence and severity of 
storms, and declining fish stocks, fisheries face increased economic pressure and 
are “forced to extend their operations, both geographically and temporally, for 
‘ever diminishing returns’ of fish catches.”173 As the market becomes more 
competitive and economic pressures on fisheries increase, the appeal of utilizing 
low-cost forced labor increases and demand for trafficked workers grows.174 
B.  Predicted Impacts  
1. Increased Number of People Impacted by Trafficking 
Climate change has already begun to increase the number of people who 
become victims of human trafficking.175 Although scientists have varying 
estimates of the exact rate at which the impacts of climate change will worsen, 
there is consensus that we are just at the beginning of witnessing these effects.176 
Time is “fast running out for [humans] to avert the worst impacts of climate 
disruption.”177 The next few years are a critical tipping point for worldwide action 
on climate change, and international will to take action is being challenged in 
unprecedented ways by the COVID-19 pandemic and faltering economies.178 
Through the mechanisms discussed in the previous Part, it is almost certain that 
climate change will lead to a large increase in the number of people who become 
vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of traffickers. 
In addition to an increased number of trafficking victims, evidence suggests 
that climate-related environmental degradation will contribute to a simultaneous 
rise in the number of people who collude with traffickers or become active 
traffickers themselves. This is especially true after sudden onset disasters, when a 
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sharp spike in the supply of trafficking victims will necessarily contribute to a high 
demand for traffickers to facilitate the distribution of these trafficked people into 
forced labor situations.179 
2. Altered Methods of Trafficking 
In its 2018 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, the UNODC reported that 
fifty-eight percent of trafficking victims were detected within their own borders, 
and eighty-six percent were detected within the same sub-region of their point of 
origin.180 Thus, current trafficking data indicates that the crime predominantly 
occurs close to the victim’s point of origin. The subset of trafficked people who 
arise from the climate change-human trafficking nexus will likely dramatically 
change these patterns, as more people will need to travel far away from home to 
escape the impact of environmental degradation. 
Additionally, as discussed in Section II, increased rates of climate-related 
migration are likely to be accompanied by a growing willingness on the part of 
human smugglers to provide loans for their customers:181 
[smuggling] recruiters encourage migrants who lack the funds needed to 
embark on their journey on the understanding that they can work to earn the 
fee at a later point in the journey . . . in most cases, migrants find themselves 
working as temporary indentured labor . . . it has become increasingly 
common for the ‘pay later’ migrant to be kidnapped and held for ransom . . . 
[t]he migrant may be forced to work for the kidnap gang while being held . . . . 
In other instances, debt collectors seek payment at the end of the journey . . . 
these debt collectors [often] have links to human-trafficking networks and, in 
the likely scenario that the migrant is unable to pay, the migrant is sold to 
traffickers in lieu of payment.182 
Humanitarian practitioners have already noticed a significant increase in 
these ‘migrate now, pay later’ smuggling schemes, which offer unprecedented 
mobility opportunities to the poorest segments of society for whom migration 
was “previously unthinkable.”183 Another implication of the rising prevalence of 
these schemes is that the rising price of smuggling services due to market forces 
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will do “little to quash demand, and migrants will merely seek alternative methods 
to pay, compromising their safety in the process.”184 
The increased willingness of smugglers to engage in these schemes 
undoubtedly contributes to rising rates of debt bondage as a mechanism of 
coercion.185 A recent report presented to the U.N. Human Rights Council found 
that debt bondage is the primary means used to control trafficking victims in 
North America, Europe and the Middle East and is prevalent across a wide variety 
of sectors including construction work, domestic work, agricultural work, factory 
work, and sex work.186 The converging influences of climate-induced migration 
and related changes in the human smuggling market will result in some of society’s 
most vulnerable people becoming at risk of trafficking in new ways. 
IV.  THE TRAFFICKING PROTOCOL APPLIES TO VICTIMS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE  
This Comment has so far sought to situate the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus within the existing legal frameworks that govern these issues and 
illuminate the mechanisms underlying the nexus. In this Section, the Comment 
argues that part of the response to the climate change-human trafficking nexus 
involves recognizing that the Trafficking Protocol provides a textual basis for 
extending its protections to victims of climate change. This argument is not 
without its challenges. Climate change-induced vulnerability necessarily “entails 
uneven, uncertain, and complex processes contingent on myriad factors, [which] 
does not fit neatly into dominant criminal justice-oriented anti-trafficking 
initiatives.”187 The ways in which states have thus far implemented the Trafficking 
Protocol very much reflect “particular forms and dynamics of capitalism and 
capital and state relations that structure conditions of insecurity and 
exploitation.”188 Effective responses to the nexus compel the interrogation of 
“broader contemporary capitalist modes of production and [ ] the need for 
continual capital accumulation.”189 In short, the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus complicates mainstream narratives about trafficking. 
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In contrast to the story of “inherently vulnerable women being sold or 
abducted and forced into sexual slavery”190 and the state stepping in to play hero, 
the application of the Trafficking Protocol to people experiencing climate-related 
vulnerability requires acknowledging the reality of climate change as something 
that the global North (namely the U.S. and the 28 E.U. member states, and not 
including China) has historically contributed to, with people in the global South 
bearing many of the worst impacts.191 Additionally, “blame and responsibility for 
the conditions and outcomes of [the climate change-human trafficking nexus] 
cannot be easily pinned to deviant and malevolent perpetrators, organized crime 
rings, or patriarchal, backward communities,” as much of the blame lies squarely 
on developed Western nations.192 
A.  Victims of Climate Change are in a Position of Vulnerability  
The wide range of potential means included in Article 3 of the Trafficking 
Protocol “generally confirms the position . . . that individuals can end up in a 
situation of exploitation through indirect methods such as deception and fraud as 
well as by sheer physical force.”193 This Comment argues that victims of climate 
change who are trafficked fulfill the means component of the Trafficking Protocol 
definition because these traffickers will have necessarily engaged in an “abuse of 
a position of vulnerability” (APOV) by taking advantage of climate-related 
vulnerability. In part, this Comment is motivated by and seeks to overcome 
prominent global trends in the prosecution of trafficking that establish the 
presence of an implicit presumption against someone being a victim of trafficking 
when overt, physical means are not present in the case.194 
This approach is less radical than it may initially seem. Criminal justice 
systems are already “routinely being called on to distinguish between situations 
characterized by poor conditions of employment and situations where a person is 
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the victim of trafficking.”195 This Comment suggests, then, that criminal justice 
systems incorporate an additional factor into their analysis: the presence (or 
absence) of climate-induced vulnerability. When the temporal and causal 
connection between the situation and the experienced environmental degradation 
is sufficiently strong and is accompanied by evidence of an intent to exploit, 
decision makers should consider this to strongly indicate that an abuse of a 
position of vulnerability has occurred, thereby fulfilling the definition of the 
Trafficking Protocol. 
APOV remains a relatively vague, undefined, and under-litigated component 
of the Trafficking Protocol. Scholars and practitioners to date have not 
substantively discussed whether “there needs to be requisite seriousness or the 
extent of the . . . abuse of a position of vulnerability that could constitute a ‘means’ 
for the purposes of the definition of trafficking.”196 Despite this vagueness, APOV 
is widely viewed as a “distinct and important part of the international legal 
definition of trafficking” and has endured the test of time, having “survived intact 
in all major treaties adopted after the Protocol that incorporate a definition of 
trafficking in persons, as well as in policy documents and interpretative texts.”197 
While the formal legislative history of the Trafficking Protocol “does not 
shed light on how or why the concept [of APOV] was included,” the UNODC 
notes that informal records indicate that its inclusion was “motivated by an 
intention to ensure that all the different and subtle ways by which an individual 
can be moved, placed or maintained in a situation of exploitation were 
captured.”198 The drafting history and Legislative Guide of the Trafficking 
Protocol offer some—albeit slightly circular in nature—elaboration by explaining 
that APOV “is understood to refer to any situation in which the person involved 
has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.”199 It 
is certainly arguable that a wide range of applications of this interpretation would 
comport with conceptions of climate-induced vulnerability that push people into 
perilous migration journeys or exploitative conditions with no real alternatives.200 
The UNODC has noted that establishing APOV generally requires two 
distinct evidentiary findings: (1) “proof of the existence of a position of 
vulnerability on the part of the victim,” and (2) “proof of abuse of (or intention 
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to abuse) that vulnerability as the means by which a particular act (recruitment, 
harboring, etc.) was undertaken.”201 Surveys of countries that have APOV within 
their domestic definition of trafficking reveal that in practice, “the focus of the 
inquiry is generally on establishing the fact of vulnerability, rather than on proving 
its abuse.”202 This reality establishes some precedent for this Comment’s proposal 
that adjudicators and decision makers take the existence of climate-related 
vulnerability, once proven, as a strong indication of the presence of abuse. 
Though few in number, prior applications of APOV support this 
Comment’s argument for the application of APOV to climate-related 
vulnerability. In Belgium, domestic legislation implementing the Trafficking 
Protocol specifically enumerated examples of positions of vulnerability such as 
“illegal or uncertain immigration or residency status, minority status, or conditions 
such as illness, pregnancy, or physical or mental disability.”203 Academic literature 
considers North Korean women who are living in China in situations of 
exploitative labor or sexual exploitation to be trafficked through the “abuse of 
their vulnerable position as refugees who fear deportation.”204 
In addition, scholars have argued that foreign brides who initially consent to 
travel to another country and marry their husband sight unseen fulfill the 
definition set for in the Trafficking Protocol because recruiters abuse the 
vulnerabilities “that come from the woman’s national experience from political, 
legal, economic, and social structures that are not experienced by their husbands 
by virtue of his gender and nationality.”205 These examples bolster the argument 
that APOV already encompasses a wide variety of vulnerabilities and may be 
properly extended to include environmental vulnerabilities. 
B.  Consent is Not Dispositive  
The climate change-human trafficking nexus further complicates existing 
debates about the applicability of “traditional liberal theory that emphasizes the 
free will of people to make choices about their lives” to human trafficking.206 
Consent is likely to be at issue in many of the situations that arise from climate 
change-related environmental degradation and resulting exploitation. For many 
people, beginning a migration journey that entails enlisting the services of a 
smuggler or undertaking labor in exploitative conditions may be the best or only 
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option in light of the devastating impacts arising from both sudden and slow onset 
environmental disasters. 
Choice and coercion represent a spectrum, rather than a binary. It is highly 
likely that many of the trafficking situations considered in this Comment will 
involve some level of implied or express consent. This is their position of 
vulnerability, and when abuse of that position has occurred, then the means of 
trafficking in the Trafficking Protocol has been established and the consent of the 
trafficked person becomes irrelevant.207 Indeed, the UNODC has anticipated 
exactly this type of issues, noting that “[i]n cases where more ‘indirect’ or ‘subtle’ 
means [of trafficking] are used,” such as APOV, then “indications or assertions 
of consent are more likely to be raised” and become central to “ascertaining 
whether a crime of trafficking in persons has in fact been committed.”208 
In some jurisdictions the relationship between consent and APOV is made 
explicit. In Moldova, for example, APOV is in fact only considered as a potential 
means when the victim has provided consent: the prosecution then uses the 
victim’s vulnerability to “explain away and nullify the apparent consent.”209 
The UNODC has issued guidance that comports with the position of this 
Comment that consent is not a barrier to applying the Trafficking Protocol within 
the context of the climate change-human trafficking nexus. Specifically, in 
discussing the role of consent in criminal cases within Anglo-American common 
law, the UNODC has noted that the Trafficking Protocol “does not precisely 
correspond” to common law conceptions of consent.210 At common law, the key 
inquiry is whether the coercive circumstances have been caused by the person to 
whom consent is given.211 Thus, “a person’s compulsion to choose between 
working or starving does not render the apparent consent to work involuntary,” 
so long as the employer did not directly cause the conditions giving rise to this 
choiceless choice.212 The UNODC explicitly notes that this view does not extend 
to the Trafficking Protocol’s position on APOV; there, “the person to whom 
consent is given must have abused an existing or created vulnerability (the origin 
of which is irrelevant) in order to secure an act intended to result in 
exploitation.”213 
There is also some indication that this Comment’s position may find support 
among practitioners. In a global survey of antitrafficking practitioners, the 
UNODC found “widespread agreement” among interviewees that legitimizing 
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consent to exploitative labor conditions by people “who are made vulnerable 
through lack of economic alternatives” would “fail to uphold basic principles of 
human dignity and non-discrimination.”214 However, many practitioners rejected 
the idea that people who lack economic alternatives and undertake work in 
exploitative labor conditions should always be considered to be victims of 
trafficking, as this idea was “unrealistic and unworkable in competitive and 
difficult labor markets.”215 Climate-related vulnerability, coupled with an abuse of 
that vulnerability and an intent to exploit, contains more limiting principles than 
does the hazy notion of “lack of economic alternatives.” This group of people can 
be distinguished from other economic migrants because the situation that compels 
such consent is the product of intentional global state action (through the release 
of greenhouse gases).216 
Moreover, practitioners expressed support for requiring legal decision 
makers to consider the full range of circumstances under which consent was given, 
including the “cultural, socioeconomic and psychological situation of the victim 
before the trafficking occurred.”217 The presence of climate-related vulnerability 
and experienced environmental degradation would be a highly relevant and 
determinative factor in these considerations. 
Maintaining clear boundaries of the limiting principles governing the 
application of the Trafficking Protocol to the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus will be highly important. Climate change is likely to further exacerbate 
cyclical patterns of coercion and choice by severely restricting the options 
available to people who are trafficked. This will be true even once they are no 
longer in the control of their traffickers or being directly coerced. For example, 
recent research in the Philippines has documented how many women who were 
trafficked as teenagers for sexual exploitation gain their freedom and return to 
their home villages, only to later opt to return to urban centers as sex workers 
because their villages are experiencing devastating environmental degradation and 
offer limited routes to survival.218 
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Decision makers should respond to this complicated intersection between 
choice and coercion by interpreting what it means to ‘abuse’ the position of 
vulnerability that people impacted by climate change may find themselves in. 
These interpretations may continuously be updated and adapted to ensure that the 
right balance is being struck. This tension is hardly novel; stakeholders of the 
Trafficking Protocol have long discussed the risk that “a liberal interpretation of 
the more ambiguous means—including a low threshold for establishing abuse of 
a position of vulnerability—can result in apparent consent being overridden to 
the point that “trafficking” comes to include a very broad range of conduct that 
otherwise may be treated as a lesser offence.”219 
Over-inclusion is a very real concern, one that must be taken seriously. 
However, as this Comment’s exploration of the climate change-human trafficking 
nexus highlights, under-inclusion is also a critical point of fallibility in the fight 
against human trafficking. The answer to this tension is to develop a nuanced and 
multi-factor standard by which individual cases may be assessed, rather than 
wholesale exclusion of cases where consent may be an issue.220 
V.  CONCLUSION  
This Comment has demonstrated that the Trafficking Protocol may be fairly 
applied to people who are made vulnerable or displaced as a result of climate 
change and subsequently become victims of trafficking through the abuse of this 
vulnerable position. This legal solution could help to decrease the protection gap 
for millions of people who may become trafficked because climate change has 
exacerbated their existing vulnerabilities or forced them to flee from their home. 
Of course, successfully applying the Trafficking Protocol in this way greatly 
depends on whether individual countries incorporate such an approach into their 
existing domestic trafficking laws. To effectively combat human trafficking as a 
result of climate change, the international community and the signatory states of 
the Trafficking Protocol must recognize the mechanisms and power dynamics 
underpinning the climate change-human trafficking nexus and commit to a 
holistic antitrafficking approach that proactively prevents climate-related 
vulnerability, recognizes and protects people who are trafficked as a result of 
climate change, and prosecutes those who exploit climate migrants and climate-
impacted people. There is room to critique both the viability and suitability of this 
legal solution. 
The Trafficking Protocol already receives sharp criticism on all sides, and 
many of these critiques gain fresh potency in the context of the climate change-
human trafficking nexus and this Comment’s argument. One principal critique 
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views the Trafficking Protocol as a politically motivated band-aid solution to 
systemic global inequities.221 Critics contend that although the Trafficking 
Protocol sets forth three primary purposes (prosecuting traffickers, protecting 
people who are trafficked, and preventing trafficking in the first place), states are 
in practice overly focused on prosecution, emphasizing crime control at the 
expense of human rights protections.222 Through heavy criminalization of 
trafficking and sporadic prosecution of traffickers, states are able to clearly define 
a bad actor against whom they have taken action and create a fictional account 
wherein the state’s own behavior is irrelevant.223 In this way, states can avoid any 
meaningful acknowledgment of and response to “the underlying social, economic, 
political, and environmental drivers of vulnerability to trafficking” and instead 
continue to ignore the “material conditions and power relations that contribute to 
[that] vulnerability.”224 
Extending legal protections to victims of climate change under the 
Trafficking Protocol may well become yet another band-aid solution. It is entirely 
possible that the existence of a legal safety net for people suffering within the 
climate change-human trafficking nexus could cause state and non-governmental 
actors to approach preemptive action with less urgency. This Comment takes the 
position that this concern should be assuaged not through wholesale rejection of 
post-disaster legal protections, but instead through vigorous advocacy for pairing 
legal protective solutions with extensive efforts to prevent the vulnerabilities that 
lead to trafficking in the first place. Such efforts should include “protecting legal 
economics and ecologies, strengthening social supports and entitlements, 
guaranteeing labour and migration rights and protections, supporting and 
diversifying local livelihoods, and ensuring meaningful climate action.”225 Both the 
law226 and our sense of justice compel the diligent pursuit of these proactive efforts 
to meaningfully protect and provide for the most vulnerable people in our world. 
Nowhere is this truer than within the context of the climate change-human 
trafficking nexus—a monster of our own making. 
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Linguistic Minorities with Disabilities and the Right to 




This Comment examines whether international law guarantees for linguistic minorities 
with disabilities the right to native language instruction. Linguistic minorities with disabilities 
currently face two challenges: the barriers presented by their disability and the difficulties of 
learning the majority language. A right to native language instruction would help eliminate this 
second challenge, removing an obstacle in academic and social development. To determine the 
existence of such a right, this Comment will first analyze the language rights regime and show 
that linguistic rights require further evaluation of the specific pragmatic interests involved. Next, 
this Comment looks at treaty and case law surrounding the education rights of linguistic 
minorities, finding that courts discuss linguistic rights as a balancing of state and minority 
interests. Under these principles, this Comment will then examine the education rights of linguistic 
minorities under the disability law framework. It argues that because states are obligated to 
provide reasonable accommodations maximizing academic and social development consistent with 
the goal of full inclusion, a right to native language instruction for linguistic minorities with 
disabilities does exist. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
For many of us, learning a second language is a choice we make to 
supplement our education, which we receive entirely in our native language. 
However, minority language or non-native speakers are often forced to learn a 
second language in order to access the educational system. Minority language 
speakers with disabilities must, on top of obstacles created by their disability, also 
overcome language barriers in school. These students can make up a significant 
portion of a population: for instance, in 2017, English language learners with 
disabilities in the United States numbered 718,000, constituting 14.3% of the total 
English language learner population enrolled in U.S. public schools.1 In contrast, 
out of a total of nearly 131,000 public schools in the U.S. in 2017,2 only 3,000 
schools had dual-language immersion programs. Unfortunately, as these dual-
language programs become increasingly popular among affluent native English 
speakers, English learners who stand to benefit significantly from them may be 
squeezed out.3 
In 1966, only five nations did not have a linguistic minority equal to at least 
one percent of their total population, while eighty-four nations had linguistic 
minorities equaling or exceeding ten percent of their population. 4  Because 
language serves as a foundation for society, linguistic protection is important. 
Today, although there are approximately 7,115 languages spoken in the world,5 
linguists predict that at least fifty percent of the world’s languages will disappear 
by the end of the century.6 Lack of education, even for minority languages not 
currently at risk of dying out, exacerbates linguistic inequalities. The right to 
education—particularly instruction in native languages—is “a corner stone for 
[the] social and economic development” of linguistic minorities.7 Monolingual 
education in majority languages may lead to “inferior education, [ ] reinforced 
conditioning to failure, and excessive dropout rates” for minority language 
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https://perma.cc/JJJ9-UA95.  
3  Kristin Lam & Erin Richards, More US Schools Teach in English and Spanish, but Not Enough to Help 
Latino Kids, USA TODAY (May 23, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://perma.cc/PU9L-PH5N. 
4  Christopher J. Reeber, Linguistic Minorities and the Right to an Effective Education, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 
112, 120 (1972). 
5  The World Factbook: Languages, CENT. INTEL. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/5HNH-PKQN.  
6  Nina Strochlic, The Race to Save the World’s Disappearing Languages, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 16, 
2018), https://perma.cc/2AQY-BQVN.  
7  Amare Tesfaye & Zelalem Kebu, The Protection of Linguistic Minorities: An Appraisal on the Role of 
Multination Federalism, 7 BEIJING L. REV. 314, 329 (2016). 
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speakers; for instance, in the U.S., the “proportion of dropouts among Spanish 
speaking children is far greater in comparison to that of English speaking 
children.”8 
Despite continuous emphasis on the need to tailor and specialize programs 
for people with disabilities to access learning, education systems often fail to 
provide enough support. The addition of a language barrier further cripples access 
to learning, making it doubly difficult for linguistic minorities with disabilities to 
receive an effective education. Nearly one billion people live with a disability.9 
However, ninety percent of children with disabilities in developing countries do 
not attend school, and the literacy rate for adults with disabilities, according to a 
1998 study, may be as low as three percent.10 
For linguistic minority students with disabilities attending school, requiring 
that they speak the majority language—supposedly necessary for accessing the 
curriculum—may also isolate them from their culture and families, especially 
when their families do not speak the majority language. Linguistic rights in 
education present complicated obstacles for states trying to integrate minorities 
while preserving their unique identities, particularly when they view minority 
languages as threats to the political unity of the state. 11  Some believe that 
instituting native language support or instruction for minorities, such as bilingual 
education, will only confuse minority children and prevent them from learning.12 
However, contrary to the perception that monolingual education in the majority 
language is necessary for advancement, research shows that being exposed to two 
languages—both the native minority language and the majority language—actually 
benefits the progress of children with disabilities.13 
This Comment discusses whether international law guarantees linguistic 
minorities with disabilities the right to receive native language instruction. Section 
II analyzes the language rights regime for linguistic minorities by looking at treaties 
and concludes that, in practice, positive language rights implicate a pragmatic 
balancing of the state interest against minority interests. Looking specifically at the 
education rights of linguistic minorities, Section III confirms that courts also 
employ a balancing or policy-focused approach in deciding when linguistic 
educational rights can be vindicated. As a result, determining whether linguistic 
minorities with disabilities are entitled to a positive right of native language 
 
8  Reeber, supra note 4, at 121–22. 
9  Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. SOC. AFFS. DISABILITY, 
https://perma.cc/BC4T-J6U8. 
10 Id. 
11  Gulara Guliyeva, Education, Languages and Linguistic Minorities in the EU: Challenges and Perspectives, 19 
EUR. L.J. 219, 220 (2013). 
12  Sara E. N. Kangas, “That’s Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: The Intersection of Special Education and 
Dual Language Education, 119 TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1, 4–5 (2017). 
13  Id. at 5.  
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instruction depends on a balancing of the interests involved. Section IV first 
explores the treaties concerning disability and education rights. It then argues that 
linguistic minorities with disabilities are guaranteed a right to education in their 
native language. Finally, having shown the existence of such a right, this Comment 
discusses the contours and implications of the right. 
II.  THE LANGUAGE RIGHTS REGIME FOR LINGUISTIC 
MINORITIES  
An understanding of the language rights regime provides context for 
determining whether linguistic minorities with disabilities have a right to native 
language instruction. Such an understanding requires a brief overview of how 
international law is structured. International law is a decentralized system formed 
by international norms or rules, which arise out of international conventions and 
treaties, international custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions.14 
These international norms can be categorized as legally-binding or non-legally 
binding.15 For instance, signed treaties and covenants require explicit consent 
from the state and are thus legally-binding.16 Customary rules, while also legally-
binding, require enough states to abide by or practice according to the rule for it 
to become a legally-binding norm.17 
Non-legally binding norms include declarations, standards, U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions, and commitments.18 However, the divide between legally-
binding and non-legally binding norms can be minimal: for example, non-binding 
declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration) are widely seen as binding.19 On the other hand, treaty reservations 
and optional provisions mean that signatories of a single treaty may actually have 
different legal obligations. 20 
Linguistic minorities are discussed—but not defined—in a number of 
international and regional treaties and declarations outlining the international 
norms surrounding linguistic rights. These instruments include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration, and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minorities Languages (ECRML). 
 
14  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Jun. 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1031. 
15  Snezana Trifunovska, Factors Affecting the Applicability and Efficiency of International Norms Protecting 
Linguistic Rights of Minorities, 9 INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 235, 240 (2002). 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18 Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. at 251. 
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A.  Definition of a Linguistic Minority  
One difficulty of defining education rights for linguistic minorities arises out 
of the ambiguities surrounding minority rights and the definition of minorities. In 
human rights, the term “minority” usually refers to national, ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic minorities. 21  However, it is often difficult to identify or organize 
minority groups; while some groups live in well-defined areas, others may be 
scattered throughout one or multiple states.22 Some minorities may be united 
under strong cultural or historical bonds, while others group together under a 
more fragmented notion of commonality.23 There is no consensus as to what the 
definition of a minority group is, not even among international documents 
focused on minority protection.24 
This Comment will use the 1979 definition provided by Francesco Capotorti, 
the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, in the context of the ICCPR. Capotorti defined a 
minority group as: 
[A] group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State 
and in a non-dominant position, whose members . . . possess ethnic, religious 
or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the 
population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.25 
Both the objective criterion that a group be in a non-dominant position and 
the subjective criterion regarding the will of the members of the group remain 
important in recognizing minority status.26 The U.N. has focused on protecting 
national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities; in particular, the U.N. also 
recognizes the importance of “combat[ing] multiple discrimination and [ ] 
address[ing] situations where a person belonging to a national or ethnic, religious 
and linguistic minority is also discriminated against on other grounds such as [ ] 
disability.”27 Multiple discrimination—such as a child with disabilities who must 
 
21  Tesfaye & Kebu, supra note 7, at 317. 
22  U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for 
Implementation, U.N. Doc HR/PUB/10/3, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter Minority Rights Standards and 
Guidance]. 
23  Id. 
24  Antonija Petričušić, The Rights of Minorities in International Law: Tracing Developments in Normative 
Arrangements of International Organizations, 11 CROATIAN INT’L RELS. REV. 47, 48 (2005). 
25  Francesco Capotorti (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Prot. of Minorities), Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, ¶ 568 (1979). Originally, this definition included a 
qualification that members of the group be nationals of the state—this criterion has often been 
challenged. See Minority Rights Standards and Guidance, supra note 22, at 2. 
26  See Minority Rights Standards and Guidance, supra note 22, at 3. 
27  Id. 
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also, unfairly, overcome language barriers—may have lasting damage on minority 
groups.28 
Protecting linguistic minorities is important because of the fundamental role 
language plays in self-conception and community facilitation. To the individual, 
language is “a culturally inherited trait” affected by other factors like geography, 
age, occupation, personality, and social status.29 In society, language functions as 
a medium of communication.30 Historically, language deprivation has been used 
as a tool of oppression: linguistic imperialism involves the “transfer of a dominant 
language to other peoples,” as “a demonstration of power” where “aspects of the 
dominant culture are usually transferred along with the language.”31 International 
treaties consistently include linguistic minorities within their definitions of 
“minority” as scholars recognize the importance of linguistic identities—often key 
to cultural identity and the preservation of communities—and the need to protect 
linguistic minorities.32 
B.  Treaties and Declarations Addressing Linguistic Rights  
Although no comprehensive international treaty dedicated to language rights 
exists, language interests are discussed in a number of major international 
instruments and regional treaties.33 These include the Universal Declaration,34 the 
ICCPR,35 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,36 the American 
 
28  Multiple discrimination refers to discrimination that “occur[s] on the basis of more than one 
perceived characteristic . . . creat[ing a] cumulative disadvantage.” Intersectionality and Multiple 
Discrimination, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/P33J-M93H. 
29  THE USE OF VERNACULAR LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION 8–9 (UNESCO 1953). 
30  Id. at 9. 
31  Some scholars, like Robert Phillipson, argue that the spread of English throughout the world is an 
instance of linguistic imperialism, as the “British Empire [gave] . . . way to the empire of English.” 
Huda Kamal El-qassaby argues that today, “English as an imperialist language has become settled 
fact.” Huda Kamal El-qassaby, Linguistic Imperialism and Reshaping the World’s New Identity: A Research 
Paper in Linguistics, 3 INT’L J. LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS 61, 62 (2015). 
32  See Moria Paz, The Failed Promise of Language Rights: A Critique of the International Language Rights Regime, 
54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157, 160–61 (2013). 
33  Id. at 170. 
34  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
Universal Declaration] (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . language.”). 
35  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
36  Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 2, Jun. 27, 1981, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter AfCHPR]. 
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Convention on Human Rights,37 the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR),38 and the ECRML. 39 
1. International instruments create for linguistic minorities a negative 
right to use their native languages. 
While the ICCPR mentions language in Article 26, its general anti-
discrimination article,40 it also contains articles requiring non-discrimination in the 
protection of children (including on the basis of language) and equal protection 
of the law.41 Article 27 of the ICCPR addresses minority rights in particular: “[i]n 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.”42 Moria Paz describes Article 27 
as notable for—unlike the Universal Declaration—expressing a direct right to 
language going “beyond a guarantee of non-discrimination and the protection of 
individual rights.”43 Article 27 places focus on minority groups’ ability to “enjoy,” 
“profess and practice,” and “use” their culture, religion, or language, suggesting a 
broad range of rights that states must respect. 
However, the use of the language “shall not be denied,” rather than “shall 
ensure,” implies that the right is a negative one. Negative rights prevent states 
from discriminating against the right-holder, while positive rights guarantee that 
the state will take certain actions on behalf of the right-holder. Thus, while the 
state cannot take actions that prevent minorities from using their own language, 
the ICCPR does not require states to take affirmative measures to ensure 
minorities can use their own language. Furthermore, because states shall not deny 
linguistic minorities the right to use their own language only when “in community 
with the other members of their group,” the linguistic right guaranteed under 
Article 27 may be significantly weakened for minorities that are not concentrated 
in one well-defined area. These limits in the ICCPR’s language suggest that while 
Article 27 brings attention to linguistic minorities as a group under special 
 
37  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 
S. TREATY DOC NO. 95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter AmCHR]. 
38  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
39  Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, E.T.S. No. 148 
[hereinafter ECRML]. 
40  ICCPR, supra note 35, at art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . language . . . .”). 
41  Id. art. 24. 
42  Id. art. 27. 
43  Paz, supra note 32, at 171. 
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protection, it may be, in practice, a “narrow right that imposes on states only a 
negative duty to refrain from regulating language use” in linguistic minorities’ own 
communities.44 
The 1992 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (U.N. Minorities Declaration) 
suggests that when it comes to language rights, states’ responsibilities should look 
more like positive rather than negative rights. Article 2 guarantees that “[p]ersons 
belonging to . . . linguistic minorities . . . have the right to enjoy their own 
culture . . . and to use their own language.”45 Article 1 requires that states “protect 
the existence and the . . . linguistic identity of minorities within their respective 
territories and encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.”46 These 
articles remove the language in the ICCPR suggesting the right is a negative right 
and replace it with a positive obligation to guarantee usage of native languages and 
to encourage promotion of linguistic identities. For instance, under article 4(3), 
states “should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons 
belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother 
tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.”47 However, while the U.N. 
Minorities Declaration suggests a stronger right to native language use, the 
declaration is not binding and provides no substantive language rights beyond 
Article 4(3).48 
At the very least, international instruments provide linguistic minorities with 
a negative right to use their native language: states cannot take actions stripping 
them of this right. However, determining whether a state has further obligations 
to provide native language instruction for linguistic minorities with disabilities 
requires the support of other legal instruments. 
2. Regional instruments create further state obligations to protect 
linguistic rights. 
A state may have additional obligations to protect the rights of linguistic 
minorities under regional legal instruments, which have also included linguistic 
rights within their protective umbrellas. The African Charter on Human and 
 
44  Paz, supra note 32, at 173. 
45  G.A. Res. 47/135, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter U.N. Minorities Declaration]. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  See id. 
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Peoples’ Rights,49 the American Convention on Human Rights,50 and the ECHR51 
all contain provisions mentioning language rights: using similar language, these 
provisions call for states to not discriminate based on race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, 
or any other social condition. These treaties do not include any provisions similar 
to ICCPR’s Article 27 or Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Minorities Declaration. 
Instead, the non-discrimination clauses place the language right under a general 
human rights regime without providing any guidelines or obligations for 
substantive realization. 
In 1992, the Council of Europe adopted the world’s only legally-binding 
treaty solely addressing linguistic rights. The European Charter for Regional or 
Minorities Languages (ECRML) includes measures promoting the use of minority 
languages through aspects like education (Article 8), media (Article 11), cultural 
activities and facilities (Article 12), and economic and social life (Article 13).52 
These measures imply that states have a positive right to promote and protect 
minority languages beyond the negative right to not be denied usage. The ECRML 
preamble identifies “the right to use a regional or minority language in private and 
public life [as] an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied in the 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 53  This 
statement suggests that the parties interpret the ECRML to be a legitimate 
implementation of Article 27 of the ICCPR, consistent with existing international 
law rather than inventing new rights. At the same time, Article 4 specifies that the 
ECRML will “not affect any more favourable provisions concerning the status of 
regional or minority languages, or the legal regime of persons belonging to 
minorities which may exist in a Party or are provided for by relevant bilateral or 
multilateral international agreements.” 54  Thus, the treaty leaves open the 
possibility that other international law instruments may demand more from states 
in protecting or ensuring the rights of linguistic minorities. 
The ECRML defines “regional or minority languages” as languages 
“traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who 
 
49  AfCHPR, supra note 36, at art. 2 (“Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind 
such as . . . language.”). 
50  AmCHR, supra note 37, at art. 1 (“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, 
color, sex, language . . . .”). 
51  ECHR, supra note 38, at art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as . . . language.”). 
52  Id. 
53  Id. pmbl. 
54  Id. art. 4. 
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form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population” that are 
“different from the official language(s) of that State.” 55  Consistent with 
Capotorti’s general definition of minorities,56 the ECRML’s definition includes the 
objective criteria of numeric inferiority and non-dominance. However, the 
ECRML’s definition of language—which in turn defines the linguistic groups 
affected—does not include the subjective criterion that members intend to 
preserve their language. As a result, the definition excludes dialects of official 
languages and the languages of migrants.57 The treaty also allows States Party 
considerable leeway in choosing their obligations: States Party must commit to, at 
a minimum, thirty-five paragraphs or sub-paragraphs from Part III, out of eighty-
nine total sub-paragraphs. 58  Moreover, parties take on obligations per each 
minority language in their territory, specified at the time of ratification.59 
The ECRML categorizes the protection and promotion of minority 
languages as “an important contribution to the building of a Europe based on the 
principles of democracy and cultural diversity within the framework of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”60 However, it also states “that the protection 
and encouragement of regional or minority languages should not be to the 
detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them.”61 Combined with 
the opt-in structure of the treaty, this statement suggests that while linguistic 
minorities have a negative right to use their own language, any positive rights 
requiring the state to take action to support their usage must be balanced against 
other state interests. Thus, although the ECRML sets out provisions dictating 
positive rights (for instance, a state committing to sub-paragraph 1(b)(i) of Article 
8 must “make available primary education in the relevant regional or minority 
languages”62), states may choose which obligations to sign onto for a specific 
minority language according to their interests. 
States have an interest in establishing “national” or “official” languages to 
“unify and stabilize” their populations and establish centralized systems.63 The 
ECRML recognizes this interest by “noting that the protection and 
 
55  ECRML, supra note 39, at art. 1. 
56  See Capotorti, supra note 25, and accompanying text. 
57  ECRML, supra note 39, at art. 1. 
58  Under Article 2, States Party must “apply a minimum of thirty-five paragraphs or sub-paragraphs 
chosen from among the provisions of Part III of the Charter, including at least three chosen from 
each of the Articles 8 and 12 and one from each of the Articles 9, 10, 11 and 13.” Article 8 deals 
with education, and Article 12 covers cultural activities and facilities. Id. art. 2. 
59  Id. art. 2. 
60  Id. pmbl. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. art. 8. 
63  See Andrea R. Ball, Note, Equal Accessibility for Sign Language under the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 759, 763 (2011). 
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encouragement of . . . minority languages should not be to the detriment of the 
official languages and the need to learn them.”64 Protection of minority languages 
occurs “within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”65 
Unfortunately, these recognized good-faith state interests also compel minority 
language users “to learn the [official] language in order to freely function within 
the domestic political and civil system.”66 Those who cannot acquire the national 
language instead face “linguistic persecution.” 67  Necessity may force minority 
language users to give up their languages to conform to the national or official 
language. Therefore, states need to walk a tight balance between advancing their 
interests in unity and stability and upholding their obligation to not deny linguistic 
minorities usage of their native languages. 
3. States balance interests when upholding positive linguistic rights. 
The difficulties of defining language rights heighten the tension between 
state interests in unity or stability and the rights of linguistic minorities. Scholar 
Moria Paz defines language rights as “specific entitlements that protect language-
related acts and values,” where “the aim of the legal protection is to ensure both 
that individuals enjoy a safe linguistic environment in which to speak their mother 
tongues and that vulnerable linguistic [ ] groups retain a fair chance to flourish.”68 
Her definition covers only “pure” language rights, which do not include language 
rights that enable the exercise of other substantive rights. For example, requiring 
special educational support for linguistic minorities due to their inability to speak 
the majority language is an educational right rather than a language right, since 
language is “a barrier they must overcome in order to enjoy equal opportunities 
in education.”69 Linguistic differences play into every facet of interactions with 
society and the state: because of the uniquely pervasive nature of language, it can 
be difficult to separate out “pure” language interests. 
While states must, at minimum, not deny linguistic minorities the right to 
use their language, states have discretion over balancing which interests to advance 
and which to forgo when it comes to language rights connected to other rights 
(such as through the scheme created by Article 2 of the ECRML). Paz argues for 
breaking down the panoply of language rights into more specific rights to create 
a “collection of narrower, more particular interests, only some of which (and likely 
not most) are entitled to absolute protection under the law.”70 Narrowing the 
 
64  ECRML, supra note 39, at pmbl. 
65  Id. 
66  Ball, supra note 63, at 763. 
67  Id. 
68  Paz, supra note 32, at 168. 
69  Id. at 169 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566–68 (1974)). 
70  Id. at 213. 
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discussion to one specific interest helps clarify exactly which rights states must 
uphold; in particular, this Comment determines whether linguistic minorities with 
disabilities are entitled to legal protection of their right to native language 
instruction. 
III.  THE EDUCATION RIGHTS OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES  
Because the right to be provided education in one’s native language 
implicates a balancing of the state unity interest against the linguistic minority’s 
interest (not a “pure” language right), a discussion of the right to education and 
its intersection with language helps further flesh out what this balancing looks like 
in increasingly multilingual societies. Such an analysis must first look at treaty law 
surrounding the educational rights of linguistic minorities and then at case law 
from the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
A.  Treaty Law 
A number of international and regional legal frameworks provide for the 
right to education specifically. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) emphasizes the universality of the right to 
education.71 Articles 28 through 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) and Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
also contain provisions on the right to education.72 While the ICESCR does not 
mention language rights as applied to education,73 both the ICCPR and the CRC 
give linguistic minorities language rights as part of a broad protection of human 
rights without specifying exactly how they intersect with educational rights.74 
Drafted by the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), the 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education 
(Discrimination in Education Convention), signed by 106 states, includes a 
provision recognizing “the right of members of national minorities to . . . ,  
depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their 
own language.”75 However, this right must (1) not prevent linguistic minorities 
 
71  UNESCO, The Right to Education for Persons with Disabilities: Overview of the Measures Supporting the Right 
to Education for Persons with Disabilities reported on by Member States; Monitoring of the Implementation of the 
Convention and Recommendation against Discrimination in Education (8th Consultation) at 5, U.N. Doc. ED-
2015/WS/3 (2015) [hereinafter UNESCO Overview of Measures]. 
72  Id. 
73  See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
74  See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 30, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
CRC]; ICCPR, supra note 35, at art. 27. 
75  Convention Against Discrimination in Education, art. 5, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93. 
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from understanding the majority language and participating in the community, or 
prejudice national sovereignty; (2) not create a lower standard of education than 
the general standard of education; and (3) make attendance at minority-language 
schools optional.76 Thus, similar to the qualifying language found in the ECRML’s 
preamble,77 the Discrimination in Education Convention suggests that the right 
to education in linguistic minorities’ native languages is again a positive right under 
state discretion to balance against other interests. 
Nevertheless, according to Article 4 of the 1992 U.N. Minorities Declaration, 
“[s]tates should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons 
belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother 
tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.”78 This Article, although 
non-binding, suggests that linguistic minorities may be entitled to being educated 
or taught in their native languages, not merely to teach or use their native languages 
with each other. While it does give states some discretion by allowing for 
“appropriate measures,” it does not include the qualifying language found in the 
Discrimination in Education Convention. 
Furthermore, the CRC reinforces the idea that language is an important 
factor to be considered by the state. Education must be aimed at the 
“development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities 
to their fullest potential,” which includes the child’s language skills.79 Education 
must also develop “respect for the child’s cultural identity, language and values,” 
which implies a linguistic identity different from the official or majority language.80 
Education systems fail to respect a child’s language if assimilation into the majority 
language due to monolingual education erases the child’s native minority language. 
Language attrition, the “gradual reduction or loss of linguistic knowledge and skills 
in an individual . . . caused . . . by a change in one’s contact with the language(s) 
in question,”81 may lead a child to lose their native language under a monolingual 
majority language education system. 
Studies show that, generally, the younger an individual migrates from their 
native language environment to a new linguistic environment, the “quicker and 
the more severe the extent of language loss.”82 Monolingual education leading to 
the loss of the child’s native language may also impact their ability to communicate 
 
76  Convention Against Discrimination in Education, art. 5, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93. 
77  The ECRML notes “that the protection and encouragement of . . . minority languages should not 
be to the detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them.” ECRML, supra note 39, 
at pmbl. 
78  U.N. Minorities Declaration, supra note 45. 
79  CRC, supra note 74, at art. 29. 
80  Id. 
81  Eun Sung Park, Language Attrition, in THE TESOL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
TEACHING 1 (John I. Liontas & Margo DelliCarpini eds., 2018). 
82  Id. at 6. 
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with family members. Article 30 of the CRC mandates that if “linguistic 
minorities . . . exist” in a state, children “belonging to such a minority . . . shall not 
be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group . . . to 
use [their] own language.”83 States shall not deny linguistic minorities the use of 
their language in community with each other. If language attrition significantly 
frustrates linguistic minority children’s ability to use their language, severing their 
ability to communicate with family members who do not speak the majority 
language, states may fail to uphold this right. 
Other treaties like the ECRML similarly reflect a mandate for states to 
balance relevant interests in recognizing language as part of linguistic minorities’ 
education right. Although the ECRML has only a monitoring system and no 
judicial enforcement mechanism, it “provides a set of values, [or] international 
norms, that guide European states in their policies towards minority languages,” 
setting forth a normative interpretation of the right of language use first stated in 
the ICCPR.84 Under the ECRML, parties must choose at least three paragraphs or 
sub-paragraphs from Article 8 (education) to comply with.85 States may choose to 
“undertake [certain provisions], within the territory in which such languages are 
used, according to the situation of each of these languages, and without prejudice 
to the teaching of the official language(s) of the State.”86 For instance, states may 
choose: 
i) to make available primary education in the relevant regional or minority 
languages; or 
ii) to make available a substantial part of primary education in the relevant 
regional or minority languages; or 
iii) to provide, within primary education, for the teaching of the relevant 
regional or minority languages as an integral part of the curriculum; or 
iv) to apply one of the measures provided for under i to iii above at least to 
those pupils whose families so request and whose number is considered 
sufficient. 87 
Out of seventy-two sets of provisions submitted by states regarding various 
minority languages in their territories, fifty-eight sets signed on to at least one of 
the above options for primary education.88 Similar choices also exist for secondary, 
 
83  CRC, supra note 74, at art. 30. 
84  R. Gwynedd Parry, History, Human Rights and Multilingual Citizenship: Conceptualising the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 61 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 329, 334 (2010); see Section II.B.1; 
ICCPR, supra note 35, at art. 2. 
85  ECRML, supra note 39, at art. 2. 
86  Id. art. 8. 
87  Id. 
88  In choosing which provisions to sign on to, a plurality of sets submitted chose the least restrictive 
option, ¶ iv. For instance, under Article 8(1)(b) addressing primary education, nineteen sets selected 
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technical, and vocational education.89 Outside of territories where regional or 
minority languages are traditionally used, parties may sign on to Article 8(2), which 
requires that states “allow, encourage or provide teaching in or of the regional or 
minority language” when “the number of users of a regional or minority language 
justifies it.” 90  Out of the seventy-two different sets of provisions, thirty-nine 
parties signed onto Article 8(2).91 States have discretion over when they believe 
the number of linguistic minorities justifies implementing education in or of those 
minority languages. States are also free to choose their obligations according to a 
certain language in a specific part of their territory: for instance, the Czech 
Republic’s declaration of ratification signed onto different provisions for the 
Polish language in the Moravian-Silesian Region and the Slovak language all 
throughout the territory.92 
Twenty-five European states have ratified the ECRML, with eleven states 
submitting different provisions for different languages and territories within their 
boundaries (making for a total of seventy-two different sets of provisions).93 The 
piecemeal application of the treaty to education rights suggests that European 
states are balancing different needs and interests in different areas as they consider 
the implementation of the right of language use first stated in the ICCPR. Critics 
of the ECRML argue that such broad state discretion gives states too much power 
to choose and apply provisions according to their political goals.94 However, the 
ECRML’s “flexibility can also be a virtue” in Europe’s complex and diverse 
linguistic landscape.95 Given the practical complexities of providing education in 
minority languages (for instance, training teachers or dealing with areas with 
multiple minority languages), encouraging “gradual, progressive compliance” may 
lead to better compliance long term.96 Unreachable short-term goals may result in 
states simply failing to meet their obligations. 
In general, the complexity of linguistic education rights for minorities, even 
within smaller regions, due to lack of consensus on what is protected may explain 
the conditioned approaches taken by treaty law. Minority languages span from 
migrant minority languages—imagine a young Hungarian child who moves from 
Hungary to live in Romania—to indigenous languages, which are often discussed 
 
¶ i, eleven chose ¶ ii, seven chose ¶ iii, and twenty-six chose ¶ iv. Reservations and Declarations for Treaty 
No. 148 – European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
https://perma.cc/9U4B-SGSN (Aug. 11, 2020) [hereinafter ECRML Declarations].  
89  ECRML Declarations, supra note 88, ECRML, supra note 39, at art. 8. 
90  ECRML, supra note 39, at art. 8. 
91  ECRML Declarations, supra note 88. 
92  Id. 
93  Germany alone submitted twenty-three sets of provisions for different regions. Id. 
94  Parry, supra note 84, at 332. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
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separately. In Europe, majority-language speakers in one country may become 
minority-language speakers in another country without becoming a regional 
minority. The already narrowed linguistic educational right may be further limited 
by distinctions amongst minority languages: the European Court of Justice tended 
to give privileges to migrant minority-language E.U. speakers, recognizing “a clear 
connection between . . . Union citizenship on the one hand and language rights 
(or, respectively, minority rights) on the other.” 97  Unfortunately, no similar 
protections guarantee “mother-tongue education [for] ‘traditional’ minorities” 
who are not majority-language speakers in another European Union country. 98 
B.  Case Law 
Cases decided by international courts help explain how language rights are 
actually implemented beyond the broad conceptions laid out by human rights 
treaties. Protection for minority languages under treaties (excluding the ECRML) 
usually appears as negative obligations to prohibit discrimination against linguistic 
minorities, rather than positive obligations requiring affirmative action to 
encourage minority language usage in the public sector.99 Case law reveals that 
courts, in line with the pragmatism underlying treaty law, act like policy makers in 
balancing the rights and interests at stake.100 
Cases concerning linguistic minorities have been brought to both the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). In Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan, the UNHRC considered the denial of re-
registration of a newspaper published in the minority language of Tajik by 
Uzbekistan authorities.101 The publication was distributed to schools using Tajik 
as the language of instruction and contained educational materials, reports on 
matters of cultural interest, and samples of student work.102 These schools faced 
“shortages in Tajik-language textbooks, low wages for teachers and the forced 
opening of Uzbek-language classes in some Tajik schools.”103 The UNHRC found 
a violation of Article 27 of the ICCPR, since the “challenged restriction [had] an 
impact so substantial that it [ ] effectively den[ied] to the complainants the right 
to enjoy their cultural rights.”104 This denial violated linguistic minorities’ negative 
right to use their language, which constitutes part of their culture. The UNHRC 
 
97  Guliyeva, supra note 11, at 234. 
98  Id. 
99  See Ball, supra note 63, at 770. 
100  See Paz, supra note 32, at 187. 
101  Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 1334/2004, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, 2 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
102  Id. at ¶ 2.2 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
103  Id. at ¶ 8.7. 
104  Id. 
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noted that “in the context of Article 27, education in a minority language is a 
fundamental part of minority culture.”105 Although the UNHRC ruled on the basis 
of the denial of the cultural right—a lesser infringement on Tajik education may 
not have resulted in the same ruling—the case affirms the importance of minority 
language instruction to linguistic minority groups. 
In J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, authors of the complaint argued that 
they had been denied use of their native language in “administration, justice, 
education and public life.”106 The UNHRC held that the state violated Article 26, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of language, since the state “barr[ed] 
the use of Afrikaans [not only] to the issuing of public documents but even to 
telephone conversations.”107 Because the authors of the complaint did not argue 
that their language rights under Article 27 were denied, the UNHRC did not 
examine the Article 27 issue.108 The UNHRC did not comment on the education 
point raised either—likely because the substantial denial of any use of Afrikaans 
made it easy for the UNHRC to find a violation without going into the details. In 
both Mavlonov and J.G.A. Diergaardt, the substantiality of the infringement on the 
negative right to language usage played a part in the UNHRC’s findings, such that 
the court did not need to consider the complexities of the positive right to 
education conducted in minority languages. 
In the Belgian Linguistic Case, “Francophone parents argued that Belgium 
implicitly violated the rights of French-speaking minority parents living in 
Flanders by offering education in state-financed schools in Dutch only, while also 
withdrawing subsidies from private schools operating in French in that region.”109 
The ECtHR found language to be distinct from identity—unlike religion—such 
that “requiring children to assimilate against their wishes, into the sphere of the 
regional language cannot be characterized as an act of depersonalization.”110 This 
ruling suggests that assimilation itself, without the severe consequences in 
Mavlonov and J.G.A Diergaardt, does not automatically imply a violation of the 
negative right to language usage. The Court noted that Belgium’s purpose was “to 
achieve linguistic unity within the two large regions of Belgium in which a large 
 
105  Mavlonov v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 1334/2004, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, ¶ 8.7 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
106  J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997, ¶ 10.10 (Jul. 25, 2000). Only 0.8 percent of the population spoke 
English as their mother tongue; nonetheless, the government set English as the only official 
language and refused to establish legislation allowing for the usage of other languages. Id. at ¶ 3.4. 
107  Id. at ¶¶ 10.6, 10.10. 
108  Id. at ¶ 3 (Jul. 25, 2000) (P.N. Bhagwati, Lord Colville & Maxwell Yalden, dissenting). 
109  Paz, supra note 32, at 181. 
110  Id. 
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majority of the population speaks only one of the two national languages.”111 
Belgian policies thus served the corresponding public interest “that all schools 
dependent on the State and existing in a unilingual region conduct their teaching 
in the language [ ] essentially of the region.”112 In fact, the Court found that the 
ECHR “implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of 
the Community and the respect due to fundamental human rights.”113 The passage 
of the ECRML, three decades later, may better detail such a balance. 
The ECtHR in Oršuš v. Croatia similarly considered the interests of the state 
and the individuals. In Oršuš, Roma children were barred from Croatian-language 
classes due to their insufficient Croatian language skills and put into segregated 
Roma-only classes; these classes implemented a 30% reduced version of the 
Croatian full curriculum. 114  Rather than order Croatia to boost their Roma-
language classes to meet the same standards of the Croatian-language classes, the 
Court found that Croatia was obligated to “take appropriate positive measures to 
assist [Roma pupils] in acquiring the necessary language skills . . . so that they 
could be quickly integrated into mixed classes.”115 Given that Roma children were 
being left behind by the Croatian education system, 116  the Court prioritized 
assimilation as the solution: placing pupils in Roma-only classes was only 
legitimate if it helped “bring[ ] their command of the Croatian language up to an 
adequate level” to secure “immediate transfer to a mixed-class.117 
The ECtHR’s approach both in Oršuš and the Belgian Linguistic Case suggests 
that balancing education and language rights only leads to what Paz calls “speedy 
assimilation on fair terms.”118 The treatment of the Roma pupils implies that 
minority language groups’ spaces of native language instruction are “protected by 
the law only so long as they are unable to speak the majority language.”119 The 
Court’s analysis of language rights sponsors “a policy that allows the State to 
incentivize assimilation of fair terms, transforming a diversity-protecting impulse 
into an integrationist regime.” 120  Courts may interpret language claims by 
 
111  Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium,” 
1968 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 832, 884 (1968).  
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 861. 
114  Oršuš v. Croatia, App. No. 15766/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 165 (2010); Paz, supra note 32, at 186. 
115  Oršuš, App. No. 15766/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 165. 
116  The Court characterized the Roma students as having “linguistic deficiencies.” Id. at ¶ 167. 
117  Id. at ¶ 172. 
118  Paz, supra note 32, at 187. 
119  Id. at 204. Under the Oršuš framework, linguistic minorities are provided native language instruction 
to the extent that it allows them to expediently reach fluency in the majority language. Once they 
reach that goal, native language instruction vanishes as they are assimilated into the majority 
language education system. 
120  Id. at 201–02. 
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balancing the facts, economic and political circumstances, and normative stakes.121 
Determining whether linguistic minorities with disabilities may have a right to 
native language instruction will require further balancing of the state’s interests in 
assimilation and unity against the rights implicated by treaties on disability rights. 
When state action or inaction looks more like a substantial violation of the 
negative right to language usage, courts are more likely to find the state in the 
wrong. 
IV.  THE EDUCATION RIGHTS OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 
WITH DISABILITIES  
While the right to use one’s native language is an inalienable negative right, 
the right of linguistic minorities with disabilities to native language instruction is a 
positive right that states may balance against other interests. Combining disability 
rights and education rights exposes how courts may interpret a case involving the 
rights of linguistic minorities with disabilities to native language instruction. Such 
an analysis must also consider the practical consequences such rights may have on 
educational policy. 
No treaty specifically mentions the educational rights of linguistic minorities 
with disabilities, although overlaps exist between linguistic rights, disability rights, 
and educational rights. However, the disability rights framework—composed of 
both soft law created before the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) and the CRPD itself—provides enough guidelines to 
determine what interests are at play when it comes to linguistic minorities with 
disabilities. 
A.  Education and Disability Right s pre-CRPD 
While Section III examined the intersection of the right to education with 
linguistic rights, an analysis of the intersection of the right to education and 
disability rights first requires determining the goals of education. The right to 
education is “one of the most universally recognized rights in national 
constitutions in the world today,” and “[e]ven when not explicitly identified in the 
constitution, the right to education can be considered as an essential component 
for the enjoyment of other rights.” 122  Article 13 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) established that 
“education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
 
121  Paz, supra note 32, at 165. 
122  Kishore Singh (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Educ., at 8–9, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/23/35 (May 10, 2013). 
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the sense of its dignity, and . . . shall enable all persons to participate effectively in 
a free society.”123 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provided a 
framework for children’s rights internationally: the CRC is the most widely ratified 
international human rights treaty, with every single country except the U.S. having 
ratified it.124 Article 28 guarantees all children access to education “on the basis of 
equal opportunity;” in particular, states shall provide free compulsory primary 
education, encourage the development of secondary education (including 
vocational education), and higher education “accessible to all on the basis of 
capacity.”125 Under Article 29, a child’s education must, among other goals, “be 
directed to” the “development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential” and the “development of respect for 
the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values.”126 
The CRC also offers specific protection to children with disabilities. Article 
23 broadly recognizes “that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a 
full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and 
facilitate the child’s active participation in the community.”127 As a result, States 
Party must “recognize the right of the disabled child to special care . . . , subject 
to available resources.”128 In particular, states must offer assistance “designed to 
ensure that the disabled child has effective access to and receives education . . . in 
a manner conducive to the child’s achieving the fullest possible social integration 
and individual development, including [their] cultural and spiritual 
development.”129 This requirement echoes Article 28 and 29 but specifies that the 
“fullest potential” for children with disabilities means the “fullest possible social 
integration and individual development.”130 
While the CRC does not describe what such special education would look 
like and limits any special care to available resources, it nevertheless establishes 
that states must provide an education tailored to help the child’s individual 
progress. Moreover, by including “cultural and spiritual development” within 
 
123  Article 13 also included more specific provisions in pursuit of full realization of the stated right, 
including free compulsory primary education, generally available and accessible secondary 
education, and the development of a system of schools at all levels. The Article reserved for parents 
the right to choose their children’s schools, as long as the schools met minimum standards approved 
by states. ICESCR, supra note 73, at art. 13. 
124  Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country That Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU 
(Nov. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/K6SS-NLY6. 
125  CRC, supra note 74, at art. 28. 
126  Id. art. 29. 
127  Id. art. 23. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. arts. 23, 28–29.  
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“individual development,” the CRC suggests that state-provided education for 
children with disabilities extends beyond improving mental and physical abilities 
to also include accessing all aspects of the child’s personal life. 
Before the CRPD came into force in 2008, a soft law regime created in 1993 
governed international law surrounding disability rights.131 The U.N. Standard 
Rules for the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 
(“Standard Rules”) created twenty-two guidelines on preconditions, target areas 
for equal participation, and implementation measures. 132  The Standard Rules 
required that the education of persons with disabilities be integrated into 
mainstream education and afforded the same amount of educational resources as 
those for students without disabilities; they also include support services designed 
to meet the needs of students with different disabilities. 133  Although 
mainstreaming necessarily implies integration, integration may not always lead to 
equal participation for linguistic minorities with disabilities—especially when 
mainstreaming comes at the cost of losing home support systems. 
For instance, a 2005 study showed that when parents of bilingual children 
with autism stopped using their native language in their home, parent–child bonds 
were weakened due to parents’ limited proficiency in English, which “lessen[ed] 
the pragmatic models accessible to the child [ ] and exacerbate[ed] the child’s 
social isolation in the home.”134 For deaf children, “mentor programming that 
created a bilingual, both sign and spoken languages, and a bi-cultural environment 
was found to have had a considerable influence on the deaf child’s language 
development in both expressive and receptive language, including grammar, 
vocabulary, and general attitudes.” 135  Similarly, a 2010 study showed that, in 
reading and math, bilingual students with disabilities who participated in a two-
way immersion program (where half of the school day was done in English and 
the other half in the student’s native language) outperformed bilingual peers with 
disabilities who were enrolled in other kinds of language programs. 136  Such 
empirical evidence suggests that language is instrumental in helping linguistic 
minorities with disabilities access their education and preserve the support of their 
home communities and organizations. 
 
131  Ravi Malhotra & Robin F. Hansen, United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
its Implications for the Equality Rights of Canadians with Disabilities: The Case of Education, 29 WINDSOR 
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 73, 77 (2011). 
132  Id. 
133  G.A. Res. 48/96, annex, Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities (Dec. 20, 1993). 
134  Kangas, supra note 13, at 5. 
135  Maya Sabatello, Disability, Cultural Minorities, and International Law: Reconsidering the Case of the Deaf 
Community, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1025, 1045 (2005). 
136  Kangas, supra note 13, at 5. 
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Despite reaching a quasi-binding character,137 the Standard Rules did not 
spur progress towards the accessibility and equality that advocates hoped for.138 
As a result, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was drafted 
between 2002 and 2006. 
B.  Education and Disability Rights under the CRPD  
Attitudes on disability rights have shifted significantly since 1989. Rather 
than “viewing persons with disabilities as ‘objects’ of charity, medical treatment 
and social protection,” the international community started seeing “persons with 
disabilities as ‘subjects’ with rights . . . capable of claiming those rights and making 
decisions for their lives based on their free and informed consent.” 139 
In 2006, the U.N. adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), the most comprehensive human rights treaty on disability 
rights.140 Drafted between 2002 and 2006, it was a compromise between activists 
who wanted a CRC-style full treaty (instead of a solely anti-discrimination model) 
providing affirmative rights and others who wanted only a short additional 
protocol on disability attached to some existing convention. 141 As a result, while 
the CRPD is a convention detailing civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights, its “drafters were clear that no new rights were being created;” instead, 
“accessibility would foster the ability of people with disabilities to access existing 
services.”142 Not only was the CRPD the fastest negotiated human rights treaty, 
but it was also signed on opening day by the highest number of signatories to a 
U.N. Convention in history (eighty-two signatories), suggesting widespread 
acceptance of the norms it embodies.143 As of today, 182 countries are party to 
the CRPD and 164 countries are signatories.144 Ninety-four have also signed onto 
the Optional Protocol on enforcement and reporting measures.145 
 
137  Sabatello, supra note 135, at 1045. 
138  See Malhotra & Hansen, supra note 131, at 78. 
139  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, INT’L DISABILITY ALL., 
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140  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
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with Disabilities Education Act. See David L. Hutt, The Disability Rights Treaty and Advocacy Strategies 
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The purpose of the CRPD is “to promote, protect and ensure the full and 
equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons 
with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.” 146  This 
Comment uses the CRPD’s definition of persons with disabilities: persons with 
disabilities are “those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”147 In essence, 
“disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and 
attitudinal and environmental barriers.”148 Instead of placing the problem solely 
on persons with disabilities, the CRPD’s definition places equal weight on 
society’s attitudes, conditions, and policies. The drafters also recorded “concern[ ] 
about the difficult conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject to 
multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion . . . or other status.”149 
Within this new framework and definition of disability, States Party to the 
CRPD must “recognize the right of persons with disabilities to education . . . 
without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity.”150 Like the CRC, it 
requires states to direct education to, among other goals, the “development by 
persons with disabilities of their personality, talents and creativity, [and] . . . mental 
and physical abilities, to their fullest potential.” 151  However, the CRPD goes 
beyond the CRC by expanding on how states should realize this educational right. 
Article 24(2) requires States Party to ensure that: 
(a) Persons with disabilities are not excluded from the general education 
system on the basis of disability; 
(b) Persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and free and 
primary education and secondary education on an equal basis with others in 
the communities in which they live; 
(c) Reasonable accommodation of the individual’s requirements is provided;  
(d) Persons with disabilities receive the support required, within the general 
education system, to facilitate their effective education; 
(e) Effective individualized support measures are provided in environments 
that maximize academic and social development, consistent with the goal of 
full inclusion.152 
UNESCO has advocated a human rights-based view of education requiring 
equal educational opportunities to all, such that the right to education is inclusive 
 
146  CRPD, supra note 140, at art. 1. 
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of all marginalized or vulnerable groups.153 Thus, the CRPD “seeks to incorporate 
difference into the education system so that persons with disabilities learn the 
skills to participate effectively in a free society while enabling learners without 
disabilities to benefit from the experiences of students from diverse 
backgrounds.” 154  The treaty does not seek to eliminate differences or “fix” 
disabilities: UNESCO notes that “[i]ndividual differences should [ ] become 
opportunities to enrich learning rather than problems to be fixed.”155 
1. States must provide reasonable accommodation and individualized 
support measures to maximize academic and social development. 
To provide “inclusive, quality and free . . . education on an equal basis,” the 
CRPD requires states to provide “[r]easonable accommodation of the individual’s 
requirements” and “[e]ffective individualized support measures . . . that maximize 
academic and social development, consistent with the goal of full inclusion.”156 
Full and effective participation in a free society necessitates further analysis, as it 
exposes tensions between mainstreaming and language preservation. However, 
for linguistic minorities with disabilities, reasonable accommodation and 
maximizing academic and social development both require consideration of their 
native languages. 
Article 2 of the CRPD defines “reasonable accommodation” as “necessary 
and appropriate modification[s] and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate 
or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with 
disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”157 This definition suggests a familiar kind of 
balancing—in light of the goal of equality, states are to consider the necessity and 
appropriateness of a modification against the burden and cost it imposes. 
Although the CRPD does not further define what constitutes a disproportionate 
or undue burden, other provisions of the treaty help show what is not a 
disproportionate or undue burden. 
To ensure “full and equal participation in education and as members of the 
community,” States Party must take the following measures for persons who are 
blind, deaf, or deafblind: 
a) Facilitating the learning of Braille, alternative script, augmentative and 
alternative modes, means and formats of communication and orientation and 
mobility skills, and facilitating peer support and mentoring; 
 
153  UNESCO Overview of Measures, supra note 71, at 3. 
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155  Id. at 6–7. 
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b) Facilitating the learning of sign language and the promotion of the 
linguistic identity of the deaf community; 
c) Ensuring that the education of persons, and in particular children who are 
blind, deaf or deafblind, is delivered in the most appropriate languages and 
modes and means of communication for the individual, and in environments 
which maximize academic and social development.158 
Furthermore, States Party must also “take appropriate measures to employ 
teachers, including teachers with disabilities, who are qualified in sign language 
and/or Braille, and to train professionals and staff who work at all levels of 
education.” 159  All of these provisions—facilitating the learning of “native” 
languages of Braille and sign language, trying to find and accommodate for best 
modes of communication, providing for qualified teachers—are necessarily 
considered reasonable under the CRPD. 
It could be argued that the absence of a provision on language rights for 
linguistic minorities, given the consideration put in place for the deaf and blind, is 
a conscious decision to exclude. The Convention defines “language” to include 
“spoken and signed languages and other forms of [non-spoken] languages.”160 
However, it is also likely that the CRPD defined “language” as such because the 
traditional definition of “language” did not include signed and non-spoken 
languages: for instance, under the previous ICCPR regime, deaf individuals were 
only included in protections of linguistic minorities if states chose to consider 
them as a linguistic minority.161 Therefore, the emphasis on the languages of the 
deaf and blind is likely due not to a denial of rights for linguistic minorities, but 
rather due to the need to clarify a previously non-explicit right. 
One could also argue that special protections are offered for Braille and sign 
language because individuals who are blind, deaf, and deafblind have no other 
options for accessing mainstream curricula, and thus analogous measures for 
linguistic minorities—who can assimilate, even if undesirable—would be 
disproportionate or unduly burdensome. However, the harms associated with 
assimilation for some linguistic minorities with disabilities are grave enough to 
make assimilation sufficiently impossible if states do not provide equal educational 
opportunities. For instance, linguistic minorities with communication or learning 
disabilities may be doubly challenged. Studies show that the “efficiency of one’s 
native language skills plays a large part in the success or failure of [second] 
language learning.”162 Requiring a child who already has difficulties with their 
native language to assimilate into the majority language—by having singular input 
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of the majority language in school—may result in both attrition of the native 
language and the incomplete acquisition of the majority language.163 The child’s 
loss of the native language—especially in households with limited proficiency in 
the majority language—may “lessen the pragmatic models accessible to the child 
[ ] and exacerbate the child’s social isolation in the home.”164 
For linguistic minorities with communication or learning disabilities, such a 
scenario would also violate CRPD’s requirement that “effective individualized 
support measures [be] provided in environments that maximize academic and 
social development.”165 Aside from the harms caused by lack of native language 
support, native language support helps maximize academic and social 
development: empirical research shows that when native languages are used as 
“medium of instruction for at least 6–8 years,” results included “enhanced self-
confidence, self-esteem and classroom participation by minority children, lower 
dropout rates, higher levels of academic achievement, longer periods in school, 
better performance in tests and greater fluency and literacy abilities for 
minority . . . children in both the mother tongue and the official or dominant 
language.”166 A 2000 study in Mali showed that children taught in their own 
language passed their end-of-elementary examinations at a nearly 20% higher rate 
than those taught only in French, the official language.167 Both UNESCO and the 
Special Rapporteur for Minority Issues have noted that “[t]he benefits of 
education in the mother language are now fairly well established scientifically 
through studies of minority children in different parts of the world.”168 
Although these studies describe linguistic minority children in general, rather 
than linguistic minority children with disabilities, it is unlikely that having a 
disability would categorically make it easier for children to succeed in the official 
language only. Research like the 2005 study of bilingual children with autism and 
the 2010 study of students with disabilities in dual immersion programs169 suggests 
that native language support is crucial to both social and academic development. 
Moreover, research shows that sequential bilinguals (children who learn a new 
language on top of their home or native language) with communication disorders 
are more vulnerable to regression in their native language. 170 Under language 
attrition theory, monolingual education can have a negative impact on the home 
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environment, even if a child’s parents continue to speak to the child at home in 
their native language.171 
2. States must provide education consistent with full inclusion.  
Linguistic minorities with disabilities are not simply persons with disabilities 
who also happen to be linguistic minorities. Because language differences 
exacerbate barriers created by disability rather than pose entirely unrelated 
obstacles, the CRPD’s provisions for individual support must include language as 
well. Involving language rights requires states to balance goals of national unity or 
assimilation with the important interests protected by the CRPD. 172  Within 
education, these effective individualized support measures must be provided 
“consistent with the goal of full inclusion.”173 
“Full inclusion” could be interpreted to mean mainstreaming children with 
disabilities within regular school classrooms: in other words, keeping children with 
disabilities together with their classmates as much as possible. Mainstreaming 
creates tension with the language right: specialized support for native languages 
could make the child feel different from others in the classroom. While full 
inclusion here more likely refers to the principle of “full and effective participation 
and inclusion in society” in Article 3, full inclusion in society—hinting at 
assimilation—also creates tension with the language right as it requires linguistic 
minorities with disabilities to acquire the dominant language to access much of 
society.174 
One might make the counterargument that providing native language 
instruction will hinder rather than improve full participation and inclusion in 
society because it may slow down the learning of the majority language, which 
likely dominates most aspects of general society. The example of the Roma 
children in Oršuš suggests that when segregated by language, states may make 
policy that effectively results in linguistic minorities being left behind in the 
education system. Not prioritizing learning the majority language could lead to 
linguistic minorities with disabilities being isolated from the greater society, 
frustrating the goals of equal opportunity, inclusion, and participation. However, 
the goal of participation is one of effective participation. Effective participation 
depends on the circumstances of each individual—denying linguistic minorities 
with disabilities native language support in favor of advancing monolingual 
learning fails to recognize the costs imposed on students. If monolingual 
education in the majority language leads to incomplete understanding of both the 
majority and native language, combined with severance from the home 
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community,175 linguistic minorities with disabilities (who are thus hindered by 
linguistic differences) may not be able to participate effectively or meaningfully. 
Moreover, such arguments depend on the incorrect idea that native 
languages and majority languages are effectively involved in a zero-sum game, 
where adding support for the native language undermines the majority language. 
First, in Oršuš, the Roma children were left behind primarily because their 
curriculum was not as robust as the Croatian-language curriculum, not because 
they spoke Roma instead of Croatian. 176  Second, available empirical evidence 
shows “that a bilingual environment does not, in and of itself, put children with 
communication disorders [who some might suggest are more challenged by 
multilingual input] at a disadvantage.”177 Rather, harm is done when children are 
faced with monolingual input in a second language. Clinicians suggest that “it 
would be illogical to recommend that input be reduced from two languages to one 
because bilingualism does not present an additional risk factor and it may present 
significant social advantages.”178 Thus, concerns that native language instruction 
undermines the majority language are largely unfounded. Instead, studies show 
that monolingual majority language instruction undermines the native language. 
For linguistic minorities without disabilities, the tradeoff between the loss of 
language and the gained access to society may balance out to favor assimilation, 
like in the Oršuš case. Linguistic minorities may lose aspects of their linguistic 
proficiency, their culture, and links to their own communities, but like courts 
recognized, they also stand to gain from acquiring the dominant language. Such 
gains include access to institutions, politics, and majority culture. However, for 
linguistic minorities with disabilities—particularly disabilities that affect social, 
communication, and learning abilities—not only are the costs associated with 
language attrition greater, but the benefits of assimilation for some linguistic 
minorities with disabilities are also lesser. For instance, social development may 
be a primary goal for students with severe disabilities; 179  thus, the home 
environment is crucial for providing a supportive base. For linguistic minorities 
with disabilities that affect social, communication, and learning abilities, sacrificing 
home communities due to lack of native language support could lead to 
“inclusion” in greater society, but the emotional and social damage done likely 
negates any possibility of “full and effective participation.”180 
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This Comment has, so far, addressed disabilities broadly. However, a 
balancing of the interests and harms involved for linguistic minorities with 
disabilities must also take into consideration different kinds of disabilities. 
Linguistic minorities with physical disabilities will not face the same difficulties as 
linguistic minorities with communication, learning, or social disabilities. In the 
CRPD’s special protections for the blind, deaf, or deafblind, who face 
communication obstacles, states are to deliver education “in the most appropriate 
languages and modes and means of communication for the individual.”181 At the 
very least, for linguistic minorities with disabilities whose linguistic differences 
exacerbate their disability (such as communication, learning, or social disabilities), 
states should provide instruction in the most appropriate language—their native 
language—to meet their obligation to provide an environment that maximizes 
academic and social development. 
If states withhold all native language support, linguistic minorities with 
disabilities may lose the ability to use their native language without benefiting from 
assimilation—not quite the “assimilation of fair terms” supported by courts like 
the ECtHR.182 The balancing involved is more similar to Mavlonov and J.G.A. 
Diergaardt, where the UNHRC found a substantial denial of language use that had 
severe consequences and little benefit, than the Belgian Linguistic Case, where the 
ECtHR determined the assimilation interest to outweigh the rights of French-
speaking children to go to a French school in their neighborhood.183 The addition 
of the disability rights framework suggests that a court must ensure that any 
balancing of the assimilation or unity interest and the linguistic minority right also 
meets states’ obligations under the CRPD to maximize academic and social 
development while ensuring effective participation and inclusion in society. 184 
Given the harms that monolingual education in the dominant language may inflict 
on linguistic minorities with disabilities, courts would need to find that some right 
to native language instruction exists to reach a fair balancing of the language, 
education, and disability rights against states’ unity, assimilation, and burden 
interests. 
C. Practical Implications and Contours of Such a Right  
Such a right would require states to provide some form of native language 
instruction; neglecting to offer any linguistic support at all would violate the rights 
of linguistic minorities with disabilities. However, more work needs to be done to 
discern what kind of support states would need to implement to comply. Given 
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the difficulties and costs involved in changing current education systems, any 
natural trend (aside from court proceedings) towards multilingual education and 
native language support for linguistic minorities with disabilities may be slow. 
However, implementing minority language instruction is possible: for instance, in 
India, “more than thirty minority languages are used as the medium of instruction 
in public schools, [with] usually Hindi or English gradually introduced in later 
years of schooling.” 185  States should take an open-minded approach to 
determining what kinds of support best meet the needs of linguistic minorities 
with disabilities. Native language instruction could range from bilingual special 
education—whether full time or part time—to translation and interpretation, 
paraprofessionals, or some combination. These choices should also be tailored to 
fit the kind of disability; for instance, more intensive support might benefit those 
with communication disorders.186 
Some scholars make the case for bilingual education generally, not just in 
special education. For instance, Christopher Reeber argues that “[i]f educated 
bilingually, linguistic minorities will not be deprived of their particular heritage yet 
will be able to communicate and effectuate their ideas to all citizens of their 
nation.”187 Reeber’s view rests on his claim that “linguistic minorities need some 
usage of their native language during their primary education in order to prevent 
future discrimination,”188 but also need to rapidly acquire the majority language.189 
However, he does not explain how such bilingual education would be 
implemented, or how states would choose which languages to teach, especially in 
multilingual regions. Neither does he mention special education, nor how that 
might look different from general bilingual education. 
Special education may pose unique challenges for bilingual education, given 
that classrooms are smaller and depend on the needs of the children with 
disabilities, rather than any arrangement by linguistic identity. In classrooms where 
students all share a single minority native language, bilingual education may be 
possible by hiring a bilingual special education teacher. However, because one 
classroom may have more than two native languages, hiring a multilingual special 
education teacher, in some cases, may simply be impossible. Nonetheless, states 
should not be free to disregard their obligations due to a lack of professional staff. 
Long-term measures designed for compliance may involve training more bilingual 
or multilingual special education teachers. Such measures might also, in the long 
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term, involve increasing the number of dual-immersion programs in general 
education to boost the number of bilingual people in the workforce. 
Short-term measures could involve hiring paraprofessionals fluent in the 
child’s native language to accompany and assist children at school, such that 
multiple minority languages could be accommodated in a single classroom without 
requiring a teacher fluent in all of the languages. If, in the short term, schools are 
unable to find therapists, speech-language pathologists, and psychologists who are 
bilingual or multilingual in the child’s native language, they should find 
interpreters, translators, or paraprofessionals to assist with this element of special 
education as well. 
Other problems may arise for linguistic minorities with disabilities who are 
mainstreamed in general education classrooms, where they receive support but 
otherwise attend the same classes as children without disabilities. This Comment 
does not consider whether children in general have a right to native language 
instruction. It is possible that an integrated classroom may have a linguistic 
minority student with disabilities entitled to native language instruction in some 
form, and a linguistic minority student without disabilities who does not have that 
same right. Administering native language support without frustrating the goals 
of integration for linguistic minorities with disabilities in mainstreamed classrooms 
may be particularly challenging. Nevertheless, the possibility of a legal right being 
vindicated in an international court—even if states cannot, at the time of 
judgment, immediately correct violations of linguistic minorities with disabilities’ 
right to native language instruction—could help raise awareness and push states 
further forwards in developing more linguistically equitable special education. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
Linguistic minorities with disabilities currently face two major challenges: the 
impairment caused by the interaction of their disability and various barriers in 
society and the costs of compelled assimilation into educational institutions 
dominated by the majority language. Although linguistic minorities are guaranteed 
a negative right to use their native language, states have discretion to balance 
interests like national unity against the interests of linguistic minorities when it 
comes to positive rights, where the language right is tied to another right. This 
finding suggested that an analysis of linguistic minorities with disabilities’ right to 
native language instruction required looking closely at the education interests 
involved. By using the CRPD as a framework for discussing the education rights 
of linguistic minorities with disabilities, the state’s obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation maximizing academic and social development in consideration of 
the goal of full inclusion created a right to native language instruction for linguistic 
minorities with disabilities. Balancing could depend on how linguistic needs 
interact with the disability—for instance, language needs may more severely 
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impact linguistic minorities with communication or learning disabilities. Finally, 
this Comment made a number of brief suggestions for policies states could 
implement to ensure such a right and flagged some of the challenges involved. 
Future research could include fleshing out the policy and legal boundaries of each 
of these suggestions, analyzing how certain disabilities may trigger specific 
implementations of the right, and what steps the international community could 
take in combating multiple discrimination. 
